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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the research 
 
In several health-care systems general practitioners have a prominent position. Although 
their position, role and functioning may differ per system, general practitioners (GPs) or 
primary care physicians (like family practitioners, general paediatricians and non-
subspecialising internists) provide direct accessible, comprehensive, longitudinal or con-
tinuous and personal care (Starfield 1992, Fry and Horder 1994). As distinguished from 
medical specialists, GPs often form the first point of contact for patients with the health-
care system. This is especially the case if they have a role as gatekeeper (Boerma et al. 
1997). The gatekeeper function involves that patients only have access to other providers 
of care after they have obtained a referral from their GP. It is the GP then who ultimately 
decides whether a patient can visit a medical specialist or whether he can visit one with-
out being confronted with cost sharing. Further, GPs often have a role as the patients’ 
guide. As a guide, the GP ensures that the patient is referred to the right provider of care 
at the right time. 
 An important rationale for their role as guide or gatekeeper is that GPs are supposed to 
have superior information about health and diseases, diagnostics, treatments, the health-
care system and the quality of other providers of care. This provides them with an inter-
esting position. GPs are providers of health-care services and are positioned at the sup-
ply-side of the health-care market. Although patients are at the demand-side of this mar-
ket, they initiate only part of the demand for health services by themselves. Repeated 
contacts and the contacts with other providers of care will often be initiated by the GP. 
GPs may therefore be viewed as suppliers as well as demanders of care (Schut 1999). As 
a guide or gatekeeper, the GP is supposed to use his superior information to induce the 
demand for care. This demand-inducement should protect the ill-informed patient from 
demanding too much or too little goods and services. Hence a GP that influences the pa-
tients’ decisions about the use of health care, or even is the decision-maker himself, has a 
large influence on the nature, the quantity, the quality and the costs of care. 
 While influencing the patient’s demand for care, the GP is supposed to act in the pa-
tient’s best interests, i.e. to act as an agent for the patient. The (sometimes large) varia-
tions among physicians or practices in the use of health care (like differences in referral 
rates) suggest at least some inefficiency and probably even differences in health out-
comes though. There is evidence that these variations can only partly be explained by 
patient characteristics, like age, sex, health status, and socio-economic status. In an ex-
tensive research among GPs in the Netherlands, large differences were found between 
practices as well as between individual GPs in the number of contacts per patient per 
year. For instance, after correcting for patient characteristics, the 95% confidence inter-
vals for practices ranged from 3.9 to 9.1 contacts per patient per year. After correcting for 
practice characteristics and type of computer software, the 95% confidence intervals for 
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practices still ranged from 5.1 to 8.3 contacts per patient per year (NIVEL/RIVM 2004). 
The differences between individual GPs were smaller than the differences between prac-
tices. Obviously, there are similarities within practices, like the same practice assistant. 
Here the 95% confidence intervals ranged from 5.4 to 7.6 contacts per patient per year 
and, after correcting for practice characteristics and type of computer software, from 5.6 
to 7.8 contacts per patient per year. 
 Tamblyn et al. (2003) found that both physician characteristics and practice character-
istics appear to be associated with the likelihood of prescribing new drugs as well as the 
utilization rates of new drugs. Relevant characteristics were, for instance, physician sex, 
specialty, medical school, years since graduation and practice location. 
 Eisenberg (2002) identified several factors that seem to influence medical decision 
making. These factors can be described in three general categories: 
1. Factors based on the physician’s own benefit, like the desire for income, the desire for 
a style of practice, physician characteristics, practice setting and the role of clinical 
leadership (educationally influential doctors). 
2. Factors based on the patient’s benefit, like the patient’s economic well-being, clinical 
factors, patient demand, defensive medicine, patient characteristics and patient con-
venience. 
3. Factors based on the benefit of society at large, like the constraints of society’s limited 
resources. 
 Information plays also a crucial role in the GP’s functioning as agent for the patient. 
Firstly, the GP may have insufficient information (for instance on the efficacy, the effec-
tiveness or the efficiency of a specific treatment), or he may lack experience. Secondly, 
the medical profession as a whole may lack knowledge of a specific disease or may not 
know whether certain health-care activities are appropriate (Pauly 1978). Besides an ab-
solute absence of particular scientific information, there may be an inferior diffusion of 
such information as well (Phelps 1992). The latter may result in the insufficiently in-
formed GP, as mentioned above. Thirdly, the GP may purposely exploit his informational 
advantage in order to affect his own welfare. His welfare may be a function of, among 
other factors, his income and his workload (Scott 1997). Clearly, if there is a ‘broad zone 
of uncertainty’ (Evans 1984), the GP has some room for discretionary behaviour and may 
pursue his own interests. Especially if the GP who prescribed the care provides it as well, 
then there is some room for discretionary behaviour. The demand for GP services is not 
fully independent of its supply then. Yet also for care prescribed by the GP but provided 
by another health-care provider, the GP may attempt to induce demand (Van Doorslaer 
and Schut 1999). 
 The variances in practice style indicate that GPs do not always act as perfect agents for 
their patients, deliberately or not.1 This suggests some room for improvement, which may 
pertain to the quality as well as to the costs of care. Attempts to improve GP care may 
come from the profession itself as well as from the patients. Providers of care may for 
instance promote scientific research, improve the diffusion of scientific information, de-
 
                                                                 
1  A uniform practice style is no guarantee that GPs act in their patients’ best interests, but at least it sug-
gests a consensus amongst physicians about best practices. 
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velop guidelines and certify practices or specific skills. Patients may also contribute, for 
instance by stating their preferences, organising themselves into patient groups and rais-
ing funds for scientific research. But as the patient is uncertain about the moment, nature 
and amount of future health-care expenses, he may want to seek insurance to cover his 
financial risk. The demand for health insurance that may result from this uncertainty (and 
that, among other things, depends on the probability of the financial loss as well as on the 
size of the loss) is an important rationale for the presence of a so-called third party in 
health care. As health insurance lowers the costs of care or even reduces these to zero at 
the moment of consumption, the patient may not be interested in reducing costs or im-
proving the cost-effectiveness of care. Under certain conditions, it will be the third party 
that has an interest in the costs or even in the quality of care, and that may attempt to in-
fluence the provision of health care. The question then is why and how the third party 
may want to influence the way care is provided. 
 
In several countries a key element in the reform of the health-care delivery and financing 
systems is the design of the incentive system. Now that the restrictive government policy 
of cost containment proved to be unsuccessful in guaranteeing access to a basic package 
of health care, the use of incentive systems is seen as an effective way to increase the 
efficiency of the health-care sector (Sørensen and Grytten 2003). A prominent role in 
such incentive-based systems is often given to third parties, like public or private health 
insurers. In several ways third parties are stimulated to organise an efficient health-care 
system. One way is to make them financially responsible for a specified package of 
health-care goods and services for a defined group of members (i.e. insured) and for a 
certain period of time. In the Netherlands, for instance, a new health insurance act is cur-
rently being implemented. This act rearranges the organisation and financing of the 
health-care sector. Mutually competing third parties (i.e. health insurers) are provided 
with the incentives to act as agents on behalf of the insured by arranging affordable, effi-
cient care of high quality. A key element of their role is that they have to act as negotia-
tors with providers of care for the price, contents and organisation of the care (Tweede 
Kamer 2003-2004). 
 Because, as mentioned above, GPs have a large influence on the nature, the quantity, 
the quality and the costs of care, the third party may want to enter into contractual rela-
tionships with GPs in order to induce them to alter their behaviour. Hence besides exert-
ing influence on GP care itself, third parties may for instance try to alter the GP’s behav-
iour regarding diagnostics or drug prescriptions (follow-up care). Especially the GP’s 
referral behaviour may be of interest because of the high follow-up costs, for instance 
associated with hospital care. A distinction can be made between two types of referrals 
though. So-called ‘supplementary referrals’ are a supplement to the GP’s services, 
whereas ‘alternative referrals’ are referrals for care that the GP could have provided as 
well (Lurås 2004). The third party may primarily focus on the alternative referrals when 
trying to enhance the efficiency of the health-care sector. However, by providing the GP 
with additional means (like personnel) or by financing additional training, the third party 
may be able to reduce the number of supplementary referrals as well. 
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 Although one can think of a set of possible techniques a third party may use to influ-
ence the behaviour of GPs, the use of financial incentives is certainly one of the most 
intriguing techniques. It is a way to stimulate the GP to choose the preferred actions by 
making these actions more attractive, i.e. changing the relative attractiveness of alterna-
tive actions. It is also a technique that is still, and will always remain under discussion. 
On the one hand, opponents may argue that physicians act as agents for their patients and 
will not be susceptible to financial incentives. Other opponents may argue that physicians 
(just like other people) are indeed susceptible to these incentives, that the resulting behav-
iour is potentially dangerous for patients and that such incentives should therefore be 
omitted from contracts. On the other hand, advocates may argue that financial incentives 
can, if used sensibly, stimulate certain physician behaviour whilst maintaining the profes-
sional or the physician’s individual autonomy. 
 Stating that physicians will solely act in their patients’ best interests can be considered 
unrealistic, as the physicians’ utility functions will contain factors like income and leisure 
besides a factor medical ethics (Flierman 1991). Stating that incentives may induce po-
tentially dangerous behaviour and that they should not be applied, is rather naive since 
there is no payment system without financial incentives. Moreover, whether the incentive 
as such is potentially dangerous, depends on the kind of behaviour that is being pro-
voked. Incentives may be used to increase the provision of specific care, like preventive 
care, which may be in the interests of the patient. But the patient may also benefit from 
cost-reducing incentives. Franks et al. (1992), for instance, reviewed a number of studies 
that showed the inherent dangers of over-consumption. Finally, financial incentives may 
result in a more efficient health-care system. For the individual patient this might possi-
bly reduce the quality of care in the short run, but in the long run it will contribute to the 
financial accessibility of care for that individual as well as for society. Yet financial in-
centives will have to be applied with care. Financial incentives may, for instance, result 
in a stronger cost awareness of physicians. In a research among Swedish physicians, 
Forsberg et al. (2001) found that a strong cost awareness was a negative predictor of 
quality of care (when rated by physicians). They argued that it is a difficult balancing act 
between cost considerations and the quality of care. 
 The use of financial incentives only makes sense if there is an effect of the incentive 
system on the behaviour of the physician (and, finally, on the outcome of the physician’s 
actions). There are, however, only a small number of studies that analysed this effect. 
Moreover, these studies often suffer from methodological problems (Scott and Hall 
1995). Financial incentives seem to be a key element in the apparent success of so-called 
managed care organisations, but patient selection effects, physician selection effects and 
missing variables may bias this effect (Hellinger 1996). Nevertheless, there are studies 
that, despite their limitations, clearly indicate that financial incentives affect physicians’ 
behaviour (see for instance Hickson et al. 1987, Hemenway et al. 1990, Flierman 1991, 
Delnoy et al. 1992 and Sørensen and Grytten 2003). 
 Making the third party financially responsible is seen as a way to further an efficiently 
organised health-care system. The third party on its turn may use a comparable incentive 
system in order to stimulate desired behaviour by the contracted GPs. The GPs can be 
made financially responsible for the provision of care by shifting (part of) the third 
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party’s risk to them. The risk may pertain to GP care only, but because of their specific 
role and position in the health-care system the financial responsibility may be extended 
to, for instance, the GP’s prescription and referral behaviour. Combining the GP’s gate-
keeping function with financial accountability for a broader spectrum of treatments may 
also enhance integration of health care in case of fragmented health care financing sys-
tems (Jegers et al. 2002). Clearly, there is a resemblance between the incentives for the 
third party and the incentives for the GP, if also the latter is made financially responsible 
for a specified package of health-care goods and services for a defined group of members 
(i.e. patients) for a certain period of time. 
 
 
1.2 Aims and contents 
 
The contractual relationships between third parties and GPs may vary by the financial 
and organisational arrangements. One of the provisions may be that GPs are made finan-
cially responsible. The third party may want to shift the financial risk (partly) to a GP, 
which will presumably be the case if it pertains to care that is to a high degree under the 
GP’s control. If the financial risk is only partly shifted to the GP, then the risk is shared. 
 Financial-risk sharing is one of the several incentives the third party may use to influ-
ence the GPs’ behaviour. As noted, there are not many reliable studies that analysed the 
effect of incentive systems on the behaviour of physicians (and, finally, on the outcome 
of the physicians’ actions). Also, little theoretical, conceptual research has been done. 
This holds especially for payment systems for GPs and for systems of financial-risk shar-
ing. This is remarkable as the behaviour of physicians has an effect on the efficiency of 
the health-care system and as the efficiency of health-care systems is a worldwide issue.  
 The main purpose of our study is to construct a conceptual framework for systems of 
financial-risk sharing between third parties and GPs, to use this for the review of several 
examples of financial-risk sharing, and to discuss how systems of financial-risk sharing 
should be structured. 
 
The central questions of this thesis are then: 
 
Is there a rationale for financial-risk sharing between third-party agents and general 
practitioners? 
And if so, how should systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
By finding an answer to these two central questions, we aim at contributing to the litera-
ture on payment systems for GPs. However, financial incentives are one possible tech-
nique out of a set of potential techniques the third party may use to influence the GPs’ 
behaviour. In health care (the use of) such a set of techniques is often designated as 
‘managed care’. We will return to this in chapter 5, but for the moment it is sufficient to 
note that managed care is a rather diffuse concept that is not clearly defined and that lacks 
a sound theoretical, conceptual framework. In an extensive review of the managed-care 
literature, published in the Handbook of Health Economics, Glied noted that there is no 
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single broadly accepted definition of the term managed care. Further, Glied argued that 
because there is a tremendous variation in the nature of the managed-care plans, it is dif-
ficult to assess theoretically as well as empirically the economics of managed care. Hence 
it may make more sense to think of managed care as a combination of several mecha-
nisms, although these mechanisms have changed over time. According to Glied, eco-
nomic theory and empirical research have not kept pace with the development of man-
aged care. ‘Research is needed to identify which characteristics of managed care generate 
economically meaningful differences in outcomes and which are only superficial’ (Glied 
2000, p. 745). As financial-risk sharing is one of the managed-care techniques, we will 
first try to provide managed care as a whole with a theoretical basis. In chapter 3 we will 
discuss agency theory, which we will use to develop a theoretical background for man-
aged care. Hence we also aim at contributing to the literature on managed care in general, 
not only by identifying the different managed-care techniques (or mechanisms) but also 
by bringing these techniques in connection with each other. 
 
The two central questions of this thesis have been split up into ten research questions to 
be dealt with in the pertinent chapters. In chapter 2 we will introduce the two central par-
ties in this thesis: the third party and the GP. We will analyse the reasons for the presence 
of a third party in health care, besides patients (the first party) and physicians (the second 
party). Then we will categorise the several types of relationships between both parties. 
The two research questions in this chapter are: 
 
1. What are the main functions of a third party in health care? 
 
2. What are the implications of the main functions of a third party for the type of rela-
tionships between third parties and general practitioners? 
 
In chapter 3 we will introduce a theory that focuses on the relationships between two par-
ties with asymmetric information and conflicting interests, and that proposes strategies to 
deal with the problems that may occur within such relationships: the theory of agency. 
We will use this theory later on to provide managed care with a theoretical background. 
Hence central to this chapter is the third research question: 
 
3. What are the main characteristics of agency theory? 
 
Whether agency theory is indeed suitable to analyse the relationships between third par-
ties and GPs is subject of chapter 4. The research question is: 
 
4. Is agency theory applicable to relationships in the health care sector in general, and 
to the relationships between third-party agents and general practitioners in particu-
lar? 
 
Third parties can use a set of techniques in order to influence the behaviour of the GPs. 
These techniques will be analysed in chapter 5. The research question is: 
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5. Which techniques can and do third-party agents apply within their relationships with 
general practitioners in order to reduce the agency problems within the patient-
physician relationship? 
 
One of the potential techniques a third party may use is financial-risk sharing with the 
GP. The research question central to chapter 6 then is: 
 
6. What is the rationale for financial-risk sharing between third-party agents and gen-
eral practitioners? 
 
Given that there is a rationale for financial-risk sharing, the question is how a contract 
can be devised that arranges the financial and the organisational aspects of the relation-
ship. We will develop an analytical framework to compare the features and effectiveness 
of different systems of financial-risk sharing. This brings us to the second research ques-
tion of this chapter, namely: 
 
7. How can systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
In chapter 7 we will review several examples of financial-risk sharing. Further, we will 
analyse whether the analytical framework of risk sharing created in chapter 6 is useful in 
analysing relationships in which the risk is shared. The two research questions are: 
 
8. What are actual effects of different systems of financial-risk sharing on the perform-
ance of general practitioners? 
 
9. Does the analytical framework of financial-risk sharing sufficiently provide insight 
into the key differences of systems in which the risk is shared between third party and 
general practitioner so as to infer the effectiveness of such systems? 
 
The final research question then is: 
 
10. How should systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
We will end with a summary and conclusion. 
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2  THIRD-PARTY AGENTS AND GENERAL 
 PRACTITIONERS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As is in other markets, in health care one can discern two parties. The first party is the 
demander of care, like a consumer or a patient. The second party is the supplier of care: 
an individual health-care provider (like a physiotherapist, a dentist or a physician) or an 
institution (like a hospital or a nursing home). Besides these two directly involved parties, 
however, there is a role for a third party. A third party in health care can perform differ-
ent functions, like taking over the financial risk from consumers or guarding the financial 
accessibility of health care (Van de Ven et al. 1994). In contrast to what the term ‘third 
party’ suggests, mostly it is not just one party that is involved. Rather, one has to think of 
various functions that can be performed by different governmental agencies and public or 
private organisations. 
The first research question central to this chapter is: 
 
What are the main functions of a third party in health care? 
 
In section 2.2, the reasons for the presence of a third party and the different third-party 
functions are addressed. In section 2.3, the second party central to this research (the gen-
eral practitioner) is introduced, and the term ‘third party’ is further defined. Also, the 
main types of relationship between third parties and general practitioners are described 
by means of several classification schemes. 
 
 
2.2 Third-party functions 
 
2.2.1 Characteristics of health care 
 
An important characteristic of health care is the presence of uncertainty at the demand 
side (Arrow 1963). The uncertainty concerns the moment of consumption, the extent of 
consumption, and the effect of consumption. Because of the uncertainty about time and 
extent of use, there is a financial risk to an individual. By paying taxes or an insurance 
premium to a risk-pooling third party (such as a government or a health-insurance com-
pany) an individual is able to protect him against the financial consequences of health-
care consumption. 
 A peculiarity of health insurance (or other forms of risk pooling in health care) is the 
way in which payments are being made in case of health care consumption. Because of 
the difficulty of determining the amount of damage caused by illness, benefits are usually 
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paid in kind or on the basis of expenditures being made. So, instead of on the assessed 
value of the amount of loss, payments depend on expenditures being made to repair the 
loss. However, these expenditures only approximate the ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ 
costs to cure the illnesses (Pauly 1986, 1988a). As an individual has some control over 
the probability of loss as well as the level of costs incurred, moral hazard may result. 
Moral hazard in health care refers to the inclination of an individual to consume more or 
more expensive care because of a reduction in the marginal costs of consumption due to 
the presence of health insurance. This phenomenon is called consumer-induced moral 
hazard. 
 Another important characteristic of health care is the information asymmetry between 
demanders and providers of care (Arrow 1963). Trained and skilled as they are, providers 
of care mostly are better informed about clinical pictures, possible treatments and the 
effects of treatments. The lack of information of consumers leads to a demand for diag-
nostic and therapeutic information to be used in decisions about future consumption 
(Pauly 1978). However, the supplier of this information is often a supplier of medical 
services as well. Especially in a fee-for-service setting and if fees are higher than the 
marginal costs of production, there is an incentive for providers to influence demand for 
their services by altering the demanders’ perceptions of need. This is called supplier-
induced demand (Evans 1974). Demand inducement as a consequence of the presence of 
health insurance is known as supplier-induced moral hazard. 
 The presence of externalities is being mentioned as a third characteristic of health care 
(Van de Ven et al. 1994). An individual can derive utility from the consumption of health 
care by others. This may, for instance, be out of concern with general welfare of other 
individuals (altruistic preferences) or for fear of contagious diseases (egoistic prefer-
ences). 
 Based on the characteristics of health care and health insurance, Van de Ven et al. 
(1994) distinguished three main functions of third parties. These are the insurance func-
tion, the agency function and the access function. 
 
2.2.2 The insurance function 
 
The occurrence of illness is largely a stochastic process. In general, it is unpredictable 
whether a specific individual will develop a certain disease and, if so, to what extent 
medical care will be needed. Hence it follows that there is a financial risk to that individ-
ual. If it is assumed that individuals are averse to financial risks and that they want to 
maximise the expected value of their utility, then it can be seen that they will prefer 
health insurance with premium m to no insurance with an expected income reduction of 
amount m (Arrow 1963, Pauly 1968). As the risk of a financial loss leads to a demand for 
health insurance, a first main role of a third party in health care is to provide insurance 
covering that risk. This function can be labelled as the pure insurance function of a third 
party, which consists mainly of pooling risks and paying claims (Pauly 1988b).1 
 
                                                                 
1  In this connection Enthoven (1994, p. 1415) speaks of ‘remote third parties’, which he describes as 
‘(...) third parties that are payors only (...).’ 
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 Pooling an infinite number of independent risks reduces the variability round the aver-
age loss (the law of large numbers) and therefore the third party’s risk to a minimum 
(Pauly 1988b). However, since the number of risks will not be infinite and some interde-
pendence among the risks may occur, some risk will remain to the third party.2 A loading 
fee on top of the actuarially fair premium will ease this financial risk and can compensate 
for administration costs besides (Arrow 1963). This extra premium will reduce income to 
a larger extent than amount m. In spite of a premium that is higher than the actuarially 
fair premium, an individual may still prefer to pay for health insurance. The individual 
will have this preference as long as the utility derived from income after insurance is 
higher than the expected utility of income in the uncertain situation without insurance 
(that is, if the individual is sufficiently risk averse). 
 A striking phenomenon in health insurance is moral hazard. The problem of moral 
hazard stems for the most part from the way in which benefits are being paid. Although 
the difficulty of observing the preventive measures taken by the insured contributes to the 
problem, the main cause seems to be the fact that it is hard to assess the damage caused 
by a certain illness (Pauly 1986). To assess this damage one should at the minimum be 
able to show the presence and the severity of an illness. As this is practically unfeasible, 
the assessment problem is in general evaded by paying in kind or by indemnifying the 
consumer by making payments that are based on factual costs. The effect, however, of 
this kind of payments is that it distorts incentives and decreases the welfare gained by 
insurance. In absence of cost-sharing, such payments reduce the marginal costs to the 
consumer at the moment of consumption to zero.3 As Pauly (1968) notes, depending on 
the price elasticity of the demand for care, the reduced user price will increase the 
amount of care demanded. So, the extent of moral hazard depends on the price elasticity 
of demand and will be zero in case of perfectly inelastic demand. 
 Besides moral hazard initiated by a consumer, one can distinguish supplier-induced 
moral hazard. In this case the inclination of an individual to consume more, or more ex-
pensive care is caused by a provider persuading him that he is in need of that care. The 
provider induces the demand knowing that insurance will reimburse the costs. Supplier-
induced moral hazard can thus be considered as a special form of supplier-induced de-
mand (Schut 1995). 
 Risk pooling, i.e. performing the insurance function, is a way to reduce the financial 
risk to which individuals are subjected. But at the same time it gives rise to the financial 
risk of extra or extra costly health-care consumption by distorting incentives to deman-
ders as well as to providers of care. Moreover, this overuse can lower the quality of care 
and may cause iatrogenic illnesses (Franks et al. 1992). Hence, another important func-
tion to be performed in health care is the reduction of moral hazard and the dissemination 
of information about the quality of certain providers as well as the appropriateness of 
medical care. 
 
                                                                 
2  An example of the interdependence among risks is the occurrence of contagious diseases. 
3  Other costs like time cost and inconvenience are not taken into consideration. 
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2.2.3 The agency function 
 
2.2.3.1 Reducing moral hazard 
To restrain the negative consequences of performing the insurance function, a third party 
has to do more than being a financier of care. To that end, it has to perform a function 
that Pauly (1988b, p. 237) labelled as ‘cost containment’, ‘expenditure control’ or ‘limita-
tion of moral hazard’. Hence a third party should not only operate on the health insurance 
market, but also on the health care delivery market. Pauly (1988b, p. 240) argued that it is 
important to note ‘(...) that the reason why the insurer finds it advantageous to interfere in 
transactions with providers springs largely from the distorted incentives offered by insur-
ance’.4 This interfering in the delivery of health care is not easy. As Luft noted, ‘it is one 
thing to be an efficient marketer of coverage and processor of claims and quite another 
thing to be a manager of a medical care delivery system’ (Luft 1985). Van de Ven et al. 
(1994) spoke of the agency function of a third party in this connection. Their concept of 
this agency function is somewhat broader than the function described by Pauly. It con-
sists of limiting moral hazard, buying care for a certain population, and collecting and 
providing information about (providers of) care. The agency function extends beyond just 
cost containment to acting as an agent for the consumers, for instance by being concerned 
about the appropriateness of care. 
 The moral-hazard problem can be divided in consumer-induced moral hazard and 
supplier-induced moral hazard. Third parties have several instruments at their disposal to 
reduce both problems. Constraining the insurance benefits, for example by establishing 
upper limits on the height of payments, may reduce consumer-induced moral hazard. 
These limits can be conditional on the disease or treatment (‘quasi-indemnities’) as well 
as unconditional (Pauly 1986). Other well-known methods of cost-sharing are co-
payments, deductibles or coinsurance. Another way of constraining benefits is restricting 
insurance coverage to necessary care for which demand is highly inelastic.5 Although 
these methods might influence provider behaviour, they are primarily directed at con-
sumers of care and are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 The (use of the) set of techniques that the third party has at its disposal to reduce sup-
plier-induced moral hazard is often designated as ‘managed care’. By means of one or 
more of such techniques, the third party may attempt to influence the decision-making 
process within the relationship between a patient and a provider of care. Examples of 
these techniques are (financial) incentives, utilisation review, mandatory second opinions 
or physician profiling. The main managed-care techniques are described in chapter 5.  
 Purchasing health care goods and services on behalf of consumers is an important part 
of the agency function. Health care purchasing means that remote third-party payers have 
 
                                                                 
4  Although Pauly confines himself to health insurers, the same seems to hold for other third parties 
within the health-care sector (like a government). 
5  A way of restricting the benefits package has been proposed by the Dutch Committee on Choices in 
Health Care (commissie Keuzen in de zorg). The committee proposed to screen benefits on necessity, 
effectiveness in relation to medical indication, and efficiency, and to assess whether consumers should 
account for the costs on their own (commissie Keuzen in de zorg 1991). 
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to abolish the model in which they simply indemnify consumers of care. There are, how-
ever, different ways in which this part of the agency function can be fulfilled. Purchasing 
activities range from simple agreements about the nature and price of services to ad-
vanced agreements about co-operation in the development and provision of services. A 
way of classifying the different arrangements is by distinguishing between ‘contracting’, 
‘purchasing’ and ‘commissioning’, as proposed by Øvretveit (1995, p. 18). The narrow-
est concept is that of contracting, which is about selection and remuneration of providers 
and about specification of the nature of services to be provided. Like in the ‘remote third-
party payment’ model, the third party has no intention to reduce moral hazard and to im-
prove the consumers’ health status. An important difference is that by contracting pro-
viders, the third party arranges access for consumers to the contracted services. 
 Health care purchasing is a broader concept and can be defined as ‘buying the best 
value for money services to achieve the maximum health gain for those most in need’. 
Besides contracting activities, it consists of the assessment of needs, planning of required 
services, deciding on a purchasing strategy, handling of complaints et cetera. Moreover, 
the purchaser pays attention to the efficiency – technical as well as allocative – and the 
effectiveness of the services being bought. 
 The broadest concept, however, is that of commissioning. According to Øvretveit, the 
purpose of health commissioning is ‘to maximise the health of a population and minimise 
illness by purchasing health services and by influencing other organisations to create 
conditions which enhance people’s health’. Commissioning is more than purchasing ser-
vices: it also encompasses, for instance, the stimulation of providers to plan, establish and 
co-ordinate services so that these services can be purchased when they are needed, and 
the co-ordination with other purchasers of the planning and contracting activities. Al-
though health commissioning stresses on health care, commissioning third parties may 
also put means into other health-influencing factors, like housing or working conditions. 
 
2.2.3.2 Past performance of the agency function 
Besides being beneficial to consumers, the performance of (parts of) the agency function, 
especially reducing moral hazard, seems to be in the interest of third parties themselves. 
Nevertheless, many third parties have been reluctant or unable to perform the agency 
function (Van de Ven et al. 1994). This reluctance or inability differs per country, and 
even differs per third party within a country though. In the United States (US), for exam-
ple, federal and state governments have been much more willing to perform parts of the 
agency function than other third parties, like private purchasers (IOM 1989). 
 With regard to conventional private health insurance, Schut (1995) mentioned several 
reasons for the prominence of a model in which the insurance function prevails. Firstly, 
during the rise of private health insurance, providers of care were able to further a model 
in which there is no relationship between third parties and providers and in which con-
sumers are reimbursed for health care expenses. Following from this is that without a 
contractual relationship with providers – and especially in case of insurers having small 
market shares – it has been difficult to perform the agency function. Thirdly, such a 
model with an insurer remotely situated entails a free choice of providers, which is attrac-
tive to consumers as well as providers of care. The fourth reason is the interest insurers 
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collectively have in rising health care costs. A larger financial risk increases, to a certain 
extent, the demand for health insurance. A last reason is that, on the one hand, an indi-
vidual insurer may have an incentive to try to curb rising premiums by performing the 
agency function. But, on the other hand, this creates a free-rider problem since other in-
surers may profit from measurers taken by the first insurer. 
 Not just private health insurers, but also several public health insurers (like the former 
Dutch ‘sickness funds’) as well as several governmental pooling systems (like the British 
National Health Service) have been unwilling or unable to perform the agency function 
properly. Dutch public insurers were lacking the incentive to reduce inefficiencies in 
health care because of the retrospective payment of all costs by the General Fund – a sys-
tem that was in force from the Second World War until the nineties. As they were (until 
1992) obliged to contract with every provider of care within their area, public insurers 
were not able to buy care from selected providers (Schut 1995). Hence there was practi-
cally no (financial) incentive to reduce moral hazard and it was legally impossible to be a 
careful and prudent buyer of care. There was no incentive to court the favour of insured 
either, because insured were assigned to the insurer in their area. During the last decades, 
the Dutch government performed the cost-containment function by constraining supply 
and prices. 
 The same kinds of arguments seem to be applicable to a National Health Service, such 
as the old-style NHS in the United Kingdom (UK). Until the reforms – these were intro-
duced in 1989 and implemented from 1991 on – everyone was assigned to a District 
Health Authority that arranged all hospital and community care. In such a largely inte-
grated and monopolistic system, incentives to strive for efficiency or for responsiveness 
to consumers’ needs or wishes are limited. Although there was a pressure to contain costs 
in the NHS, it was not so much a pressure to act as the consumers’ agent by reducing 
moral hazard or organising effective and efficient care. Rather, it was a pressure coming 
mainly from the top (the NHS Executive) in an attempt to keep within the expenditure 
limits set by the Treasury (Propper 1995a). 
 
2.2.3.3 Increasing importance of the agency function 
There are several reasons why the importance of the third party’s agency function has 
been increasing or will increase in the near future. A first reason is the reasonable expec-
tation that there will be a further rise in health care expenditures. Newhouse (1992) men-
tioned a number of factors that have caused such an increase and that might cause a fur-
ther increase. Firstly, and according to Newhouse perhaps most importantly, health care 
expenditures will rise as a result of technological change, or what he called ‘(...) the 
march of science and the increased capabilities of medicine’ (Newhouse 1992, p. 11). 
Secondly, health care is a labour-intensive service in which it is difficult to raise produc-
tivity. Although some productivity gains are possible – reduced length of stay in hospitals 
is an example – on average these gains will be lower than in other sectors of the econ-
omy. However, if wages in the health care sector follow wage increases in other sectors, 
health care will become relatively more expensive. If volume of care remains the same, 
quality of care will tend to go down or total expenditure will tend to go up (Baumol’s 
cost disease of the service sector). Thirdly, the increase can be explained by the ageing of 
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populations. People live longer and, therefore, are more likely to have on average higher 
health care costs. Moreover, older people are also more likely to develop a costly chronic 
disease. 
 Another reason why the third party’s agency function is becoming or will become 
more prominent, is a changing opinion about the consumer’s position in health care. As is 
the case with other goods and services, consumers want more freedom of choice and re-
sponsiveness to their needs and wishes (Glennerster et al. 1994). To make choices, suffi-
cient information is needed. Since insurance payments reduce marginal costs at the mo-
ment of consumption to zero, it is information about the quality of care that is relevant to 
consumers, not about prices. In general, consumers have difficulties in judging the skills 
of health care providers and the quality of diagnosis and treatment. Third parties are more 
able to collect and to analyse data, and to disseminate information about practice patterns, 
quality and outcomes of health care than individual consumers are. As far as such data 
has been collected in the past, it has not been disseminated because of imperfections in 
the data or because it was meant for internal use only (Pauly 1988a). 
 
2.2.4 The access function 
 
As argued, performance of the insurance function and the agency function by a third 
party may overcome problems created by two of the intrinsic characteristics of health 
care, namely uncertainty and the asymmetry of information. The third characteristic, ex-
ternal effects, also legitimates third-party involvement in the health-care sector though. 
Since whether or not consuming health care by a certain individual may have conse-
quences for the physical or psychological well-being of others, there is a societal concern 
over the accessibility of at least some basic goods and services. 
 Externalities in health care stem from different interpersonal preferences. Firstly, in 
case of altruistic preferences, a certain person derives utility from another person’s well-
being. This other person’s well-being is a function of his health – a status that may be 
influenced by health care consumption – and his consumption of other goods and ser-
vices. Altruistic preferences can give rise to an income-transferring scheme in order to 
enable the benefiting person to rise his utility. However, the person who obtains addi-
tional means decides whether or not to spend these cross-subsidies on health care. 
 More specific are the paternalistic preferences. One might particularly be concerned 
about someone’s health status or about his use of health care, which influences this 
status. Such preferences can lead to a demand for third-party interventions in order to 
improve the financial accessibility of care. Possibilities are subsidising premiums, subsi-
dising individual or institutional health care providers, or supplying health care. 
 In case of contagious diseases, egoistic preferences with regard to accessible health 
care may result in subsidisation or free provision of preventive and curative services. 
 
It’s true that performance of the insurance function may remove economic barriers to 
access, but this is not necessarily the case. Absent a compulsory risk-pooling arrange-
ment, some individuals might prefer not to insure, thereby risking the inability to pay if 
health care is needed. Furthermore, in an unregulated, competitive insurance market 
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some individuals may encounter serious problems in obtaining insurance. As in such a 
market there is a strong tendency towards experience rating, some high-risk individuals 
will be unable to pay a premium that reflects their risk. Problems in obtaining insurance 
may also result from a failure in the health-insurance market: for fear of adverse selec-
tion, the risk-pooling party may refuse to accept the risk or offer coverage at a premium 
that is, in view of the individual’s risk, mistakenly too high (Evans 1984).6 
 Although it is an important function, in this thesis the access function is left out of 
consideration. 
 
 
2.3 Relationships between third-party agents and general practitioners 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Third-party payers and third-party agents 
Like the insurance function and the access functions, the agency function may be fulfilled 
by a third party. In this thesis a third party is considered to be a risk-bearing party receiv-
ing contributions for a defined group of members and for a certain period of time, and 
having the contractual or legal obligation to reimburse or to provide a specified package 
of health-care goods and services. An example of a third party covered by this definition 
is a health insurer. Notice that this definition does, for instance, not comprise govern-
mental agencies that merely develop legislation to protect patients or that merely fulfil 
the access function, or a Central Fund that merely collects premiums and makes pay-
ments to health insurers. 
 Then, there is the distinction between third-party payers and third-party agents. We 
suppose that a third-party payer is mainly concerned with performing the insurance func-
tion and has no intention to arrange access for the insured to health-care services and to 
improve the insured’ health status. Probably, emphasis will be placed on marketing and 
selling of insurance products, claims processing, and the like. A third-party agent, how-
ever, is supposed to act on behalf of the insured or patients. This acting may manifest 
itself in, for instance, reducing moral hazard by using a wide array of measures to influ-
ence the way health care is provided. 
 
General practitioners 
The second party in this thesis is the general practitioner. The term general practitioner is 
used here without reference to a specific kind of doctor practising in a specific health-
care system. The term primary care physician is also used in case we referred to the 
United States or in case we cited from articles in which the term is used. Although pri-
mary care physicians and general practitioners (GPs) may differ from each other in some 
aspects, they have some common characteristics – or at least, they ought to, otherwise 
 
                                                                 
6  Adverse selection arises from the asymmetry of information between a buyer and a seller of insurance. 
The less-informed seller of an insurance policy runs the risk of attracting buyers who expect their indi-
vidual loss to exceed the premium they have to pay. 
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they can not be distinguished from other (specialty) physicians (Starfield 1992). These 
characteristics are (Starfield 1992, Fry and Horder 1994): 
- The provision of direct accessible first-contact care to a small, defined population. 
- Longitudinal care, which means that ‘(...) individuals in the population identify with a 
source of care as ‘‘theirs,’’ that the provider or groups of providers at least implicitly 
recognise the existence of a formal or informal contract to be the ‘‘regular source of 
care,’’ and that this relationship exists for a defined period of time or indefinitely until 
explicitly changed’ (Starfield 1992, p. 41). 
- The care provided or arranged for is comprehensive and consists of all types of goods 
and services, including referrals. 
- There is co-ordination (integration) of care, for instance by means of a regular physi-
cian and medical-record keeping. The physician has information about the patient’s 
prior problems and the goods or services provided before and recognises the meaning 
of that information for present actions. 
This is more or less comparable to the attributes of primary care summarised by Godber 
et al.: direct access, generalist care, longitudinal care and delivery in a community setting 
(1997, p. 276). 
 There were two reasons for our choice of the GP as the second party. Firstly (follow-
ing Starfield 1992, p. viii), the choice of physicians is because of the overall responsibil-
ity they usually bear. Nurses, for instance, may bear responsibility for some parts of pri-
mary care too, but are usually not responsible for the totality of the care. Secondly, from 
a third-party agent’s viewpoint, the relationship with a GP may be interesting as these 
physicians often fulfil a role as gatekeeper and co-ordinator of medical services. As a 
result, these physicians have a considerable influence on the nature, quantity and quality 
of the goods and services delivered. 
 
2.3.2 Classification of relationships between third parties and general practitioners 
 
The relationship between a third-party agent and a GP can be structured in various ways. 
Question then is whether the structure of such relationships should be contingent on the 
third-party functions. In order to answer the second research question, 
 
What are the implications of the main functions of a third party for the relationships be-
tween third parties and general practitioners? 
 
we will first take a closer look at the relationships by reviewing several classification 
schemes. 
 
The classification of Hurst 
Hurst (1992) distinguised between three models. The reimbursement model is character-
ised by the absence of a relationship between second and third party. The third party only 
fulfils the insurance function. It pools risks and pays claims (i.e. reimbursing the patient 
for incurred health-care expenses) and has no contractual or legal obligation to arrange or 
to provide health care goods and services. In the contract model there is a contractual 
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 18 
relationship between independent parties. At least arrangements are made with regard to 
the accessibility of the contracted services. Often, payments are made directly to the phy-
sicians so that health care is provided in kind.7 The integrated model concerns a vertically 
integrated system in which health insurance and care are supplied by the same organisa-
tion. 
 The ability to perform the agency function will differ per type of relationship. In ab-
sence of a relationship it is virtually impossible to perform the agency function. A con-
tractual model is more suited then as both parties may agree upon a contract that embod-
ies, for instance, the third party’s interference in the provision of health care. The inte-
grated model may seem even more suited because of the complete integration with an 
employer-employee relationship and the resulting instruments for the third party. Em-
ployment of the physician does not mean that he automatically acts in the best interests of 
both third party and patients though. 
 
The classification of Van de Ven et al. 
In case a third party not only fulfils a payer function but also acts as an agent on behalf of 
the insured, another classification might be more suited. Van de Ven et al. expanded 
Hurst’s framework by combining it with four alternative health care markets. The latter 
resulted from the distinction between competing and monopolistic third parties on the 
one side and competing and monopolistic health care providers on the other.8 This com-
bination yields ten models of third party-provider relationships.9 Expansion with market 
structure is valuable since this structure provides third parties and providers with incen-
tives that may influence behaviour. For instance, a competitive market may provide a 
third party with an incentive to perform the agency function properly. In a monopolistic 
market this incentive is absent. On the other hand, without competition it may be easier to 
perform this function, as a monopoly provides the third party with the necessary leverage 
to manage care (Van de Ven et al. 1994). 
 Their classification is also useful as it touches on the position of third party and physi-
cian in contract negotiations by distinguishing the structure of both sides of the market. 
Both parties have bounded possibilities to offer and to refuse contracts depending on the 
market structure. In case of a monopolistic contract model, for instance, third parties may 
be limited in their contract design. This will be different in a monopsonistic contract 
model. In case of competing third parties, physicians may have several options to choose 
from. In a monopsonistic contract model, however, they may be entirely dependent upon 
the contracts the third party offers. 
 
 
                                                                 
7  Notice that Øvretveit’s contracting concept, as described in subsection 2.2.3.1, is narrower and only 
one possible form of Hurst’s contract model. 
8  In this classification, only price competition is taken into consideration. 
9  Combinations with an integrated model only exist in a situation of competition between third parties 
and competition between providers, or in a situation without competition between third parties and 
without competition between providers. 
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The classification of Weiner and de Lissovoy 
Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993) described a model in which the contractual relationships 
between consumers, sponsors, providers and intermediaries are identified.10 They defined 
six dimensions of the contracting process: whether the sponsor, the intermediary or the 
physicians assume a financial risk, whether the consumer is free to select a provider, 
whether the provider’s autonomy is restricted, and whether the health plan is obliged to 
provide care. Of interest here are the placement of risk on the physicians and the restric-
tions on their practice choices. Whether for cost-containment or for quality reasons, the 
contract is used to influence the way health care is provided. 
 Like Hurst, Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993, pp. 89-90) described an integrated model 
in their classification scheme. In their scheme, an integrated system is a health plan 
where: 
1. There is a legal responsibility to deliver medical services to enrolled consumers who 
seek care from within an integrated network of providers employed by, or under con-
tract to, the plan (italics added, A.V.). 
2. There is an entity that manages care by controlling the patterns of practice of providers 
in the network. This is accomplished by administrative and possibly financial controls. 
These include, at a minimum, mandated pre-certification of major services and retro-
spective profiling of provider practices via information systems. 
In Hurst’s classification the integrated model is characterised by the presence of labour 
contracts, whereas the definition of an integrated system as proposed by Weiner and de 
Lissovoy is broader and more functionally oriented. The implication is that an arrange-
ment that is of the integrated type according to Weiner and de Lissovoy, may resemble 
Hurst’s contract model. 
 
The classification of Welch et al. and Hillman et al. 
A classification scheme can also highlight the financial as well as the organisational side 
of the arrangements. Welch et al. (1990) and Hillman et al. (1992) developed such a clas-
sification scheme.11 Their framework is specifically aimed at the relationship between 
third parties and primary care physicians. Although they focused on Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs), their scheme seems equally applicable to relationships in which 
other parties fulfil the insurance function and the agency function.12 Therefore, a modi-
fied version is discussed here: it is made applicable to relationships with other third par-
ties, and the order of the characteristics has been changed. The following characteristics 
are discerned: 
1. Whether the third party contracts the primary care physicians directly (two-tiered sys-
tem) or indirectly via an intermediary organisation (three-tiered system). 
 
                                                                 
10  In their taxonomy sponsors, like employers or the government, pay the majority of costs of a health 
plan. Intermediaries may have administrative functions only, but may also co-ordinate care or bear the 
insurance risk. 
11  The difference between the classifications proposed in both articles is the order in which the charac-
teristics are arranged. 
12  An HMO is an organisation with a contractual responsibility to arrange and to provide health-care 
services to a population of enrolled subscribers (see subsection 7.4.1). 
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2. The method of payment by the third party, including: 
a. the basic method of payment for primary care services; 
b. the size and nature of the ancillary payments, if any. 
3. The way an intermediary organisation, if any, translates the contracts with the third 
party into contracts with the physicians. 
4. The size and nature of the risk pool, if any, used to share the risk or reward. 
5. Whether the primary care physicians see only members of this third party or also of 
other third parties. 
 
Ad 1 
In a two-tiered system there is a direct relationship between the third party and the physi-
cian, whereas in a three-tiered system an intermediary organisation (the middle tier) is 
located between the third party and the physician. 
 
 third third 
 party party 
 
 
  middle 
  tier 
 
 
 primary primary 
 care care 
 physician physician 
 
Two-tiered system Three-tiered system 
 
It is important to distinguish between these two organisational forms. A middle tier or 
intermediate entity may change the incentive system (or other parts of the arrangements) 
the third party uses. Further, the nature of the relationship between third party and physi-
cian may differ from the one between middle tier and physician (Welch et al. 1990). This 
will especially be the case if the middle tier is a group practice consisting of colleagues 
practising within the same building. Gold et al. (2002) pointed out that the concept of 
two- and three-tiered systems is even outdated and oversimplified since complex ar-
rangements can lead to four, five or even more tiers (multi-tiered arrangements). Further, 
they pointed at the fact that risk sharing with an intermediate entity is often combined 
with the delegation of responsibilities, for instance for provider selection. 
 
Ad 2 
There are several methods for paying physicians, like capitation or fee for service. The 
incentives the physicians experience differ per method of payment, so the third party may 
use them as a first instrument to influence the physician. Modifying the nature and the 
extent of ancillary payments is another way of influencing the physician. Ancillary pay-
ments may, for instance, take the form of bonuses. 
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Ad 3 
The contract between third party and middle tier may be translated into a contract with 
different incentive mechanisms. For example, the third party may use capitation to pay a 
directly contracted physician. If it pays a middle tier according to a capitation scheme, the 
middle tier on its turn may pay the physician by means of fee for service. The middle tier 
will be motivated, though, to ‘pass through’ the incentives it faces (Eggleston 2005). The 
example of a capitation scheme that is translated into a fee-for-service system may result 
in financial problems for the middle tier. 
 
Ad 4 
The fourth characteristic is the risk pool. A risk pool is a group of providers who share in 
the rewards and penalties from surpluses and deficits in, for instance, drugs or referral 
budgets. 
 
Ad 5 
Whether or not physicians also see patients who are member from another third party, is 
determining the amount of freedom patients have in choosing among physicians and third 
parties. More important here, however, is that the proportion of patients who are member 
of a certain third party is determining the responsiveness of the physician to the financial 
incentives employed by that third party (Welch 1990). It may be expected that the larger 
this proportion is, the more the physician will be responsive to the incentives.  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we addressed some issues with regard to the functions of third parties in 
health care. To find an answer to the first research question, 
 
What are the main functions of a third party in health care? 
 
we first described some characteristics of health care. The sector is characterised by un-
certainty at the demand side, an asymmetry of information between demanders and pro-
viders of care, and the presence of external effects. These characteristics form a justifica-
tion for the presence of a third party. Three functions of a third party in health care are: 
- the insurance function, which consists mainly of pooling risks and paying claims; 
- the agency function, which consists of limiting moral hazard (for instance by buying 
care for a certain population) and collecting and providing information about care; 
- the access function, which is about guaranteeing the accessibility of, at least, some 
basic goods and services. 
 
In this thesis, the third party is considered to be a risk-bearing party receiving contri-
butions for a defined group of members and for a certain period of time, and having the 
contractual or legal obligation to reimburse or to provide a specified package of health-
care goods and services. As second party is chosen for the group of GPs because of the 
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characteristics of GP care and the GP’s role in health care. From the viewpoint of a third-
party agent, the relationship with GPs may be of interest as they often act as gatekeepers 
and co-ordinators of medical services. Hence GPs have a considerable influence on the 
nature, quantity and quality of health care.  
 Third parties that act as agent on behalf of the insured have to enter into relationships 
with providers of care, among whom GPs, in order to fulfil their role properly. Fulfilling 
the agency function is difficult in case a relationship between both parties is absent, as in 
a reimbursement model. The relationships may be structured in different ways, ranging 
from simple contractual arrangements to full integration. This brings us to the second 
research question central to this chapter: 
 
What are the implications of the main functions of a third party for the type of relation-
ships between third parties and general practitioners? 
 
There are several ways the relationships may be analysed and classified. We reviewed 
classification schemes of Hurst, Van de Ven et al., Weiner and de Lissovoy, and of 
Welch et al. and Hillman et al. to provide some basic insight into the various types of 
relationships. The classification of Hurst is of interest because it gives insight into the 
main financial and contractual relationships between third party and physician. The clas-
sification of Van de Ven et al. adds to this the market structure, which is an important 
factor for the possibilities and the incentives to perform the agency function. The classifi-
cation of Weiner and de Lissovoy adds the concepts of the distribution of the financial 
risk among several parties and of restrictions on the physicians’ clinical options. Finally, 
the classification of Welch et al. and Hillman et al. is specifically aimed at the relation-
ship between third parties and primary care physicians and analyses the financial and the 
organisational side of the arrangements between both parties in detail. 
 Two major conclusions can be drawn from the four classification schemes. A first 
conclusion is that a particular relationship between a third party and a (primary care) 
physician can be approached in several ways, like in a juridical, an organisational or a 
financial way. But even then the several authors highlight different aspects of, for in-
stance, the organisational side of relationships. Not all of them included the option of the 
middle tier in their schemes, for instance. If one is interested in the payment system used 
by a third party, the presence of a middle tier may not be relevant. But if one is interested 
in the effect of that payment system on the behaviour of GPs, the recognition of a middle 
tier, which may alter such a payment system, is crucial. 
 A second conclusion is that the financial as well as the organisational structures of 
relationships between third parties and GPs can differ considerably. These may vary from 
no relationship at all to full integration of both parties. Third parties may contract directly 
or indirectly (via a middle tier), pay physicians directly or reimburse the insured, use sev-
eral payment systems, et cetera. Middle tiers may alter a contract concluded with a third 
party and change, for instance, the payment system. Such aspects of the relationships and 
several of the concepts of the classification schemes will be dealt with in following chap-
ters. 
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3.1 The choice of a theory 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the two parties central to this thesis were introduced. Firstly, we 
introduced the concept of the third-party agent: a risk-bearing party receiving contri-
butions for a defined group of members and for a certain period of time, and having the 
contractual or legal obligation to reimburse or to provide a specified package of health-
care goods and services, and that is supposed to act on behalf of the insured or patients. 
Secondly, we introduced the general practitioner (GP): a direct accessible, general 
physician who provides longitudinal, comprehensive care in a community setting. Acting 
on behalf of the insured patients, the third-party agent may want the GP to provide care in 
a way that is beneficial to the patients. There are several ways the third-party agent can 
attempt to influence the behaviour of the GP and to promote a certain outcome. In order 
to achieve that, the third-party agent may want to enter into a contractual relationship 
with the GP. In this chapter we will discuss the (choice of a) theoretical background for 
our study of the various relationships between third-parties and GPs and of the various 
strategies the third party may use.  
 
In section 3.2, we will explain the theory itself. In section 3.3, we will present several 
means to handle agency problems. Subject of section 3.4, finally, are the theory’s strong 
and weak sides, and the advantages and disadvantages of using the theory in this thesis. 
We will end with a summary. The application of the theory to the health care sector and, 
more specifically, to the relationship between third-party agents and GPs, is subject of the 
next chapter. 
 
3.1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
In order to exert influence on the way care is provided, the third-party agent may want to 
enter into a contractual relationship with the GP. In contract theory is distinguished 
between complete contracts and incomplete contracts (Hendrikse 2003).1 Complete 
contracts are considered to be complete because they contain all the information that is 
available to the contracting parties. Not all of the information may be available to both 
parties, but as far as it is and as far as it is relevant it will be part of the contract. This 
 
                                                                 
1  The paragraph on contracting theory is largely based on Hendrikse (2003). 
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information pertains to the actions of the contracting parties and the possible future 
situations. Everything that is known to the contracting parties is specified ex ante, so ex-
post bargaining because of unforeseen situations is not needed. As it is generally assumed 
that parties show rational behaviour and that all the relevant information can be included 
freely in the contract, complete contracts may become very complex. 
 In complete contract theory no distinction is made between observable actions and 
verifiable actions. Observable actions are actions that are observable by the parties 
involved in the contract. These actions are termed verifiable, if they can be verified by a 
third party. This may be important in case of conflicts. In complete contract theory it is 
assumed that all observable information is also verifiable and that potential conflicts are 
dealt with by means of a contract – opportunistic behaviour will be taken account for 
during the design of the contract – or a third party (like a judge). 
 An influential theory that represents complete contracting theory is the classical 
agency theory. This theory focuses on the contractual relationship between two parties. 
One party (called the agent) acts for or on behalf of the other party (called the principal). 
Their relationship is characterised by conflicting interests and asymmetric information. 
The theory stresses the issues of compensation based on measured performance and 
monitoring. The principal has to devise an incentive scheme in such a way that the agent 
is stimulated to act in the principal’s interests, given the behavioural assumptions of 
rationality and opportunism. Agency theory was initially developed to investigate 
questions of incomplete information and risk sharing. Later it became an analytical tool 
for organisational theory as well (Moe 1984). Hereafter, we will return to this theory 
extensively. 
 Complete contract theory has been criticised for several reasons. This has led to the 
development of alternative theories, which can be designated as incomplete contract 
theories. There are several reasons for contracts to be incomplete (Hendrikse 2003). 
Firstly, it may not be attainable to anticipate all possible contingencies. Hence incomplete 
contract theory disputes the assumption of complete contract theory that it is possible to 
foresee every future action and every possible future situation and to include these 
possibilities into the contract for free. Secondly, complete contracts may become 
complex, and writing such a contract may be too costly. Thirdly, language may be 
context-dependent, allowing for divergent interpretations of the terms of the contract. 
Fourthly, not all the relevant information may be verifiable. Incomplete contracts will 
only contain observable actions that can be verified. Given the behavioural assumption of 
opportunism and in the absence of trust, it makes not much sense to agree upon non-
verifiable actions. In case of a conflict then, the cause of the conflict can not be proven to 
a third party (like a judge). 
 Complete contract theory has also been criticised because it can not explain the 
boundaries of organisations. In fact, in complete contract theory organisations are not 
very relevant as everything is covered by the contract. There is not really a difference 
between contracts within or contracts between organisations, although organisational 
aspects may influence the incentives parties face. In complete contract theory, there are 
solely ex-ante decisions. In incomplete contract theory, however, it is assumed that the 
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incomplete contract does not account for all possible contingencies. As a result, a 
situation may occur for which the contracting parties made no provisions in the contract. 
Hence there is a difference between ex-ante decisions and ex-post decisions. Given the 
behavioural assumption of opportunism, this may create ex-post problems like violation 
of the contract or renegotiation over contract conditions. In dealing with this potential ex-
post opportunistic behaviour, a governance structure, like an organisation, can play an 
important role. Incomplete contract theory tries to analyse and to explain why particular 
governance structures are or should be chosen in case of specific circumstances. 
 Several attempts have been made to explain why in some circumstances the 
organisation instead of the market is chosen as the governance structure. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), for instance, viewed the integrated firm as a means to increase 
production through team production. They considered to some extent teamwork within a 
firm to be more productive than production through the market, because of problems with 
the monitoring of the agents’ efforts. They argued that monitoring can be done better 
within a firm and that that it will be done appropriately if the party that monitors receives 
the residual income resulting from the team’s actions. Monitoring also played a role in 
the analysis of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), who argued that the costs of measuring 
the agent’s performance are an important determinant of integration. In situations in 
which the costs of measuring the agent’s performance are low, it may be favoured that 
the agent owns the assets. If the costs are high, integration may be favoured. 
 An influential approach to the problem of choosing a governance structure has been 
the theory of transaction costs economics. It can be viewed as an economic theory of 
organisation. It focuses on the choice of a certain governance structure, given several 
characteristics of a transaction. Two important governance structures are the hierarchical 
organisation and the market. Question then is why some transactions take place within 
the hierarchical organisation and other transactions take place on the market. According 
to Williamson (1985) environmental factors, like uncertainty and small-numbers 
exchange, and human factors, like bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour of 
agents, are important aspects for the relative efficiency of governance structures. A 
crucial factor is asset specificity, which refers to the relative lack of transferability of 
assets that are used in a given relation to other relations. Examples of types of asset 
specificity are site specificity or physical asset specificity. Especially if asset specificity 
and the degree of uncertainty are high, and given that rationality is bounded and agents 
are opportunistic, then internalisation, or at least very strong contracts, will be optimal. 
The hierarchical governance structure is supposed to prevent ex-post bargaining in case 
an unforeseen situation emerges. The thread of ex-post bargaining may lead to a situation 
in which parties don’t want to invest ex ante in the relation-specific assets. As a result, the 
transaction may not take place at all. If the hierarchical governance structure takes away 
this thread, parties may be willing to make the necessary investments. 
 One reason that transaction costs economics has been criticised is that it argues what 
the costs can be of organising a transaction on the market, but that it does not argue what 
the costs can be of a transaction within a firm. The theory does for instance not explain 
why opportunistic behaviour of parties changes within an organisation, and it does not 
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explain either why a firm would stop integrating if integration reduces transaction costs. 
It also does not give a clear definition of integration (Grossman and Hart 1986). 
According to Grossman and Hart, a governance structure can define and allocate the 
decision rights for those situations for which no provisions were made in the contract: the 
residual decision rights. They distinguished between residual rights and specific rights. 
Their theory of vertical and lateral integration focuses on the ownership of assets. They 
presented it as a theory of costly contracts that emphasizes that contractual rights can be 
divided into specific rights and residual rights. As contracting is costly, it may be too 
costly to specify all the rights a party may want to have over another party’s assets. Then, 
it may be optimal to specify some specific rights of control over the assets in the contract 
and to purchase all the other rights (the residual rights). Ownership then, implies the right 
to control all the aspects of the assets (the residual rights) except those that have been 
explicitly given to the other party by means of a contract (the specific rights). Grossman 
and Hart argued that when the residual decision rights are purchased by one party, they 
are lost by another party. This creates distortions, and therefore, they argued, there is also 
a cost to integration. ‘That is, integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and 
distortionary behavior, but it does not remove these incentives’ (Grossman and Hart, 
1986, p. 716). The approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and of Hart and Moore (1990) 
is a property rights approach whereby the point of view is taken that for decisions upon 
integration, the possession of the rights of control over particular assets is crucial. In other 
words, if one party wants to have the decision rights concerning another party’s assets, it 
needs to integrate. 
 The relationship between parties in which transactions take place can thus vary by 
choice of a governance structure. Given that contracts are incomplete and ex-post 
bargaining problems may occur, a governance structure can determine the way these ex-
post bargaining problems are handled, for instance by giving a party the authority to 
decide in circumstances not covered by the contract. Hendrikse and Jiang (2005) argued 
that a governance structure is concerned with two important questions.2 One important 
question is how the decision rights are allocated and who has the right (in the form of 
authority and responsibility) to take decisions regarding the deployment and use of assets. 
Themes with regard to authority are, for instance, the allocation of authority, formal 
versus real authority, decision control (ratification, monitoring), decision management 
(initiation, implementation) or enforcement mechanisms. A second important question is 
how the benefits and costs associated with the use of an asset are allocated. Themes with 
regard to income rights are, for instance, the use of financial incentives and compensation 
schemes, and who receives the benefits and who has to pay the costs of using an asset. 
 In the above, the agency approach is referred to as an example of a complete contract 
theory. Agency theory is concerned with the analysis of income rights. As an incomplete 
 
                                                                 
2  The distinction between decision rights and income rights was made by Hansmann, H. (1996), The 
Ownership of Enterprise, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
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contract theory, the property rights approach is concerned with the analysis of decision 
rights. This classification may be correct as far as it is related to the classical treatment of 
agency problems, concerned with complete contracts consisting of optimal compensation 
schemes. However, the distinction between the two approaches is becoming less strict. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), for instance, tried to integrate several approaches to the 
make-or-buy decision of firms. They argued that several choices regarding this decision 
are intertwined, like: 
- the way agents are paid (for instance, a fixed wage or based on measured perform-
ance); 
- the ownership of assets (owned by a firm or by an independent agent); 
- the design of the job (whether the firm of the independent agent decides about tasks 
that are included or that are expressly excluded from the job, methods, or working 
hours). 
They stated that these instruments can and should be used complementary. One of their 
findings was that if the costs of monitoring an agent are high or if some activities of the 
agent are important but hard to measure, then it is more likely that commissions are 
modest, the firm owns the assets, and job restrictions limit the agent’s freedom. On the 
other hand, if monitoring an agent is easy or if there are no important hard-to-measure 
activities of the agent, then it is more likely that commissions are strong and output-
based, the agent owns the assets, and the agent is free to design his own job. 
 Further, Neelen (1993) argued that in agency theory the problem of the principal is 
mainly confined to the design of an incentive structure, but that there are other control 
mechanisms that the principal may use to induce the agent to act in the principal’s 
interests. One of these mechanisms is control by directives or authority, which is an 
important theme addressed by the decision rights approach. 
 
We will analyse the relationships between third-party agents and GPs using agency 
theory, but we will continue Neelen’s line of reasoning and expand upon the set of 
strategies that the principal may use to further the outcome he aims for. We will also 
address some modifications of, or extensions to the traditional assumptions of agency 
theory, which supports our view that the distinction between the agency approach and the 
property rights approach is becoming less strict. 
 One reason why we choose for an agency perspective and focus on concepts that are 
stressed by that theory is that it seems to correspond well with the situation central in this 
thesis. This situation relates to the contractual relationships between two parties (that is, 
third-party agents and GPs) in which the one party (the principal) enters into a 
relationship with a second party (the agent) in the expectation that the agent’s actions are 
beneficial to the principal. As an important aspect of agency theory is the use of 
(financial) incentives, it corresponds well with the subject of this thesis, namely financial-
risk sharing. 
 A focus on the allocation of decision rights (i.e. a property rights approach) could be 
interesting as well. An interesting question could for instance be why GP care is mostly 
provided by independent GPs, but sometimes by employed GPs. The question then could 
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be whether the authority of the employer changes the allocation of decision rights 
regarding the treatment of patients, or whether in case of employment the professional or 
the physician’s individual autonomy is maintained or not. We assume though that, 
because of the professional or the physician’s individual autonomy, authority within an 
employment relationship between third parties and GPs does not extend to interfering in 
the patient-physician relationship in a way different from the ways in a market 
relationship. 
 Another reason why we do not focus on the allocation of decision rights is that it 
concerns the ownership of or the contractual rights over specific assets. The use and the 
ownership of assets are less important issues in general practice than they are for instance 
in medical specialist care. Further, the assets related to providing GP care are hardly 
relation-specific assets. In other words, we consider the level of asset specificity to be 
low. In chapter 5, we will discuss instruments that in fact specify the rights over the use 
of, for instance, hospital assets. The GP owns most of the rights to decide whether or not 
to treat a patient or to have a patient treated, for instance by means of hospital assets. The 
third party has some specific rights, for instance, concerning the decisions whether or not 
to certify a hospital admission. Obviously, this departs from the relationship and 
ownership issues as described by Grossman and Hart (1986) because the GP’s residual 
rights to decide whether or not to have a patient treated in hospital do not imply 
ownership of hospital assets. In fact, in the present relationships it is not so much a 
question of the rights over assets but of the rights over actions. Given the subject of 
financial-risk sharing, we are not interested in the organisational boundaries of firms and 
hence in the determinants of integration. We are interested in the contractual relationship 
between two parties. Moreover, we assume that, because of the professional relationship, 
integration does not solve the characteristic problems of agency relationships resulting 
from asymmetric information and conflicting interests. Partially analogous to the 
argument of Grossman and Hart (1986, p. 692), it is unclear how integration changes the 
scope for opportunistic behaviour ‘when one of the self-interested owners becomes an 
equally self-interested employee of the other owner’. Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985, p. 32) 
argued that ‘forming an organisation only internalises agency relationships. It does not 
eliminate problems of co-ordination, incentives, and so on. Presumably, though, it should 
substantially lessen them, for now we are all working on the same team and can be 
rewarded accordingly’. 
 The fact that we use agency theory as the theoretical background for our study does 
not imply that we will restrict ourselves to the standard economic treatment of the 
principal-agent problem with the issues of performance-based compensation and 
monitoring. We will argue hereafter that there are two approaches to agency problems, 
the normative, non-empirical principal-agent approach and the empirically based positive 
theory of agency. The positivist stream has been mainly concerned with describing the 
several governance mechanisms that should solve the agency problems (Eisenhardt 
1989). Our approach is partly a positive one whereby we will describe mechanisms or 
techniques third parties may and actually do use within their relationships with GPs. Like 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Neelen (1993), we will argue that the range of these 
 
3  AGENCY THEORY 
 
 29 
techniques is much wider than just deciding how to pay for performance. In chapter 5, we 
will try to bring these techniques in connection with each other. Partly, our approach is 
normative in the sense that we will discuss how systems of financial-risk sharing should 
be structured. 
 
In this thesis, we will use agency theory to examine different financial and organisational 
arrangements between third parties and GPs as well as the strategies that third parties 
(may) use as part of their agency function.3 Hence central to this chapter is the third 
research question: 
 
What are the main characteristics of agency theory? 
 
 
3.2 The theory of agency 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
In this section we give an introduction to the economic theory of agency. Central to the 
theory are two phenomena that may jointly occur in relationships between two parties. 
These phenomena, which are asymmetrically distributed information and conflicting 
interests, are discussed in subsection 3.2.2. Although these phenomena were recognised 
earlier, the theory of agency was only developed in the seventies. It is one of the 
approaches within neo-institutional economics in which the applicability of the neo-clas-
sical theory of the firm has been broadened.4 According to Jensen (1983, pp. 334-336), 
agency theory has been developed into ‘(...) two almost entirely separate and valuable 
literatures that nominally address the same problem.’ One approach has been called 
‘principal-agent’. It is normative and non-empirical. Also, in general, it is highly 
mathematical. Authors concentrate on the most efficient contract given different levels of 
information, risk aversion and uncertainty. 
 Another approach is what has been called the ‘positive theory of agency’. In this type 
of literature is also focused on the relationships between principals and agents, but 
contrary to the principal-agent approach it is, in general, non-mathematical and empiri-
cally oriented. Positive agency theory is ‘(...) about how the world behaves’ (Jensen 
1983, p. 320). The theory is aimed at obtaining evidence of and explaining the existing 
contractual relationships, at the provisions made in the contracts and at factors in the con-
tracting environment, like organisational structures or the labour market. 
 
                                                                 
3  Although there is a connection between agency theory and the third party’s agency function (the third 
party acts as an agent for the insured), it is important to notice that agency theory is not a theory about 
this agency function. 
4  Other approaches are, for instance, transaction-costs analysis and property-rights analysis. 
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 Because of the methods used in the principal-agent literature and in the positive 
agency literature, Neelen (1993, p. 62) labelled the two types ‘the analytical agency 
theory’ and ‘the empirical agency theory’ respectively. Notwithstanding the differences, 
in both approaches the same problems of contracting within relationships with 
asymmetric information and conflict of interests are being addressed. Our approach to 
analysing relationships between third-party agents and GPs is mainly a positive one. 
While describing the way the financial and organisational arrangements between these 
parties should be structured, however, we will also use a more normative approach, 
although not mathematical. 
 After we have described the basic agency model, we will address some modifications 
of, or extensions to the traditional assumptions in subsection 3.2.3. Agency theory has 
been applied to, for instance, insurance arrangements, public bureaucracy, and employ-
ment.5 Despite the different settings, the problems resulting from asymmetric information 
and conflicting interests are more or less comparable. These problems are discussed in 
subsection 3.2.4. Finally, we will present some examples of the omnipresent agency 
relationships in daily life (subsection 3.2.5). 
 
3.2.2 Traditional assumptions of agency theory 
 
Relationships between third parties and GPs are characterised by unequally distributed 
information. Each party has certain information the other party does not have. On the one 
hand, a third party may be at a disadvantage against a GP. For instance, a third party may 
not know the quality of the GP when entering into a contractual relationship. Further, 
although a third party may have some general information about an insured’s health 
status, it is the GP who typically has more and better information about the clinical pic-
tures of this insured and about the indicated diagnostic tests and treatments. On the other 
hand, a third party may have an advantage over a GP, for instance by having some 
performance figures of the GP’s competitors that can be used in contract negotiations. 
 Another important characteristic of the relationships between third parties and GPs is 
that both parties may have different, and possibly conflicting, interests. A conflict of 
interests may give rise to problems in a relationship in which an ill-informed party wants 
a well-informed party to perform a certain action. 
 As to these problems, the relationships between third parties and GPs are not unique. 
On the contrary, relationships between two parties in which the one party has more or 
different information than the other party are omnipresent. Both parties may be involved 
in a transaction in which goods or services are being exchanged for some kind of 
compensation. Often, one party has been delegated to do some work for, or on behalf of 
 
                                                                 
5  Important contributors to the theory have been Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Harris and Raviv (1978), and Shavell (1979). See, for instance, Mitnick (1980), 
Moe (1984) and Eisenhardt (1989) for other references and applications of agency theory. 
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the other party. The latter would like the first to act in his interests, but as both may have 
different information and different, possibly conflicting interests, it’s obvious that 
problems can arise. A theory that focuses on relationships between two parties, that 
specifically addresses the problems of asymmetric information and conflicting interests, 
and that proposes strategies to deal with such problems (for instance, by suggesting 
optimal contract designs) is the theory of agency. 
 In agency theory, two parties can be distinguished. One party is supposed to be ill 
informed and is called the ‘principal’; the other is supposed to be well informed and is 
called the ‘agent’.6 Generally, it is assumed that the agent may choose an action out of a 
set of possible actions and that this action, or its outcome, affects the principal’s welfare 
as well as agent’s. The kind of relationship they have may differ. Often, the ‘agency rela-
tionship’ is characterised as contractual, although there does not necessarily have to be a 
contract in the formal sense of the word. 
 The presence of an asymmetry of information between principal and agent is a crucial 
characteristic of an agency relationship. This asymmetry is due to the fact that in the first 
instance it is solely the agent who has information about his own actions, or about the 
circumstances upon which he bases these actions. In agency theory, this information is 
considered to be a commodity that can be obtained by paying a price (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Therefore, in general, the following assumption is made. The principal will not know 
which actions the agent has chosen to perform, how much effort the agent makes, or 
whether the agent has made the right decisions, unless he incurs costs to detect these 
actions or the information upon which they are based. Furthermore, there is no direct 
incentive for the agent to disclose this information to the principal (MacDonald 1984). 
 A second crucial characteristic of an agency relationship is the conflict of interests. 
Both the principal and agent have their own objectives and it is likely that these diverge. 
The principal would like the agent to act in his (the principal’s) interests. However, 
besides affecting the principal’s welfare, the actions of the agent also affect his own 
welfare. Both parties may value the agent’s actions differently.  
 It is important to distinguish the concept of ‘conflicting interests’ from the concept of 
‘self-interest’. The first occurs within a relationship between two or more people, while 
this is not necessarily true for the second concept, as this is about human behaviour of an 
individual. In agency theory, it is assumed that both parties are driven by self-interest in 
an opportunistic or self-regarded manner.7 Notice that conflicting goals are not much of a 
 
                                                                 
6  Notice that ‘ill-informed party’ and ‘well-informed party’ are relative concepts. Here, ‘ill-informed’ 
means less informed. The ill-informed principal may still be better informed than another party involved 
in, or affected by the transaction. Also, as Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985, p. 3) noted, an agent may know 
more about the tasks he has to perform, but a principal may know more about what he wants to be 
realised. 
7  Williamson (1985, pp. 47-50) distinguished different forms of self-interest seeking. In the weakest 
form, ‘obedience’, there is in fact no self-interest seeking. At the other extreme is ‘opportunism’. 
Opportunistic behaviour includes deceiving people, giving them incomplete or false information on 
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problem if the agent is obedient. Likewise, opportunistic behaviour does not exclude 
harmonising goals. 
 What complicates the relationship is the presence of outcome uncertainty. Often, 
agency theory is applied to relationships in which the outcome of a particular process is 
uncertain and only partially the result of the actions performed by the agent. The outcome 
is also determined by factors over which the agent has no control, like technological 
developments, weather conditions or government regulation. The relative contribution of 
the agent to the final result is unknown. As a result, the principal may have problems 
drawing conclusions about the agent’s effort from the outcome. 
 As noted, in agency theory agents are assumed to behave opportunistically. Next to 
this assumption, some other behavioural assumptions are being made. Agency theory is 
embedded in neo-institutional economics and, in general, it is assumed that both parties 
are rational, show utility-maximising behaviour and are risk averse (Neelen 1993). Often 
it is assumed that the agent is more averse to risks than the principal.8 
 
3.2.3 Modifications of the traditional assumptions 
 
The assumptions of the basic agency model about principal and agent are rather 
restrictive, which limits the applicability of the theory. In the course of time, some 
modifications of the theory, or extensions to it, have been proposed. A first one is the 
relaxation of the goal-conflict assumption. In some cases, the goals of principal and agent 
may converge, for instance, in case of employers and employees in a clan (Ouchi 1979) 
or in a small family business. 9 
 Although the assumption of opportunistic behaviour of the agent is at the heart of 
agency theory, it is questionable whether agents always behave in that way. The 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
purpose. Somewhere in between is ‘simple self-interest seeking’ which is a more decent kind of behavi-
our. 
Perrow (1986, p. 233) also discerned a ‘neutral’ kind of behaviour. Behaviour is considered neutral if 
one’s action does not hurt or even helps another and entails no gain or loss to the actor. Also according to 
Perrow, ‘other-regarding behaviour’ helps the other and entails the actor a loss. Finally, in case of ‘self-
regarding behaviour’ the other suffers a loss. 
8  Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 60-61) noted that the principal is assumed to be less risk avers than the agent 
because the first is able to diversify his risks. Such an assumption is, for instance, applicable to the relati-
onship between employer and employee, or between insurer and insured. 
9  Employees (agents) who display a deep commitment to an organisation’s objectives may improve their 
career prospects. However, the other way around, employees who face career prospects may display a 
deep commitment to these objectives. Hope of promotion may motivate an agent to respect the 
organisation’s objectives (Sappington 1991). During the so-called socialisation process, objectives of an 
employee may be aligned with the objectives of the organisation. According to Ouchi (1979, p. 837), a 
clan is a unique organisation characterised by this socialisation process. He also distinguished between 
professions (a group of people who occupy different organisations with the same values) and cultures 
(the process of socialisation referring to all the citizens of a political unit). 
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relationship between patient and doctor or, again, the relationships within a small family 
business are examples in which this assumption might be relaxed.10 Further, as Perrow 
(1986, p. 227) noted, it may be the principal instead of the agent who behaves opportu-
nistically. 
 It is assumed that principal and agent are rational. Some, Eisenhardt (1989) for 
instance, assume that the rationality of the parties is bounded. 
 The programmability of the agent’s tasks is another possible extension of the standard 
assumptions. Usually it is assumed that the agent’s behaviour is difficult to observe and 
to evaluate. However, if a task is more programmed – task programmability is defined as 
‘the degree to which appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance’ 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 62) – then observing and evaluating the agent will be less difficult. 
 In agency theory it is assumed that the outcome is the principal’s most important 
source of information. The outcome may not be certain and it may be unclear how far it 
results from the agent’s actions, but the outcome is observable or measurable. However, 
in practice the outcome may be difficult to observe or to measure. As Eisenhardt noted 
(1989, p. 62), it may take time before an outcome can be measured, or an outcome may 
be ‘soft’. Related to this is the presence of several agents who all contribute to the 
outcome. Team effort makes it difficult for the principal to measure an individual agent’s 
contribution to the outcome. If the agent is aware of the principal’s problem, he may be 
tempted to shirk (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
 In case of more agents performing comparable tasks, the principal may use the relative 
performance of other agents as an indicator of a certain agent’s efforts (Sappington 
1991). The external factors over which the agents have no control should be the same for 
all agents then. Otherwise relative performance is unfair. Another advantage of more 
agents is that competition between agents may stimulate an individual agent to act in the 
principal’s best interests. 
 Long-term or repeated relationships may lessen the information asymmetry in the 
course of time. The longer the principal knows the agent, the better he will know him and 
the circumstances under which the agent has to perform his actions, and the easier it will 
be to evaluate his behaviour. Also, the agent may be less tempted to cheat, as the risk of 
detection becomes larger. Moreover, the agent as well as the principal may have an 
interest in maintaining such relationships, because of investments that are made, 
experience or information that is acquired (to which there is a cost), et cetera. 
 Relaxation of the assumptions can have consequences for the design of the contract 
between principal and agent. If goals of both parties are similar, the agent does not 
behave opportunistically, the agent’s tasks are programmable, there is competition 
between agents, or relationships are long-termed, then the contracts can be less complex. 
 
                                                                 
10  In the example of the small family business it is not clear whether the goal-conflict assumption or the 
opportunistic-behaviour assumption should be relaxed, though. The goals of the kids may resemble the 
goals of the parents, but they may also be obedient. 
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On the other hand, problems with observing or measuring the outcome, or the presence of 
several agents all contributing to it, may increase the need for more complex monitoring 
techniques. 
 
3.2.4 Agency problems 
 
The difficulties that may arise because of the combination of asymmetric information and 
conflicting interests are called ‘agency problems’. Two types of agency problems can be 
discerned. The first problem is that of hidden information, hidden knowledge or, usually 
more specific, adverse selection (Arrow 1986). In this case the agent’s actions themselves 
may be observable, but the information which he uses for deciding upon these actions is 
unknown. Therefore, the principal does not know whether, given the agent’s knowledge, 
the agent has made the choice that benefits the principal most. 
 By adverse selection is meant that an applicant (the agent) usually is inclined to opt for 
an insurance policy in a way beneficial to himself but detrimental to the insurer (the 
principal). Because the applicant often has more information about his risk than the 
insurer, he may be able to choose a policy of which the price is lower than the expected 
claim costs. Adverse-selection problems only form a subset of the hidden-information 
problems. In the case of adverse selection the problem of asymmetric information occur 
before the contract is concluded, while in the other cases such problem also may occur 
during the contract period. 
 The second agency problem is called hidden action or, usually more specific, moral 
hazard (Arrow 1986). This hidden-action problem arises if a principal can not monitor 
the agent’s actions, but only has some information about the outcome of the activity. The 
principal derives some utility from this outcome. Because the agent’s actions and his 
effort increase the probability of the outcome the principal aims for, they are of value to 
the principal. It is assumed, however, that the agent’s actions and efforts are a disutility to 
him (MacDonald 1984, Arrow 1986). Hence principal and agent may value the agent’s 
effort differently.  
 In case of moral hazard, the agent’s actions are not observable either. Often, these 
actions are induced by the presence of some kind of insurance. Because the agent is 
insured against a certain event or loss, he faces reduced incentives to take preventive 
actions or to minimise the damage at the moment the event or the loss occurs.11 
 Often, ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ are used in connection with insurance, 
although the terms are also used in other contexts.12 Hereafter these terms will be used 
instead of ‘hidden information’ and ‘hidden action’. 
 
                                                                 
11  Sometimes, it is the principal who is insured. In that case, moral hazard occurs in case the agent’s 
actions are influenced by the principal’s insurance. To this is returned in chapter 4. 
12  The terms ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ are, for instance, also used to describe problems 
within the relationship between employer and employee (see, for instance, Moe 1984). 
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3.2.5 Examples of agency relationships 
 
Example A1: the relationship between insurer and applicant 
 
Principal: The insurer. 
Agent: The applicant. 
Good/service: Insurance against risk. 
Desired actions: Provision of information by the applicant about his risk. 
Information asymmetry: The applicant has more information about his risk than the insurer. 
Conflict of interests: The insurer would like to attract low-risk individuals, that is, individuals 
with expected claim costs lower than the premium charged for a certain 
policy, whereas the applicant would like to select a policy with a premium 
lower than his expected claim costs. The applicant has therefore no incen-
tive to signal his risk voluntarily and truthfully. 
 
Example A2: the relationship between applicant and insurer 
 
Principal: The applicant. 
Agent: The insurer. 
Good/service: Insurance against risk. 
Desired actions: Provision of information by the insurer about, among other things, his 
reliability, his policy on issues as service, payouts, investments and 
development of new products, his arrangements with intermediaries and 
repairers. 
Information asymmetry: The applicant has difficulties selecting an insurer, as it is the insurer who 
has more information about his reliability, policy, arrangements, et cetera. 
Conflict of interests: The applicant would like to select the insurer most fitted to his needs and 
wants, but the insurer has no incentive to reveal information in so far as 
this information is conflicting with his own interests.13 
 
Before proceeding, the foregoing is illustrated with some examples of relationships in 
which the problems of asymmetric information and conflicting interests are present. It is 
shown that, from an agency perspective, relationships may be interpreted in several ways. 
The identification of principal (ill informed) and agent (well informed), their goals and 
the goods or services in question may be problematic. This is demonstrated by example 
A1 and example A2, which pertain to the adverse-selection problems within the 
 
                                                                 
13  For example, the insurer has no incentive to inform an applicant about the way he provides service if 
it leaves a lot to be desired (assuming that the insurer wants to attract the applicant). 
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relationship between an insurer and an applicant. Of course the desired actions as well as 
the interests of both principal and agent are hypothetical. 
 In example A1, it is the insurer who is ill informed. In the next example, the same 
parties are involved, but now the applicant is supposed to be ill informed. Further, the 
asymmetry relates to different information. 
  
Example B: the relationship between firm and market researcher 
 
Principal: Firm. 
Agent: Market researcher. 
Good/service: Information about customer preferences. 
Desired actions: Collecting, analysing and providing information about what (potential) 
customers need or (want to) buy. 
Information asymmetry: The firm is unable to monitor the researcher and, therefore, does not know 
whether the researcher makes an effort to act in the firm’s best interests. 
The firm has difficulties determining whether the final outcome is the best 
possible outcome. 
Conflict of interests: The firm has an interest in obtaining a high-quality research report at a 
low price, whereas the researcher may value income positively and effort 
negatively.14 
 
Example C: the relationship between employer (or planner) and chauffeur 
 
Principal: Employer (or planner). 
Agent: Chauffeur. 
Good/service: Delivery of parcels. 
Desired actions: Delivering parcels as fast as possible. 
Information asymmetry: The employer or planner has no, or only little information about the way 
the chauffeur drives (speeding, losing his way), and also faces outcome 
uncertainty due to weather conditions and traffic jams. 
Conflict of interests: The chauffeur may have no incentive to act in the employer’s or planner’s 
best interests, that is speeding in order to deliver as many parcels as 
possible in the shortest possible time and thereby lowering costs15 
 
 
                                                                 
14  It is often assumed in the principal-agent literature that the agent derives a positive utility from 
income and a negative utility from effort. See, for instance, Shavell (1979), MacDonald (1984) and 
Arrow (1986). 
15  Whether the chauffeur has an incentive to deliver as many parcels as possible in a certain period of 
time, will, among other things, depend on the compensation in use. 
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Example B and example C concern problems of moral hazard. In example B, the 
principal is able to observe the outcome, which is the result of the agent’s actions, but he 
is unable to evaluate the outcome. In example C, the principal’s problems are increased 
due to the presence of outcome uncertainty. 
 
 
3.3 Dealing with agency problems 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
In agency relationships, the principal encounters problems of asymmetric information, 
conflicting interests and outcome uncertainty. As a consequence, the outcome – partially 
the result of the agent’s actions – may deviate from the outcome the principal had in 
mind. The principal will have to motivate an agent to act on his behalf by drawing up a 
contract that stimulates the agent to choose an action that is in the principal’s interests. 
 Subject of this section is the set of different strategies derived from agency theory that 
the principal can use to further the outcome he aims for. We classified these strategies 
into three groups. The first strategy is aimed at selecting the right agent. The second 
strategy is aimed at stimulating, informing and persuading, and directing the agent. The 
general term used here to cover these methods is controlling. The third primary strategy 
is monitoring the agent and involves observing or measuring his behaviour. Also subject 
of this section are the costs an agency relationship entails to both the principal and the 
agent. 
 
3.3.2 Selecting the agent 
 
In an attempt to minimise the agency problems, the principal may take some preventive 
measures. One possibility is agent selection, which serves two purposes. 
 The first purpose of selection is to reduce problems of diverging interests by seeking 
an agent who is committed to the principal’s goals. Selection of a fitting agent takes place 
before the contract is concluded.  
 A second purpose of selection is stimulating the already selected agent to act in the 
interests of the principal. Simply the fact that the principal is in the position to select an 
alternative agent may serve as a stimulus to the agent to direct his behaviour at the 
principal. This ‘threat of competition’ takes place after the contract between principal and 
agent is concluded (Sappington 1991, p. 57). 
 There are different approaches to screen the potential agent. Firstly, the principal may 
try to distinguish the agents and classify them according to age, sex, training, occupation, 
or whatever relevant variable. Secondly, in case of agent characteristics that are more 
difficult to observe, the principal may stimulate a potential agent to reveal his true 
knowledge, skills, beliefs, expectations, et cetera. An indirect way of inducing an agent to 
disclose his hidden information is self-selection (Arrow 1986, p. 1187). By offering 
agents several contracts and letting them choose the one they prefer, the principal may be 
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able to differentiate the agents from each other. Finally, a principal may incorporate a 
probationary period. 
 In general, the selection problem will occur before a new contract is concluded. 
Another possibility is that the principal wants to deter the agent from terminating the rela-
tionship in order to prevent adverse selection problems. For instance, an insurer (the 
principal) may want to deter the insured (the agent) from terminating the insurance 
contract by raising switching costs or by colluding with other insurers (Schut 1995).16 
 
Naturally, to be able to select an agent, a sufficient supply of agents is necessary. The 
problem, however, will often be the ability of the principal to identify among several 
agents the one who might serve the principal’s interests best, and not so much the number 
of agents. Further, it is not necessarily the principal who selects the agent. The agent may 
also have been appointed to the principal (or the other way around) or the agent may have 
selected the principal. Finally, legislation may prohibit selective contracting or provide 
the agent with a monopoly position. 
 
3.3.3 Controlling the agent 
 
Another way to handle agency problems is trying to bring the objectives of the selected 
agent in line with those of the principal. The principal may try to influence the agent’s 
behaviour and his efforts by using one or more methods of control. Although in agency 
theory (especially in the mathematical principal-agent literature) emphasis is placed on 
financial incentives and risk-sharing arrangements, other methods to control the agent are 
possible as well. These methods range from simply providing information hoping it will 
guide the agent, to forcing him by using (threats of) violence. 
 Distinctions between different controlling strategies have, for instance, been made by 
Lindblom and by Mitnick. Lindblom (1977) distinguished between control by exchange, 
control by authority and control by persuasion. Control by exchange involves inducing, 
in a market-like situation, an agent to perform an action by offering him a benefit in 
return. Control by authority involves unilateral co-ordination of an agent’s actions within 
a hierarchical relationship or ‘mutual adjustment' among different authorities.17 Control 
by persuasion, lastly, involves transferring information to the agent in the hope that he 
 
                                                                 
16  Schut (1995, pp. 126-128) described several strategies a private health insurer may use to prevent 
adverse selection. These are rating risks (based on loss probabilities or loss experiences), selecting 
preferred risks (selective underwriting), stimulating risk signalling by agents (self-selection), raising 
switching costs, and collusion. 
17  Authority can also be exercised in absence of a hierarchical relationship. In case of mutual adjustment 
among authorities, different (equal) authorities give way to each other and exercise authority over each 
other. For instance, authority A may force authority B to co-operate by the threat of not co-operating 
with B’s projects (see Lindblom 1977, pp. 29-31). 
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chooses the preferred actions or, somewhat stronger, persuading the agent to choose these 
actions. 
 Another classification was proposed by Mitnick (1980, p. 9) who made a distinction 
between regulation by incentives and regulation by directives, although he recognised 
that directives can also be viewed as negative incentives. Regulation by incentives 
involves ‘changing the perception of the nature of the alternatives for action subject to 
choice; i.e. changing the relative attractiveness of alternatives.’ Changing the relative 
attractiveness can be done by changing the alternatives or its characteristics, or by 
changing the agent so that he evaluates or perceives the alternative actions in a different 
way (Mitnick 1980, pp. 342-343). The agent, however, still has a choice which action to 
perform or how much effort to make. In case of regulation by directives, or rules for 
behaviour, the agent’s choice is directed. 
 Neelen (1993, p. 71) combined the classifications of Lindblom and Mitnick. This 
resulted in three methods to control the agent: control by incentives, control by persua-
sion or information, and control by directive or authority. Neelen substituted ‘control by 
incentives’, analogous to Mitnick’s ‘regulation by incentives’, for Lindblom’s concept of 
‘control by exchange’. This is an arbitrarily decision since Mitnick’s ‘regulation by 
incentives’ also contains methods comparable to Lindblom’s concept of ‘control by 
persuasion’. However, the resulting classification (control by incentives, control by 
persuasion or information, and control by directive or authority) is workable here. Firstly, 
Mitnick’s ‘regulation by incentives’ is split into its two parts, i.e. changing the alterna-
tives or its characteristics (control by incentives), or changing the agent (control by 
persuasion or information). Secondly, Neelen’s classification contains the concept of 
‘incentives’ which is a well-known concept in agency literature. Therefore, it is more 
workable here than Lindblom’s classification. Hence hereafter Neelen is followed. 
 
Control by incentives 
Usually, the agent has to choose one action or a series of actions from a set of feasible 
actions. Control by incentives involves stimulating the agent to choose from this set those 
actions that benefit the principal most by making the preferred actions more attractive to 
the agent. 
 One can think of several ways to stimulate an agent. A first way to categorise possible 
incentives is by their nature. For instance, incentives can be financial or non-financial by 
nature. Non-financial incentives can be further subdivided into incentives that are non-
financial but do have a monetary equivalent (like a larger lease car or presents) and incen-
tives that do not (like compliments or admiration). In agency theory, incentives are 
usually stated in monetary terms. Financial incentives can be based upon behaviour (for 
instance, hourly wages as a proxy for behaviour), outcome (for instance, by letting the 
agent share in the yield) or a combination of both. 
 Often considered in agency theory – at least in the principal-agent literature – is letting 
the compensation of the agent depend upon the outcome by sharing the risks due to the 
external factors over which both principal and agent have no control. Does the outcome 
only result from the agent’s actions, then there is no need for risk sharing and the 
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 40 
compensation can be based upon the outcome. In case of a random component, the risks 
will probably be shared. Whether risk sharing will be used in an agency relationship 
depends upon the principal’s as well as the agent’s aversion to risks. Suppose the 
principal is risk averse. Then a risk-neutral agent can be compensated by giving him the 
yield minus a fixed portion for the principal.18 By so doing, the agent bears all the risk 
and has a strong incentive to make an effort. On the other hand, if the agent is averse to 
risks too, then sharing of these risks will be inevitable and the compensation will only to 
some extent depend upon the outcome (Shavell 1979). As a consequence of lessening the 
agent’s risks, the incentive he faces to make an effort will be reduced too. 
 Apart from being financial or non-financial, incentives can also be positive (reward-
ing) or negative (penalising) by nature. Positive incentives entail, for instance, a bonus or 
a promotion in case the agent’s behaviour or the results of his actions are satisfactory. 
Examples of negative incentives are a malus or termination of the contract in case his 
behaviour or his results are not satisfactory. 
 A second way to categorise possible incentives is by the fact whether they are made 
contingent upon a certain condition. Incentives may be conditional as well as uncondi-
tional on, for instance, the actions the agent performs or on his efforts. To illustrate this, 
consider the relationship between employer (the principal) and employee (the agent). In 
order to stimulate hard working, the employer may increase his employees’ incomes. This 
increase is an incentive not conditional on the factual production level of an individual 
employee. Another possibility, however, is that the employer pays his employees on a 
piecework basis. The increase of an employee’s income is made conditional on his efforts 
then. 
 
To make the agent performing certain actions (or not performing them) on behalf of the 
principal, the latter has to draw up a contract that stimulates desired behaviour: the 
‘incentive compatibility constraint’. The stronger the incentives, the more the agent will 
be forced to act in the principal’s interests. However, the principal often is limited in his 
choice of contract design. If the agent considers the contract as unattractive, he may not 
want to accept it. Moreover, in case of more than one principal there may be competition 
for the agent. If there is, the agent may have several options to choose from. Hence the 
contract offered by a certain principal must be at least as attractive as those offered by 
other principals. This limitation is called the ‘participation constraint’ (Arrow 1986, Ryan 
1994). 
 
Control by persuasion or information 
Whereas incentives stimulate the agent to perform the preferred actions, control by 
persuasion or information involves informing the agent so that he values the preferred 
actions more positively and persuading him to perform these actions. The principal may 
 
                                                                 
18  This fixed portion can be seen as a ‘franchise fee’ (Sappington 1991, p. 47). 
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gather data and inform the agent directly, use advertising, point at societal norms, et 
cetera. In principle, the rewards and penalties remain the same though. 
 
Control by directive or authority 
Control by directive or authority differs from the other two controlling strategies in that 
the agent’s choice is restricted. The actions the agent has to perform are defined. As do 
control by incentives and control by persuasion or information, control by directive or 
authority of course leaves room for undesirable actions performed by the agent, but he 
will have to bear the costs of sanctions then. In case of strong incentives there is a 
resemblance to control by directive or authority for in fact the agent’s choice is restricted 
too. 
 In agency theory authority and hierarchy is sometimes left out of consideration and 
both parties within the relationship are considered to be equal. That is, there is no hier-
archical relationship and contracting takes place on the market instead of, for example, 
within organisations. For some relationships, for instance the relationship between an 
insurer and an insured, this will not present problems. For other relationships, however, 
these concepts cannot be ruled out. An example of such a relationship is the one between 
employer and employee. Therefore, the absence of authority and hierarchy in some 
relationships has been seriously questioned by organisational theorists (see, for instance, 
Perrow 1986) but has also been recognised by agency theorists (see, for instance, 
MacDonald 1984). Pratt and Zeckhauser (1985) noted that, as it is assumed that 
monitoring the agent is costly, organisations might fulfil several control functions that 
can not be achieved in market-type relationships as well. According to Pratt and 
Zeckhauser (1985, p. 32) ‘forming an organisation only internalises agency relationships. 
It does not eliminate problems of co-ordination, incentives, and so on. Presumably, 
though, it should substantially lessen them, for now we are all working on the same team 
and can be rewarded accordingly’ (italics added, A.V.). 
 
3.3.4 Monitoring the agent 
 
There are different ways to handle the problems of imperfect information that occur after 
the contract is concluded. One way is to monitor the agent in order to reduce the 
information gap. Besides trying to acquire information about the agent’s actions, the 
principal may also try to trace the information the agent uses for deciding upon these 
actions. 
 A different approach might be to try to acquire information about the external factors 
which influence the outcome but over which the agent has no control. If the principal 
succeeds in this, he may be more able to draw conclusions about the agent’s actions from 
the outcome. Hereafter, the term monitoring will be used solely to denote observing or 
measuring the agent’s behaviour. Acquiring information about the external factors over 
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 42 
which the agent has no control will be denoted as monitoring, observing or measuring the 
external factors.19 
 Monitoring the agent serves several purposes. Obviously, it may reduce the principal’s 
informational disadvantage, but it can also be viewed as an incentive. The agent, 
knowing his behaviour is being observed or measured, may be stimulated to act in the 
principal’s best interests if his compensation is contingent upon this behaviour (see 
subsection 3.3.3). Further, investment in observation and measuring instruments is one of 
the preventive measures the principal may take before the contract is concluded in an 
attempt to minimise agency problems. The presence of such devices may discourage a 
potential agent who has the intention to cheat to enter into a relationship with the 
principal. It thus can be seen as an additional way to select an agent. 
 
3.3.5 Agency costs 
 
Because the transaction costs of selection, controlling and monitoring are positive, the 
principal has to incur costs to accomplish desired behaviour. But, as will be explained, 
also the agent may have to incur some expenses. 
 Different types of costs can be distinguished. Mitnick (1980, p. 150) distinguished 
between specification costs and policing costs. Specification costs are the costs the 
principal has to incur to identify the actions and efforts that serve his interests the best. 
The agent may also have to incur such costs ‘(...) in ascertaining and acting for the 
principal’s preferences.’ The principal has to pay policing costs to monitor the agent and 
to enforce compliance. 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) distinguished between three types of costs, of 
which the sum is labelled ‘agency costs’. Firstly, the principal has to make monitoring 
and controlling costs to reduce the information asymmetry by observing or measuring the 
agent’s behaviour and to control the agent.20 Secondly, the agent may take measures to 
guarantee that he does not harm the principal. Also, the agent may ensure that the princi-
pal is compensated whenever he does act contrary to the principal’s best interests. The 
expenses the agent has to incur are called bonding costs.21 If in spite of the incurred 
monitoring and bonding costs the outcome indeed deviates in a negative manner from the 
 
                                                                 
19  Elsewhere, however, the term monitoring is also used in a broader sense: Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p. 308) understood by monitoring not only observing or measuring but also controlling the agent, for 
instance by using incentive schemes. For reasons of uniformity, the term monitoring and controlling 
costs will replace the term monitoring costs as used by Jensen and Meckling (see subsection 3.3.5). 
20  Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) labelled these costs monitoring costs (see the previous footnote). 
As examples of monitoring methods they mentioned auditing, formal control systems, budget restric-
tions, and incentive compensation systems (1976, p. 323). 
21  Examples of bonding methods are a contractual guarantee that the financial accounts will be audited 
by a public account, bonding against malfeasance of the agent, and limitation of the agent’s decision 
making power (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p. 325). 
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outcome the principal aimed at, then is spoken of the residual loss, which is the dollar 
equivalent of the principal’s welfare reduction. 
 Dealing with agency problems implies searching for structures that can reduce the 
residual loss. However, reducing this loss requires incurring monitoring and controlling 
costs as well as bonding costs. Total agency costs, then, have to be minimised by finding 
a level of equilibrium between monitoring and controlling costs plus bonding costs on the 
one hand and the residual loss on the other hand. 
 
 
3.4 Using agency theory 
 
In this study, agency theory serves as the theoretical framework by which the relation-
ships between third parties and GPs are analysed. Although the theory seems well suited 
to serve as theoretical framework here, the choice of agency theory entails some limita-
tions. Firstly, the theory of agency itself has some limitations. Secondly, the agency 
theory may not be fully applicable to the relationships between third parties and GPs. The 
first limitations are subject of this section; the latter are discussed in the next chapter. 
 As with all theories, the theory chosen here is a simplification of the surrounding 
world. An example is the isolated environment in which agency relationships, especially 
in the principal-agent literature, often are assumed to exist. It is practically impossible to 
deal with all the variables that affect the decisions of both principals and agents. But even 
though models used in agency theory tend to be rather simplistic, sometimes the proposed 
solutions (complicated financial contracts) are often more complex than observed in 
practice. Arrow (1986, pp. 1193-1194) mentioned three reasons why such complicated 
fee functions are not found in reality. Firstly, both drawing up the arrangements included 
in complex contracts and living up to them is costly. Thus the more complex the contract, 
the higher the transaction costs. Another reason is that in reality all kinds of subtle 
monitoring means are present that make it less necessary to devise complex incentive 
mechanisms. Thirdly, in reality several incentives replace the complicated financial 
incentive structures proposed by agency theory; non-financial stimuli may also influence 
the agent’s behaviour. Examples of these are compliments, appreciation, pride, social and 
professional norms, peer review, or dismissal. 
 Another questionable point is the assumption that the agent behaves opportunistically. 
Although it is important to recognise that some agents may behave opportunistically, it is 
more interesting to investigate under which conditions agents behave in a self-regarding 
way and when they behave in a neutral or other-regarding way (Perrow 1986, p. 232).22 
Perrow (1986, p. 234) also noted that ‘(...) there is no innate tendency to either self- or 
 
                                                                 
22  Opportunistic behaviour is also self-regarding behaviour, but self-regarding behaviour does not have 
to be opportunistic. The latter includes deceit while self-regarding behaviour may be more decent (see 
subsection 3.2.2). 
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other-regarding behaviour in people; either can be evoked depending on the (organisa-
tional or societal, A.V.) structure.’23 He continued by stating that agency theory ‘(...) 
gives scant attention to the co-operative aspects of social life (...)’ (1986, p. 235). 
 Another behavioural assumption concerns the maximising behaviour of both principal 
and agent. As in the neo-classical theory of the firm, in the neo-institutional agency 
theory actors are viewed as utility maximising. However, different levels of rationality 
can be distinguished, ranging from maximising behaviour, via bounded rationality, to 
organic rationality (Williamson 1985, pp. 44-47). There is no unanimity about this 
human-behaviour assumption. 
 Despite these limitations, agency theory has been chosen as the framework. The main 
reason is that the central problems described by the theory seem to resemble the problems 
that occur in the different relationships between third parties and GPs very well (see also 
section 3.1). In the existing relationships, an agent (the GP) provides goods or services 
and is compensated by a principal (often a third party). Furthermore, the relationships 
seem to be characterised by asymmetric information and conflicting interests. Also, the 
outcome of health care is often uncertain due to external factors over which the provider 
has no control. 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we discussed the (choice of a) theoretical background for our study of the 
various relationships between third-parties and GPs and of the various strategies the third 
party may use. There are several reasons for choosing an agency perspective instead of, 
for instance, focusing on the allocation of decision rights. One reason is that agency 
theory seems to correspond well with the situation central in this thesis concerning the 
contractual relationships between two parties (that is, third-party agents and GPs) in 
which the one party (the principal) enters into a relationship with a second party (the 
agent) in the expectation that the agent’s actions are beneficial to the principal. Further, 
the aspect of the use of (financial) incentives corresponds well with the subject of this 
thesis, namely financial-risk sharing. 
 Although a decision rights approach could shed an interesting light on the different 
kind of organisational arrangements between third parties and GPs, questions of 
integration and ownership of assets are beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, the 
use and the ownership of assets are less important facts in general practice than they are 
for instance in medical specialist care, and there are hardly relation-specific assets. 
 
                                                                 
23  Perrow (1986, p. 233) mentioned several organisational conditions which favour self-regarding 
behaviour, for instance, minimisation of continuing interactions (no long-term relationships), encourage-
ment of storage of rewards and surpluses by individuals and of measurement of individual effort, 
minimisation of interdependent effort through choice of equipment and work-flow design. 
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Regarding the question of authority, we assume that the professional or the physician’s 
individual autonomy makes it difficult for a third party to interfere in the patient-
physician relationship in a way different from the ways in a market relationship. Hence 
we assume that the professional relationship with the GP makes that the agency problems 
within an employment situation do not significantly differ from the agency problems 
within a market relationship. A final consideration is that GPs are often self-employed. 
 We have given an overview of agency theory in order to provide an answer to the 
second research question: 
 
What are the main characteristics of agency theory? 
 
In agency theory, a principal commissions an agent to perform some actions for, or on 
behalf of him. The relationship between both parties is characterised by asymmetric 
information and conflicting interests. The agent has more information about his 
intentions, his actions and his efforts or about the circumstances upon which he bases his 
actions and may have different goals. As a result, problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard may arise. Moreover, the principal may have problems drawing conclusions 
about the agent’s efforts by observing the outcome. This is due to the fact that in many 
agency relationships the outcome is uncertain because of external factors that influence 
the outcome but over which the agent has no control. In order to achieve the outcome he 
aims for, the principal has to design a contract that motivates the agent properly. 
 Within the theory of agency, two approaches can be distinguished: the normative and 
non-empirical principal-agent approach, which is highly mathematical, and the empirical 
non-mathematical approach of the ‘positive theory of agency’. In both approaches 
authors concentrate on contracting problems between two parties in a relationship with 
unevenly distributed information and conflicting interests. Also, in both approaches 
assumptions of conflicting goals, human behaviour (opportunism, rationality and risk 
aversion), and information (a commodity, and asymmetrically distributed between 
principal and agent) are being made. While describing mechanisms or techniques third 
parties may and actually do use within their relationships with GPs, our approach can be 
characterised as a positive one. While discussing how systems of financial-risk sharing 
should be structured, our approach can be characterised as normative, although not 
mathematical. 
 Some modifications of the traditional assumptions of the basic model of agency have 
been proposed. These relate to the assumptions of goal conflict and opportunistic 
behaviour, the rationality of principal and agent, the programmability of the agent’s tasks, 
the measurability of the outcome, the number of agents, and the duration of the 
relationship. 
 There are different strategies to handle the problems of agency relationships. Firstly, 
the principal may select an agent who is expected to behave in the principal’s best 
interests. Then, the principal may use different strategies: controlling the agent and 
monitoring the agent. Different controlling strategies are control by incentives, control by 
persuasion or information, and control by directive or authority. By monitoring the agent, 
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the principal may reduce the information gap and may also stimulate the agent to act in 
the principal’s interests. 
 To accomplish desired behaviour, the principal has to incur monitoring and controlling 
costs. The agent may have to incur bonding costs. Nevertheless, there still may be a 
residual loss due to the divergence between the realised outcome and the outcome the 
principal had in mind. Total agency costs are minimised by searching for a level of 
equilibrium between the costs of selecting, monitoring and controlling the agent on the 
one hand, and the residual loss on the other hand. 
 In spite of some limitations the theory seems well suited to serve as the theoretical 
framework here. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that agency theory is applicable to relation-
ships between two parties (a principal and an agent) that are characterised by asymmetri-
cally distributed information and conflicts of interests. Although agency theory is not 
specifically aimed at the various relationships in the health care sector, the agency char-
acteristics, which may be found within such relationships, make its application to that 
sector reasonable. On the other hand it may be argued that the health care sector has 
some special characteristics that may limit the applicability of the theory. 
 Two research questions are addressed in this chapter. In the first place is dealt with the 
fourth question as formulated in chapter 1: 
 
Is agency theory applicable to relationships in the health care sector in general, and to 
the relationships between third-party agents and general practitioners in particular? 
 
To that end, some specific relationships in the health care sector are analysed using 
agency theory. We start with what might be viewed as the central relationship in health 
care: the patient-physician relationship. In the first instance (section 4.2) this relationship 
is considered in isolation from other relationships, that is, as if no third party is involved. 
As argued in chapter 2, however, the health care sector is characterised by the presence of 
a third party performing the insurance function and the agency function. Hence in the 
second instance the third party is introduced. This introduction results in new agency re-
lationships. The relationships dealt with here are those between patient (i.e. insured) and 
third party (section 4.3) and between third party and GP (section 4.4). The patient-phys-
ician relationship is affected by the presence of a third party and, therefore, is reconsid-
ered in section 4.5. In subsection 4.6 we use the several concepts derived from agency 
theory to construct a theoretical framework of which the relationship between third party 
and GPs is a part, and that provides the rationale for the third party’s strategies to influ-
ence the GP. 
 
 
4.2 Patient and general practitioner 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between patient and physician may be considered as the main relation-
ship in health care. It is true other relationships in health care are also important, but in 
general they only facilitate the patient-physician relationship. The question to be an-
swered here is whether the theory of agency is applicable to the relationship between a 
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patient and a GP. In practice, the amount of information both parties possess as well as 
their preferences and attitudes will differ per patient and per physician. But even the rela-
tionship between a specific patient and physician may differ per visit and depend on the 
nature of the patient’s complaints. For instance, the relationship a chronically-ill patient 
may have with a physician will change once an acute disease has developed. 
 In subsection 4.2.2, agency theory is applied to the relationship between patient and 
(primary care) physician. In subsection 4.2.3, some modifications of the standard as-
sumptions are discussed. The concept of perfect agency is discussed in subsection 4.2.4. 
Finally, in subsection 4.2.5 we analyse the agency problems that may occur within the 
relationship. 
 
4.2.2 Applying the theory of principal and agent 
 
Agency theory seems applicable to the patient-physician relationship. Indeed, several 
authors described the relationship using agency theory (see, for instance, Evans 1984, 
Dranove and White 1987, Blomqvist 1991, Mooney and Ryan 1993, Ryan 1994, Scott 
1996, Smith et al. 1997) or mentioned it as an obvious instance of an agency relationship 
(see Moe 1984, Arrow 1986, Spremann 1989). According to Arrow (1986, p. 1193), the 
patient-physician relationship is even an almost perfect example of the principal-agent 
problem. 
 In agency terms, the relationship is characterised by asymmetric information. The GP 
is supposed to be the well-informed agent, the patient the ill-informed principal. The pa-
tient may have information about what he wants to be realised, but usually it is the phys-
ician, as a trained and skilled professional, who is much better informed about clinical 
pictures, possible treatments and the effects or side-effects of specific treatments. Does 
the physician already have a lead at the beginning of the relationship, the difference in 
information may increase as the relationship develops and the physician obtains more and 
more information about the health status of a particular patient. But then, the patient may 
also acquire (part of) this information and thereby keep up with the physician. Whether 
the patient will be able to reduce the asymmetry of information is open to question. 
 The extent of the difference in information between patient and physician may differ 
per relationship. The patient may have some experience with a certain disease and may 
be almost as well informed as the physician, which is especially plausible in case of a 
patient with a chronic disease. If the difference in information is minor or even absent, 
continuation of such a relationship may still make sense if the patient depends on the 
physician, for instance for a prescription or a referral. In absence of an asymmetry of in-
formation, however, the relationship doesn’t meet the characteristics of an agency rela-
tionship anymore. 
 Further, not only the patient but also the GP may not always be well-informed. Due to 
a lack of knowledge or experience he may not know which actions to perform or whether 
his actions are effective, considering the patient’s symptoms. A shortage of knowledge 
may be a limitation of a particular physician, but it may also reflect the absence of certain 
knowledge or consensus within the medical profession. As Pauly (1978, p. 17) remarked, 
‘no one knows whether board certification, tonsillectomies, or some lab tests will im-
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prove health outcomes or not.’ Patients are often not able to evaluate the quality of care, 
that is, the quality of treatments, diagnostics, prescriptions or referrals, but sometimes 
physicians are neither. According to Evans (1984, p. 89), there is, ‘particularly for diag-
nostic and monitoring activities, a broad zone of uncertainty in which optimal treatment 
and the limits of efficacy have not been scientifically established.’ Although in case of a 
relatively ill-informed physician the extent of the information asymmetry may be limited, 
the patient may still think such an asymmetry exists. Only the idea that the physician is 
better informed may cause agency problems. 
 The second crucial characteristic of an agency relationship, the presence of a conflict 
of interests, may also be found here. The patient will expect the physician-as-agent to act 
in his best interests by providing goods or services properly. In case of a GP, examples of 
these goods and services are information, advice, prescriptions, referrals, medical ser-
vices provided by the physician in question, and co-ordination of care provided by other 
providers. In return for this provision, the physician will receive a financial compen-
sation. However, the relationship may be characterised by conflicting interests. Once the 
patient has made a price-quality trade-off, he may want the physician’s unconditional 
attention, devotion and effort, whereas the physician’s behaviour is restricted by his own 
objectives. Although the physician will probably take the patient’s interests into account, 
acting accordingly may reduce his own welfare. The physician’s welfare may, for in-
stance, be a function of his income, his leisure, his workload, and his intellectual satisfac-
tion (Scott 1997). Whether and how the physician’s income is influenced by his actions 
depends on the compensation scheme. Then the question arises how income affects the 
physician’s welfare. Probably, it will have a positive effect but with a diminishing mar-
ginal utility. 
 Common ways of compensation are fee for service, capitation and salary. Each action 
by the physician may increase his income in a fee-for-service system, whereas it may 
relatively decrease his income in a capitation system. In a salary system, the income will 
remain unaffected. By using a certain compensation system, the patient can thus stimu-
late the physician to act in the desired manner.1 The conflict will depend on the compen-
sation scheme in use. For instance, in a fee-for-service system the interests of patient and 
physician are similar as long as the marginal benefits of care exceed the marginal costs 
for both physician and patient. Once the marginal benefits for the patient become lower 
than the marginal costs (i.e. fee plus time costs), a conflict may arise. From this point on, 
the physician may want to provide more care than is best for the patient if the fee is 
higher than the marginal costs of providing care. In a capitation system the incentives are 
different. Here a conflict may arise as long as the marginal health effects are positive and 
will disappear once the marginal effects diminish. In case of zero or negative effects, nei-
ther the patient nor the physician has an incentive to demand or to provide care. 
 Another major concept of agency theory, the presence of outcome uncertainty, seems 
to apply to the present relationship too. The outcome is uncertain and will only partially 
 
                                                                 
1 Notice that in this section the patient-physician relationship is considered in isolation from other rela-
tionships, that is, in absence of a third party. It is not very likely then that the patient would opt for a 
salary or a capitation scheme. 
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be the result of the GP’s actions. It will result from the course of medical treatment as 
well as the natural course of the disease or other health influencing factors. As a result, 
the patient will have problems assessing the appropriateness of the physician’s actions 
and the quality of the physician as such. 
 
Because of the differences in information and interests, the patient can not assume that 
the GP will always act in his interests. Therefore, the patient has to devise a contract that 
will stimulate the physician to act in a way that is beneficial to the patient. As the physi-
cian will not accept each contract and, moreover, will probably have different contracts to 
choose from, the contract offered by a particular patient will have to be at least as attrac-
tive as those offered by other patients. The options the patient has then range from what 
he finds minimally acceptable to himself – this will be the result of a price-quality trade-
off – to what is minimally acceptable to the physician. The latter limit is called the ‘par-
ticipation constraint’ (Arrow 1986, p. 1189). Eventually, the patient can choose the op-
tion of ‘voting with his feet’ (exit) if the costs of staying with the same physician out-
weigh the transaction costs of switching (Tai-Seale 2004). He will have to find another 
physician then who is prepared to accept his contract terms. 
 
Usually, the physician is depicted as the agent. To illustrate that the role of both principal 
and agent might also be reversed, another way to look at the relationship is described 
here. By reversing the roles of both parties, the physician now becomes the ill-informed 
principal, the patient the well-informed agent. There seems to be an asymmetry of infor-
mation in the sense that it is the patient who has essential information about his medical 
history, current health status, life style, true intentions for visiting a physician, et cetera. 
The ill-informed physician would like to obtain this information, as it may be crucial to 
the decisions about diagnosis and treatments. Also, the physician would like to have the 
patient acting in his interests by complying with his prescriptions. As will be shown here-
after, these actions are in the interests of the physician because of his reputation, for fi-
nancial reasons, et cetera. The patient-as-agent, however, may have own interests. Espe-
cially in the pre-contractual phase he may want to withhold information that might influ-
ence the terms of the contract. Further, he may have his own reasons for paying a visit, 
which don’t necessarily have to be medical by nature. He may, for instance, want atten-
tion or he may want to legitimise his absence from his work. Further, the patient may 
have his reasons for holding back information, or for distorting it. The information may, 
for instance, be intimate by nature and the patient might feel ashamed about it. Likewise, 
provision of certain information may reveal the patient’s lifestyle, which may be a major 
cause of his symptoms. Guilt then may restrain the patient from telling the truth. As to 
the compliance with the physician’s prescriptions, it is well known that compliance is far 
from optimal. 
 Both parties may have both roles; it is not either the patient or the physician who may 
fulfil the role of principal. Moreover, it could be argued that they are principal and agent 
at the same time. The GP is agent in his relationship with the patient in which he pos-
sesses more information about clinical pictures, treatments et cetera, and in which he is 
supposed to apply his knowledge and experience in a way which increases the patient’s 
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welfare most. The physician is principal in his relationship with the patient in which the 
latter is better informed about the possible causes of his symptoms, the nature and the 
extent of this symptoms, his true intentions et cetera. In both cases, the patient and the 
physician have their own interests, which will probably diverge. 
 
4.2.3 Modification of standard assumptions 
 
Although there is a clear resemblance between the patient-physician relationship and the 
standard agency relationship, the first diverges from the latter in several respects. There-
fore, some assumptions of the agency theory are relaxed here. 
 Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the patient-physician relationship and 
the standard agency relationship concerns the conflict of interests, which may be less se-
vere in the first relationship than in the latter. In agency theory the agent is supposed to 
act in his own interests, which may be problematic unless his interests are, for instance by 
coincidence or due to incentive mechanisms, similar to those of the principal. However, 
Evans (1984, p. 79) argued that a professional relationship, like the patient-physician 
relationship, should not be confused with the standard principal-agent relationship. ‘In 
the principal-agent problem (...) the objectives of principal and agent are strictly sepa-
rated; each intends to serve only her own interests. What distinguishes the professional 
agency relation is that the professional includes part at least of the patient’s/client’s inter-
ests in her own objectives.’ Professional norms and values taught him during his training 
and social control by peers, patients, et cetera, will stimulate the physician to direct his 
actions at the patient. Nevertheless, it is likely that there is a large variation in this altru-
ism across the population of physicians (Jack 2005). Also important here is the notion of 
trust (Gray 1997). The patient will have to trust in the physician’s capabilities and trust 
that he applies his skills in a way that is beneficial to the patient, even if this is incompat-
ible with the physician’s own interests.2 
 Another reason why the conflict of interests may be smaller is the nature of the rela-
tionship between a patient and his GP. Especially the relationship between a patient and a 
GP may often be characterised as a lengthy or a repeated contact. This is in contrast to 
the relationship with a specialist, which is often relatively short-termed. A long-term rela-
tionship may prevent the physician from pursuing solely his own interests, because poor 
performance may prompt the patient to terminate the relationship or not to renew it 
(Dranove and White 1987). Poor performance may also ruin the physician’s reputation. 
Further, Jelovac (2001) argued that if repeated contracts are a possibility and depending 
on the type of contract between third party and physician, the physician may be induced 
to recommend the most adequate treatment in order to avoid additional treatments and 
their associated costs in the future. The same will hold for the present relationship be-
tween patient and physician. 
 
                                                                 
2 The patient as the ill-informed principal has to trust in the physician’s knowledge and experience, and 
thus in fact has to trust in the presence of an information asymmetry. As to the conflicting interests, he 
has to trust in the absence of a conflict. 
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 A next remark about the differences between both types of relationships pertains to the 
principal’s goals. In agency theory it is assumed that the principal knows what he wants 
to be realised. In the patient-physician relationship, however, it is questionable whether 
the patient-as-principal indeed knows what the final result of the physician’s actions 
should be. The patient may have some general ideas, like ‘control the disease’ or ‘restore 
health’, but often it will be the physician who will determine which goals are attainable, 
and which are not.3 Moreover, often the goals can only be set after the patient has been 
diagnosed, that is, after the relationship has been established. This may have conse-
quences for the strategies the patient may use to select and to control the physician. For 
instance, it is hard to select an agent if it is not clear which knowledge and experience are 
required at the moment the selection takes place. Also, without the diagnostic informa-
tion it will be difficult to make the actions that are mostly preferred by the patient attrac-
tive to the physician. 
 Two final remarks pertain to the outcome of the physician’s actions. Firstly, the out-
come is non-financial by nature. Instead of in financial terms, it will probably be stated in 
terms of health status or well-being. Secondly, as noted above, the outcome is uncertain 
due to the natural course of the disease and external factors over which the physician has 
no control. But what distinguishes the present relationship is that the patient also influ-
ences the outcome. Although it is not uncommon that a principal has some influence on 
the outcome, the extent of the patient’s influence seems to be significant.4 Not only the 
provision of information by the patient determines to a large extent the success of the 
physician’s actions; the patient’s compliance with the physician’s recommendations or 
prescriptions is another major outcome determinant. 
 
4.2.4 Perfect agency 
 
Having recognised that the GP as the patient’s agent may possess superior information 
and have different interests, the question arises when he acts as the patient’s ‘perfect’ 
agent. In the discussion about a perfect-agency relationship, two matters are put forward. 
Firstly, there is the question of who should be the decision-maker. The physician may 
convey the information to the patient and let the patient make the decisions, or he may 
make the decisions himself and perform those actions which he thinks are in the patient’s 
best interests. The second question pertains to what should be enhanced: the patient's 
health or his well-being. 
 There are several views on the physician’s agency role. Evans (1981) viewed the rela-
tionship between a patient and a GP as one in which the physician has, to some extent, 
integrated forward into the role of the patient. Perfect agency requires complete forward 
 
                                                                 
3 For the patient it may be hard to judge the need for and the quality of the physician’s goods and ser-
vices. Often, it will be the physician who sets the goals and who decides in which way these goals may 
be achieved. Hence the physician’s goods and services have the characteristics of credence goods. 
4 That in a standard agency relationship the principal may have some influence on the outcome can be 
illustrated by example C in section 3.2.5. The outcome is the result of the chauffeur’s actions and exter-
nal factors, like weather conditions or other traffic, but it also depends on the employer for it is the latter 
who decides upon matters like the purchase of reliable cars or communications equipment. 
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integration, whereby the individual patient and the physician form an informed pair. This 
informed pair should use the physician’s information and the patient’s objectives and 
constraints to take decisions that are solely in the patient’s best interests. But despite this 
pairing, elsewhere Evans (1984, p. 75) viewed the physician as the agent ‘(...) trying to 
choose what the patient would have chosen, had she been as well-informed as the profes-
sional.’ Thus, it seems to be especially the physician who is making the decisions on the 
patient’s behalf. What is in the patient’s best interests is not entirely clear. Evans spoke of 
maximising the patient’s well-being, but he recognised that it may be beyond the physi-
cian’s ability to do so. The physician’s primary goal will be to deliver or to arrange care 
in order to improve the patient’s health. Evans distinguished three types of agents. The 
agent in the standard agency relationship will always try to increase his own welfare and 
behave opportunistically. The professional-as-perfect-agent will not dupe the patient but 
direct his behaviour at him. In the middle of these extremes is the professional-as-imper-
fect-agent who will sometimes act in the patient’s best interests and sometimes not. 
 Culyer (1989, p. 37) expressed a somewhat different idea on perfect agency. His view 
was similar in that he considered the physician as an agent ‘ideally choosing in the way 
the individual would, had he or she been possessed of the same informational advantages 
as the professional’. At least part of the decision-making about health-enhancing actions 
has been delegated to the physician here. The major difference is that according to Culyer 
it is health that generates utility instead of well-being. 
 A different view is that ‘(...) the doctor’s role is to give the patient all the information 
the patient needs in order to enable the patient to make a decision, and the doctor should 
then implement that decision once the patient has made it’ (Williams 1988, p. 176).5 Ac-
cording to Williams, there is no delegation of decision-making from the patient to the 
physician in case of perfect agency; it is the patient who decides. 
 Perfect agency requires similar interests, or at least a physician who acts according to 
the patient’s aims. In case of perfect agency, then, it does not make a lot of difference 
whether the physician or the patient himself makes a decision on the latter’s behalf.6 The 
decision will probably be the same. As the aims are the patient’s, the physician-as-per-
fect-agent should behave altruistically, but not paternalistically. Does, despite the equal 
information, the patient’s opinion about what the proper decision is deviate from what the 
physician would have decided had he been the patient, then the physician should not 
‘overrule’ this opinion. What is ‘perfect’ depends on one’s viewpoint; in agency theory it 
is the principal’s, i.e. the patient’s, and not the agent’s. 
 In short, there does not seem to be agreement on what perfect agency is about. The GP 
as perfect agent may be viewed as facilitating the patient’s decisions, or as the one mak-
ing the decisions on behalf of the patient. It is also unclear whether the physician is sup-
 
                                                                 
5 Williams continued by arguing that interchanging the terms ‘patient’ and ‘doctor’ seems more in ac-
cordance with reality. The result becomes then ‘the patient’s role is to give the doctor all the information 
the doctor needs in order to enable the doctor to make a decision, and the patient should then implement 
that decision once the doctor has made it’ (Williams 1988, p. 176). 
6 It will make some difference whether it is the physician or the patient who is the decision-maker if the 
patient derives some utility from the decision-making as such. 
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posed to act in the patient’s best interests by enhancing the patient’s health or his well-
being. 
 
A distinction can be made between a theoretical view on perfect agency on the one hand 
and a more practically oriented view on the other hand. In the theoretical view, patient 
and physician indeed form a pair, like Evans (1981) described it. The patient informs the 
physician of his aims. Further, he provides all the information he possesses about his 
medical history, his current symptoms, his life style, and other possibly relevant informa-
tion. The perfectly-informed physician – that is, perfectly informed about his field – uses 
this information while deciding upon the most desirable actions, after which he discusses 
these actions with the patient. Both parties become perfectly informed; the patient ac-
quires the physician’s knowledge and vice versa. In this interactive process, both patient 
and physician may want to adjust their aims and actions to the acquired information. For 
instance, the patient may adjust his aims due to the acquired diagnostic information, 
while the physician may adjust his plans to the patient’s aims. Such a way of exchanging 
and discussing information and shared decision-making resembles the legal doctrine of 
‘informed consent’ (President’s Commission7 1982).8 
 A perfect-agency relationship as described is practically unfeasible, as the perfect-
information condition will not be met. Physician and patient are not perfectly informed. 
In case the physician does not inform the patient, the latter will have problems becoming 
informed about diagnosis, intervention plan, et cetera (Starfield 1992). The patient will 
not be able to adjust his aims then. In the more practically oriented view on perfect 
agency, the physician will still do his utmost to act in the patient’s best interests, given 
the limited knowledge in his field or given constraints over which the physician has no 
control (like legal constraints or the patient’s limited financial means). A physician who 
purposely withholds information or is negligent in acquiring information is no perfect 
agent; not in the theoretical view, but not in a more practical view either. There are sev-
eral reasons a physician may not want to inform a patient (Ryan 1994). The physician 
may have the idea that a patient does not want certain information, or that he will not 
understand it. Time constraints may also restrain the physician from informing the pa-
tient. Further, the physician may not want to upset the patient, or he may be afraid that 
the patient will reject the proposed actions. From an agency standpoint, however, these 
reasons imply an imperfect agency relationship. 
 The perfect-information condition will also not be met if the physician lacks knowl-
edge or experience in general. Further, there may be a communication problem resulting 
in a lack of information about the patient in question. Firstly, instead of anamnesis the 
physician may use other ways to acquire information and by so doing miss some details. 
Secondly, he may not give the patient enough time to provide the information. Thirdly, 
he may miss some information by directing the conversation too much (Starfield 1992). 
 
                                                                 
7 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, shortened to President’s Commission. 
8 As communication is essential, perfect agency cannot be accomplished when the patient is comatose or 
has been anaesthetised. 
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 A second reason why a perfect-agency relationship as described is not feasible is that 
the similar-interests condition will not be met. The interests will diverge as the physician 
has his own interests, which cannot be ruled out and which may result in a conflict of 
interests. For instance, the way the physician is compensated may contribute to this con-
flict as it may induce him to provide more or less services than what could be considered 
as optimal from the patient’s point of view. If the physician makes a compromise be-
tween the patient’s interests on the one hand and his own interests on the other hand or if 
he deliberately withholds information, then he acts as an imperfect agent. 
 An important assumption made in the foregoing is that the patient has the capability to 
make health care decisions. This requires that he possesses a set of values and goals, is 
able to communicate and to understand the information, and is able to reason and delib-
erate about his choices (President’s Commission 1982, p. 57). For some patients, these 
conditions will not be met. Is a patient incapable of making health care decisions, then 
alternatives, like appointing a guardian, have to be sought. As this is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, such patients are not considered here. 
 Another reason for departing from the usual way of decision making is if the patient 
has stated explicitly – by means of a waiver – that he does not want to be informed. Then, 
withholding the patient information is in his interests and thus valid. 
 Other examples of situations in which informed consent is not required are medical 
actions which are directed or authorised by the law (legal requirements), emergencies, 
and the so-called therapeutic privilege in case informing the patient would be detrimental 
to the patient (President’s Commission 1982, p. 93). 
 
Summarising, in case of perfect agency it would not matter whether the patient or the GP 
would be the decision-maker. Both would become perfectly informed and both would act 
in the patient’s best interests. In practice, however, for several reasons the perfect infor-
mation condition will not be met and there will be a problem of conflicting interests. 
Hence, the patient will have to draw up a contract by which the physician is motivated as 
much as possible to act in a way advantageous to the patient. Whether such a contract 
should stimulate the physician to enhance the patient's health or his well-being is open to 
question. There may be some truth in Evans’s consideration that maximising the patient’s 
well-being may be beyond the physician’s ability. On the other hand, it may be argued 
that especially GPs are confronted with problems that are related to well-being rather 
than health. This is beyond the scope of this thesis, however. 
 
4.2.5 Agency problems 
 
Due to the different information and interests, the two agency problems of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard may occur. The patient may be confronted with adverse selection 
if he has problems assessing the physician’s knowledge, experience and willingness to 
act in his best interests. Assuming the physician is eager to attract the patient to his prac-
tice, he may be tempted to exaggerate his qualities, or at least not to understate them. 
 As mentioned in subsection 4.2.2, the medical profession has limited information on 
the workings and the exact effects and side-effects of many medical technologies. The 
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individual physician will almost certainly lack this information too and, consequently, 
may feel uncertain about the right actions. This lack of knowledge may result in a wide 
variety of practice styles – defined as the physician’s set of beliefs about the efficacy of 
particular forms of care before the care is provided (Folland et al. 1997, p. 216). As long 
as the care is considered appropriate, a different practice style does not mean the physi-
cian is an imperfect agent. However, if certain information is available but the physician 
is negligent in keeping up to date about his field, the agency relationship is not perfect. 
 A frequently described problem in the patient-physician relationship is supplier-
induced demand. Because he is ill informed, the patient is not capable of judging the 
physician’s actions. As Evans (1984, p. 83) noted, inducing demand is exactly what the 
physician-as-agent should do as otherwise the ill-informed patient may demand too much 
or too little goods or services. Hence, the physician should induce demand in a way that 
serves the patient’s interests best. However, according to the thesis of supplier-induced 
demand, under certain circumstances the physician may be prepared to induce the patient 
to demand more goods or services than he probably would have demanded if he were as 
well informed as the physician. Although the GP differs from a secondary care physician 
in that he specifically has a referral function, he also treats patients by himself. This re-
sults in a double role: the physician provides the care after he had decided, or advised the 
patient about the indicated treatment (Evans 1974). Theoretically, the physician is thus in 
a position to increase the demand for his own goods or services. 
 Several approaches have been used and several models have been put forward to de-
scribe and analyse the problem of supplier-induced demand (see Labelle et al. [1994] and 
Folland et al. [1997] for reviews). Studied are, for instance, the effect of physician supply 
on the volume of medical care utilisation, on physician incomes and on fee levels, the 
effect of fee levels and changes therein on utilisation, and the effect of reimbursement 
methods on utilisation (Labelle et al. 1994, p. 350). Folland et al. (1997, pp. 170-178) 
gave an overview of the models developed in the course of time. In the original model it 
is supposed that a physician is able to use his discretion to increase the quantity of care 
demanded. A decreasing number of patients per physician, due to an increasing number 
of physicians, may drive a physician to induce demand. In case the increase in demand is 
large enough, a new equilibrium may be found in which the price is higher than the initial 
price. Examples of other models are the target-income model, the discretion model and 
the profit-maximising model. 
 Despite the fact that several models are developed, the problem has not been settled 
yet. Labelle et al. (1994, p. 351) grouped the criticisms into three categories: 
1. A lack of a rigorous theoretic model: models are incomplete or findings are consistent 
with the models as well as with neo-classical theory. 
2. Specification errors in econometric models: important variables are omitted, endoge-
neity of independent variables is not recognised, or demand is underidentified. 
3. Measurement errors: the sample is not representative, or a bias occurred due to the use 
of aggregate data. 
The extent to which physicians induce demand seems to be limited. It is estimated that 
the elasticity of inducement is 0.1. Doubling the number of physicians results in an in-
ducement effect of ten percent then (see, for instance, Rossiter and Wilensky 1983 and 
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Cromwell and Mitchell 1986). However, the presence of supplier-induced demand is 
analysed by measuring the increase in demand due to induction by physicians. This in-
duction is supposed to occur as a reaction to lowered fees or a diminished number of pa-
tients per physician. The effectiveness of the agency relationship absent a change in fees 
or physician stock is not analysed. Hence even without this change factual demand may 
be higher than the patient would have demanded had he had the same information. 
Whether this factual demand indeed is higher is difficult to assess. 
 Grytten and Sørensen (2001) examined whether supplier-induced demand existed 
for primary care services in Norway. They analysed data for two groups of primary care 
physicians: contract physicians (receiving fixed grants in addition to patient fees per visit 
and fees for the provision of specific items of medical treatment) and salaried physicians. 
They found no evidence for supplier-induced demand, which according to the authors 
could be explained in two ways. Firstly, contract physicians are motivated by other fac-
tors, like professional norms and caring concerns, than pure economic factors. The sec-
ond explanation is that the regular controls by the Norwegian National Insurance Ad-
ministration are effective in restraining supplier-induced demand. 
 Supplier-induced demand usually refers to the problem that the physician induces the 
patient to demand more than he would have if he was as well-informed as the physician. 
The opposite is also possible though. Then, the physician influences the patient’s demand 
in such a way that less goods or services are demanded than probably would have been if 
the patient were as well-informed as his physician. Here the same measurement problem 
arises. It is difficult to test whether the demand would indeed be higher if the patient was 
better informed. 
 
The relationship between patient and general practitioner 
 
Principal: Patient 
Agent: General practitioner 
Good/service: Diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic information, prescriptions, 
referrals and (co-ordination of) medical care 
Desired actions: Proper provision of information and (co-ordination of) medical care, 
that is, according to the patient’s preferences in order to obtain a 
desired outcome (i.e. a certain health status or state of well-being) 
Information asymmetry: The physician is supposed to have superior information about clini-
cal pictures, possible treatments, effects or side-effects of treat-
ments, et cetera 
Conflict of interests: The nature, quantity and quality of the care the patient is prepared to 
pay for will depend on the price-quality trade-off he makes. How-
ever, for reasons of own interest the physician may want to provide 
a different type or volume of care. A fee-for-service system, for 
instance, may drive the physician to provide more care than the 
patient would have been prepared to pay for had he possessed the 
same information. On the other hand, arguments like leisure or 
workload may result in a reduction of the amount of care the phys-
ician is willing to provide. 
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4.3 Patient and third party 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
By ignoring the presence of a third party, one passes over the influence this presence has 
on the structure and the functioning of the health-care sector. A consequence of third-
party financing is that the patient is no longer a solo principal operating more or less in-
dependent of others, but that he is now member of a group. The risk-spreading function 
of the third party makes that the patient, as an insured, is confronted with the interests of 
other insured. The patient’s behaviour within his relationship with the physician has ex-
ternal effects now. 
 
4.3.2 Applicant or insured and third party 
 
Agency theory has also been applied to the relationship between insured and third party. 
Usually, the third party is viewed as principal then (see, for instance, Arrow 1986). As 
the agent, the applicant has crucial information about his medical history, his current 
health status, his life style et cetera – the ‘quality’ of the applicant – and, therefore, may 
have a better idea of his future health care costs than the third party. The latter is sup-
posed to have an interest in attracting an applicant with expected claim costs lower than 
the premium charged for a particular policy, or in adjusting the premium or the policy to 
the applicant’s risk. In each option the third party would like to obtain the information the 
applicant possesses. 
 Harris and Raviv (1978) viewed the insurer as the principal confronted with a moral-
hazard problem. In case the insured pays a fixed premium – independent of the illness 
and independent of the costs of care – he faces fewer incentives to prevent the disease 
from occurring (ex ante moral hazard), but he does face an incentive to increase his 
spending on care (ex post moral hazard). As the insurer can not observe the insured’s 
actions, he has to draw up a contract that stimulates the insured to behave more effi-
ciently. An obvious way to reduce moral hazard is to make the benefits contingent on the 
nature and the severity of the illness. Once the illness is diagnosed and a payment is 
made, the insured bears the risk of overspending. However, it is virtually impossible to 
appraise the incurred loss due to an illness. 
 A more common way to reduce moral hazard is cost sharing. Although this will de-
pend on the form of cost sharing – coinsurance, copayment, deductible, no-claim – it may 
reduce moral hazard as it raises the costs of consuming health care to the insured. In the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment it has been shown that a reduction of the extent of 
the coverage leads to a reduction in the amount of care demanded (Newhouse et al. 
1996).9 
 
                                                                 
9 See Newhouse et al. (1996) and Bakker (1997) for further details of cost sharing and the RAND ex-
periment. 
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 Another way to reduce moral hazard is to restrict the access to certain providers or the 
entitlement to relatively expensive care, which the insured may want to substitute for 
comparable but cheaper care. 
 The roles of principal and agent may also be inverted so that the applicant becomes 
principal and the third party becomes agent. In a health care system with a choice of third 
parties, the applicant faces an adverse-selection problem. The applicant would like a third 
party that will look after his interests, but it is the third party that possesses information 
about his performance of the insurance function, the agency function, or the access func-
tion – the ‘quality’ of the third party. To facilitate the selection, the applicant may use 
information acquired from relatives or acquaintances, consumers’ associations, annual 
reports et cetera. 
 Once the selection of a third party has taken place, the former applicant may face a 
new problem, namely the problem of moral hazard. As the insured cannot (perfectly) 
monitor the insurer’s actions, he does not know whether the outcome is the best possible 
outcome and how far it is the insurer who is responsible for it. A distinction can be made 
here between two of the different functions a third party may perform: the insurance 
function and the agency function. In performing these functions, the third party is sup-
posed to act on the insured’s behalf. Firstly, he should act as a prudent insurer. Secondly, 
in performing the agency function, he is supposed to take measures to reduce the prob-
lems of adverse selection and moral hazard the insured-as-patient may have within the 
relationship with his GP. 
 In case the same party performs both functions, conflict of interests may occur. The 
outcome that should be attained by performance of the insurance function is risk bearing 
and payment of claims against the lowest possible premium, given certain coverage. The 
expenditures should be restricted then. In case of the agency function, however, the third 
party has to arrange high-quality care. Although high-quality care may result in lower 
costs, such care may be cost enhancing as well. 
 The use of controlling and monitoring methods may stimulate the third party to act in 
the insured’s interests. Further, in a competitive health insurance market and under the 
assumption that the insured is not a ‘bad risk’ (expected costs higher than the contribu-
tion the insurer receives for this particular insured), the insured may use the so-called 
threat of exit. If the insured is indeed a ‘bad risk’, then the potential exit of this particular 
insured will probably not be perceived as a threat to the insurer. 
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The relationship between applicant or insured and third party 
 
Principal: Applicant/insured 
Agent: Third party 
Good/service: Reduction of uncertainty, information about providers of care, ar-
rangement of and access to cost-effective high-quality care 
Desired actions: Gaining of information about the insured’s preferences, reliable 
insurance products, proper provision of information about the qual-
ity of health-care providers, quick payouts, product development, ar-
rangements with intermediaries and health care providers, reduction 
of moral hazard, et cetera 
Information asymmetry: The third-party agent has private information about its own behav-
iour and efforts, about the providers of care, about the behaviour of 
other insured, et cetera 
Conflict of interests: The third party may have no direct incentive to reveal the above-
mentioned information to the insured and may, for instance, have 
other interests regarding the arrangements with providers of care, 
the quality of care provided to the insured, the trade-off between 
quick payouts and receiving interest 
 
 
4.4 Third party and general practitioner 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
What differentiates the relationship between a third-party agent and a GP from a standard 
agency relationship is that it is embedded in the triangular relationship between patient, 
physician and third party, and that it is difficult to view it apart from the patient-physician 
relationship. Contrary to the latter relationship, which can be viewed as a separate entity, 
the relationship between third party and physician only exists because of the patient-
physician relationship. Hence, the findings of section 4.2 are of use here. 
 Several authors applied agency theory, more or less extensively, to the relationship 
between a third party and a physician (see, for instance, Dranove and White 1987, Blom-
qvist 1991, Robinson 1993, Pontes 1995, Propper 1995b, Smith et al. 1997, Jelovac 
2001). Scott (1996) also used agency theory to describe various relationships in health 
care. He modelled health care as a four-party system in which the government is the 
third-party payer and the medical profession as a group – a professional body or trade 
union – is positioned between the third party and the individual physician. In such a 
model it is recognised that negotiations about contracts may be conducted by, for in-
stance, a professional body. However, the possibility of applying selection, controlling, 
or monitoring techniques within the relationship between a third party and an individual 
physician is omitted in the model of Scott. In this thesis, not the negotiations as such are 
in question, but the resulting arrangements between third party and GP that may influ-
ence the behaviour of the physician. 
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4.4.2 Application of agency theory 
 
The third party is depicted here as the ill-informed principal and the physician as the 
well-informed agent. The physician has information about his knowledge and experience, 
his intentions, his own actions et cetera. The third party is supposed to know what should 
be accomplished but may have difficulties checking whether the physician concerned is 
the most capable physician, whether he performs the right actions and whether he makes 
an effort. 
 Naturally, the exact objectives of both parties are unknown and can only be inferred. 
The physician will at least take the preferences of the patient into account while making 
health care decisions. As perfect agent he should even fully act in the patient’s best inter-
ests. As to the third party, it has been noted that one should identify the nature of the third 
party. The third-party payer will have different objectives than the third-party agent. Fur-
ther, the control over a third party may be held by different interest groups. Who controls 
the third party will determine its objectives (Pauly 1988b). But irrespective of who con-
trols the third party, it is plausible that the objectives of third parties, insured and physi-
cians will diverge. 
 The interests of a third party only performing the insurance function will be different 
from those of a third party (also) performing the agency function. While performing the 
insurance function, the third party will probably aim at reducing the risk that its expendi-
tures exceed its revenues. The discipline of the market may force third-party payers to 
pursue their primary objective, i.e. cost reduction or profit maximisation. This may, for 
instance, be accomplished by curtailing spending on sales, premium collection, verifi-
cation and payment of claims, as well as by pooling risks and diversifying (Pauly 1988b) 
or by charging higher premiums. In performing this function, the third party doesn’t nec-
essarily have to be involved in a relationship with the physician. Conflict of interests may 
even be entirely absent, although the third party may have an interest in a physician 
economising on goods and services as this may reduce the number of claims. 
 Performance of the agency function, however, entails different interests. This function 
carries the representation of the insured’s preferences. It is true, performance of the insur-
ance function is also in the insured’s interests because of a welfare gain due to risk reduc-
tion. Moreover, proper performance of this function may result in relatively low costs, 
which may be translated into a relatively low premium. Looking after the insured’s inter-
ests by performing the agency function, however, requires the minimisation of agency 
problems within the patient-provider relationship. Whether performance of this function 
will result in a conflict of interests between third party and physician, depends on 
whether both act as perfect agents on behalf of the insured or patient respectively. The 
size and the nature of a possible conflict will depend on the private preferences of the 
parties involved. 
 If the third-party agent performs its function properly, the physician will be stimulated 
to act as an agent for the patient. Interests may conflict here as the physician may have 
his own objectives, which may differ from the third party’s. Blomqvist (1991, p. 412) 
pointed at the physician’s role as ‘double agent’ – the patient’s as well as the insurer’s 
agent – ‘(...) which is due to the combination of both information asymmetry and third-
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party financing (...).’ Clearly, both roles will conflict once the physician and the third 
party pursue their own interests instead of the patient’s. If both the physician and the third 
party would act as the patient’s perfect agent, then the conflict would be absent for the 
interests of both parties would reflect the interests of the patient. It should be noticed that 
the better the physician acts as the patient’s agent, the less necessary it is that the third 
party performs the agency function on behalf of that patient, that is, as far as it concerns 
the reduction of moral-hazard problems. The function may be beneficial to the patient 
though, as in the course of time the third party may have acquired information about the 
quality of several physicians. This information may help the patient reducing the costs of 
searching the most eligible physician. 
 The kind of outcome a third party aims at will be related to the performed functions. Is 
it the insurance function, then it may be expected that within the insurer-physician rela-
tionship economising on health care expenditures is what interests the principal most. 
The outcome is financial by nature then. The insurer-as-agent should aim at an outcome 
congruent with the outcome the insured-as-patients aim at. Here the outcome is financial 
as well as non-financial. It is non-financial as it concerns the quality of care and will 
probably be stated in terms of a certain health status or some state of well-being. As it 
will be a trade-off between quality and price, the outcome will also have a financial com-
ponent. 
 Contrary to what was assumed in section 4.2, it is not the patient but the third party 
that is supposed to draw up the contractual arrangements to control the agent and to ne-
gotiate a compensation scheme.10 Hence, it is the third party that may face difficulties 
interpreting the outcome and assessing whether the physician performed the right actions 
and whether he performed them right, and thus deciding how the physician should be 
compensated – or even whether he should be compensated at all. Whatever the outcome 
should be, the third party will be confronted with outcome uncertainty. Again it is uncer-
tain whether the outcome is the result of the physician’s actions or external factors, like 
the natural course of the patient’s disease and other factors that influence the patient’s 
health but over which the physician has no control. 
 
4.4.3 Modification of standard assumptions 
 
Some differences between the present agency relationship and the standard agency rela-
tionship have already been noticed and relate to the triangularly relationship between 
patient, GP and insurer. Another difference between the present and the standard relation-
ship is the conflict of interests. Again it is the professional relationship between the pa-
tient and the physician that causes this difference. In the standard theory it is assumed 
that the agent behaves opportunistically. However, opportunistic behaviour of the physi-
cian within his relationship with the third-party agent may result in opportunistic behav-
iour within the relationship with his patient. As it may harm the patient or his own reputa-
 
                                                                 
10 Often, the negotiations will be conducted by national associations of insurers and physicians. Here it is 
assumed that the individual parties have the freedom to negotiate at least part of the arrangements by 
themselves. 
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tion, the physician may be reluctant to behave in this way. For instance, due to the pres-
ence of insurance, the physician may be tempted to cheat and prescribe an unnecessary 
treatment in order to extract more money from the insurer. The insurer will sustain a fi-
nancial loss then, but the patient may bear costs too. The short-term effect for the patient 
may be a financial loss due to cost sharing as well as a physical injury. A minor long-
term effect may be the upward pressure on the insurance premiums. Hence professional 
ethics may refrain the physician from cheating within his relationship with the third 
party. This does not alter the fact that there remains room for self-interest seeking behav-
iour though. Due to the ‘zone of uncertainty’ (see subsection 4.2.2) a physician has room 
for discretionary behaviour and thus to pursue his own interests. Extra diagnostics or 
treatments can be prescribed without facing ethical problems. Some margin for opportun-
istic behaviour remains too. The physician may send in claims for treatments never pro-
vided, send in claims twice et cetera. 
 On the other hand, the physician’s opportunism may be beneficial to the patient. Pre-
scribing a fully covered expensive treatment instead of a cheaper but partly or not cov-
ered alternative may indeed benefit the patient. The third party, however, will be better 
off if the physician chooses the cheaper one (although depending on the marginal effect 
of the expensive treatment, in the long run the patient may be better off too because of 
the premium effect). Obviously, the third party acts as an imperfect agent here as other-
wise it would have preferred the physician’s action that benefits the patient most. A ma-
jor cause of this imperfection is the fact that the insurer is agent on behalf of many prin-
cipals. The presence of several principals forms another difference between the present 
and the standard agency relationship. Thus far it is suggested here that within his rela-
tionship with the physician, the third party will represent the individual insured. How-
ever, once the insured consumes care, the third party can not be a perfect agent on an 
individual insured’s behalf. It has to represent a group of insured then and, therefore, has 
to divide premium revenues among them. This may again result in a conflict of interests. 
In case of health-care consumption, the individual insured faces low or zero costs against 
positive benefits. The costs of the consumed care are at the expense of the group of in-
sured although the benefits are less obvious. Therefore, the group will adopt a critical 
attitude towards the insured’s consumption. Some positive benefits may be reaped due to 
altruistic and egoistic preferences, but the group will be reluctant to pay for excessive use 
of health care. The third-party agent, therefore, should act according to the preferences of 
the individual insured under a ‘veil of ignorance’, that is the insured states his preferences 
not knowing whether he will become sick or not (ex ante preferences). 
 Likewise, in performing the agency function, the insurer should take measures to im-
prove the quality of the provided care by reducing the agency problems the insured faces 
within the patient-physician relationship. The costs of these measures will be borne by 
the third party, i.e. the group, and will therefore appear low to the individual insured. In 
performing the agency function, the third party will thus balance the insured’s improved 
benefits against the costs of the measures necessary to gain this improvement. Hence if 
the physician acts in the interests of the patient, then both may encounter a conflict with 
the third party as their demand for care may be larger then the amount the group is will-
ing to pay for. The third party may then prompt the physician to consider the interests of 
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the other insured. The resulting agency problems within the patient-physician rela-
tionship are subject of section 4.5. 
 
4.4.4 Agency problems 
 
As in other agency relationships, both the problems of adverse selection and moral haz-
ard may occur within the relationship between third party and physician. The third party 
may face difficulties assessing the physician’s quality, as it is the physician who has the 
information about his knowledge and experience, his intentions et cetera. The physician 
has no incentive to reveal this information or may be tempted to exaggerate it. The incli-
nation to exaggerate competence, however, may be limited due to the presence of mal-
practice legislation. The threat of malpractice suits may keep the physician from entering 
into a contract that requires him to practice beyond his ability. Moreover, it may be diffi-
cult to obtain malpractice insurance for practising care one is not qualified for. To reduce 
the information-asymmetry, a third party may try to assess the quality of the provider by 
checking academic qualifications, membership of professional associations, references 
and state licences (Pontes 1995, p. 59). Further, the third party may induce the physician 
to reveal his quality by offering him different contracts and letting him choose (self-
selection). Jack (2005) argued that different methods of payment can be an efficient way 
of sorting physicians according to underlying characteristics, like altruism, risk aversion, 
or ethical standards. Risk averse physicians, for instance, may prefer being paid on a fee-
for-service basis. 
 Adverse selection is mainly a problem in a model with competitive third-party payers 
offering several contracts from which the physicians can choose. In a system in which 
just one type of contract is available, the problem of adverse selection will probably be 
less severe.11 
 A well-described moral-hazard problem is that of supplier-induced demand. As noted 
in section 4.2, due to his superior knowledge the physician is able to induce the demand 
for health care goods and services. This may happen in a way that is not in the patient’s 
interests, but merely in the interests of the physician himself. A third-party payer will be 
affected by the physician’s actions, as it has to pay the claims. A third-party agent not 
only has to pay the claims, but may also face the consequences of the improper level of 
care provided to the insured on whose behalf it acts. Demand inducement may, for in-
stance, lead to dissatisfaction of the insured about the third-party agent’s actions or may 
have negative effects on the insured’s health status. 
 
                                                                 
11 Even in a National Health Service with one national contract adverse selection may occur. For in-
stance, the contract for GPs may be unacceptable to excellent or even reasonably good physicians (who 
may succeed in becoming a medical specialist) but may very well be acceptable to inferior physicians. 
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The relationship between third-party agent and general practitioner 
 
Principal: Third-party agent 
Agent: General practitioner 
Good/service: Diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic information, prescriptions, 
referrals, and (co-ordination of) medical care 
Desired actions: Proper provision of information and (co-ordination of) medical care 
according to the preferences of the patient involved, but taking into 
account the interests of the other insured while making health-care 
decisions 
Information asymmetry: The physician is supposed to have superior information about the 
clinical picture of the patient involved, the indicated treatment, his 
own effort et cetera; outcome uncertainty is a complicating factor in 
observing the physician’s actions 
Conflict of interests: The exact conflict depends on the weight put on the different inter-
ests: by the third party on the interests of the patient/insured in-
volved, of the other insured, and of its own; by the physician on the 
interests of his patient, and of his own 
 
 
4.5 The patient-physician relationship reconsidered 
 
The presence of a third party is of influence on the relationship between a patient and his 
physician. Firstly, a third party may have increased the information both the patient and 
the physician possess due to the performance of the agency function. The better the pa-
tient is informed about medical care and about the supply side, the less problems he may 
face in selecting a physician and in checking whether the physician performs the right 
actions and whether he performs them right. The better the physician is informed, the 
better he is able to serve as the patient’s agent. 
 Secondly, the interests of both parties may have been altered, which may result in 
modified behaviour. It has been argued that the conflict of interests may be less severe 
than in a standard agency relationship due to, for instance, professional norms and values. 
On the other hand health insurance provides the physician with the opportunity to pursue 
his own interests. The physician’s altered behaviour due to the presence of insurance may 
result in an effect often called supplier-induced moral hazard.12 
 The patient’s behaviour may be altered too. If the patient is fully insured, then the ne-
cessity to make a price-quality trade-off is removed. As long as the benefits of additional 
care are positive, the patient faces an incentive to demand this care as its costs seem zero 
at the moment of consumption (abstracted from, for instance, cost sharing and time 
costs). Actually, the costs are positive and spread over the group of insured. 
 
                                                                 
12 The term supplier-induced moral hazard is used to denote a specific form of supplier-induced demand: 
the physician induces demand in the knowledge that the patient’s insurance policy covers the resulting 
costs. 
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 A third remark is about the contractual arrangements. In general, it is not the patient 
who draws up the arrangements that should motivate the physician-as-agent to act in the 
patient’s best interests. At least parts of the arrangements are the result of negotiations 
between third parties and physicians (or their representatives). Examples are the negoti-
ations for remuneration systems and the level of the payments on which the individual 
patient mostly has no influence. As a result, the patient is in want of some instruments 
that might be suited to guide the physician. In the present triangular relationship, the use 
of such instruments is delegated to the third-party agent. This is different from what is 
usually supposed in the theory of principal and agent. Furthermore, as the contractual 
terms are set, it makes less sense for the physician to prefer one contract to another. Al-
though some variation in contracts may remain, like public and private contracts or con-
tracts adjusted for risk, the variation will probably be smaller than if patients were free to 
devise a contract. 
 Given that there is not a single best contract, the question arises on whose behalf the 
physician-as-agent will act. It is unlikely that he will focus on just one patient. Firstly, the 
contract will not provide him with the financial means to act as an agent on behalf of just 
one patient. The physician will have to be an agent for other patients too and thus will 
have to divide his time, energy and means among them. Secondly, as the patient is in-
sured, he faces no costs at the point of service and, therefore, may be tempted to demand 
unconditional attention, devotion and care. Scarcity of resources may prompt the phys-
ician – or he may be encouraged to do so by a third party – to take the interests of other 
insured, or even of society, into consideration by constraining the demand. 
 While describing his view on perfect agency, Mooney (1994, p. 94) distinguishes be-
tween perfect agency from the viewpoint of an individual patient, from the viewpoint of a 
physician’s patients – that is, the practice population as a whole – and from the viewpoint 
of society. From the viewpoint of the physician’s patients, the perfect agent maximises 
the group’s utility, given constraints like scarce resources. Mooney expects health, in-
formation, involvement in the decision-making process, and several aspects of the deci-
sion-making and treatment process to be arguments in the patient’s utility function. From 
the viewpoint of society, perfect agency means maximising society’s utility, which may 
consist of efficiency and equity. Mooney excludes the perfect-agent relationship between 
an individual patient and the physician from further analysis as ‘(...) the idea of the ‘in-
dex’ patient getting unrestricted and unconstrained treatment based on the ethical princi-
ple that the doctor must do the best she can for the patient, irrespective of what else the 
doctor might be doing, is not an economic issue since it denies the scarcity of resources’ 
(Mooney 1994, p. 94). 
 Clark and Olsen (1994) consider the physician as an agent facing a budget constraint. 
Their physician-as-perfect-agent is the decision-maker who has to find a level of equilib-
rium between maximising the patient’s utility (which may be gained from the process of 
health care as well as the outcome of this process) and the utility of ‘society’ (a group 
consisting of patients and potential patients who contribute to the budget). 
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The relationship between patient and general practitioner revised 
 
Principal: Patient 
Agent: General practitioner 
Good/service: Diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic information, prescriptions, referrals 
and (co-ordination of) medical care 
Desired actions: Proper provision of information and (co-ordination of) medical care, that is, 
according to the patient’s preferences in order to obtain a desired outcome 
(i.e. a certain health status or state of well-being) 
Information asymmetry: The physician is supposed to have superior information about clinical pic-
tures, possible treatments, effects or side-effects of treatments, et cetera 
Conflict of interests: Now that the patient is insured, the necessity to make a price-quality trade-
off has been removed. As long as the marginal benefits outweigh the resid-
ual costs (like time costs) the patient has an incentive to demand for care. 
The physician may not just direct his actions at one single patient, but may 
take the interests of his other patients, or even of society into account while 
deciding upon his actions. 
 
 
4.6 Theoretical framework of the agency relationships 
 
How can agency theory be used to analyse and compare the different type of (existing) 
relationships between third-party agents and general practitioners? 
 
The combination of the relationships discussed here results in a theoretical framework 
that serves as the background to the further analysis of the relationship between third par-
ties and GPs. This framework consists of a set of four agency relationships (see figure 
4.1).13 
 
Figure 4.1. Four agency relationships 
 
         4 
     third-party agent  regulator 
 
     2     3 
 
 
       1 
 
    patient/     general 
    applicant/     practitioner 
    insured/      
     citizen  
 
                                                                 
13 Some relationships are omitted here. For instance, the regulator may engage in direct relationships 
with GPs (licensure, quality controls et cetera). 
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The first agency relationship: between patient and general practitioner 
The first relationship considered here is the one between a patient (the principal) and a 
GP (the agent). Due to the asymmetric information and the physician’s own interests, the 
physician may act as the patient’s imperfect agent. As a result, the patient may encounter 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
 
The second agency relationship: between applicant or insured and third-party agent 
For several reasons, the same principal (now in his role as applicant) may want to enter 
into a relationship with a third party. One reason may be the reduction of his financial 
risk. Another reason may be the reduction of agency problems the applicant (that is, the 
patient) may face within his relationship with the physician, in which case entering into a 
relationship with a third-party agent may help. But then, he may have difficulties select-
ing the third-party agent who will serve his interests best – this under the assumption that 
there are several third parties to choose from. 
 Within the framework employed here it is assumed that both the third-party agent and 
the GP pursue also their own interests and thus act as imperfect agents for the patients. 
Measures should be taken then to try to control both parties. Although one could think of 
other parties fulfilling this role, the third-party agent is viewed here as the principal to 
whom the design of contracts is delegated and that has to control and monitor the GP. 
But having selected a third-party agent, the insured faces difficulties checking whether 
this agent actually performs his agency function properly. The insured may try to control 
and monitor the third-party agent. Further, in a competitive insurance market the insured 
is, in principle, in a position to choose another third-party agent and may therefore use 
the threat of exit as an incentive (i.e. deselect the agent). 
 
The third agency relationship: between third-party agent and general practitioner 
In performing the agency function, the third party is supposed to take measures to reduce 
the problems the patient encounters within his relationship with the GP. Therefore, the 
third-party agent should, as a principal, enter into an agency relationship with the physi-
cian concerned. This is the third agency relationship. 
 
The fourth agency relationship: between regulator and third-party agent 
Despite of the presence of techniques like (de)selection, control and monitoring, it is gen-
erally recognised that the insured is in a weak position. This explains the presence of a 
fourth agency relationship: between the third-party agent (the agent) and a second third 
party, i.e. a regulator (the principal). This regulator, for his part, is supposed to take 
measures to reduce the problems the insured may have within his relationship with the 
third-party agent and to stimulate the third-party agent to act in the insured’s best inter-
ests. Thus, while trying to remove the imperfections in the third-party agent’s functioning 
as agent on behalf of the applicant or insured, the regulator acts here as another agent.14 It 
 
                                                                 
14 This regulator may, for instance, be a government. It will be obvious that this creates another set of 
agency problems with the applicant, insured or patient as principal and a government, for instance cho-
sen by means of voting, as agent. 
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is assumed here that the regulator actually uses instruments to effectuate that the insurer 
will indeed act as the insured’s agent. The regulator may, for instance, further managed 
competition between insurers, institute supervision, or provide information.15 
 
To be able to fulfil its role as the insured’s agent properly, the third-party agent has to 
gain information about the insured’s preferences first. Having acquired this information, 
it has to take measures to promote a relationship between patient and physician that ap-
proaches a perfect agency relationship. The physician is agent on behalf of the rest of his 
practice population too and, furthermore, will be encouraged by the third-party agent to 
take notice of the other insured. ‘Perfect’ implies acting according to the patient’s ex ante 
preferences (under a veil of ignorance). The third-party agent will thus aim his attempts 
to improve the agency relationship between the physician and the individual patient espe-
cially at the physician’s own interests by, for instance, increasing the compatibility of 
incentives. 
 Starting from standard agency theory, one might expect to find a third-party agent 
controlling and monitoring a selected group of physicians. However, Arrow (1986, pp. 
1193-1194) mentioned some reasons why the arrangements found in practice may vary 
from the theoretical arrangements. Such reasons are transaction costs or the existence of 
professional norms (see also section 3.4). Further, in the preceding pages it has been ar-
gued that relationships in the health care sector deviate from a standard relationship, 
which is for an important part the result of overlapping interests. In addition, instead of a 
third party the regulator may have assumed the agency role, leaving the third party to 
fulfil only the insurance function. Hence the question is whether, and to what extent, the 
three main strategies (selecting, controlling and monitoring an agent) are actually found 
within these relationships. In the following chapter a closer look is taken at the several 
instruments third-party agents may and actually do use. 
 
 
4.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
Agency theory is not specifically aimed at relationships in health care. Nevertheless, in 
view of the characteristics of the relationships analysed in this chapter, its use here seems 
justified. Regarding the relationship between patient and physician, some authors have 
even pointed at it as an obvious example of an agency relationship. Although less promi-
nently, also the relationship between a third party and a physician has been described in 
agency terms. 
 Health-care relationships are not straightforward agency relationships. In several re-
spects they differ from the standard agency ones. First of all, in relationships in which a 
GP is involved, the conflict of interests may be relatively small. This is because of pro-
fessional norms and due to the fact that as a professional the physician will include at 
least part of the patient’s interests in his own objectives. 
 
                                                                 
15 The questions which measures should be taken to control the third-party agent and which parties are 
the obvious ones to take these measures are beyond the scope of this research. 
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 Secondly, the relationship between a patient and a GP usually is a lengthy or repeated 
one, so poor performance may prompt the patient to terminate or not to renew the rela-
tionship and may ruin the physician’s reputation. 
 Thirdly, due to his superior knowledge and experience, it will often be the agent (i.e. 
the physician) instead of the principal (i.e. the patient) who specifies the goals that are 
ultimately achievable. Moreover, often these goals can only be set after the patient has 
been diagnosed and thus after the relationship has been established. It should be noticed 
that the patient as the ill-informed principal visits a professional because of his superior 
knowledge and experience. Because the patient can not be an expert in all fields himself, 
he expects that the physician indeed is a professional and thus expects that the physician 
has superior knowledge and experience. Paradoxically, the patient thus enters an agency 
relationship expecting and hoping for the physician’s information surplus. 
 Although it is exactly the informational advantage that is an important reason for visit-
ing a professional (i.e. the physician), this advantage gives the physician the opportunity 
to induce the patient’s demand for his goods or services. Although inducing demand is 
what a physician-as-agent should do, the physician may be able to persuade the patient to 
demand more goods or services than the patient probably would have demanded if he 
were as informed as his physician is. If the patient has health insurance, then a special 
form of supplier-induced demand, namely supplier-induced moral hazard, may occur. 
 This brings us to the final difference, namely the presence of a third party besides the 
first (i.e. the patient or the insured) and the second party (i.e. the physician). These parties 
form a triangular relationship. The presence of a third party may have an influence on the 
information first party and second party possess as well as on their interests (for instance, 
because of the altered financial incentives they face). Also, what happens in one relation-
ship within the triangle is probably of influence on the other party. The presence and role 
of a third party has some additional effects, like the presence of others’ (i.e. other in-
sured’) interests and thus of external effects. Another effect is that now it will be the third 
party instead of the patient who will be the main designer of the contractual arrangements 
with the physician and who will use the several instruments to promote that the physician 
acts in the patients best interests. This leaves the patient as a principal with only a very 
limited set of techniques to influence the behaviour of the GP.  
 In spite of the fact that health-care relationships differ from standard agency relation-
ships, the agency characteristics and the resulting agency problems are obviously present 
within the relationships described here. Hence the research question of this chapter: 
 
Is agency theory applicable to relationships in the health care sector in general, and to 
the relationships between third-party agents and general practitioners in particular? 
 
is answered positively. 
 
By means of the agency concepts, we constructed a theoretical framework consisting of a 
set of agency relationships and providing the rationale for the use by a third party of the 
several strategies in order to influence the GPs. The set consists of four agency relation-
ships. 
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 The first relationship is the one between patient (the principal) and GP (the agent). 
Because of asymmetric information and diverging interests, the patient may encounter 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In order to reduce his financial risk as-
sociated with health care use and to reduce the agency problems the patient may face 
within his relationship with the physician, he may want to enter into a relationship with a 
third-party agent; the second agency relationship. But then, he may face difficulties in 
selecting the third-party agent who will serve his interests best. 
 Once selected, the third party as an agent for the insured is supposed to take measures 
to reduce the problems the patient may encounter within his relationship with the GP. To 
be an effective agent, the third-party agent will have to enter into a relationship with the 
physician; the third agency relationship. Whether the third party is indeed an agent that 
serves the insured’s interests, is also a part of the problem within the second agency rela-
tionship. 
 The remaining agency relationship mentioned in the description of the framework is 
the relationship between the third-party agent and the so-called regulator (the fourth 
agency relationship). In spite of the several techniques available to the insured, like 
(de)selection, control and monitoring, the insured’s weak position creates a need for a so-
called regulator. The regulator will have to reduce the problems the insured may have 
within his relationship with the third-party agent and to stimulate the latter to serve the 
insured’s interests. It may, for instance, further managed competition, institute supervi-
sion or provide information. 
 
Within the theoretical framework, it is assumed that the insured as well as the regulator 
stimulate the third-party agent to gain information about the insured’s preferences and to 
take measures in order to improve the agency relationship between patient and physician. 
One might expect then to find a third-party agent controlling and monitoring a selected 
group of physicians. For several reasons though (like the presence of positive transaction 
costs and professional norms), the factual arrangements will probably differ from the 
theoretical arrangements. Moreover, it has been argued that because of overlapping inter-
ests the relationships in health care may deviate from a standard agency relationship. 
Hence the question is to what extent the three main strategies (selecting, controlling and 
monitoring) are actually used by third-party agents within their relationships with GPs. 
This is subject of the following chapter. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical framework constructed in the previous chapter is applied here to analyse 
whether third-party agents actually use the several strategies in order to influence the be-
haviour of GPs. A literature study is conducted to investigate which strategies third par-
ties (like GP fundholders in the UK, and managed-care organisations in the US) may or 
do employ and with what effect. The research question central to this chapter is: 
 
Which techniques can and do third-party agents apply within their relationships with 
general practitioners in order to reduce the agency problems within the patient-physician 
relationship? 
 
In health care (the use of) such a set of techniques is often designated as ‘managed care’. 
In section 5.2 we will analyse this rather broad but also rather widely used concept in 
terms of agency theory, identify the several phases of managed care and bring these in 
connection with each other. Next, we will identify several techniques that are applied in 
health care, and group them according to the triptych of agency theory (sections 5.3, 5.4 
and 5.5). In section 5.6 we will briefly discuss some issues of the use of managed care 
and the difficulties of drawing conclusions from the managed-care literature. 
 
 
5.2 Managed care and agency 
 
5.2.1 A definition of managed care 
 
The techniques used by third-party agents in health care are often grouped together under 
the term ‘managed care’. Although the term ‘managed care’ is widely used, there is no 
consensus about its precise meaning. As a result, the definitions often differ from each 
other. Glied reviewed the managed-care literature extensively and noted that there is no 
single definition of the term managed care that is broadly accepted. Because of the tre-
mendous variation in the nature of the managed-care plans, it is difficult to assess the 
economics of managed care theoretically as well as empirically. Hence another way to 
look at managed-care plans is to think of these plans as combinations of various sets of 
mechanisms. These mechanisms have changed over time though. According to Glied, 
economic theory and empirical research have not kept pace with the development of 
managed care and research is needed to identify the characteristics of managed care that 
generate economically meaningful differences in outcomes (Glied 2000). 
 When it comes to managed care, authors seem to have different opinions about at least 
four matters. Firstly, the term is often used to refer to several techniques, but sometimes it 
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is used to denote the diverse organisational arrangements within which these techniques 
are employed (Weiner and de Lissovoy 1993). 
 Secondly, there is disagreement about the several techniques as such. The question is 
then whether the use of a certain technique is essential for the notion of managed care, 
and whether can be spoken of managed care if just one technique is applied or only if at 
least several techniques are used. This may be illustrated by the following definitions. 
Miller and Luft (1994, p. 1512), for instance, restricted the term by stating that ‘The se-
lection of network physicians is the starting point for such management and is the single 
most important feature that distinguishes a managed care from an indemnity (fee-for-
service) plan with utilisation management.’ In other words, selection of physicians is an 
essential part of managed care and differentiates managed care from non-managed care. 
Just like Miller and Luft, Weiner and de Lissovoy (993, p. 89) used an ‘at-a-minimum 
definition’ of managed care. Instead of selection, however, they viewed pre-admission 
certification (pre-admission review) as ‘(…) the element that distinguishes (…) managed 
care plans from non-managed indemnity plans.’ 
 A third group of definitions of managed care focuses on the goals that should be ac-
complished with managed-care techniques. According to Rodwin (1995, p. 604), ‘Man-
aged care changes traditional indemnity insurance and fee-for-service practice by inte-
grating the financing and delivery of medical services, with the aim of controlling costs 
and improving quality’ (italics added, A.V.). Iglehart (1994, p. 1167), on the contrary, 
stated that the term refers to ‘(...) a variety of methods of financing and organising the 
delivery of comprehensive health care in which an attempt is made to control costs by 
controlling the provision of services’ (italics added, A.V.).The definitions agree with 
each other on the fact that managed care is about the financing as well as the organisation 
of health care. A major difference, however, is that according to the second definition the 
goal of managed care is cost control, whereas in the first equal attention is paid to the 
quality-improving potency of managed care. This difference reflects the divergent views 
on managed care; as a means to contain costs, as a means to contain costs while at least 
maintaining quality, or as a way to improve quality (preferably against relatively low 
costs). As a result of the emphasis some put on the economics of managed care, the term 
‘managed care’ has a negative connotation. It is often associated with cost containment 
and external control (Ellis and Burns 1998). Research by the Steering Committee on Fu-
ture Health Scenarios (STG 1997) showed that, in general, Dutch GPs are opposed to 
managed care. Partly, this seemed the result of ignorance. Further, they were of opinion 
that managed care puts an extra burden on them but doesn’t lead to significant improve-
ments in the quality of care.1 
 Finally, the question is whether it is or should be a third-party payer who applies the 
managed-care techniques. The aforementioned definitions seem to suggest that it indeed 
should be. Both Miller and Luft (1994, p. 1512) and Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993, 
p. 89), for instance, spoke of managed care plans and indemnity (fee-for-service) plans. 
Iglehart (1994, p. 1167) and Rodwin (1995, p. 604) considered managed care as an inte-
gration of financing and organisation of health care. However, a group practice or an as-
 
                                                                 
1 See STG (1997) for opinions of other parties on managed care. 
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sociation of GPs may as well function as third party that may try to influence an individ-
ual physician’s decision-making. In that case, managed care can not be considered an 
infringement on the professional autonomy, i.e. the autonomy of the profession as a 
whole. At most, an individual physician’s autonomy is reduced then. An example of a 
definition in which an infringement on the autonomy of patient and physician is dis-
played is the definition by Van der Werf (1997, p. 512) who interpreted managed care as 
a way of directing care whereby a third party appropriates responsibilities and power 
within the physician-patient relationship. 
 
Managed care is regarded here as the attempts of a third party, by means of one or more 
techniques, to influence the decision-making process within the relationship between an 
individual patient and an individual provider of care, i.e. the GP. These decisions are no 
longer the exclusive domain of patient and physician. If this decision-making is consid-
ered to be affected by patients as well as by physicians, then a third party wanting to 
manage the care by influencing this decision-making has two options. The first option is 
the application of the managed-care techniques within the relationships with physicians, 
as is described in this chapter. A second option would be to try to manage care via the 
insured by: 
- selecting potential insured (cream skimming); 
- controlling them by means of cost sharing (co-payment, deductible, co-insurance, or 
no-claim discounts), policy conditions, consumer information et cetera; 
- and by monitoring them, for instance, through analysing claims or checking preventive 
measures to be taken by the insured. 
In fact, such strategies to influence the behaviour of the insured may also be considered 
managed-care techniques. However, while speaking of managed care authors usually 
refer to techniques applied within the relationships between third party and physicians. 
This may reflect an economic view of the patient-physician relationship in which the 
physician is considered the patient’s agent having superior knowledge and experience 
and to whom, therefore, patient care decision-making is delegated. In medical sociology 
the patient has a more prominent role. Although depending on variables like the nature of 
the disease or the patient’s socio-economic status, also the patient contributes to the deci-
sion-making. Decision-making is then considered as a bargaining process. In this thesis 
managed care is used in a more narrow sense, focusing on the techniques used in the rela-
tionships between third-party agents and GPs. 
 
5.2.2 The application of agency theory to managed care 
 
From the perspective of agency theory, managed care can be viewed as a set of tech-
niques that a principal may employ with the purpose of influencing the behaviour of an 
agent in a way beneficial to the principal. If it is assumed that the interests of the third 
party (the principal) are also the patient’s interests, then the ultimate purpose of managed 
care is to encourage the GP (the agent) to act in the patient’s interests. 
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 The triptych of agency theory can be applied to classify the various managed-care 
techniques. It consists of three successive phases that form an iterative process. Likewise, 
managed care can be viewed as an iterative process (see figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1. The managed-care cycle 
 
 
       
     A. Selection 
 
 
     B. Control 
      B1. Incentives 
      B2. Persuasion/information 
      B3. Directive/authority 
 
 
     C. Monitoring 
 
 
 
 The first step of the managed-care cycle, selection, is made to identify and contract 
those GPs of whom it may be expected that they will provide high-quality care in a cost-
effective way. 
 Once physicians are selected, a third-party agent may strive to make contractual ar-
rangements about the provision of care; the second step in the managed-care cycle. The 
third party has several control techniques at its disposal then, like financial incentives, 
practice guidelines, physician profiling, and a group of techniques often labelled as utili-
sation management. 
 The third step of the managed-care cycle is monitoring to check whether, as far as ob-
servable, the outcome is satisfactory. The problem of outcome measurability may be 
evaded by trying to observe the physician's behaviour. As the outcome will only partially 
result from the physician’s actions, an alternative may be to monitor the other outcome-
influencing factors and, by so doing, determine the physician's contribution. The third-
party agent can use the assembled information in deciding upon ‘reselecting’ or ‘dese-
lecting’ the GP (i.e. to extend or to renew his contract, or to terminate his contract respec-
tively). 
 After monitoring the GP, the managed-care cycle is completed and may be run 
through again. The next step in the cycle, selection, will often be taken implicitly. Moni-
toring, for instance, may reveal information on the outcome moving the third party to 
take additional measures. Clinical rules may be modified, or the information may be used 
to provide the physician with feedback. 
 The use of managed care gains in effectiveness if the three successive phases of the 
managed-care cycle, i.e. selection, control and monitoring, are designed and used coher-
ently. 
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5.3 Selecting general practitioners 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
A first step third-party agents may take in an attempt to manage the health care on behalf 
of their members is the selection of GPs. By physician selection is meant here that a third 
party selects and contracts a part of the total physician stock. The selected group may 
range from only one physician to a hundred percent of the total number of eligible physi-
cians. 
 Selection is considered to be an important aspect of managed care (Langwell 1990). 
Martin et al. (1985, p. 74) suggested that selection of providers may even be the most 
important feature in a cost containment program. Miller and Luft (1994, p. 1512) also 
recognised the importance of physician selection and viewed it as the starting point for 
and the most crucial feature of managed care. There is a large difference in practice be-
haviour among physicians in different health care settings, but even within a certain set-
ting there is often a wide variation. Luft (1981, p. 138) suggested that this variation indi-
cates that there is no ‘standard practice’, and ‘that the selection of particular practitioners 
to join a group may have a substantial influence on the average observed behavior within 
a setting.’ 
 Physician selection is a common feature of managed-care organisations (MCOs) like 
Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) or Preferred Provider Organisations (PPOs). 
Although, again according to Luft (1981, p. 138), the variability in practice behaviour 
does not seem to be less in an HMO than it is in non-managed practices, it may well be 
the case that such organisations select and attract physicians who have on average a more 
conservative practice style. A ‘conservative practice style’ suggests that the primary goal 
of physician selection is to select and to contract those physicians who act in a cost-
effective way, and preferably order less diagnostic tests, refer less patients to specialists, 
and prescribe less drugs. The goal thus is containment of health care costs. Indeed, the 
strategy is often viewed as a major cost-containment strategy. Johns (1985), for instance, 
argued that at least in California the strategy was introduced as such. In 1982, selective 
contracting was made the preferred policy approach on state level by means of legisla-
tion. 
 Further, in their report of the case study of United Healthcare, Martin et al. mentioned 
the same argument. United Healthcare was an Independent Practice Association organ-
ised by the SAFECO Insurance Company (see also subsection 7.4.2). It started in 1974, 
became the largest of its kind in the United States and was terminated in 1982 because of 
major losses. At the outset, United Healthcare strove to attract as many physicians as 
possible, and no attempt was made to select cost-conscious physicians.2 Consequently, it 
also attracted physicians who provided cost-ineffective care. Physician selection was ap-
plied only at the end of its history. The lack of the selection technique is viewed as one of 
 
                                                                 
2 An important reason for contracting as many physicians as possible was that it was considered attrac-
tive for potential members if they would not have to change physicians once they would choose for 
United Healthcare (Martin et al. 1985, p. 56). 
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the reasons for the failure of the plan. In retrospect, United Healthcare managers viewed 
initial selection of physicians as the most crucial cost-containment feature for a health 
plan (Martin et al. 1985, p. 74). 
 Besides cost containment, the selection of high-quality providers may be another im-
portant goal. Starting from the idea of the third-party agent arranging care on behalf of its 
clients, the selection of providers who are able to meet certain quality standards may be 
of equal importance. Proponents of selective contracting defend it as a strategy to lower 
health care costs as well as a means to improve patient care. Moreover, cost containment 
and high quality may be two sides of the same coin, as in the long run a wrong diagnosis 
and treatment will be more expensive. It is being asserted that the quality of care as well 
as the quality of the ones providing such care is very important in contracting decisions, 
and that this appears from the fact that some managed-care organisations require certain 
qualifications, like board certification (see Bindman et al. 1998, p. 675).3 Moreover, the 
goal of selective contracting seems to have changed in the coarse of time. Was it origi-
nally a way to contract physicians (regardless of their way of practising) in order to ob-
tain discounts (in return for patients), later it became a strategy to contract cost-effective 
and high-quality providers (Robinson 1993). 
 In some respects, selection of physicians by a third party resembles preferred-risk se-
lection (or cream skimming) by a third party on the health-insurance market. In the latter 
case, the third party tries to select members for whom the expected health care costs are 
lower than the premium these members have to pay. Preferred-risk selection may occur 
before or after an insurance contract is concluded (see, for instance, Van de Ven and Van 
Vliet 1992). As argued in the foregoing, in case of physician selection the third party may 
try to select physicians who practice in a cost-conscious way. It may, for instance, select 
those physicians for whom the (expected) costs are lower than the (expected) revenues.4 
Equally, physician selection may occur before or after a contract between both parties is 
concluded. It will be easier, though, to select preferred physicians before contracting, 
than to try to get rid of them or to change their values and behaviour afterwards (Martin 
et al. 1985). Gold et al. (1995a, p. 1679) conducted a survey to identify the arrangements 
made between managed-care organisations and physicians. Their research indicated that 
managed-care organisations indeed prefer to select physicians before a contract is con-
cluded. The majority of the plans (71 percent) chose ‘careful selection’ whereas only 18 
percent chose to ‘prune later’.5 
 
                                                                 
3 Having a ‘board certification’ means that the physician is recognised by a medical board to be qualified 
to work in his field. 
4 It was also noted, however, that a certain physician may have been selected for quality reasons. Than, 
the similarity between preferred-risk selection on the health-insurance market and physician selection 
does not hold. Still, high-quality physicians may be considered good risks as they may attract new in-
sured due to their good reputation. On the other hand, high-quality providers may attract expensive pa-
tients, i.e. potentially bad risks (expected health care costs are higher than the premium they have to 
pay). This will especially hold for some specialised physicians attracting chronically-ill patients. 
5 Note that by ‘careful selection’ Gold et al. (1995a) meant selection before a contract is concluded. In 
this thesis, the term ‘selection’ is being used in two ways: to denote selection of physicians and the pos-
sible denial of a contract as well as selection and the possible termination of a contract. 
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 What is labelled physician selection here in fact consists of two phases: the selection 
phase, and the contracting phase. In the first phase the third party has to select (i.e. to 
identify) the physicians who meet its requirements. In the second phase the third party 
actually has to contract the selected physicians. 
 
5.3.2 The selection phase 
 
Third parties may try to select preferred physicians in several ways. A first way is to use 
claim data, which they may have acquired during a previous contract. Analysing such 
data may reveal information, for instance about physicians’ billing practices and the cost-
effectiveness of their behaviour. Problematic is that a large amount of data is required 
and that this data should be reliable and controlled for case mix (Gold et al. 1995b). A 
physician who prescribes in a certain time period, for instance, 1.3 times the amount of 
drugs a colleague prescribes, is not necessarily less efficient than his colleague. Maybe 
the drugs are a (cheaper) substitute for hospital care. Another reason may be that the 
practice populations of both physicians differ. Of course, practice size is a crucial deter-
minant here, but also is the case mix of the practice population. Further, the physician 
may provide better care than his colleague may. Gold et al. (1995a, p. 1680) found that 
only 37 percent of the plans used quantitative data about physicians’ performance and 
practice style for the selection of new physicians. Sixty-three percent, however, used 
qualitative data, like professional reputation and patterns of care. 
 Another way to select physicians is credentialing (Gold et al. 1995b). Credentialing of 
physicians includes verifying licenses, malpractice histories, hospital privileges et cetera. 
Gold et al. found that all plans credentialed physicians before concluding a contract. Fur-
ther, managed-care organisations often visit physicians’ offices and check whether the 
facilities meet certain standards (Gold et al. 1995a, p. 1680). Medical as well as adminis-
trative facilities may be reviewed then. 
 Bindman et al. (1998) investigated which characteristics of primary care physicians 
and their practices were associated with denials and terminations of managed-care con-
tracts between these physicians and managed-care organisations. They found that con-
tracting by managed-care organisations is indeed done selectively. Eighty-seven percent 
of the 947 respondents – these were office-based primary care physicians in California – 
had at least one contract with an individual practice association model HMO or with a 
direct contract HMO. Twenty-two percent of the physicians had experienced a denial or a 
termination of a contract with one of these types of HMOs. Bindman et al. argued that 
this might be a larger proportion than expected given the demand for primary care physi-
cians in managed-care organisations. Of the characteristics, practice size was the strong-
est predictor of denials and terminations. The smaller the physician’s practice, the more 
likely it was that he was denied or terminated from a contract once. Further, primary care 
physicians with a large proportion of uninsured and non-white patients were significantly 
less likely to have managed-care patients within their practice. No association was found 
between age, sex or race of the physician and denial or termination. Board certification 
was also not associated with being denied or terminated from a managed-care contract, 
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but it was twice as likely that certified physicians had at least one contract with a man-
aged-care organisation.6 
 In the United Kingdom, general practices were eligible for fundholding status in case 
they met a certain list-size as well as administration and automation standards. Further, 
all partners of the practice had to agree with participation in the fundholding scheme 
(Audit Commission 1995). Formulating such terms was a way to select those GPs of 
which it may be expected that they were capable of being a fundholding agent for their 
patients. 
 
On the one hand, it may be hard for a third party to select physicians who are cost con-
scious and provide high-quality care, as the physicians’ characteristics are difficult or 
costly to observe. On the other hand, self-selection may make the selection process 
somewhat less complicated (Martin et al. 1985, Arrow 1986). Careful marketing and stat-
ing explicitly in advance that cost-effective and high-quality care is stimulated by the use 
of managed-care techniques may enhance self-selection.7 By so doing, it may be ex-
pected that the third party will predominantly attract physicians whose ideas about prac-
tising health care harmonise with those of the third party. According to Sørensen and 
Grytten (2003), for instance, more talented and motivated people will try to find and ac-
cept positions with performance compensation, while others will seek traditional wage 
contracts. They tested whether experienced and productive physicians and physicians 
who prioritize professional work rather than leisure-time and family life tend to prefer 
fee-for-service contracts, and whether less experienced and productive physicians and 
those who prioritize leisure-time and family life tend to prefer employment positions with 
a fixed salary. Indeed their results indicate that the probability of having a fee-for-service 
contract increases with age and seniority, and that priority given to leisure-time and fam-
ily life reduces the probability of a fee-for-service contract. Further, Jack (2005) argued 
that offering the physician different payment methods can be an efficient way of sorting 
physicians according to underlying characteristics, like altruism, risk aversion, or ethical 
standards. Risk averse physicians, for instance, may prefer a fee-for-service system, 
whereas less risk averse physicians may opt for a capitation payment. 
 Nevertheless, in several cases the assumption of self-selecting physicians may not 
hold. One reason is that physicians may be forced by local circumstances to apply for a 
contract with a third party. Firstly, they may apply for such a contract not because they 
agree with the terms of it, but because of competition for patients. For example, if the 
majority of patients favour a fundholding GP because they provide or arrange better care, 
then non-fundholders may be forced to apply for fundholding status too. Secondly, phys-
icians may be forced to apply for a contract because otherwise they would not obtain 
enough patients. This will especially be the case if a third party has a large market share 
within the physician’s area and if it stimulates its members to use the selected physicians. 
 
                                                                 
6 Bindman et al. (1998, p. 679) noted that because it is widely recognised that IPAs and direct contract 
HMOs require board-certified physicians, physicians without certification may not even apply for a con-
tract. As a result, they do not encounter a denial or a termination of a contract. 
7 See also subsection 3.3.2. 
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Not having a contract with this third party involves missing a substantial group of pa-
tients. Another reason why self-selection will not automatically provide the third party 
with the most suitable candidates is that physicians may lack information about their own 
behaviour relative to the behaviour of other practitioners. As a result, they may falsely 
view themselves as cost-effective and high-quality providers. 
 
5.3.3 The contract phase 
 
After the third party has overcome the problems of the selection phase, it actually has to 
conclude contracts with the physicians. Here is touched on the problems a third party 
may face then. 
 Firstly, the ratio of the number of physicians the third party wants to contract to the 
total supply of physicians should be smaller than one. Does it equal one or is it even lar-
ger than one, then the third party is forced to contract all the physicians available, other-
wise it cannot guarantee its members access to care. Constraints on the supply of physi-
cians, therefore, limit the usefulness of the selection instrument by third parties. 
 Secondly, even if the above mentioned ratio is smaller than one, a third party may be 
forced to contract all GPs who want to do so. By 1994, 21 states in the US had enacted 
‘any willing provider’ laws. Due to these laws, third parties are obliged to contract physi-
cians who are willing to accept its contract terms (Iglehart 1994). Although selection of a 
certain type of physician is still possible by means of contract design, it is within those 
states not longer possible on an individual basis. 
 Thirdly, physicians may object to selective contracting for reasons of solidarity or be-
cause it may disturb the network in which they co-operate. Also an association of GPs as 
a whole may boycott selective contracting and forbid its members to take up an offer in-
dividually. In some countries or US states, however, antitrust laws prohibit such cartels. 
 Finally, the third party as agent has to take account of the members’ wishes. Selective 
contracting only makes sense if patients visit the selected physicians. To encourage the 
use of these physicians, the third party may stimulate their members financially to visit 
them in case health care is needed. Probably, the care provided is paid for in full if it is 
provided by a selected physician. If not, the patient will have to pay a part of the bill (as, 
for instance, in a preferred provider organisation) or even has to pay the whole bill him-
self (as, for instance, in an exclusive provider organisation). The consequence of selective 
contracting a subset of the total supply of physicians will thus be that patients’ choice is 
restricted. 
 
 
5.4 Controlling general practitioners 
 
5.4.1 Control by incentives 
 
Usually, a GP has to choose an alternative from a set of possible actions. For instance, he 
has to decide whether or not to treat or whether or not to refer a patient, which diagnostic 
test he should order, whether he should prescribe generic drugs or brand names, et cetera. 
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By means of incentives a third party may attempt to influence these choices. The physi-
cian is still left a choice and, ideally, chooses the action that is most beneficial to the 
third-party agent and thus – if the third party performs his agency function well – to the 
patient. 
 
5.4.1.1 Financial incentives8 
The use of financial incentives is based on the idea that such incentives influence the be-
haviour of (primary care) physicians and that this behaviour has an effect of the costs and 
quality of care. Two basic economic theories are important here (Hsiao 1992). The first 
one is the demand-side theory. Followers of this theory consider health care to be equal 
to other goods or services on the market. The demand for health-care goods and services 
results from decisions by informed and independent buyers of care and depends on their 
‘willingness to pay’. Suppliers of health care have no or only little possibility to influence 
this demand or to set their prices independent of it. 
 A second important theory is the supply-side theory. Followers argue that health care 
differs from other goods or services. This mainly results from market failures, like the 
presence of uncertainty (with health insurance and hence reduced price sensitivity as a 
result) and an asymmetry of information (with the physician as the dominant decision-
maker; see also chapter 2). 
 Within the framework of the supply-side theory fits the assumption that physicians are 
able to influence the demand for care. Under certain circumstances, like a decreasing 
number of patients per physician, physicians may exploit this opportunity. Especially if 
the physician provides the diagnosis as well as the care, then there is room for demand 
inducement (Van Doorslaer 1988).9 This is due to the physician’s double role as agent for 
the patient and as provider of care. Hence physicians are able to shift the demand curve, 
so it cannot considered to be autonomous any longer (Schut 1988). The result is a posi-
tive correlation between supply, price and use of care. (See also subsection 4.2.5.) 
 Obviously, physicians do not always act in their patients’ best interests. According to 
Flierman (1991) there are two explanations for this. Firstly, the physician’s utility func-
tion contains an income and a leisure variable, besides a medical-ethics variable. The 
physician may get professional satisfaction from acting in the patients’ interests, but at 
the same time this acting may influence his income and the amount of his leisure time. 
Secondly, it is not always clear what is in the patients’ best interests. This professional 
uncertainty may manifest itself in uncertainty about the physician’s competency or in 
uncertainty about the moment and the way care should be provided (see also subsection 
4.2.2 for the ‘zone of uncertainty’). If the optimal treatment is not evident, then the role 
of income and leisure may increase. In what way the physician’s choice of an action out 
of a set of possible ones influences his income depends on the payment system. The main 
payment systems are discussed hereafter. 
 
                                                                 
8 The use of financial incentives in order to influence the behaviour of GPs is also subject of the next 
chapter. Therefore, this subsection is an introduction to the subject. 
9 Besides the care prescribed and provided by the same physician, one can discern the care demanded by 
the patient and the care provided by another physician than the physician whom prescribed it. 
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 Two main categories of financial incentives are distinguished here: basic payments 
and ancillary payments. 
 
Basic payments 
The first category consists of basic methods to pay GPs for the services they provide, i.e. 
for primary care. The predominant methods are fee for service, capitation and salary; 
case-payment systems are still uncommon. Each method provides a physician with cer-
tain incentives and has certain potential effects. Whether certain effects are considered an 
advantage or a disadvantage depends on one’s viewpoint and one’s objectives. If, for 
instance, a third party wants to reduce the number of primary-care services, then the in-
centives originating from a fee-for-service system may be considered undesirable. How-
ever, an attempt to substitute primary care for secondary care may be supported by the 
introduction of such a system. The fact that in table 5.1 the incentive of a fee-for-service 
system to provide extra services is considered to be a disadvantage can therefore be dis-
puted. 
 In case of fee for service the physician’s income is the product of the number of ser-
vices and the fees paid for these services. A fee-for-service system stimulates physicians 
to provide additional services as long as the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal 
costs of providing them. 
 In a capitation system, a physician is paid a fixed payment per patient for a defined 
period of time (usually a month or a year) and for a defined package of health care ser-
vices. Several incentives evolve from capitation. The physician is stimulated to promote 
prevention and to provide care efficiently, but also to reduce the quality of services (qual-
ity skimping), to refer patients (cost shifting), and to select patients on the basis of their 
expected costs (cream skimming). 
 In a salary system a physician has no incentives to increase the number of services or 
to select patients. There is no direct incentive to increase productivity or efficiency, or to 
increase the quality of care. As to the latter aspect on the other hand, the absence of an 
incentive to increase the volume of care reduces the danger of over-provision of care. 
Hence a salary system may have positive effects on the quality of care as well. 
 Jegers et al. (2002) distinguished between fixed versus variable payment systems and 
between retrospective versus prospective payment systems. In case of a fixed payment 
system, there is no link between payments and the physician’s activities, whereas such a 
link does exist in a variable payment system. In case of retrospective payment system, 
there is a link between payments and the physician’s costs, whereas this link is absent in 
prospective payment systems. 
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Table 5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of basic methods of payment 
 
BASIC 
PAYMENT 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Fee for service - Automatic adjustment for case com-
plexity 
- Close relationship between remu-
neration and services 
- Provides insight into practice pro-
files 
- May be applied to stimulate the 
provision of care 
- Much used, often preferred by phy-
sicians 
- Incentive to provide extra services 
- In case the ratio of fees to effort is 
not constant, a shift to the more prof-
itable services may occur 
- Administratively complicated 
- Difficult to set a budget in advance 
Capitation - Administratively simple 
- Provides physician with incentive to 
minimise the costs per case treated 
- Budgeting in advance is possible 
- Incentive to provide preventive care 
- Risk of patient selection by physician 
- Risk of lower quality (quality skimp-
ing) 
- Provides physician with incentive to 
refer (especially expensive) patients 
- Unfair distribution of means in case 
the average morbidity in practice 
populations differs largely 
- Provides little insight into practice 
profiles 
Salary - Administratively simple 
- No influence of profitability of ser-
vices 
- Allows for co-operation between 
physicians 
- Budgeting in advance is possible 
- No incentive for cream skimming 
- Risk of decreased productivity 
- No incentive for efficiency 
- Risk of lower quality (quality skimp-
ing) 
- No incentive to pay attention to the 
patient’s demands 
- Provides little insight into practice 
profiles 
Case payment - Fairly good adjustment for case 
complexity 
- Fairly close relationship between 
remuneration and services 
- Provides physician with incentive to 
minimise the costs per case treated 
- Provides some insight into practice 
profiles 
- Facilitates integrated care 
- Difficult to draw up an extensive list 
of diseases 
- The severity of cases (and the result-
ing costs) may vary considerably, 
even within a diagnosis group 
- Risk of patient selection by physician 
in case the severity of cases varies 
considerably within a diagnosis 
group 
- Risk of lower quality (quality skimp-
ing) 
- Risk of ‘diagnosis creep’ 
- Difficult to set a budget in advance 
 
Source: Glaser (1970), Reinhardt (1985), Janssen (1988), Delnoy et al. (1992), and NRV (1993). 
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Ancillary payments 
Besides using basic payment methods for primary care services, the third party may use 
ancillary payments as an additional incentive system. Such payments may be made to 
stimulate the provision of specific care (i.e. function-related fees, like a fee for a special 
kind of minor surgery or immunisation). Another possibility is to use such payments in 
order to stimulate the provision of cost-effective and high-quality care by the GP, or to 
stimulate him to arrange for the provision of such care by other providers (i.e. behaviour- 
or outcome-related fees). A behaviour- or outcome-related fee is an amount of money 
paid to the physician supplementary to the basic payment once he has, for instance, met a 
certain norm. 
 
The difference between function-related, behaviour-related and outcome-related fees may 
be subtle but – as defined here – lies in two characteristics. A first characteristic is the 
presence of a check after a certain period of time or after a certain event (for instance, a 
treatment). As a result, the regularity of the payments may differ. The second characteris-
tic is the nature of the check. The subject of the monitoring may be the behaviour of the 
physician, or it may be the effect of this behaviour. 
 Although a function-related fee is an ancillary payment, it will often have a continuous 
character. The payment may be made ex ante (or even ex post), but there is no check ex 
post. The fee may serve as a compensation for practice costs as well as remuneration for 
the physician himself. Hence the physician is given the opportunity, and thus stimulated, 
to provide certain services. 
 Contrary to a function-related fee, a behaviour-related fee is made contingent upon an 
ex-post check. There is the question of whether or how the physician provides the speci-
fied services before the definitive payment is made. Hence it is considered here to be an 
irregular payment, although it may become regular if the physician keeps succeeding in 
providing the services in a satisfactory way. 
 An outcome-related fee is also contingent upon an ex-post check. The question, how-
ever, is not whether or how the physician provided the specified services, but what the 
effects of his behaviour are. The effects may, for instance, be stated in terms of costs or 
volumes of care or in terms of health effects. Again, the fee is considered here to be an 
irregular payment, but it may become a regular payment if the physician keeps succeed-
ing in meeting the required norm. Instead of just two possibilities (only a behaviour-
related fee if the physician provided the specific services or if he provided them well) 
there may be a whole range of attainable qualities. Depending on what is agreed upon, all 
those qualities below or above a specified level may result in a bonus. Although not nec-
essarily so, the outcome-related payment may vary to the extent that the norm is met. 
 The difference between the three types of ancillary fees may be illustrated by an ex-
ample regarding an electronic prescription system. A third party may pay: 
- a function-related fee in order to enable as well as to stimulate the physician to use 
such a system; 
- a behaviour-related fee if the physician indeed has used the system correctly in the past 
year; 
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- an outcome-related fee if the system resulted in a lower number of prescriptions or in 
lower drug costs. 
Another example is a payment for offering immunisation services, where the outcome-
related payment is made once the physician has increased the immunisation rate of the 
eligible population beyond a certain level. 
 
The category of ancillary payments consists of bonus systems, withhold systems and 
budget systems. In a bonus system, a GP receives an additional payment in case he meets 
a certain norm (financial or non-financial). For instance, he may receive a bonus if his 
actual costs are lower than the costs projected by the third party. Other examples are pre-
determined levels of patient satisfaction, medical knowledge and technical skills, produc-
tivity, compliance with pre-certification and authorisation requirements, co-operation 
with quality-management programs, use of network providers, or all kinds of utilisation 
figures (see also Kongstvedt 1993c, pp. 192-197). Besides on individual behaviour, a 
bonus may also depend upon total plan performance (Kongstvedt 1993a). The opposite of 
a bonus is a malus. In case of a malus system the physician has to return an amount of 
money for not meeting a certain (financial or non-financial norm), for instance if his ac-
tual costs are higher than the costs projected by the third party. 
 In case of withholds, a portion of the basic payment is withheld until a certain point in 
time (for instance, the end of the year). At that point, a physician’s actual costs are com-
pared with the projected costs, as in a bonus system. If the actual costs exceed the pro-
jected costs, the withhold is used to cover the excess costs. Any remaining money is paid 
to the physician (Kongstvedt 1993a). 
 Often, malus and withhold systems are considered to be incentive systems, but they 
may also be viewed as some kind of directive. The main difference between incentives 
and directives is that in case of incentives the physician is rewarded if he chooses those 
actions preferred by the third party. If he does not, he misses his reward. In case of direc-
tives, the physician is punished if he does not choose the dictated actions. So contrary to 
incentive systems, directives result in a declining welfare if the physician acts in another 
way than preferred. A physician can not claim the withheld sum if it appears at the end of 
the year that he did not practice efficiently.10 
 Bonus systems and withholds are frequently used to stimulate GPs to behave effi-
ciently with regard to follow-up care, that is to order, refer and prescribe in an efficient 
way. GPs may also receive a budget for the costs associated with this care. An example is 
the British General Practice Fundholding scheme, in which GPs received a budget with 
which they had to finance health care services, like hospital care, diagnostic tests, drugs 
and appliances (see section 7.3). 
 
The third party may blend basic payment systems to mitigate the negative effects and to 
combine the positive effects of the different systems. The combination of capitation and 
fee for service, for instance, may balance the incentives for under- and over-provision of 
 
                                                                 
10 Another way to look at this matter is to consider a directive to be a negative incentive (see also subsec-
tion 3.3.3). 
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care. In combination with the ancillary payments, this results in a number of payment 
options. An interesting option for paying the GP then may be a combination of a capita-
tion payment and a bonus system for efficient referral behaviour. There are several argu-
ments for blended or mixed payment systems. One argument is that mixed systems re-
duce the incentives for undesirable behaviour, like cream skimming and quality skimp-
ing, while maintaining some incentives for efficient behaviour (Ellis and McGuire 1990, 
Newhouse 1996). Another argument is found in case the third party wants to link the 
payment system to the performance of the physician in providing quality care. Since 
some dimensions of quality will never be contractible, mixed payment systems balance 
incentives for quality efforts across contractible and noncontractible dimensions of qual-
ity. This refers to the problem of multitasking: the difficulty of designing an incentive 
system to stimulate certain behaviour or a certain outcome if the provider has to perform 
various tasks and if for some tasks the desired outcomes are more difficult to measure 
(Eggleston 2005). 
 
Application of payment methods 
Hillman et al. (1992) surveyed contractual arrangements between IPA-type HMOs and 
primary care physicians. They distinguished between two- and three-tiered HMOs (see 
subsection 2.3.2) and found that 41 percent of the two-tiered HMOs used a fee-for-
service system to pay primary care physicians, 45 percent used a capitation system, and 
14 percent used a salary system. Twenty-six percent of the three-tiered HMOs used fee 
for service as final payment system for primary care, 18 percent used a capitation system, 
and 39 percent used a salary system. 
 In a survey among physicians, Remler et al. (1997) found that 43 percent of the indi-
vidual generalists was paid a salary. Further, generalist practices received capitation 
payments for, on average, 18 percent of their patients. However, individual generalists 
received a capitation payment less frequently: on average for 9 percent of their patients. 
Apparently, part of the practices translated the capitation into another payment system. 
Of the generalists receiving some capitation (31 percent), the share of patients for whom 
capitation was paid, was 29 percent. 
 Gold et al. (1995a) found the following figures. Group- or staff-model HMOs paid 
their primary care physicians according to a salary system (28 percent) or a fee-for-
service system (3 percent), or used other arrangements of which capitation (34 percent) 
was the predominant method.11 Of the network- or IPA-type HMOs, 2 percent paid a 
salary, 12 percent used fee for service, and 84 percent used other arrangements with capi-
tation (56 percent) as the predominant method. PPOs used fee for service (90 percent) or 
other arrangements with capitation (7 percent) as predominant method. Often, managed 
care-organisations adjusted the payments for utilisation measures. Fifty percent of the 
group- or staff-model HMOs made such adjustments; 74 percent of the network- or IPA-
type HMOs did so. Of the PPOs, 34 percent made these adjustments too. Other payment 
adjusters were patients’ complaints, quality measures, consumer surveys, physician pro-
 
                                                                 
11 The category ‘other arrangements’ consisted of risk-sharing arrangements, like capitation with or 
without withholding or bonuses, or salary or fee for service with withholding or bonuses. 
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ductivity, or enrolee turnover rates. 
 In a more recent study among 116 HMOs, Gold et al. (2002) found that 24.7% of the 
HMOs paid their individual primary care physicians according to a fee-for-service sys-
tem. About 8% combined this with a withhold or bonus system. About 61% paid a capi-
tation, with about 29% combining it with a withhold or bonus. Around 14% paid a salary, 
with 3% combining salary and withhold or bonus. Interesting is the amount of care cov-
ered by the capitation fee: 
- all HMOs included primary care office units in the capitation; 
- 93% included other services provided in the physician office; 
- 84% included ambulatory care provided elsewhere; 
- 84% included inpatient visits; 
- 47% included referral for specialist care; 
- 46% included ancillary care provided by others. 
According to Gold et al., the latter two are more likely to be included when payments are 
made to a group of physicians instead of to individual physicians. 
 Hemenway et al. (1990) described the effect of implementing a bonus system for 15 
physicians in an ambulatory care centre in the US. The implementation resulted in an 
increase of the number of services. Patient visits rose by 12% and charged services rose 
by 20% per month. 
 Flierman (1991) and Delnoy et al. (1992) described the effects of a change in payment 
system for the GPs in Copenhagen. The capitation system was replaced by a blended 
system of capitation and fee for service. Both payment systems generated 50 percent of 
the physician’s income. The introduction of the blended payment system resulted in a 
significant increase in the number of diagnostic and curative services in the experimental 
group compared to the control group.12 For instance, the number of diagnostic services 
showed an increase of 66% in the experimental group versus an increase of 11% in the 
control group. The number of curative services showed an increase of 80% in the ex-
perimental group versus an increase of 18% in the control group. The number of referrals 
to private medical specialists or to hospitals decreased with respectively 27% and 23% in 
the experimental group versus respectively 1% and 6% in the control group. 
 Scott and Hall (1995) reviewed 18 studies of the effects of several remunerating 
methods for GPs/primary care physicians. They concluded that it is difficult to evaluate 
these effects due to methodological problems. Randomised-controlled trials are seldom 
feasible. Further, it requires changing payment systems or the presence of different meth-
ods within the same setting. According to Hellinger, many studies are subject to several 
sources of bias, like patient selection effects, physician selection effects and missing vari-
ables (Hellinger 1996). 
 Sørensen and Grytten (2003) found that Norwegian primary care physicians who were 
paid on a fee-for-service basis had more consultations, more patient contacts and less 
referrals than their colleagues who were paid on a salary basis. The differences were 
 
                                                                 
12 The research was not a randomized-controlled trial, but the group of physicians confronted with the 
change of the payment system (physicians in the city of Copenhagen) was compared with a control 
group (physicians in the province of Copenhagen). 
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mainly the result of a higher number of working hours, but also of higher time efficiency. 
These results were for about one-third due to a selection effect and for about two-thirds 
due to the incentive effect. In the long-term, however, the selection effect seemed to fade 
away, which may be due to altered physician preferences. Sørensen and Grytten expected 
that changing the salary system into a fee-for-service system would result in an increase 
of these physicians’ their production by about 23% in the short-term and by about 40% in 
the long-term. 
 As an exception, Hickson et al. (1987) described the results of a randomised-
controlled trial in which the impact of payment systems on the behaviour of the partici-
pating (18) physicians was tested. They found that physicians who were reimbursed on a 
fee-for-service basis scheduled more visits per patient than salaried physicians did and 
saw their patients more often during the study of nine months. This difference was 
mainly the result of fee-for-service physicians seeing more well patients than salaried 
physicians. 
 In chapter 7 we will discuss other studies of the effects of financial incentives on the 
behaviour of physicians. 
 
5.4.1.2 Non-financial incentives 
 
Gatekeeping 
In general, a gatekeeper model is an arrangement in which a GP must give prior authori-
sation for diagnostic tests and several forms of care, like community health services, non-
emergency specialist care, hospital care, and sometimes also emergency care. Payment 
for these services is often linked to the referral by a primary-care gatekeeper (Trapnell 
1985, Franks et al. 1992). Nevertheless, gatekeeper models may differ in the degree to 
which they serve as a prior-authorisation system, and to which the gatekeepers function 
as organisers and co-ordinators of care (Gold et al. 1995b). 
 Primary-care gatekeeping may in the first place be viewed as a technique to direct pa-
tients’ behaviour, for in a gatekeeper system patients are required to have the gatekeeper 
authorise specialist care, hospital care, et cetera. Yet primary-care gatekeeping is also a 
technique to control the GPs themselves. One could consider the appointment of GPs as 
gatekeepers to be a directive. Here, however, assigning them the gatekeeper function and 
providing them with the necessary tools is viewed as a stimulus to actually perform this 
function. Ultimately, it will be these physicians who decide whether or not to refer pa-
tients (thus whether or not to respond to the incentive). The individual autonomy of the 
physicians as well as the professional autonomy of the profession is thus maintained. As 
incentive, the appointment and provision of tools may not be strong enough and physi-
cians may still be triggered to order, refer and prescribe in a sub-optimal way. Therefore, 
gatekeeping often coincides with other techniques, like financial incentives. 
 As with other managed-care techniques, primary-care gatekeeping may be considered 
a cost-containment device or a technique to improve the quality of care. It is a way to 
control costs as the number of visits to other and perhaps more expensive providers of 
care, like specialists or hospitals, may be reduced (the inhibiting effect of gatekeeping). 
In addition, it may result in a shift from more expensive secondary care towards less ex-
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pensive primary care (the substitution effect). Franks et al. (1992) argued that viewing 
gatekeeping as a function of opening and closing the gate to costly care is a simplistic 
view, because it suggests that the GP is the third-party payer’s agent instead of the pa-
tient’s. They defined gatekeeping as ‘the process of matching patients’ needs and prefer-
ences with the judicious use of medical services’ (Franks et al. 1992, p. 424). It should be 
noticed that since in this thesis the third party is supposed to act as agent on behalf of the 
patients, a GP who acts as agent for the third party should, ideally, act identically as a GP 
who acts as the patient’s agent. If primary-care gatekeepers indeed have to match their 
patients’ needs and preferences with the use of health care and also have to organise and 
co-ordinate care, then they have adopted a large part of the third-party’s agency function. 
In fact, part of the decision-making process has been delegated to the GP then. Although 
one may argue that such decisions should have been the GP’s in the first place, not sel-
dom this decision-making has become part of the third party’s domain. This is, for in-
stance, exemplified by the use of techniques like pre-admission review and mandatory 
second opinions (see also subsection 5.4.3). 
 Gatekeeping may also improve the quality of care. Although undertreatment is a seri-
ous risk in gatekeeping arrangements and may require strategies to prevent this risk, pro-
tecting patients from overtreatment is a major benefit. Gatekeeping may reduce the num-
ber of false positive test results and iatrogenic diseases (Franks et al. 1992). It may also 
contribute to the reduction of medicalisation. This illustrates that quality improvement 
might very well result in cost containment and vice versa. But primary care gatekeeping 
has some other advantages. As the patient has to visit his GP each time he might need 
medical care, the physician gets to know him better and is able to form a notion of the 
patient’s medical history and to get a picture of his life and work. This also enables the 
physician to keep a medical record. Another advantage is that the gatekeeper may support 
the patient in making decisions on the required care and the most suitable type of pro-
vider. Furthermore, for the patient treatment by a GP may be more pleasant than if he has 
to visit a specialist or a hospital. A final advantage mentioned here is that the gatekeeper 
system enables medical specialists to maintain and to develop their skills and knowledge, 
as the group of patients they see is much more a selected group than it would be absent 
the filter of the gatekeeper. 
 Remler et al. (1997) found that generalists act as gatekeepers for, on average, forty 
percent of their patients. Within 61 percent of the group- or staff-model HMOs patients 
are required to select an individual primary care physician, and 96 percent of these or-
ganisations holds their primary care physicians responsible for most specialist referrals. 
Ninety-two percent of the network or IPA HMOs required their patients to select an indi-
vidual primary care physician who had also responsibility for most specialist referrals 
(Gold et al. 1995a). 
Also in the Netherlands and the UK GPs act as primary care gatekeepers for referral care. 
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Group-membership incentives 
Physicians may be working in a group practice or may be member of a risk pool. 13 Apart 
from the direct financial incentives emanating from membership of a risk pool, there are 
group-membership incentives as well. The proximity of peers, the membership of a risk 
pool and the pressure to comply with group norms or standards may influence provider 
behaviour and, therefore, can be regarded as another technique the third party may use. 
Eisenberg (2002) argued that in every practice organisation there are physicians who are 
particularly influential in determining the group norms of practice style. The role of clini-
cal leadership by educationally influential physicians can be used as a starting point to 
influence the practice patterns of their colleagues. 
 
5.4.2 Control by persuasion/information 
 
A third-party agent may inform a GP about the desired actions hoping that the physician 
values these actions more positively then, and may try to persuade him to perform these 
actions. The techniques discussed here briefly are practice guidelines (and clinical rules), 
physician profiling and high-cost case management. 
 
Practice guidelines 
In the course of time, various names have evolved that more or less embody the same 
concept, i.e. instructing a physician how he should or should not act in a specified situa-
tion. Examples are practice guidelines, protocols, clinical rules, regulations, and prospec-
tive utilisation review (Hillman 1991). As different authors use the terms differently, it is 
not always instantly clear which exact meaning their terms have. 
 Practice guidelines, protocols or clinical rules may be developed for diagnostic as well 
as therapeutic services. Although the terms more or less embody the same concept, in 
practice they may differ in the way the physician is obliged to follow the instructions and 
is sanctioned if he does not do so. Here, practice guidelines are considered to have an 
advisory role; the physician will not be punished by the third party if he acts differently. 
The third party may thus employ practice guidelines to inform the physician and to per-
suade him to perform certain actions, i.e. to make the physician value the preferred ac-
tions more positively. However, if the instructions are formulated in a coercive manner, 
as protocols or rules, then they may be classified as a directive. Protocols and clinical 
rules are thus considered to be compulsory by nature (see subsection 5.4.3). An example 
of practice guidelines are the eighty NHG-Practice Guidelines, developed by the Dutch 
College of General Practitioners (NHG). 
 All these techniques may coincide with, for instance, financial incentives. In case of 
practice guidelines, a physician may be rewarded financially in case he uses them. In case 
of protocols and clinical rules, a physician may be confronted with withheld payments or 
even with termination from a contract. 
 
                                                                 
13 A risk pool is a group of providers, like GPs, who share in the rewards or penalties from surpluses or 
deficits in the budgets for certain types of care, for instance secondary care (Hillman et al. 1992). To this 
subject is returned in the next chapter. 
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 Practice guidelines are usually based on codified approaches to health care services. 
Nevertheless, physicians often judge them negatively, as they are associated with cook-
book medicine (Kongstvedt 1993b). Hillman (1991, p. 139), who considers ‘clinical 
rules’ to be the collective noun that also comprises practice guidelines, mentioned several 
advantages of clinical rules (and thus of practice guidelines). Firstly, they are a way to 
inform physicians about appropriate and effective treatments. Secondly, they facilitate 
the evaluation of compliance with new clinical approaches and they may support physi-
cians if they want to withhold a service a patient demands for. Thirdly, rules provide a 
basis for standardising the approach to a certain problem. Fourthly, rules may support 
physicians in defending themselves against malpractice claims if they can prove compli-
ance with a rule issued by the profession. 
 Remler et al. (1997) found that generalists were subject to condition specific guide-
lines or protocols for, on average, 17 percent of their patients. Gold et al. (1995a) found 
that 76 percent of the group and staff HMOs as well as of the network or IPA HMOs 
made any use of practice guidelines. Twenty-eight percent of the PPOs did too. Any use 
of guidelines involved establishing formal, written guidelines, monitoring compliance, 
and meeting with physicians to review results. 
 
Physician profiling 
By means of physician profiles or practice profiles, GPs may be informed about their 
relative performance. Profiling entails ‘(...) the preparation and selective dissemination of 
reports that compare the practice patterns of different providers on such dimensions as 
resource consumption, charges, and outcomes. (It) provides relative performance meas-
ures among providers, and can be used to identify potential quality problems, assess pro-
vider performance, and improve utilisation review’ (Evans et al. 1995, p. 1107). As the 
total care provided by a physician to his practice population is reviewed, the focus is on 
practice patterns rather than on the uniqueness of one case (Parkerton et al. 2003). Profil-
ing serves as a feedback mechanism.14 
 
High-cost case management/large-case management/medical case management/ 
catastrophic-case management/individual benefits management 
‘High-cost case management’ refers to the process of identifying patients with (expected) 
high costs, assessing their needs and personal circumstances, and then arranging less ex-
pensive care, preferably of at least the same quality. It thus differs from the other utilisa-
tion-management techniques in that it is specifically aimed at (potential) high-
expenditure patients and at arranging alternative care as well as assessing the appropri-
ateness of the care. 
 A case-management program is a voluntary technique (IOM 1989). It is considered 
here to be employed by a third party in co-operation with the GP. The physician, how-
ever, remains responsible for the final health-care decisions. Frequently, specialised 
 
                                                                 
14 Besides being a means to provide physicians with feedback, profiling is also a monitoring technique 
used in order to provide the third party with information about the monitored physicians. For a further 
discussion of profiling, see section 5.5. 
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nurses provide case management. In that instance it is no longer a means to support the 
GP in making health-care decisions but an autonomous treatment by another provider of 
care. It is beyond the scope of this research then. 
 
5.4.3 Control by directive/authority 
 
A third method the third-party agent may use in an attempt to control a GP is by means of 
directives or authority. The actions the physician has to perform are defined, so his 
choice is restricted. Of course, even being subjected to directives the physician may still 
choose to perform otherwise but he risks sanctions then. Several techniques are used in 
health care, all of which can be ranged under the term directive but are often summarised 
by the term ‘utilisation management’. A selection of these techniques is explained here.15 
 Utilisation-management techniques form a well-known part of managed care. Less 
well known, however, is the precise meaning of the term. Several definitions circulate 
and authors range different techniques under the term. One was proposed by The Com-
mittee on Utilisation Management by Third Parties of the Institute of Medicine (IOM). 
The committee defined utilisation management as ‘a set of techniques used by or on be-
half of purchasers of health care benefits to manage health care costs by influencing pa-
tient care decision-making through case-by-case assessments of the appropriateness of 
care prior to its provision’ (IOM 1989, p. 17). For four reasons, this can be considered a 
narrow definition. Firstly, the committee mentioned solely purchasers of health care and 
not, for instance, group practices. Secondly, according to the committee, goal of utilisa-
tion management is to manage health care costs. The reduction of unnecessary care is 
left out of consideration. A third reason is that only case-by-case assessments of the ap-
propriateness of the care are taken into account. Finally, the committee focused on tech-
niques used to assess the care prior to its provision. The committee distinguished two 
main ex ante techniques: prior review and high-cost case management. Prior review 
techniques were further subdivided into pre-admission review, admission review, contin-
ued-stay review, discharge planning and second opinion. 
 Bailit and Sennett (1991, p. 87) broadened the IOM definition by omitting the last part 
of it, ‘prior to its provision’. As a result, utilisation management also includes retrospec-
tive utilisation review. Another definition was proposed by Milstein (1997, p. 87), who 
described utilisation management as ‘all interventions originating outside the phys-
ician/patient relationship with an intent to promote an economical mix of health care ser-
vices’. Kerr et al. (1995) defined utilisation management in the broadest sense; it in-
cluded physician incentives and primary care gatekeeping.  
 Striking is the emphasis on the costs of care instead of the quality of care; just as is the 
case with many definitions of managed care (see subsection 5.2.1). In a survey among 
utilisation-review organisations, respondents reported that in one to three percent of the 
cases they reviewed in 1993 they observed ‘unnecessary or inappropriate care that in-
 
                                                                 
15 The description of the terms is mainly based upon the study of the Committee on Utilisation Manage-
ment by Third Parties of the Institute of Medicine (1989). See also Langwell (1990) and Gold et al. 
(1995a,b). 
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volved significant risks for patients’ (Schlesinger et al. 1997, p. 116). Although this per-
centage may seem low, it indicates that maintenance of and improvements in the quality 
of patient care are attainable goals. Moreover, Schlesinger et al. extrapolated this figure 
to the whole industry and estimated that utilisation-review organisations identify between 
85,000 and 255,000 of such cases per year. Further, utilisation management may contrib-
ute to the quality of care in the other 97 to 99 percent of the cases, although in a less dra-
matic way. 
 Whether the techniques within the second category, the control techniques, are con-
sidered to be stimulating, persuading, or directing, will mainly depend upon the sanc-
tions. In case of utilisation management, a sanction may be that the third party does not 
pay for the services if the physician ignores its treatment proposals. The physician then 
faces a loss if he perseveres despite the reviewer’s directives.16 Utilisation management 
should then be considered a directive. Case management is an exception to this as, usu-
ally, case-management programs are voluntary (IOM 1989). It may be considered an in-
centive then, or a way to persuade physician and patient to use the recommended ser-
vices. 
 
Clinical rules, protocols 
A first method to direct the behaviour of GPs is to issue clinical rules, or protocols, stat-
ing how a physician should or should not act, given a certain clinical circumstance. Im-
posing clinical rules can be considered a first step as it is taken before a patient comes in 
view. See also subsection 5.4.2. 
 
Pre-admission review/pre-admission certification/pre-service review/ 
pre-procedure review/prior authorisation 
Although the terms may be mixed up, generally ‘pre-admission review’ is used to indi-
cate a technique that is employed to assess the need for a proposed hospital admission, 
prior to the admission itself. ‘Pre-admission certification’ indicates that an admission 
needs to be certified in order to obtain payment. ‘Pre-service review’, ‘pre-procedure 
review’ and ‘prior authorisation’ are usually used to indicate the assessment of the need 
for a procedure, regardless of whether it will be performed on an inpatient basis or not. 
 The difference with gatekeeping is that the current techniques are applied by a third 
party. The appointment of the GP to the gatekeeper function may be done by a third 
party, but the performance of the function is done by the physician. Thus in case of pre-
admission review, pre-admission certification et cetera, the third party is the final deci-
sion-maker, whereas it is the physician in case of primary-care gatekeeping. 
 
Admission review 
The term ‘admission review’ is used to describe a technique employed to assess whether 
an emergency or an urgent admission was appropriate or not. In case of such admissions, 
 
                                                                 
16 It may make a slight difference whether a patient is reimbursed or whether the services are delivered 
in kind: in a reimbursement system it will be the patient who bears the costs of the reviewer’s sanctions. 
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pre-admission review is generally not feasible so that the admission is reviewed within a 
few days after hospitalisation. 
 
(Mandatory) second (surgical) opinion 
For some procedures patients have to get a second opinion from another physician to 
check whether the proposed services are needed and appropriate. 
 
Continued-stay review/concurrent utilisation review/length-of-stay review 
These are techniques used to check whether continued inpatient care is really needed or 
whether a patient could also be treated on an outpatient basis. The term ‘concurrent utili-
sation review’ may also apply in case the third party assesses the appropriateness of the 
hospital care itself. The inpatient basis does not have to be under discussion then. 
 
Discharge planning 
‘Discharge planning’ refers to techniques used to ensure that patients are discharged from 
hospital as soon as medically justified. These techniques may range from indicating, at 
admission, an expectation of the length of stay to extensive post-discharge service plan-
ning. 
 
Retrospective utilisation review 
If is assessed whether the already delivered health services were appropriate, then is spo-
ken of ‘retrospective utilisation review’. Although this is a technique that is applied after 
care has been consumed, to a patient the threat of denial of claims may be an incentive 
strong enough to refrain from over-consumption. To a GP the threat of termination of his 
contract by the third-party agent is an incentive to refrain from demand inducement. Ex-
cept for using it to assess the care delivered to a specific patient, it may also be employed: 
- to monitor whether the information provided prior and during the delivery of services 
was accurate; 
- to examine the high-volume, low unit-cost claims, which are not suitable for assess-
ment prior or during service delivery; 
- to analyse patterns of care for physician, practice or hospital profiling and for selective-
contracting purposes (IOM 1989, p. 20).17 
 
Application of utilisation management 
Of all managed-care techniques, utilisation-management techniques seem to be the most 
employed.18 In a survey of U.S. physicians conducted in 1995, Remler et al. (1997) found 
 
                                                                 
17 It should be noticed that here is departed from the principle of case-by-case assessment as mentioned 
by The Committee on Utilisation Management by Third Parties of the Institute of Medicine (IOM). 
18 Since all third parties use some payment method and since such methods all provide physicians with 
some kind of financial incentive, it may be argued that financial incentives are the most widely em-
ployed technique. However, it is questionable whether all third parties consciously choose a basic 
method of payment as a way to influence medical practice. Moreover, at least in some countries the 
payment method results from legislation. This may be different for risk-sharing arrangements, but these 
are less widely employed then utilisation-management techniques. 
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that on average 59 percent of a physician’s patients had a health-insurance plan review-
ing the length of hospital stays. For surgeons, this number was even somewhat larger: on 
average 62 percent. On average 58 percent of a generalist’s patients had their length of 
stay reviewed. On average 45 percent of a generalist’s patients had their site of care re-
viewed and 38 percent the appropriateness of diagnosis and treatment. 
 Gold et al. (1995a) found that of all managed-care plans they surveyed in 1994, 62 
percent used at least four of the following five utilisation-review techniques: pre-
admission review for all non-emergency admissions, concurrent and retrospective re-
view, discharge planning, and ambulatory review for resource-intensive services. Ninety-
five percent used one of these techniques. 
 The reviewing party may deny coverage for services a physician recommended his 
patient. Remler et al. (1997) found that for the several forms of care surveyed, the maxi-
mum percentage of denials was six percent of the patients for whom care was recom-
mended. Second-round denials (as a result of successful appeals) were at most three per-
cent. For example, first-round denial rate of hospitalisations was 3.4 percent; second-
round rate was 1.0 percent. Generalists were less likely than medical specialists to have 
coverage denied for hospitalisations, referrals to specialists, endoscopies and cardiac 
catheterisations, but were more likely to experience a denial for substance abuse referrals, 
mental health referrals and MRIs. Striking are the differences between physicians: most 
physicians did not experience a denial at all, whereas five percent of the physicians ex-
perienced a denial for at least a fifth of their mental health referrals. One percent had a 
denial for at least twenty percent of the hospitalisations they recommended. 
 The rates of first-round and second-round denials by utilisation review organisations 
found by Schlesinger et al. (1997) ranged from on average 3.6 percent and 2.8 percent 
respectively to 14.1 percent and 12.5 percent respectively of requested hospitalisations.19 
 Remler et al. (1997) noted that although the proportion of final denials was always at 
most three percent, utilisation review may have a larger impact since its presence may 
discourage physicians from recommending care for which it may be expected that the 
reviewing organisation will deny coverage. Moreover, both Remler et al. and Schlesinger 
et al. did not present figures of conversions or withdrawals. Conversions are those cases 
in which physicians are convinced by the reviewer to change a recommendation for hos-
pitalisation in outpatient care, and where coverage is not formally denied. Withdrawals 
 
                                                                 
19 At least two reasons may explain the differences in denial rates between the surveys of Remler et al. 
(1997) and Schlesinger et al. (1997). The first reason is that the percentages found by Remler et al. re-
flect the share of patients for whom care was recommended and coverage was denied. The patients for 
whom care was recommended, however, included patients for whom the care was not reviewed by their 
health insurance plan. So, the share of patients for whom care was recommended and for whom cover-
age was denied, provided that their care was reviewed, will be higher. The percentages found by 
Schlesinger et al. reflect the share of patients for whom the care was reviewed and not covered. A second 
reason for the differences in denial rates may be that the reviewing organisations in the Remler survey 
are health insurance plans; in the Schlesinger survey the care is reviewed by utilisation review organisa-
tions. Utilisation review organisations are specialised organisations. Moreover, they are hired by other 
third parties to review their members’ care and it may, therefore, be hypothesised that they use utilisa-
tion-management techniques more aggressively in order to come up to the expectations. 
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are cases in which a recommendation for hospitalisation is dropped before the reviewer 
formally denies it (Schlesinger et al. 1997). 
 
 
5.5 Monitoring general practitioners 
 
Physician profiling 
Physician profiles or practice profiles may be used to monitor the behaviour of GPs and 
to analyse the outcomes.20 Results can be compared with results from other providers or 
with guidelines. The method differs from many utilisation-management techniques in 
that it is retrospective instead of prospective or concurrent and that it does not focus on 
individual cases but on patterns of care (Welch et al. 1994). 
 Two main goals of profiling can be discerned. One goal is to inform the less-informed 
physician. A third party may be better informed about the relative performances of physi-
cians. Providing a physician with information about his relative performance gives him 
an opportunity to review his own behaviour and to adjust it if desirable. Physician profil-
ing may, therefore, be considered a technique to control the physician by means of per-
suasion or information. It is thus a way to reduce the information gap between third party 
and physician by informing the physician.  
 The other main goal of physician profiling is to monitor the physician. This may re-
veal information about the physician’s behaviour as well as the outcome. As noted in 
section 4.2.2, the outcome only partially results from the physician’s actions, and will 
result from the natural course of the disease or other health-influencing factors as well. 
Trying to monitor the physician’s behaviour may reveal information about the appropri-
ateness of the physician’s actions and the quality of the physician as such. The third party 
may use this information then for selective contracting purposes. Besides being a way to 
reduce the information gap between third party and physician by informing the physician, 
physician profiling is thus a way to reduce the information gap between physician and 
third party by informing the third party.  
 A third party may monitor a physician and compare the findings with a practice-based 
norm or a standard-based norm (Evans et al. 1995). Practice-based norms originate from 
the experiences of comparable providers. These may be located within, for instance, the 
same practice, hospital, or region. Standard-based norms are derived from practice stan-
dards. The other way around, physician profiles may be used to specify practice stan-
dards for specific diagnoses or procedures (Boland 1985). Practice-based norms are more 
widely used than standard-based norms (Gold et al. 1995b). 
 Parkerton et al. (2003) argued that assessment of the performance of primary care 
physicians requires multiple, reliable measures. They pointed at the fact, though, that it is 
still unclear what the relationship is between the several measures of physician perform-
ance and between these measures and costs. The physician’s performance with a certain 
type of disease is probably not a reliable indication of his performance with other types of 
 
                                                                 
20 See subsection 5.4.2 for a definition of profiling. 
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diseases. His performance with a specific type of screening may not provide a good indi-
cation of his screening in general. 
 Remler et al. (1997) found that the physicians surveyed were subject to profiling for 
on average 16 percent of their patients. For generalists this percentage was, on average, 
22 percent. Gold et al. (1995a) found that 74 percent of the surveyed managed-care or-
ganisations used profiles, provided physician feedback, or identified areas for system-
wide improvement. For group or staff HMOs, network or IPA HMOs, and PPOs the per-
centages were 76, 86, and 52, respectively. 
 Evans et al. (1995) analysed the effect of a hospital’s introduction of a program to pro-
file the length of stay of the physicians’ patients.21 The profiling program had a statisti-
cally significant effect on the share of physicians who achieved the practice-based length-
of-stay benchmark. The reductions in the length of stay depended on: 
- the physicians’ initial performance level (with reductions mainly achieved by physi-
cians who initially failed to meet the norm), 
- patient severity (with improvements primarily for patients at medium severity levels), 
- and the economic significance of the DRGs, the Diagnosis Related Groups (the larger 
the impact, the larger the effect). 
 
 
5.6 The use of managed-care techniques 
 
Third parties can apply managed-care techniques independently or complementary to 
other techniques. For instance, financial incentives as well as practice guidelines may be 
used on their own or in combination. In the latter case, payment of financial rewards may 
have been made contingent upon the use of practice guidelines as to stimulate its use. 
 Little is known about the exact arrangements third parties make with providers of care 
(Gold et al. 1995a,b, Remler et al. 1997, Glied 2000). Gold et al. (1995a) tried to identify 
the arrangements made between managed-care organisations and physicians. It appears 
from their survey that managed-care organisations, and in particular HMOs, have com-
plicated systems to select, control and monitor physicians. Although their article provides 
a wealth of information about the arrangements, it has some limitations. Firstly, it offers 
little insight into the effects such arrangements have on the cost, quality and accessibility 
of the care (Gold et al. 1995a, p. 1682). Secondly, although it provides information on the 
extent managed-care organisations employ managed-care techniques, it does not provide 
information on the extent of the exposure of physicians to these techniques. This is an 
important limitation since physicians often have patients from several third parties, in-
cluding non-managed indemnity plans (Remler et al. 1997). Thirdly, it would be interest-
ing to know whether the techniques employed are substitutes or whether they are used 
complementary. Neither the Gold article nor the Remler article provides much informa-
tion on that subject. Nevertheless, useful information on the application of managed-care 
techniques can be deduced from their research. The following table is compiled of find-
ings by Gold et al. (1995a). 
 
                                                                 
21 These figures may be different for a profiling program introduced by a third-party agent. 
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Table 5.2 Techniques used by third parties within their relationships with physicians, 
US 1994 (figures in percentages; source: Gold et al. 1995a). 
 
Technique All plans Group or 
staff 
HMOs 
Network 
or IPA 
HMOs 
PPOs 
 (N = 108) (N = 29) (N = 50) (N = 29) 
Board certification or eligibility requirement 57 90 48 41 
Large emphasis on previous costs or utilisation 
patterns in selection decisions 
 
13 
 
4 
 
18 
 
14 
License and credentials verification 100 100 100 100 
Office visit, facility review, medical record 
screening: 
- all of these 
- none of these 
 
43 
27 
 
38 
34 
 
66 
8 
 
7 
52 
Quantitative data review 37 24 38 48 
Financial-risk sharing between third party and PCP: 
- capitation as predominant method 
Salary (no withholds or bonuses) 
Fee for service (no withholds or bonuses) 
60 
37 
8 
31 
68 
34 
28 
3 
84 
56 
2 
12 
10 
7 
0 
90 
Payment adjusters: 
- utilisation or cost measures 
- patient complaints 
- quality measures 
- consumer surveys 
- provider productivity 
- enrolee turnover rate 
- none of these 
 
57 
49 
46 
36 
24 
21 
28 
 
50 
57 
54 
37 
43 
11 
29 
 
74 
61 
64 
55 
26 
36 
14 
 
34 
21 
7 
3 
3 
3 
55 
PCPs responsible for referrals to most specialists 94 96 92 – 
Quality monitoring and focused studies: clinically 
focused studies, outcome studies, quality improve-
ment initiatives, and the use of these for quality im-
provement or success measurement: 
- all of these 
- focused studies regularly 
 
 
 
 
62 
83 
 
 
 
 
79 
100 
 
 
 
 
70 
96 
 
 
 
 
31 
45 
Use profiles, provide physician feedback, search 
areas for improvement: 
- all of these 
- one of these 
 
 
68 
74 
 
 
69 
76 
 
 
80 
86 
 
 
45 
52 
Use formal practice guidelines, use them extensively, 
monitor compliance, meet with physicians to discuss 
results: 
- all of these 
- one of these 
 
 
 
26 
63 
 
 
 
31 
76 
 
 
 
34 
76 
 
 
 
7 
28 
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Technique All plans Group or 
staff 
HMOs 
Network 
or IPA 
HMOs 
PPOs 
Pre-admission review for all non-emergency admis-
sions, concurrent and retrospective review, discharge 
planning, and ambulatory review for resource-
intensive services: 
- at least four of five 
- one of these 
 
 
 
 
62 
95 
 
 
 
 
72 
97 
 
 
 
 
70 
100 
 
 
 
 
37 
86 
 
As stated, the figures do not give an exact insight into the way managed-care organisa-
tions combine the several techniques. However, several techniques are applied more of-
ten, so it is more likely that they are used complementary. For instance, it is likely that 
the majority of network or IPA HMOs that shared their financial risks with primary care 
physicians (84 percent) consists of the same HMOs that made their primary care physi-
cians responsible for the referrals to most of the specialists (92 percent). It is hard to de-
duce, though, whether the PPOs that apply profiles (45 percent) are the same PPOs that 
use incentives based on performance by adjusting payments to primary care physicians 
(45 percent). Possibly, a proportion of the PPOs does use profiles but does not use them 
to adjust payments.22 Without knowing exactly which (combinations of) techniques are 
applied within which settings, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the techniques. 
 Judgement of the effectiveness is further hampered by methodological problems, as 
there are virtually no randomised-controlled trials. Steiner and Robinson reported on a 
large review of the evidence on managed care in the US. Regarding the effectiveness of 
managed-care techniques they concluded the following: ‘Despite literally thousands of 
publications since 1990 whose subject is some component of the managed care approach, 
it is still not possible to answer fundamental questions about the independent contribution 
of each component to organisational performance. There are almost no randomised-
controlled trials of these techniques in managed care settings. Most publications either 
describe or advocate the use of techniques, without any evidential basis; many others 
evaluate interventions only in qualitative terms, lack comparison groups, and make no 
tests of statistical significance’ (Steiner and Robinson 1998, p. 178). 
 Glied (2000) reviewed the managed-care literature extensively and argued that the 
empirical research on managed care is complicated by two factors. Firstly, managed-care 
plans use different combinations of managed-care techniques, or use the same techniques 
in a different way (for instance in a more stringent or in a less stringent way). Research 
also suffers from the heterogeneity of plans. For instance, some plans are for-profit, 
whereas other plans are not-for-profit, and some plans are insurer-based, whereas other 
plans are provider-based. Secondly, as a result of risk segmentation, managed-care en-
rolees may differ from enrolees of conventional insurance plans (‘remote third-party pay-
 
                                                                 
22 It may be argued that it is not likely that the PPOs that do not apply profiles do adjust payments to 
primary care physicians. However, it may be the case that some PPOs use other information than cost 
and utilisation patterns for payment adjustment. For instance, consumer satisfaction or the physician’s 
use of practice guidelines may be used for this. 
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ers’). Hence differences in the use and outcome of care may be the result of characteris-
tics of the enrolees instead of the use of managed-care techniques. 
 
More information is available on the overall performance of organisations that apply 
managed-care techniques in any form. Schut (1986), for instance, reviewed a large num-
ber of studies related to HMOs. For preventive care he found that HMO-members had a 
higher use of preventive care than the traditionally insured, provided that the HMO-
members had a better insurance coverage for this type of care. In case of comparable in-
surance coverage, the use of preventive care by HMO-members was equal or lower. The 
volume of hospital care was lower within HMOs than within the traditional insurance 
sector. One type of HMO, the Prepaid Group Practice (PGP) had 20 to 40% less hospital 
admissions than the traditional system. The number of hospital days was about 35% 
lower, but the length-of-stay was comparable to the traditional system. Remarkably, the 
use of ambulatory care was also comparable to the traditional system. The costs of care 
for PGP members were 10 to 40% lower than the costs of care for the traditionally in-
sured. Lower costs mainly resulted from the lower volumes of (hospital) care. According 
to Schut, the quality of care was at least comparable to the quality provided within the 
traditional system. For some specific items, like waiting times and the patient-physician 
relationship, patient satisfaction seemed to be lower though. 
 Also Miller and Luft (1994) reviewed a large number of studies (including the ran-
domised-controlled RAND health insurance experiment) that compared managed-care 
organisations with non-managed indemnity plans on the following items: health care 
utilisation, expenditure, prevention, quality of care, and enrolee satisfaction. 
 
Health care utilisation 
With regard to hospital admission rates, they found generally lower rates for HMOs. The 
differences between HMOs and indemnity plans varied considerably per study, though, 
ranging from no statistically significant rates, to 26 to 37 percent fewer hospitalisations. 
There were no significant differences between the several types of HMOs (staff, prepaid 
group practice, network, or IPA). The length-of-stay in hospitals was generally 1 to 20 
percent shorter for HMOs. No major differences were found between the different HMO 
types. The physician office visits per enrolee were balanced for older studies in which the 
number of observations with lower use within the HMO setting equalled the number of 
observations with higher use. The number of visits did differ in studies with more recent 
data, indicating the same or more physician office visits for HMO enrolees. However, no 
evidence was found of higher use of physician services for HMOs as to compensate the 
lower hospital use. Further, on average HMOs used 22 percent fewer services that are 
expensive and/or have less costly alternatives. 
 
Expenditure 
Only a few studies were found in which the effects of managed care on costs were stud-
ied. In two studies the total expenditures per enrolee were lower within HMO settings. In 
one of these, 13 percent lower expenditures were found. In the other the difference was 
11 percent. Only the first study showed a significant difference. 
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Prevention 
Clearly, HMO enrolees were provided with more preventive tests, procedures and ex-
aminations. They also received more health promotion activities. 
 
Quality of care 
For the quality of care the results were somewhat ambiguous. Most studies showed better 
or equivalent process or outcome quality. However, some studies indicated that the qual-
ity was less for HMO enrolees. Two studies, for instance, showed adverse results for 
HMO enrolees with mental health problems. 
 
Enrolee satisfaction 
Satisfaction of enrolees can be split into satisfaction with costs and satisfaction with ser-
vices. HMO enrolees were found to be more satisfied with the costs of their health plan 
than were enrolees in a non-managed indemnity plan. Regarding services, the studies 
showed mixed results, but HMO enrolees tended to be less satisfied. This was mainly 
because of restrictions they faced on the choice of physicians. 
 Although the results were not unambiguously favourable to HMOs, Miller and Luft 
suggested that HMOs provided services at lower costs than fee-for-service indemnity 
plans. This was based on the fact that HMOs used less inpatient services as well as ser-
vices that are expensive and/or have less costly alternatives, and on the fact that HMOs 
provided enrolees more comprehensive coverage. Another major finding of their review 
was that, contrary to earlier findings, there was no difference in performance between the 
several HMO types. Prepaid groups or staff HMOs did not perform better than IPA or 
network HMOs. Miller and Luft (1994, pp.1517-18) have several possible explanations 
for this. Firstly, it may be due to methodological problems. The number of observations 
for the several HMO types was small. Secondly, physician groups in network HMOs 
may have started to employ financial incentives, like risk sharing, too. Thirdly, it may be 
easier to change medical practice within the newer primarily capitated groups than within 
the longer established prepaid group practices or staff HMOs. Finally, IPAs increasingly 
rely on utilisation management and financial incentives. Not only do these types of 
HMOs rely more on these techniques than in the past; they also do more than prepaid 
groups or staff-model HMOs. 
 In an update of their previous literature analysis, Miller and Luft (2002) found roughly 
comparable results. Compared with non-HMOs, HMOs provided more or less compara-
ble quality of care, scored less on access to care, had lower ratings for enrolee satisfac-
tion, provided more preventive care, showed shorter lengths-of-stays and used less ex-
pensive resources. 
 The findings of Gold et al. (1995a), as reproduced in the table, are consistent with the 
judgement of Miller and Luft that network and IPA HMOs rely more on financial incen-
tives and utilisation-management techniques than do prepaid group practices and staff 
HMOs. Apparently, the IPA and network HMOs have caught up with the group and staff 
model HMOs. It may be the case that IPAs use more formal, contractual arrangements 
(i.e. individual pressure), whereas prepaid group practices use more informal arrange-
ments and rely more on group norms (i.e. social pressure). 
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5.7 Summary and discussion 
 
In order to find an answer to the research question central to this chapter, 
 
Which techniques can and do third-party agents apply within their relationships with 
general practitioners in order to reduce the agency problems within the patient-physician 
relationship? 
 
We gave an overview of techniques that are used by third parties rather commonly – that 
is to say, in some health-care systems. In health care (the use of) such a set of techniques 
is usually designated as ‘managed care’. We argued that the managed-care techniques fit 
in the triptych of agency theory remarkably well. The three successive phases that com-
prise this triptych (selecting, controlling and monitoring the agent) form an iterative proc-
ess, which we labelled the managed-care cycle. Hence from the perspective of agency 
theory, managed care can be viewed as (the cyclical use of) a set of techniques by which 
the third-party agent may attempt to influence the behaviour of the agent in a way that is 
beneficial to the patient. 
 The selection and contracting of (primary care) physicians is regarded to be crucial in 
managed care, in spite of the difficulties associated with it. Selection of physicians with a 
conservative practice style is considered to be the best guarantee of cost-effective and 
high-quality care. Research indicates that third parties prefer physician selection before 
concluding contracts above ‘pruning later’. ‘Pruning’ may be easier, but it will be diffi-
cult to change the behaviour of physicians by then or to get rid of them afterwards. Selec-
tion and contracting of the selected physicians requires sufficient and reliable qualitative 
information and quantitative data about the physicians’ behaviour controlled for case mix 
and practice size. Self-selection of physicians can reduce the selection problem though. 
Contracting the selected physicians requires an oversupply, legal possibilities to contract 
selectively, the co-operation of individual physicians or of the profession as a whole and 
the insured consent. 
 The second phase of the agency cycle is found in managed care as well. A prominent 
controlling means is the use of incentives, which may stimulate the physician to choose 
those alternatives from a set of possible actions that are most beneficial to the third party 
and to the patient. Financial incentives may emanate from the basic payment system and 
from ancillary payment systems. Ancillary payments may be function-related, behaviour-
related or outcome-related. Contrary to a function-related fee, behaviour- and outcome-
related fees are made contingent upon an ex-post check on the way the specified services 
are provided and on the effects of the physician’s behaviour respectively. The category of 
ancillary payments consists of bonus, withhold and budget systems. The third party may 
use mixed (blended) payment systems in order to balance the incentives from the several 
basic and ancillary payment systems. A mixed system may, for instance, balance the in-
centives for undesirable behaviour, like cream skimming and quality skimping, and effi-
cient behaviour as well as the incentives for quality efforts across contractible and non-
contractible dimensions of quality. 
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 The GPs’ assignment to the gatekeeper function is another example of an incentive 
system. The physician is stimulated to refer patients to other providers of care only if 
necessary. As it is a weak incentive, gatekeeping is often combined with other tech-
niques. 
 Other prominent means to control physicians are practice guidelines, physician or 
practice profiling and utilisation-management techniques. Some, like guidelines and pro-
filing, are aimed at informing the physician and persuading him to perform the desired 
actions. Other, like (pre-)admission review, mandatory second opinion and continued-
stay review, are aimed at restricting the choice of the physician. Some view these tech-
niques as an infringement on the professional autonomy or the physicians’ autonomy. 
However, infringement on the individual physicians’ autonomy is exactly what is consid-
ered as a way to ensure that the patients’ interests are served best. It depends on the role 
of the profession in designing and conducting managed care whether the techniques are 
an infringement on the professional autonomy. An association or a college of physicians, 
for instance, may issue practice guidelines. Peer review is a widely accepted way of 
monitoring physicians by physicians themselves. In these cases the individual autonomy 
is restricted but the professional autonomy is maintained. Because of this professional 
autonomy, physicians will probably prefer managed-care techniques designed or issued 
by the profession itself to techniques issued by a relative outsider, like a health insurer. 
Because of their individual autonomy, they will probably prefer control by incentives and 
control by persuasion or information to control by directives or authority. By means of 
directives or authority the physician’s actions are restricted in an almost coercive way. 
 Finally, the monitoring phase of the agency cycle can also be identified in managed 
care. In the form of physician profiling two main goals are revealing information about 
the behaviour of the physician or about the outcome of the process to which the physician 
contributed, and informing the physician about his relative performance. Profiling can 
thus be viewed as a way to reduce the information gap between physician and third party 
by informing the third party as well as a way to reduce this gap by informing the physi-
cian. 
 Combining the agency or managed-care cycle, as pictured in figure 5.1, with the man-
aged-care techniques described in this chapter results in figure 5.2. 
 Managed care requires a relationship between the third-party agent and the physician. 
Within this relationship the several techniques may be used in combination with each 
other. Although this is not the subject of this research, it may be hypothesised that the 
stronger are the relationships between both parties (towards integration), the less formal 
are the arrangements. The proximity of peers, group norms or the culture within a group 
of physicians may be very effective characteristics of such arrangements. 
 There is some evidence regarding the overall performance of organisations that apply 
managed-care techniques. This suggests that managed-care organisations provide health 
care at lower costs than fee-for-service indemnity plans. There is some ambiguity over 
the issues of quality of care and enrolee satisfaction though. Although most studies 
showed at least comparable quality, a few studies showed adverse results for some spe-
cific health problems. The lower satisfaction was mainly the result of the enrolee’s re-
stricted choice of physicians due to physician selection by the organisation. 
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Figure 5.2. The managed-care cycle unfolded 
 
 
       
     A. Selection 
      - Physician selection 
 
 
     B. Control 
      B1. Incentives 
        - Financial incentives 
        - Gatekeeping 
        - Group-membership incentives 
      B2. Persuasion/information 
        - Practice guidelines 
        - Physician profiling 
        - High-cost case management 
      B3. Directive/authority 
        - clinical rules, protocols 
        - pre-admission review 
        - admission review 
        - second opinion 
        - continued-stay review 
        - discharge planning 
        - retrospective utilisation review 
 
 
     C. Monitoring 
      - Physician profiling 
 
 
 
Less is known about the exact arrangements between third party and physician and about 
the effect of specific managed-care techniques in terms of cost, quality and accessibility 
of care. Often, the arrangements are complex and different per third party. Hence it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions and to infer the independent contribution of each 
technique to (the outcome of) health care, organisational performance et cetera. It is also 
difficult to infer whether the different techniques are substitutes or whether they are or 
can be used complementary. Finally, the focal point of many studies was the third party 
instead of the physician. Such studies are informative as it is the third party that may ap-
ply the techniques, but in the end it is the physician’s behaviour that is of interest. As the 
physician may have contracts with several third parties, he may be confronted with dif-
ferent controlling en monitoring techniques. This combination of techniques will influ-
ence his behaviour. Therefore, studies that have the physician as focal point are at least as 
important. 
 
As explained in chapter 4, outcome uncertainty is an important characteristic of the rela-
tionships in which a physician is involved. The outcome in terms of the patient’s health 
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status is uncertain and will only partially result from the GP’s actions. It will result from 
the natural course of the disease, the medical treatment, the behaviour of the patient, and 
other health influencing factors. As a result, the third-party agent will have problems as-
sessing the appropriateness of the physician’s actions. Hence contracts that will specify 
(all) possible outcomes and that, for instance, relate payments to factual outcomes are not 
common in health care. Also the majority of managed-care techniques are focussed on 
the behaviour of the physicians. This does not alter the fact that the behaviour of the phy-
sician has some effect on the outcome. If the behaviour has no effect on the outcome in 
terms of the patient’s health status, then it will at least have some effect on the outcome 
in terms of volume or costs of care, patient satisfaction, availability of scarce care for 
other patients et cetera. Monitoring and analysing claims data may reveal important in-
formation then. Indeed, some third parties adjust their payments to physicians on the ba-
sis of utilisation, cost or quality measures, consumer surveys, physician productivity or 
other measures. 
 As the outcome in terms of health status will be the result of many factors besides the 
GP’s actions, it is difficult to make the physician (partly) responsible for a negative out-
come. The volume or the costs of the care provided, however, are closely related to phy-
sician’s actions. Hence the third party may design an incentive system that is closely re-
lated to the volume or the costs of care. An example of such an incentive system is finan-
cial-risk sharing by which means the third party shares the responsibility for the costs of 
care with the physician. The rationale for financial-risk sharing and the way such ar-
rangements can be structured is subject of the next chapter. 
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6  FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN THEORY 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we described several managed-care techniques and grouped them 
according to the triptych of agency theory, selecting, controlling and monitoring. A spe-
cific controlling technique is the use of financial incentives. One form of a financial-
incentive system is financial-risk sharing between third-party agent and GPs. How risk-
sharing arrangements may be structured financially, and how these arrangements relate to 
the organisational side of the relationship between both parties, is subject of this chapter. 
An answer is sought to the following research questions: 
 
What is the rationale for financial-risk sharing between third-party agents and general 
practitioners? 
 
and  
 
How can systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
In section 6.2 the rationale is discussed for systems in which the risk is shared between 
third-party agent and GP. In section 6.3 is analysed how such systems can be structured. 
 
 
6.2 The rationale for financial-risk sharing 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
We return to the concept of ‘sharing’ in the term ‘financial-risk sharing’ in subsection 
6.2.4, but the other two parts of the term are defined more precisely here. The first part of 
the term indicates that the potential results of the risks involved are purely monetary by 
nature. Other risks, like the risk that due to under- or over-provision of care the reputation 
of a third party or a physician may be damaged, are left out of consideration here. The 
second part, ‘risk’, can be defined and classified in several ways. One option is to view 
risk as a potential deviation from a norm, for instance, an expected value. Then, risk can 
be divided as follows (see De Wit’s interpretation of Härterich, De Wit 1994, p. 4): 
1. pure risk, i.e. only negative deviations (loss); 
2. speculative risk, i.e. positive as well as negative deviations (profit or loss); 
3. profit side, i.e. only positive deviations. 
In the literature on provider reimbursement the term ‘risk’ is used differently. Some au-
thors use it to denote pure risk (see, for instance, Kongstvedt 1993a) whereas others re-
gard risk to be based on a chance for profit as well as loss (see, for instance, Miller 1996). 
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Unless otherwise stated, here the term ‘risk’ refers to the speculative risk. This is a rather 
obvious definition in view of the frequent use of capitation systems in which for a risk-
bearing (primary care) physician the financial results may turn out well or badly. 
 
6.2.2 Insurance risk 
 
In absence of some form of third-party insurance, an individual will have to pay for each 
health-care good or service delivered by a physician. As it is largely impossible to predict 
accurately the moment and the frequency of consumption as well as the nature and the 
amount of care, the individual faces a pure risk (see previous subsection). Introduction of 
a third party enables the individual to reduce this risk.1 By paying an insurance premium, 
the individual (from then on the insured) substitutes a certain financial loss for the uncer-
tain financial loss associated with the occurrence of illnesses. The third party’s insurance 
function thus involves a risk transfer from the insured to the third party, i.e. the health 
insurer. The risk the third party now bears is labelled the insurance risk (Kirkman-Liff 
and Van de Ven 1991). It is defined as the possible (positive or negative) variation 
around a normative cost level – a level as reflected in the insurance premium. The pure 
risk as faced by the individual is thus changed into a speculative risk for the third party. 
On a free insurance market and with perfect information the premium will resemble the 
normative value, i.e. the expected costs per insured (risk-rated premium).2 
 For a third-party insurer holds that the expected loss is the basis for the cost price and 
the premium and that the variability around the overall loss determines the probability of 
a ruin.3 Especially in case the causes of the losses are not correlated, the variability 
around the mean loss will decrease if the number of insured increases. The variability 
around the overall loss will increase then, but in general the standard deviation of the 
overall loss is smaller than the sum of the standard deviations of the individual losses. Is 
the group of insured infinite, then the variability around the mean loss will even approach 
zero and the expected mean loss will resemble the mean loss on a national level (law of 
large numbers). Further, the losses will be distributed normally (central limit theorem) 
(Voûte 1987). 
 Once responsible for the insurance risk, the third party has to reimburse a patient for 
the use of health services (a reimbursement system) or pay the physician directly for the 
care provided (a contract or integrated model; see subsection 2.3.2). Ideally, the pay-
ments would be directly related to the costs the third party would consider being ‘neces-
sary’ or ‘needed’ to treat the patient. In other words, the third party would only experi-
 
                                                                 
1 If third-party insurance is absent, the physician runs the risk that his income drops considerably due to 
a lack of ‘clientele’, or that after the delivery of goods or services the patient turns out to be insolvent. 
Introduction of third-party insurance has the additional advantage that it takes away the risk of a patient 
being insolvent. 
2 By means of premium regulation and for reasons of solidarity, however, a regulator may force the third 
party to set a premium that more closely reflects mean costs per insured. 
3 The probability of a ruin is the probability of a loss in one year of a certain (agreed upon) amount of 
money, for instance with the size of the stock and/or the reserve capital, resulting in an inability to meet 
one’s liabilities (Tolley et al. 1987; Seal 1969). 
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ence those costs that have to be made to provide an optimal amount of care, that is, a 
level of care given ‘perfect agency’. This optimum would imply: 
A. The optimal diagnosis: timely and correct diagnoses instead of missed, unnecessary or 
wrong diagnoses (for instance, no upcoding, i.e. choosing diagnoses which yield lar-
ger marginal benefits to the physician than the proper diagnoses would). 
B. The optimal treatment: no unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive treatments and no 
postponing or withholding of treatments (may result in higher future costs). 
Furthermore, the physician-as-perfect-agent would use preventive medicine and patient 
education to reduce initial physician visits in order to lower the costs associated with the 
insurance risk. The definition of the insurance risk, the possible deviation from a norma-
tive cost level, is thus made under the assumption of perfect agency. For several reasons, 
however, it is hard, if not impossible, to reach this optimal level of care. As a result, the 
third party runs a second risk: the risk of imperfect agency. 
 
6.2.3 Risk of imperfect agency 
 
Besides the insurance risk, which results from the stochastic nature of the occurrence of 
illnesses, the risk transfer from insured to third party involves a second risk. Kirkman-
Liff and Van de Ven (1991) labelled it the risk of the provision of cost-ineffective care. It 
consists of duplication of tests and the provision of services that are not strictly necessary 
from a medical point of view, inappropriate care, care provided by overqualified provid-
ers, et cetera. In addition to the insurance risk and the risk of the provision of cost-
ineffective care, the risk of underprovision of care is also of importance here. The third-
party agent is not only interested in reducing cost-ineffective care, but also in reducing 
underprovision as this may harm the patient and may also result in higher future costs. As 
both are agency problems, the risk of the provision of cost-ineffective care and the risk of 
underprovision of care together form the risk of imperfect agency. Is the insurance risk 
the variation around a normative level of costs given perfect agency, the risk of imperfect 
agency is the variation around the insurance risk as a result of a physician acting as im-
perfect agent for the patient. 
 
There are several reasons why the actual level of care may deviate from the optimal level 
of care as mentioned in the previous subsection. Some causes stem from the patient-
physician relationship as such, whereas other causes result from the presence of third-
party insurance. The first group of causes consists of agency-like problems within the 
patient-physician relationship (see chapter 4). Some of these problems are information 
problems, whereas other problems result from conflicting interests. The asymmetry of 
information between physician and third party allows the under- or over-provision of 
care. A physician may, for instance, be susceptible to the incentives emanating from the 
payment system. In fact, the risk of imperfect agency may for an important part be the 
result of the difficulty of establishing a perfect payment scheme. As it is virtually impos-
sible to define for each state of health and for each patient the optimal level of preven-
tion, the optimal diagnosis and the optimal treatment, and as it is therefore equally diffi-
cult to develop an accompanying payment system, the third party is forced to use a less 
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than perfect payment scheme. If, for instance, the physician’s marginal benefits (MB) of 
providing additional care exceed his marginal costs (MC), then a fee-for-service system 
stimulates him to provide additional goods and services. If the physician’s marginal costs 
of treating a patient are higher than his marginal benefits, which may be the case with 
capitation payments, then the payment system stimulates the physician to reduce his ef-
forts in delivering care and to refer the patient to other, and maybe more expensive pro-
viders of care. 
 The second group with causes of imperfect agency contains two forms of insurance-
induced moral hazard: consumer-induced moral hazard and supplier-induced moral haz-
ard. May the agency problems within the patient-physician relationship result in under- 
as well as over-provision, the result of moral hazard will be over-provision of care. 
 
Table 6.1. Causes of the risk of imperfect agency 
 
 
A. Patient-physician relationship: 
1. Information problems: 
i. Inadequate experience or limited information physician 
2. Conflicting interests: 
i. Incentive for physician to provide additional, unnecessary, care (for instance, if 
MB > MC) 
ii. Incentive for physician to underprovide care, or to refer patient on medically 
unnecessary grounds (for instance, if MC > MB) 
B. Moral hazard: 
1. Consumer-induced moral hazard 
2. Supplier-induced moral hazard 
 
 
The patient is primarily responsible for the occurrence of consumer-induced moral haz-
ard. The third party may try to control this type of moral hazard by means of cost-sharing 
arrangements. However, consumer-induced moral hazard is also related to the physi-
cian’s agency role and so may contribute to the risk of imperfect agency. Firstly, once the 
patient has entered the medical circuit, it is the physician’s job to restrain him from the 
so-called moral hazard ex post – the demand for more or more expensive care. Secondly, 
it may be argued that the physician-as-agent should also try to influence initial physician 
visits by means of preventive medicine and patient education – the reduction of moral 
hazard.4 
 
6.2.4 Dealing with both risks 
 
Once a third party accepts an applicant, it becomes responsible for both the insurance risk 
and the risk of imperfect agency. In theory, the third party has a choice then between four 
strategies to handle these risks: risk bearing, risk shifting, risk splitting, and risk sharing. 
 
                                                                 
4 See Horgby (1995, p. 31) for the distinction between moral hazard ex ante and moral hazard ex post. 
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Risk bearing 
A first strategy for a third party would be to bear the risks and to spread it over all poli-
cyholders by means of a higher premium (risk premium as well as loading fee). As long 
as an insured wants to pay for it, a third-party agent could draw up a policy that would 
allow the insured to consume and physicians to provide care freely and according to their 
own view (a ‘Total Freedom policy’, Van de Ven 1996). This, however, would be a char-
ter for over-provision of care. The insured’s freedom of choice would prevent the third 
party from contracting physicians selectively and would allow the insured to visit the 
physicians he prefers, even if they provide substandard quality or cost-ineffective care in 
the opinion of the third party. The insured’s freedom of consumption would hinder the 
third party to influence the nature and the amount of care, where and by whom it is deliv-
ered, et cetera. This may result in lower quality of care due to, for instance, false test re-
sults and iatrogenesis. It is in the insured’s interests, therefore, if the third party also of-
fers a policy with conditions that allow the third party to manage the care (an ‘Appropri-
ate Care policy’, Van de Ven 1996).5 Notice that the risk-bearing strategy is inconsistent 
with the concept of the third-party agent. 
 
Risk shifting 
A second strategy for a third party would be to shift the risks to independent physicians 
or to a middle tier, like a provider organisation. On the one hand, this would remove the 
charter for over-provision of care. On the other hand, the physicians would bear full re-
sponsibility then, which implies responsibility for the insurance risk. It is the insurer, 
however, who should bear this risk; it is one of the rationales for the presence of a third 
party. The insurer is capable of dealing with this risk as the total number of insured is 
large – making it possible to use actuarial techniques based on the law of large numbers – 
and because he has the means at his disposal to meet fluctuations in costs and to compile 
 
                                                                 
5 It should be noted that an ‘Appropriate Care policy’ is not inconsistent with the concept of agency. At 
the moment an individual chooses an ‘Appropriate Care policy’ instead of a ‘Total Freedom policy’, he 
will probably do so because he wants the third-party agent to reduce the amount of cost-ineffective care 
delivered to himself and to other insured. Once the insured actually needs health care, his preferences 
may change (see also the ‘veil of ignorance’ in subsection 4.4.3). Although he may still be unwilling to 
pay a premium for cost-ineffective care provided to other insured, he now may want to consume such 
care himself being convinced that it may be effective. A third party is not an imperfect agent if it sticks 
to the insurance contract both parties once concluded and refuses to reimburse this care. 
Some argue that managed care in general and the limitation of the insured’s freedom of choice in par-
ticular may threaten the quality of care, which seems to be in contradiction with the above. Ohsfeldt et 
al. (1998) gave some arguments used by proponents of ‘freedom of choice’ laws. Firstly, freedom of 
choice allows patients to choose other physicians if they suspect the preferred physicians of quality 
skimping. Secondly, quality may be enhanced by a reduction of the time a patient has to travel. Thirdly, 
such laws may prevent that solely large chains or groups of physicians are contracted. Here, however, 
two assumptions are made. One assumption is that an individual can choose between a ‘Total Freedom 
policy’ and an ‘Appropriate Care policy’. If he regards a limited freedom of choice as undesirable, then 
he can opt for the ‘Total Freedom policy’. The second assumption is that a third-party agent is stimulated 
– for instance, by a regulator – to avoid quality-skimping physicians and to guarantee a sufficient spread 
of physicians, and that small providers are contracted if that is in the interests of the insured. 
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and analyse large sets of claims data. Moreover, bearing the full risk may prompt physi-
cians to take, from a third-party agent’s point of view, undesirable measures, like cream 
skimming or quality skimping. 
 
Risk splitting 
Another option for a third party to deal with the risks would be to choose a middle coarse 
between bearing all the risk and shifting all the risk. As noted, it is a function of the third 
party to deal with the insurance risk. Also argued is that the risk of imperfect agency is to 
a large extent under control of the physicians (see also table 6.1). An obvious solution, 
therefore, would be to split the risk: bear the insurance risk but shift the risk of imperfect 
agency to the physicians. Bearing this latter risk would stimulate an individual physician 
to gain more experience and to increase his knowledge if this could reduce the risk. 
Moreover, if many physicians were risk-bearing, an extra effect would be that the medi-
cal profession as a whole is encouraged to increase collective knowledge of diseases and 
medical practices. Further, bearing this risk would decrease the incentive to provide un-
necessary care or to demand for unnecessary care to be delivered by another provider of 
care. The problem, however, is that it is difficult to separate the insurance risk from the 
risk of imperfect agency. As noted in the foregoing, it is virtually impossible to define, in 
advance, all possible states of health and disease with the accompanying optimal diag-
nostic and treatment patterns. Even retrospectively it will be hard to decide whether the 
physician’s actions were optimal. It will be difficult for a third party to measure the out-
come of the physician’s practising. And even if measurable, it will be difficult to decide 
whether the outcome results from the physician’s efforts, from other providers’ contribu-
tions, from the patient’s behaviour, from other health-influencing factors or from the 
natural course of the disease. Hence an unsatisfactory outcome can not easily be ascribed 
to the physician’s behaviour. Further, a satisfactory outcome may indeed be the result of 
the physician’s actions, but it will be hard to state whether the same outcome could not 
have been obtained in a more cost-effective manner. These problems imply that the mid-
dle coarse of bearing the insurance risk and shifting the risk of imperfect agency to GPs 
is practically not feasible. 
 
Risk sharing 
A more feasible middle way for a third party to deal with the insurance risk and the risk 
of imperfect agency seems to share the risks with physicians. Although a second-best 
option – the physician becomes partly liable for the insurance risk – it is a seemingly sat-
isfying strategy between bearing all the risk and shifting all the risk. In a financial-risk 
sharing arrangement surpluses and deficits in the budgets for certain types of care are 
distributed among third party and physician. The physician’s responsibility is thus larger 
than zero but less than hundred percent. Such an arrangement offers incentives to reduce 
the provision of cost-ineffective care, which can be balanced with the protection of a 
physician from too much risk as well as the attempt to prevent him from taking undesir-
able measures. Furthermore, the physician will not only be stimulated to reduce over-
provision. The incentive for underprovision will be less in comparison with the risk-
shifting option. Moreover, by means of a well-structured arrangement it will be made 
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unattractive to postpone care, to shift the liability to other providers, to reduce the quality 
of care, et cetera. 
 In a risk-sharing arrangement between a third party and a physician, the risk that was 
transferred from the insured to the third party is now partly transferred to the physician. 
Shifting a part of the financial risk from first party to second party via a third party may 
seem a circuitous route, for the individual could also have passed the risk directly to the 
physician by paying him a monthly or yearly premium. In fact, the individual would then 
become subscriber to physician services and the physician would become insurer. The 
insurance principle of spreading risks based on the law of large numbers, however, would 
demand large practice populations and might force the physician to use risk-management 
techniques, like risk analysis, risk reduction, and transfer of risks. This would especially 
be true if the physician-as-insurer would bear full responsibility for a large package of 
goods and services. The circuitous route, therefore, is an effective way to spread the risks 
more evenly and to protect the physician from too much risk, and to save him the bother 
of product development, marketing, management et cetera. 
 
The third party can influence the location of the financial risk by means of the payment 
system. Jegers et al. (2002) distinguished between fixed versus variable payment systems 
and between retrospective versus prospective payment systems (see also subsection 
5.4.1.1). In case of a variable, retrospective payment system, the third party will bear the 
risk. In case of a fixed, prospective payment system the physician will bear the risk. 
 
 
6.3 Potential effects of financial-risk sharing 
 
Financial-risk sharing is one of the third party’s potential answers to the agency problems 
of differential information and conflicting interests within the patient-physician relation-
ship and within the relationship between third party and physician. It aims at shifting a 
part of the financial risk to physicians. As argued, the ultimate goal of risk sharing is to 
stimulate physicians to provide high-quality and cost-effective care. Risk-sharing ar-
rangements are a compromise between risk bearing and risk shifting. In case the third 
party shifts the risk, the physician faces strong incentives for efficiency but also for unde-
sirable behaviour. In case of risk bearing, the incentives for undesirable behaviour are 
low but so are the incentives for efficiency. There is thus a trade-off between efficiency 
and high-quality care.6 
 
High-quality and cost-effective care 
Well-designed risk-sharing arrangements stimulate GPs to reduce the costs of care, while 
maintaining or even improving quality. The physician is, in other words, stimulated to 
reconsider several aspects of the delivery of health care. Firstly, he may reconsider which 
 
                                                                 
6 Newhouse (1996) introduced the trade-off between efficiency and selection in the context of reim-
bursement of health plans. Besides selection, a physician can show other kinds of undesirable behaviour 
too. 
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care is to be delivered. A wait-and-see policy may be satisfactory. If not, he has to decide 
whether treatment should be palliative or curative. Extensive curative care may not be a 
cost-effective option if the patient is incurably ill. Further, the question arises whether the 
patient’s complaints are somatic, psychosomatic, or mental. A second point of reconsid-
eration may be who should provide the care. A medical specialist, a GP, a paramedic? 
Can a practice nurse substitute for a GP? Thirdly, where should the care be delivered? 
Care may be provided in a hospital, on an inpatient or an outpatient basis. But maybe 
quality can be maintained or even enhanced if care is provided within a relatively lower-
cost setting, like the community. A fourth question is with what intensity (how often and 
how long) care should be delivered. Additional diagnostics may be unnecessary, and the 
marginal value of, for instance, twelve treatments to nine may be low. 
 The effectiveness of risk-sharing arrangements, however, will stand or fall on their 
financial and organisational structures. With too little risk, the physician may not respond 
to the incentives and the third party’s aims of high quality and cost-effectiveness may not 
be achieved. Too much risk, on the other hand, may provoke undesirable behaviour, like 
cream skimming, cost shifting, and quality skimping. 
 
Cream skimming 
Besides the use of strategies to enhance the quality of care and to improve the cost-
effectiveness, other, but undesirable behaviour may also be induced. Once a GP is finan-
cially responsible for a part of the future costs for his practice population, he may be 
tempted to reduce his expected costs by means of cream skimming. The term cream 
skimming originates from the insurance industry and refers to the selection by an insurer 
of low-risk (or: preferred) insured, i.e. insured for whom the expected costs are lower 
than the matching premium. It may occur if the insurer has information about the in-
sured’s expected costs that is not fully reflected in the premium. If an individual physi-
cian is unable to adjust the height of the reimbursement to the (expected) costs of care for 
a certain patient, he may face an incentive for cream skimming too. This may be the case 
with prospective payment systems (like capitation) but even with ‘cost-based’ reim-
bursement (like fee for service) if the marginal costs exceed the marginal revenues. Ap-
plied to the practice of a GP, cream skimming is defined here as the selection by a physi-
cian of low-risk (or: preferred) patients, i.e. patients for whom the expected costs (as pre-
dicted by the physician) are lower than the reimbursement.7 He may attract low-risk pa-
tients or, given a certain practice population, try to avoid (dump) high-risk patients. 
 When it is an attractive option to select patients according to their expected costs, a 
physician has several techniques at his disposal. Some of these techniques resemble those 
that can be used by an insurer, other are specific for the practice of a GP. The location of 
his practice (in a region with a relatively large proportion of low-risk patients) as well as 
 
                                                                 
7 Some define creaming by providers in a different way, namely as the over-provision of services to low 
cost patients (see Ellis 1998, p. 538). This, however, is a somewhat restricted definition for the provision 
of services is not a necessary condition for skimming. In case of capitation payments, providers face at 
least two incentives. The first is indeed to attract patients with expected lower costs than the capitation 
payments. The second, however, is not to over-provide but to underprovide. 
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its accessibility (little public transport, a building with stairs) may help the physician to 
attract low-risk patients. Further, he can advertise selectively the practice’s opening 
hours, not specialise in chronic or other expensive diseases, provide subtly poor-quality 
care to high-risk patients (waiting times for making an appointment as well as in the of-
fice) et cetera (Kirkman-Liff and Van de Ven 1991). Other strategies are to avoid con-
tracts with insurers having a relatively large amount of high-risk patients, or to inform the 
patient with a high-cost disease of other providers ‘who are more capable of dealing with 
such problems’. If a GP has to purchase follow-up care on behalf of his practice popula-
tion (like in a GP fundholder system) he may contract providers selectively. No or only 
little contracts are concluded then with providers specialised in high-cost care. 
 
Cost shifting 
A major characteristic of the GP is his referral function: he may send a patient to another 
provider of care who is more qualified or authorised to deal with the patient’s complaints. 
It depends on the structure of the risk-sharing arrangement whether this care shifting also 
results in cost shifting. If a physician is financially responsible for specialist care, refer-
ring a patient to a medical specialist only implies the shifting of care. Cost shifting occurs 
if the care delivered by the provider to whom the patient is referred is not part of the GP’s 
risk package (the package of care for which the GP bears financial responsibility, see 
subsection 6.4.2). 
 If the GP is liable for only a part of the patients’ care, and if it is not exactly clear to 
others (like the third party, his colleagues or the patient) which care or which provider is 
indicated (i.e. if there is an information asymmetry), he may use cost shifting as another 
strategy to reduce his costs. Cost shifting is considered to be improper if, from a medical 
and economic point of view, the patient should have been treated by the GP himself or by 
another provider for whose care the GP is financially responsible but, nevertheless, is 
referred to a provider outside the risk package. An informational advantage from the phy-
sician over the other parties is, however, not an essential condition for cost shifting, for it 
may work equally well within the so-called ‘zone of uncertainty’ (see also subsection 
4.2.2). For example, it may be unclear whether, given a certain diagnosis, a patient 
should be treated within a hospital or not. If the physician is responsible for community 
care then but not for hospital care, cost shifting can be an ideal cost-reducing strategy. 
 
Quality skimping 
For patients not avoided by means of cream skimming and not referred to another pro-
vider, a GP may try to reduce his costs by skimping on the quality of care. Main possi-
bilities are to reduce his efforts while treating a patient, to postpone necessary care, or 
even to withhold it. Skimping on quality may reduce costs at short notice but it can be a 
highly uneconomical strategy in the long run. Characteristic for primary care is the long-
term relationship between patient and physician. Therefore, postponing or withholding 
care may deteriorate the patient’s health and result in higher costs later on. Furthermore, 
postponing and withholding care for financial reasons is not likely to occur if the physi-
cian is paid on a cost-basis. It may, however, be a problem in case of prospective pay-
ment systems – of which the use is more likely in case of long-term relationships – espe-
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cially if the payments are not adjusted for health. For that reason, quality skimping seems 
to be a more attractive option for risk-bearing medical specialists, as their relationships 
with patients is generally of relatively short duration (and payments are often on a fee-
for-service basis). Nevertheless, a GP may use skimping on quality too, particularly if he 
does not expect costs to be higher in the future or as a strategy to discourage high-risk 
patients. 
 Except for the length of the relationship, the physician is constrained in his ability to 
skimp on quality by, for instance, the extent of the information asymmetry, his reputation 
and the extent of competition. The better patient and third party can monitor the physi-
cian, the more difficult skimping will be. Fear for his reputation may deter the physician 
from quality skimping, although this is related to the asymmetry of information and the 
risk of detection. If patients are able to ‘vote by feet’, the physician may avoid skimping. 
On the other hand, skimping may be used as a tool for cream skimming and the voting 
may be encouraged then. 
 
 
6.4 The structure of risk-sharing arrangements 
 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
Once is decided upon risk sharing as incentive system to control the GP, a contract has to 
be devised arranging the financial as well as the accompanying organisational relation-
ship between both parties. Such contracts can be structured as follows. A first matter to 
be resolved is for which care the GP bears (some) financial responsibility (see subsection 
6.4.2). A second matter is the determination of the proportion of the physician’s practice 
population that is covered by a risk contract (subsection 6.4.3). Next, both parties have to 
agree upon a norm with which the physician’s behaviour, or the outcome of this behav-
iour, can be compared (subsection 6.4.4). Depending on the terms of the contract, a de-
viation or a meeting of the norm will have a financial consequence for the physician. The 
physician may, for instance, be given a bonus (subsection 6.4.5). To limit the impact of 
the incentive system on the GP (i.e. to protect him from to much risk), additional meas-
ures may be added. These measures may affect the maximum of the bonus as well as the 
malus (subsection 6.4.6). 
 The aforementioned aspects of a contract can be viewed as ‘variables’. By altering 
them, the incentives the GP faces vary accordingly. Potentially, this could result in a 
change of the physician’s behaviour and the outcome of his behaviour. 
 
6.4.2 Risk package 
 
Crucial in structuring a risk-sharing arrangement is the composition of the risk package, 
i.e. the scope of goods and services for which costs the GP bears at least some financial 
responsibility. It is noted before that due to his role as gatekeeper and co-ordinator of 
medical services, the GP has a considerable influence on the nature, quantity and quality 
of goods and services to be delivered by other providers of care. This influence justifies 
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the extension of his financial responsibility by including care beyond the primary care 
services in the risk package.8 The risk package may be extended then to include certain 
referral care (specialist services, like consultations, surgical procedures, anaesthesia and 
obstetrics), hospital care (outpatient as well as specific inpatient care), and ancillary ser-
vices (like laboratory, radiology, physical therapy, and pharmacy). 
 In designing the risk package, third party and physician have to take the following into 
consideration. Firstly, the probability that in a certain period the physician incurs costs 
for one type of care will be higher than for another type. Moreover, given costs in that 
year, the variability in costs for the different types of care may differ as well. The type of 
care included in the risk package thus determines the insurance risk the physician runs. 
The larger the insurance risk, the more (costly) risk-reducing measures are required to 
protect him. 
 A related question is whether it is the third party or the GP who has to purchase care. 
In a system in which the physician, besides being financially responsible, also has to 
draw up and conclude contracts with other providers of care – this is comparable with GP 
fundholding in the UK – it is important that he is able to judge the referral care economi-
cally as well as medically. For that reason, in the fundholding system only standard, rela-
tively inexpensive care without ‘open-ended treatments’ for which the physician would 
be able to diagnose the case and to estimate its costs was included (Glennerster and Mat-
saganis 1993). 
 A third matter to be taken into consideration is that the composition of the risk pack-
age may affect the occurrence of cream skimming and cost shifting. If the physician 
bears no financial responsibility at all (or only for his own primary care) there is no (or 
only a small) incentive for cream skimming, for expenses are reimbursed or patients can 
easily be referred to other providers of care. If the physician is responsible for the costs of 
all care, then cost shifting is no longer possible and the incentive for cream skimming is 
maximised. Between these extremes it will depend upon the care excluded from the risk 
package whether cost shifting is an option. To shift the costs to another provider, the care 
delivered by this provider should not only have been excluded from the risk package but 
also substitute for the care included in the physician’s risk package. 
  Fourthly, once the risk package is established, it has to be decided whether this pack-
age is considered to form a whole or whether it is divided into separate cost categories. 
The advantage of categorising health-care costs is a better insight into the cost structure, 
making it easier to track changes and to identify room for improvement. Common is a 
functional categorisation in inpatient services, outpatient services, physician services, 
other medical services, ancillary services, prescription drugs, reinsurance premiums, and 
other medical costs (Blox et al. 1989, Ward 1993). Another main advantage of a division 
into separate cost categories is that it permits the third party to vary the extent of the GP’s 
responsibility, i.e. the extent of financial-risk sharing, per cost category (see also subsec-
tion 6.4.5). Disadvantage of the division into cost categories is the inherent danger of 
reduced substitution, or even undesirable substitution of expensive care for less expen-
 
                                                                 
8 Whether the inclusion of certain care in the risk package is considered an extension, depends on one’s 
definition of primary care services. Definitions may differ, for instance, per country. 
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sive care if the physician bears more risk for the relatively inexpensive goods and ser-
vices. The division may also result in increased administration costs. 
 A final matter mentioned here is that the composition of the risk package may also 
influence the behaviour of other providers of care. Firstly, these providers may have been 
made jointly responsible by participation in a risk pool.9 Secondly, if not participating in 
the risk pool, they may react to the altered behaviour of the GP. For instance, if GPs un-
der a risk contract substitute primary care for secondary care, secondary care providers 
may try to compensate their loss of income by increasing the number of services that are 
not parts of the risk package (Delnoy and Stokx 1993). 
 
6.4.3 Size of the practice population (at risk) 
 
The foregoing may apply to a one-patient contract, but it is evident that in practice a con-
tract will apply to a larger part of a physician’s practice population. Which proportion of 
his practice population is covered by a risk contract is of importance for at least three 
reasons. Firstly, the number of patients for whose care the physician is financially re-
sponsible determines the magnitude of the incentives and presumably the effect of the 
risk contract. All other things being equal, the larger the proportion, the more effect the 
incentives emanating from the contract will have. Obviously, an incentive system will 
have a stronger influence on the physician’s behaviour if it applies to, for instance, 800 of 
his 2500 patients than if it applies to 80 of this 2500. 
 There is a second reason why the proportion of a physician’s practice population cov-
ered by a risk contract is important. The larger this proportion, the more difficult it is to 
shift the costs incurred under that contract to other third parties with which the physician 
has no risk contract. An example of how this might be done is to compensate a loss of 
income due to the risk contract by increasing the number of claims for patients for whose 
care he is not financially responsible. 
 A third reason is that the larger the group of patients for whom the physician has con-
cluded a risk contract, the less vulnerable he is to random fluctuations in the health-care 
costs of his patients (i.e. the insurance risk). 
 Which proportion of his practice population is covered by a risk contract will depend 
on the number of third parties the physician is confronted with. 
 
One third party 
A GP may have a relationship with a single third party. This will be the case in a health-
care system with just one third party (like a National Health Service), if a third party has 
a regional monopoly, or if the physician has an exclusive relationship with the third party 
(like within a closed-panel or staff HMO). As the physician sees only patients who are 
insured with the third party in question, it is likely that, in principle, all of his patients are 
covered by the risk contract. Some of them may be excluded though. Decisions about the 
exclusion of members may, for instance, be based on their health status. Some patients, 
 
                                                                 
9 A risk pool is a group of providers who share in the rewards and penalties from surpluses and deficits 
in the budgets for certain types of care (see subsection 6.4.6.4). 
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like those with AIDS or those who are in need of a transplant, may be excluded because 
of their expected high costs. 
 
Several third parties 
Alternatively, the GP may practise within a health-care system with several third parties. 
The market share of each third party as well as with which third parties the physician has 
a risk contract determines the ultimate proportion of his practice population that is cov-
ered by such a contract. Again all members of a third party with whom the physician 
concluded a risk contract may be covered, or some of them may be excluded because of 
their health status. 
 The presence of several different risk contracts may result in some unforeseen behav-
iour. Theoretically, the incentives resulting from the several risk contracts may balance 
out. If one-third part applies a cost-increasing bonus and the other a cost-decreasing one, 
the effect (supposing comparable proportions of members) may be a middle course. An-
other effect may be that if one contract is dominant, the physician will act on it. Attempt-
ing to change his behaviour for a minor proportion of his patients may not be worthwhile 
then. 
 
6.4.4 Normative level of care 
 
Definition and function of a norm 
At the heart of a risk-sharing arrangement lies a norm. The third party can establish a 
normative level of care with which the actual level is compared. The outcome of this 
comparison can form the basis for ancillary payments in addition to the basic payment 
methods. A norm can be defined as ‘an official standard or level of achievement that you 
are expected to reach or conform to’.10 In this thesis, a norm is thus a standard or a set 
level of achievement for the GP, although it will depend on the terms of the contract 
whether the norm functions as a target or as a threshold. In case of a target, the norm is 
indeed a level of achievement that the physician is expected to reach or conform to. In 
case of a threshold, the physician should attempt to keep below or – again depending on 
the contract terms – above the norm. 
 A norm may be specified as a certain quality level, like compliance with guidelines or 
protocols. Other options are to specify a norm as a certain volume of care, like a number 
of prescriptions or referrals per patient per year, or as a cost level. In the first case, the 
physician can only influence the financial risk by influencing the amount of care. In the 
latter case he may try to influence the volume as well as the price of care, or attempt to 
substitute relatively inexpensive care for relatively expensive care. As the financial risk is 
the starting point in a risk-sharing arrangement, the normative level of care will probably 
be expressed as a cost level.  
 Setting a normative level is a critical part of designing risk-sharing arrangements. The 
norm determines the GPs’ compensation as well as the incentives they face. Such ar-
rangements, therefore, should meet at least two requirements. First of all, the normative 
 
                                                                 
10 Collins Cobuild English Dictionary 1995, p. 1122. 
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level for physicians should be such that each physician has in principle the same possibil-
ity to meet the norm. Even if physicians would act as perfect agents and provide the op-
timal diagnoses and treatments, factors exogenous to the physicians may make it virtually 
impossible to conform to the norm. Important, for instance, are the patient characteristics. 
As these may differ per practice, the norm should account for the resulting cost varia-
tions. In this way a settlement takes place of systematic differences in health status of the 
practice populations. This is the requirement of fairness. Secondly, the norm should pro-
vide the physician with the proper incentives. Within the proposed framework, a third-
party agent applies a financial-incentive system with a norm to stimulate the physician to 
act as agent for his patients by providing cost-effective high-quality care. Obviously, 
such a system should not provoke adverse physician behaviour, like cream skimming, 
cost shifting, and quality skimping. This is the requirement of incentive compatibility (see 
also subsection 3.3.3). 
 
The basis of a norm 
The main question is upon what the norm should be based. As explained in subsection 
6.2.2, the ideal normative level would equal the costs that would be considered as ‘neces-
sary’ or ‘needed’ to treat a patient given a right diagnosis. Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, p. 
767) called such costs ‘acceptable costs’. These costs were conceptualised as ‘(…) those 
generated in delivering a “specified basic benefit package” containing only medically 
necessary and cost-effective care’ and were considered to be needs-based. They used the 
term in a different – though considerably comparable – context, namely in a discussion 
about the calculation of premium subsidies for health plans.11 As well as for health plans, 
however, it is virtually impossible to determine such an optimal level of care and the re-
lated necessary costs for physicians. As a result, the third party will have to use other 
figures as yardstick. 
 Instead of using necessary or acceptable costs, an obvious way to determine a norm is 
the use of actual (or observed) costs. The problem with actual costs is that these costs 
differ per GP. After correction for practice size, substantial variations can be found. The 
variation in per capita spending per physician can be explained in two different ways. 
Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) explained variations in observed health care expenses across 
insured by dividing the variation into a random component and a systematic component. 
The random component is the result of the largely stochastic nature of health problems, 
which makes costs of an individual person largely unpredictable. The remaining variation 
results from several systematic factors. They mentioned seven classes of risk factors ex-
plaining the variation in spending across individuals. These can be grouped into charac-
teristics of insured, of providers, of the region, and of the health plan. Three factors are 
characteristics of insured, namely age and sex, health status, and socio-economic status. 
Characteristics of providers, like practice style and supply, form another factor. A charac-
teristic of the region where the care is provided are the input prices. A sixth factor is the 
 
                                                                 
11 A health plan is a kind of third party and is defined as ‘a risk-bearing entity that performs at least some 
insurance function – i.e. it bears some or all of the financial risk associated with the random variation in 
health expenditures across individuals.’ (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000, p. 758). 
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market power of the health plan, i.e. its ability to negotiate lower prices. Finally, features 
of the benefit plan may determine health care costs. Examples of such features are cost 
sharing with insured, contents of the benefit package, use of managed-care techniques et 
cetera. 
 
Figure 6.1. Explanation of the variation in health care spending 
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Van de Ven and Ellis argued that, for reasons of solidarity, society may desire adjustment 
of the premium subsidies for health plans.12 Only for some of the systematic factors, the 
so-called S-type risk factors, solidarity may be demanded. These will be the factors of 
which the resulting costs can not be influenced by the parties involved (i.e. third party or 
insured) and are ‘acceptable’ to be subsidised. Age, sex, and health status are typical S-
type factors. Unless decided otherwise, the effects of the remaining risk factors, the N-
type factors, are for account of the third party and may be reflected in the premium con-
tribution to be paid by the insured. If, for instance, third parties have the legal and techni-
cal possibilities to influence the providers’ practice styles, then adjustment for this factor 
may be considered undesirable. It depends whether a particular factor is designated as a 
S-type or as a N-type factor. One society may have other preferences for this than an-
other. Further, it depends on the party in question. A factor may be considered N-type in 
the calculation of a subsidy for a third party, but S-type while determining a physician’s 
norm. 
 The above mentioned explanation of Van de Ven and Ellis is related to the division of 
costs into the costs resulting from the insurance risk and those resulting from imperfect 
agency. Ideally, the variation amongst physicians in the average cost per patient would 
only reflect the positive or negative variation around the normative cost level, that is, 
would only reflect the insurance risk. The costs resulting from the insurance risk can be 
subdivided into a random part and a systematic part. A large part of the variation is ex 
ante random. The remaining part is determined by the S-type systematic factors. These 
risk factors cause variable costs that can be considered ‘necessary’, ‘needed’ or ‘accept-
able’. But as argued, information problems and conflicting interests may result in certain 
provider behaviour (N-type systematic factors) that may lead to additional costs: the costs 
of imperfect agency. 
 
                                                                 
12 A premium subsidy for a health plan is not necessarily the same as the norm for that plan. In some 
health insurance systems – the Dutch system is an example of this – the premium subsidy equals the 
norm minus a fixed amount. To cover this deficit, the third party may charge the insured a premium 
contribution. 
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The use of cost figures 
To determine a normative level, health care costs can be used in several ways. The sim-
plest way is to base the norm on the physician’s historical costs. Overall costs per physi-
cian or figures on diagnostics, treatments, prescriptions and referrals per physician are 
needed then. The use of historical costs has an important advantage: the transition from a 
risk-free contract to a risk-sharing contract can be smooth because major disruptions of 
the physician’s financing are absent. There are several disadvantages of using historical 
figures, however. First of all, it implies a continuation of an existing situation with possi-
bly large differences in practice patterns. This is not a real problem as long as these dif-
ferences are the result of differences in health status of the practice populations. It may be 
problematic, though, if the variations result from differences in provider characteristics. 
A norm based on historical figures means that the norm is adjusted for practice style, 
which may be considered undesirable. GPs who practised cost-effectively are punished, 
whereas their colleagues with a cost-ineffective style of working are rewarded with a 
relatively higher norm. A second disadvantage is that physicians face an incentive to in-
crease the costs in the year before they conclude a risk-sharing contract. If historical fig-
ures are persistently used, then the incentives to increase costs, at least up to the norma-
tive level, remain. An additional problem may be the availability of detailed figures per 
physician and for the types of care to be included in the risk package. The conclusion is 
that a norm based on historical costs has the advantage of a smooth transition. However, 
it has the disadvantage that it accounts for N-type factors whereas it may not account for 
the S-type factors accurately. It will not lead to a fair compensation of physicians. Fur-
thermore, it does not stimulate physicians enough to provide cost-effective care of good 
quality. 
 A more advanced way to determine a normative level is to use average per capita costs 
(averaged, for instance, per insurer, per region or per country). The advantage of using 
mean costs is that it is an easy way to calculate norms. It has several disadvantages, 
though. In the first place, the same objection as raised to the use of historical costs applies 
to this method: it implies the awarding of a potentially sub-optimal situation. Inefficien-
cies find expression in the average costs. Further, it is not a very accurate and fair way. A 
likely result is that some physicians are confronted with a norm that is actually too high 
and, therefore, have less opportunities to meet the required level of achievement and thus 
to get additional payments. Others may be favoured wrongly. Moreover, a norm based on 
average costs will inevitably result in the existence of groups of high-risk patients: pa-
tients for whom the physician expects the actual costs to be higher than the norm pre-
dicts. As a result, cream skimming becomes an option and may be an appealing strategy. 
Generally, this danger increases if more care is included in the risk package.13 
 Calculation of the norm can be improved by adjusting for one or more risk factors, 
like age and sex. The question is for which factors the norm should be adjusted. The 
more the model is refined, the more likely it is that its predictions will tally with the ac-
tual costs, and the more equal the possibilities are for physicians to become eligible for 
additional payments. Furthermore, a more refined model will make it more costly to 
 
                                                                 
13 This depends on the type of care included in the risk package (see subsection 6.4.2). 
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practise cream skimming. Providing cost-effective quality care becomes a more obvious 
option then. On the other hand, each further refinement will make the model more com-
plex and more costly. 
 
Risk factors 
The systematic factors that can be used to calculate norms for GPs may differ from those 
used in the calculation of subsidies for third parties. As to the latter, age, sex, and health 
status were mentioned above to be typical factors for which adjustment may be de-
manded. These factors may also be used for physician norms because of differences in 
the distribution of such patient characteristics per practice, although with the marginal 
note that use of the factor health status is arguable. Strictly speaking, if the view is taken 
that only factors may be used which GPs can not influence, then its use is questionable. 
Except for new patients in their practices, physicians can exercise influence on their pa-
tients’ health by means of patient education and preventive medicine, diagnostics, treat-
ments et cetera. However, because of the requirements of fairness – the physician’s influ-
ence on a patient’s health is limited – and incentive compatibility – no adjustment for 
distinct differences in health status may provoke adverse physician behaviour – the factor 
health status is inevitable. The exact weight of the factor may, nevertheless, be up for 
discussion. 
 Besides direct patient characteristics, other systematic factors explaining the cost 
variations may be used in calculating risk-adjusted norms. Variations in patients’ costs 
that are not the result of direct patient characteristics ought not to be reflected in the 
norms as far as GPs can exert influence on them. It seems not reasonable to make physi-
cians responsible for cost variations that they can not influence, like those caused by 
other providers and that are the result of negotiations between third parties and the pro-
viders in question. If indeed other systematic factors are used, then the earlier mentioned 
requirement of fairness implies a settlement of systematic differences in health status of 
the practice populations and of differences in the other factors in so far as the GPs can 
not influence them. Characteristics of the health plan (i.e. the insurer) can be left out of 
consideration. Characteristics of the region will probably be exogenous to the physicians, 
although large physician groups (purchasing groups) may have some influence on them. 
Most obvious are the characteristics of providers. In a system of financial-risk sharing, 
the results of inefficient behaviour of GPs themselves and of providers with whom they 
may have concluded contracts concerning volume and price of care are, in principle, their 
own responsibility. Such financial liability for their own policy of provider contracting is 
found in, for instance, a fundholding system. 
 
6.4.5 Bonus, malus and withhold 
 
Characteristic for the risk-sharing arrangements as discussed in this chapter is that the GP 
has a limited financial responsibility for a limited package of health care. The third party 
remains financially responsible for the rest of the costs of the risk package and for the 
care excluded from the risk package (figure 6.2). After composition of a risk package and 
after calculation of an accompanying norm, the normative costs can be compared with 
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the actual costs. Eventually, the physician’s financial responsibility can find expression in 
a bonus. Like defined in subsection 5.4.1.1, a bonus is an amount of money paid to the 
physician in supplement to the basic payment method only if he has met certain require-
ments. Such use of just a bonus system as an extra payment limits the physician’s risk to 
the profit side. The third party provides the physician with only positive incentives then. 
The bonus may be paid out of the savings, for instance realised in the budgets for follow-
up care. Does the third party provide just negative incentives or does it provide negative 
incentives as well, then the physician faces a pure or speculative risk respectively.14 Just 
like a positively appraised outcome may result in a bonus, a negatively appraised out-
come may result in a malus: an amount of money to be paid by the physician for not 
meeting certain requirements or for exceeding a norm. 
 
Figure 6.2. Division of responsibilities among third party and GP 
        
   responsibility physician 
    
   costs risk package  
     
total health care costs responsibility third party 
     
   remaining costs  
     responsibility third party 
    
Bonus and malus can be calculated by comparing actual and normative costs at the end of 
a budget period. 
 A first option then is to pay a percentage of the difference between actual and norma-
tive costs, in case the difference between both costs is regarded as positive. If the differ-
ence between both costs is regarded as negative, then a malus may be collected. We label 
this first option a proportional bonus or a proportional malus (the larger the difference, 
the larger the bonus or malus). 
 A second option is a bonus that is inversely proportional to the difference: the more 
equal actual and normative costs are, the larger is the bonus (or the malus). We label this 
second option an inversely proportional bonus or malus. 
 Another option is to use a fixed bonus or a fixed malus, irrespective of the difference 
between actual and normative costs. The difference between a bonus that is (inversely) 
proportional to the difference between both costs and a fixed bonus is that in the first the 
physician’s behaviour is reflected more closely: the better he performs, the higher the 
bonus. 
 As mentioned in the previous subsection, the norm may function as a target or as a 
threshold. Its functioning is merely determined by the bonus and malus systems. This is 
illustrated by the following figures. 
 
                                                                 
14 As it is little motivating for physicians, the use of only negative incentives seems no option. Neverthe-
less, such systems are not uncommon on a macro level. By determining a macro budget for particular 
care, physicians are made responsible for cost overruns. 
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Figure 6.3. A cost-decreasing proportional bonus/malus system with threshold 
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In the bonus/malus system displayed in figure 6.3 the norm, which is 100, functions as a 
threshold. It provides the physician with an incentive to keep below the threshold by re-
ducing health care costs. It is an example of a proportional system; the arrow indicates 
that the bonus (or malus) increases with the deviation from the norm. 
 
Figure 6.4. A cost-increasing proportional bonus/malus system with threshold 
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The system in figure 6.4 is also an example of a proportional system with a norm as 
threshold, but here the physician is stimulated to keep above the threshold. Fundamen-
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tally different is the inversely proportional system displayed in figure 6.5 in which the 
norm functions as target. Here, the arrow indicates that the bonus increases if the devia-
tion from the norm decreases. 
 
Figure 6.5. An inversely proportional bonus system with target 
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In principle, all systems may be usable and it will depend upon the goals of the third 
party which system is preferred. A third-party payer – under the assumption of relation-
ships with physicians – may prefer the cost-decreasing proportional system with thresh-
old. The inversely proportional system with target may be the third-party agent’s choice. 
The reason for this is that in this system the desired level of achievement is made ex-
plicit: the normative level of care. The bonus is at its maximum if the norm is reached. As 
a result, the inversely proportional system with target reduces the danger of adverse phy-
sician behaviour. Whether this adverse behaviour consists of under- or over-provision 
depends on the bonus system. The cost-decreasing bonus system may result in underpro-
vision, whereas the opposite holds for the cost-increasing bonus system. An interesting 
option then is to combine the incentive of the ancillary payment system with the contrast-
ing incentive of the basic payment system. A cost-decreasing bonus system may be com-
bined with a fee-for-service system, while a cost-increasing bonus system may be com-
bined with a capitation system in order to balance the incentives. 
 In the cost-decreasing system the desired level of achievement is less explicit: a level 
somewhere below the normative threshold. Although it is probably not what the bonus 
system is intended for, such a system stimulates the physician to withhold care com-
pletely because the bonus is at its maximum then. Nevertheless, even a third-party agent 
may use the proportional systems displayed in the figures 6.4 and 6.5, for instance tem-
porarily in order to decrease or increase the provision of a particular type of care. 
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Figure 6.6. An incremental bonus system 
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A variant of the system in figure 6.5 is a mix between an inversely proportional system 
with target and a fixed bonus/malus system. It is characterized by an incremental bonus 
(figure 6.6). In the sense that there are – in this example – only two bonus levels, it is a 
clearer and (administratively) simpler version. Moreover, it agrees with the solution for 
the random variation in costs mentioned in the previous subsection: the definition of a 
range as norm. The physician may face an incentive just to cross the border between 
minimum and maximum bonus, but this holds for all break points. Moreover, reaching 
the maximum bonus is exactly what the physician is supposed to do. 
 Another variant of the inversely proportional system with target is displayed in figure 
6.7. Here it is combined with a malus system through which two break points are created. 
Obviously, the incentives the physician faces are stronger. 
 
Figure 6.7. Bonus/malus system with target 
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In case of a bonus or a malus system there is solely a settlement of surpluses or deficits at 
the end of a certain time period, resulting in a bonus or a malus or in an adjustment of the 
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payments in the next time period. A common variant of the malus system is the withhold 
in which case the third party anticipates a deficit by collecting a certain percentage of the 
fees paid to the physician. If the difference between the normative and the factual level of 
volume or costs is negative, then the withheld money covers the deficits. If positive, the 
withheld money is yet paid to the physician. 
 If a bonus or malus is based on the difference between the normative and the actual 
level of costs, the responsibility of a GP – and thus the derived bonus or malus – can be 
calculated by taking a percentage from the difference. As the risk is shared, the maxi-
mum percentage will be less than hundred percent, in absence of additional risk-reducing 
measures. If the physician’s risk is limited, then the initial responsibility may be hundred 
percent though. Further, different percentages may be used for bonus and malus. The 
proportion will be determined by the amount of risk the third party wants to transfer, on 
the ability of the physician to influence volume or costs, and on the organisational and 
financial arrangements that are further made, like the presence of risk-limiting measures. 
The arrangements may also be refined by varying the percentages per type of care. Up to 
a fixed amount, the physician may be held fully responsible for a deficit in the primary 
care budget, but only partially for a deficit in the hospital budget. Equally, a surplus in 
the primary care budget may be returned to the physician. A surplus in the hospital 
budget, however, may be distributed among GPs, medical specialists and the third party. 
The latter may also have a right to a portion of the surplus, especially if it results from its 
managed-care activities. Another reason to limit the responsibility of the physician to 
only a proportion of the difference between normative and actual level is to limit the fi-
nancial incentives he faces. In case of full budgeting or full capitation, the physician is 
fully responsible (i.e. bonus and malus amount to hundred percent). Such a large propor-
tion, however, may result in cream skimming, in cost shifting, or in withholding or post-
poning care. 
 A bonus system may be combined with a malus system. A third party may use a malus 
as well as a bonus for the whole risk package. Another option is to use solely a bonus 
system for the hospital budget, but to use a bonus and a malus in the other budgets. In 
that case the physician is thus rewarded for his contribution to cost savings, but is not 
held responsible for deficits in the hospital budget. The use of only a malus system is 
unattractive for physicians but it may prevent increasing costs or sustain a certain level of 
care. 
 In three-tiered systems, the middle tier may change the arrangements made by the 
third party. It may introduce or abolish bonus, malus and withhold systems, or change the 
amount the physician is at risk. However, the middle tier will at least be motivated to 
‘pass through’ the incentives it faces (Eggleston 2005). If a middle tier is made fully re-
sponsible for a certain risk package, it may share this risk with the physicians then. A 
middle tier sharing risk with the third party may also share its part with physicians. 
 
6.4.6 Limitation of the physician’s risk 
 
Since the insurance risk and the risk of imperfect agency are difficult to separate, risk-
sharing arrangements provide the physician with at least a portion of the insurance risk. 
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As a result, physicians made (partially) responsible for this risk perform a part of the in-
surance function and become, to some extent, insurer. But the goal of a financial-risk 
sharing arrangement is to stimulate a GP to act in the interest of the insured, and not to 
transform him into an insurer. For several reasons, providing a physician with much risk 
poses a hazard. Firstly, the physician may be prompted to take undesirable measures, like 
quality skimping, unnecessary referrals or cream skimming. Secondly, the incentive sys-
tem may be ruined: a few expensive patients at the beginning of a financial period may 
dilute the incentives emanating from, for instance, a bonus system by making it virtually 
impossible for the physician to benefit from a surplus at the end of that period. Ulti-
mately, a physician may fail to bear the risk and may be ruined. 
 There are different approaches to limiting the risk a physician runs. The amount of risk 
is the result of the likelihood that the physician’s patients need care (the probability of a 
loss), the type of care included in the risk package (the average size of the loss, i.e. low-
cost versus high-cost care), and the amount the physician is liable for (like 10, 25, or 50 
percent of the deficits). Evidently, a physician who bears full responsibility for all hospi-
tal care is subjected to a larger risk than one who is responsible for only 25 percent of 
primary care costs. A first approach is thus to limit the percentages and to design the risk 
package carefully. But even with relatively low percentages and relatively low-cost care, 
mere chance may significantly influence the likeliness a physician receives a bonus. 
Therefore, additional measures may be needed. Another approach is not to try to reduce 
the losses in advance, but to enhance the physician’s ability to carry the financial conse-
quences. For both approaches it would be useful to draw a parallel with strategies used by 
insurers to limit the risk, because the insurance industry has a long experience in this 
area. Hereafter, we consider the risk-spreading techniques that are applied in the insur-
ance industry. 
 
6.4.6.1 Risk-spreading techniques in the insurance industry 
Two ways of risk spreading discerned within the insurance industry are coinsurance and 
reinsurance (Riley 1997).15 In case of coinsurance, several third parties (insurers) accept 
a share of the risk and are only liable for the same share of the losses. Characteristic is 
thus that the insured concludes contracts with several insurers. 
 
                                                                 
15 The term coinsurance is often used in another context, namely to denote a specific form of cost shar-
ing between insurer and insured. In such a coinsurance arrangement, claim costs are shared between 
insurer and insured in a predetermined rate. The idea in both contexts is the same: several parties accept 
a share of the risk. 
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Figure 6.8. Coinsurance versus reinsurance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case of reinsurance, the insured has a contract with just one insurer. This insurer, on 
his turn, may conclude one or more reinsurance contracts with a reinsurer in order to 
spread his risk. Reinsurance may be defined as ‘the insurance of contractual liabilities 
incurred under contracts of direct insurance or reinsurance’ (Carter 1979, p. 4).16 
 Von Eije (1989) quoted Gerathewohl (1976) in discerning three types of technical 
dangers against which reinsurance may protect an insurer. One danger that may occur is 
the danger of chance. Usually, insurance premiums are based on independent claims, but 
sometimes, like in case of natural disasters, this assumption will not hold. The result may 
be that claims accumulate in a short period, which is thought of as being risky. Further, 
the danger of chance includes the random occurrence of a (large) number of independent 
(large) claims. Whether claims are large is considered in relation to premium income and 
reserves (Carter 1979, p. 7). Another technical danger is the danger of being mistaken in, 
for instance, rating or underwriting. Information problems, like adverse selection and 
moral hazard, may underlie this danger. Especially very large claims are considered to be 
dangerous then. A third danger is the danger of change. The insurer may be confronted 
with changes in factors that may influence (i.e. unexpectedly increase) the frequency and 
the average amount of the claims. 
 
                                                                 
16 The inclusion of the terms ‘or reinsurance’ in the definition of reinsurance can be justified as follows. 
In the first instance, a reinsurance contract between an insurer and a reinsurer provides insurance of li-
abilities that may be incurred under a contract between an insured and an insurer. In case the reinsurer, 
on his turn, has reinsured the reinsurance contract he has accepted – the reinsurance of a reinsurance 
contract is known as a retrocession – then reinsurance provides insurance of liabilities which may be 
incurred under a contract between an insurer and a reinsurer (Carter 1979). 
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 Several forms of reinsurance can be distinguished.17 A first form of reinsurance is the 
quota share. A quota-share arrangement is a proportional form of reinsurance in which a 
fixed proportion, for example 40 percent, of each claim is for account of the reinsurer.18 
Its administrative simplicity is a main advantage. It is, therefore, an inexpensive form of 
reinsurance. Moreover, the insurer is able to insure larger risks than would be possible 
without a quota-share contract. As the absolute variation in the retained share of the 
losses decreases, the probability of ruin – this is the probability that the insurer’s losses 
will exceed its resources – will also decrease. Main disadvantages are that it also rein-
sures against small risks, and that it does not alter the relative variability of the expected 
losses on the retained share of the portfolio. Therefore, the loss ratio will remain the same 
(Carter 1979). 
 A second form of reinsurance is the surplus contract. This proportional reinsurance 
form is characterised by ‘multiples of lines’. A line is the retention, i.e. the amount of a 
policy that the primary insurer retains under a surplus contract. By multiplying the line by 
a number – usually is agreed upon a number between five and twenty – the maximum 
liability for the reinsurer is found. The rest of the claim above the maximum is beyond 
the responsibility of the reinsurer, although a second surplus arrangement may be made 
to provide coverage for the costs beyond the reinsurer’s initial responsibility. An impor-
tant advantage is that, although depending on the amount of the line, small and medium 
claims are the insurer’s responsibility, whereas large claims are partly covered by the 
surplus contract. Furthermore, it reduces the relative variability of the expected losses. 
The administration costs are a main disadvantage. For each policy has to be decided 
whether or not to reinsure, and for each claim has to be checked whether it should be 
covered by the reinsurer. In principle, it does not provide protection against large claims 
and against the accumulation of losses. 
 A third reinsurance method is the excess of loss per risk (i.e. per policy), which is a 
non-proportional form. Below a certain deductible, the claims are for account of the in-
surer. The amount above the deductible is the reinsurer’s responsibility, although his li-
ability may be limited up to a certain amount. An excess of loss per risk contract has sev-
eral advantages. Firstly, it provides protection against large losses. Secondly, the insurer 
can retain a larger portion of the premiums, as he is liable himself for the more frequent 
losses below the deductible. Thirdly, it has the advantage of lower administration costs 
as, usually, deductibles are the same for all policies and premiums are a percentage of the 
sum of the primary premiums. However, it does not protect against the accumulation of 
claims due to a single occurrence or due to chance. 
 The fourth method of reinsurance, the excess of loss per occurrence (i.e. for all poli-
cies), is also an example of a non-proportional contract, but the goal is the reduction of 
the danger of chance by reducing the impact of dependency. This type of contract covers 
all claims with an amount above a certain deductible and that result from the same occur-
 
                                                                 
17 Regarding the reinsurance methods heavily is drawn on the work of Carter (1979) and the thesis of 
Von Eije (1989). 
18 In proportional reinsurance arrangements the reinsurer is responsible for the same proportion of the 
claims as the proportion he receives of the premium. 
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rence, provided that the occurrence fits within the contract’s definition. Deciding whether 
several claims originate from the same incident and whether this incident is indeed cov-
ered by the contract is a main problem of such arrangements. 
 A fifth reinsurance form is the non-proportional stop loss. This form reinsures the sum 
of the claim amounts as far as it exceeds a certain percentage of the sum of the premiums. 
It may protect the insurer against the risk of ruin. Often, however, the claim amounts 
above the retained percentage are shared between primary insurer and reinsurer. More-
over, the reinsurer’s liability is often limited to a maximum amount. Some consider the 
stop loss to be an ideal form of reinsurance for the insurer as the cause of the total claim 
amount is irrelevant. It provides protection against increases in the frequency as well as 
in the size of losses. 
 A final form of reinsurance mentioned here is the n largest claims. In a simple form, 
the insurer reimburses the highest n claims in full. It is a non-proportional method. For 
the reinsurer this form has the advantage over the excess of loss per risk that the number 
of claims will not increase due to inflation.19 Inflation may increase the size of the claims 
though. A solution may be to use a deductible that is revised in case of inflation. 
 
6.4.6.2 Risk-spreading techniques in the health-insurance industry 
The risk-spreading techniques described above are applied within the insurance industry 
in general, but are of use in the health-insurance market as well. Many health plans 
(HMOs for instance) have reinsurance arrangements to cover, at least partly, those claims 
that exceed a certain deductible. These deductibles usually relate to the claims of a single 
risk or to the aggregate claim costs – i.e. an excess of loss per risk or a stop loss respec-
tively (see Kongstvedt 1993a, Brennfleck Pascuzzi 1993, and Ward 1993). 
 Van Barneveld et al. (1998) analysed whether different forms of mandatory reinsur-
ance could be used as a supplement to risk-adjusted capitation payments within a health-
care system with competing health insurers. Such techniques should reduce incentives a 
health insurer may face to take undesirable measures – especially cream skimming – but 
maintain incentives for efficient behaviour. They distinguished three reinsurance forms. 
In the first form, high-risk pooling, insurers are allowed to select a fraction of their port-
folio of which the costs will be pooled (partially). A small modification of this form 
might be the replacement of a fraction by a fixed number of insured whose costs are 
pooled. Then, there is some resemblance to the n largest claims form mentioned above.20 
An important difference, however, is that with high-risk pooling insured are selected in 
advance of a certain financial period, whereas in a n largest claims system insured are 
selected at the end of the financial period. Their second form, the excess of loss, resem-
 
                                                                 
19 In case of an excess of loss per risk inflation may increase the size of the loss beyond the deductible. 
Hence the number of claims for the reinsurer may increase as well. 
20 The terminology is somewhat confusing. Pooling resembles coinsurance (see subsection 6.4.6.1) but is 
used by Van Barneveld et al. in the context of reinsurance. The explanation for this is that coinsurance is 
presented here as a form of reinsurance: the insurer reinsures a fraction of his portfolio by pooling it with 
other insurers. 
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bles the excess of loss per risk form in the above. The third form, proportional pooling, is 
what is labelled here a quota-share arrangement. 
 Despite the similarities between the risk-pooling arrangements known from the insur-
ance industry in general and those discussed by Van Barneveld et al. (1998) for the 
health-insurance industry, there are some differences. First of all, the goals of applying 
such arrangements are different. Goal of reinsurance techniques used within the insur-
ance industry is mainly to offer protection against the random risk of large individual 
losses or of an accumulation of losses due to a single occurrence, and against fluctuations 
in the aggregate loss experience (Carter 1979). Van Barneveld et al. (1998) argued, how-
ever, that in health care a regulator’s goal will be to reduce the incentives for cream 
skimming by reducing the predictable risk that may occur as a result of using capitation 
payments which are imperfectly adjusted for risk. They considered it the insurer’s and 
not the regulator’s job to deal with random fluctuations. Competition and premium regu-
lation in a health-insurance market, however, may restrain the insurer’s ability to adjust 
premiums to random fluctuations. It may very well be the case, therefore, that a voluntary 
reinsurance arrangement is used in conjunction with a mandatory pooling arrangement. A 
second difference is that, usually, premiums for reinsurance policies are adjusted for risk, 
whereas in the variants of Van Barneveld et al. the premiums are independent of the risks 
that are pooled in order to prevent cream skimming by the insurer. It should be noted that 
this pertains to the specific situation as described by Van Barneveld et al. in which there 
is only one reinsurer, i.e. no competitive reinsurance market. As is the case in the tradi-
tional reinsurance market, competition between reinsurers results in risk-rated premiums. 
A third difference is that, usually, reinsurance arrangements are voluntary. The variants 
discussed by Van Barneveld et al., however, are mandatory. 
 
6.4.6.3 Reinsurance techniques in risk-sharing arrangements 
The question is whether the goals as well as the ways of applying risk-spreading tech-
niques within a system of risk-bearing GPs differ from those described above.21 A first 
objective may be to reduce the incentives for cream skimming and also for cost shifting 
and quality skimping, i.e. to reduce the predictable risk. A second objective may be to 
protect the physician against the random risk as well. Due to the relatively small practice 
size, a GP is especially vulnerable to random fluctuations in occurring costs. 
 Reinsurance techniques may be applied in different ways. Regarding the way an ar-
rangement is financed, reinsurance premiums should not be related to the risk of the pa-
tients whose costs will be pooled as otherwise the physician would still face an incentive 
to skim cream (in conformity with Van Barneveld et al. 1998, p. 225). The problem of 
premium rating is most noticeable in case a GP has to decide whether or not to take out 
reinsurance for an individual risk. However, the most common way to finance, for in-
stance, an excess of loss per risk or a stop-loss arrangement is by means of a premium 
calculated as a percentage of the total premium income. For the physician, this would 
mean that reinsurance coverage is provided for all his patients against a premium that is a 
percentage of his gross income. This would reduce the danger of cream skimming con-
 
                                                                 
21 See also the remarks on this subject by Van Barneveld et al. (1998, p. 231). 
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siderably. Still, it will depend on the reinsurance technique and its exact application 
whether there remains a retention, i.e. a quantity not covered by reinsurance, and thus 
whether there remains an incentive for undesirable behaviour. With regard to the volun-
tariness of risk-spreading arrangements, a third-party agent may decide to compel the 
contracted physicians to arrange for risk-spreading systems or to accept the arrangements 
made by the third party. This may be the best way to protect the incentive system and to 
guard the insured’ interests. 
 Risk-spreading arrangements within a system of risk-bearing GPs may differ in an-
other way from those in the insurance industry. A GP may seek reinsurance with a risk-
rated premium from a party outside his relationship with the third-party agent (see figure 
6.9 B), which resembles normal practice in the insurance industry (figure 6.9 A). How-
ever, another option is that the third party functions as reinsurer (figure 6.9 C). For ex-
ample, the third party pays the physician a budget, but limits the physician’s liability to 
amount x. Costs above this deductible are covered by the third party itself. Clearly, such a 
design results in a thin line between the basic payment system and the reinsurance sys-
tem. 
 
Figure 6.9. Risk-spreading arrangements 
 
A. insured        insurer      reinsurer 
B. third party   physician  reinsurer 
C. third party   physician 
 
 
 
A system in which the third party functions as reinsurer has several advantages over a 
system in which the physician has to seek reinsurance from another party. Firstly, the 
administrative costs will be lower. In case costs arise that are covered by reinsurance, the 
physician only has to deal with the primary insurer, i.e. the third party. Further, the terms 
of a reinsurance contract will be related to the contract between third party and physician. 
So if a patient changes from third party, if a patient changes from physician, or if the 
terms of the contracts between third party and physician are changed, the physician does 
not have to change his reinsurance contract.  
 A second advantage is that such a system may be less expensive as there is only one 
insurer involved instead of two, who probably would both charge a loading fee for profit 
as well as a risk load. 
 A third advantage – and this is important from an agency point of view – is that rein-
surance changes the incentives a physician faces. By offering reinsurance-like protection 
itself, the third party will be more able to control these incentives. 
 In case the third party is the government, reinsurance by the government has the major 
advantage that the costs of reinsurance can be spread very broadly. Financing of the rein-
surance program can be spread over the whole population (Blumberg and Holahan 2004). 
 On the other hand, in one specific (but not exceptional) case there is an advantage in a 
system in which the physician himself has to seek reinsurance: if a physician has con-
tracts with several third parties. If all individual third parties would base their measures to 
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reduce the physician’s risk on the proportion of their insured in the physician’s practice 
population, then the physician would be ‘over-insured’. An option for the physician is 
then to seek reinsurance from another party or to pool the contributions of the different 
third parties with other physicians. This latter option, risk-pooling with other physicians, 
is not only a potential solution to the problem of several third parties. Pooling may be 
used next to a reinsurance technique, or as a fully-fledged alternative in order to spread 
the physicians’ risks (see the next subsection). 
 In principle, the several reinsurance techniques described in subsection 6.4.6.1 can be 
applied to the practice of the GP. In a quota-share arrangement, the physician is respon-
sible for x percent of the patient’s costs. The remaining (100 – x) percentage is for ac-
count of the third party (or a reinsurer). In a surplus arrangement, the third party covers 
the patient’s costs up to x times the physician’s retention. If an excess of loss per risk is 
used, an individual patient’s costs above a certain deductible are for account of the third 
party. The excess of loss per occurrence form reduces or removes the physician’s liability 
in case of a catastrophic incident covered by the policy, like an epidemic or a natural dis-
aster. A stop-loss contract covers all the patients’ costs a physician occurs as far as these 
costs exceed a particular percentage of the payments the physician received from the 
third party for the patients involved. In case of a n largest claims, finally, the costs of the 
n patients with the highest costs are the third party’s liability. 
 With reinsurance forms for which this is not already made explicit by nature of the 
contract, the maximum liability of the third party can be fixed or may be limited up to a 
certain percentage of the patient’s costs. In the latter case, a combination may be made 
between, for instance, an excess of loss per risk and a quota share. The rationale for such 
additional arrangements is not so much to protect the reinsurer from too much risk – as is 
the case in the regular reinsurance contracts in the insurance industry – but to preserve an 
incentive to provide cost-effective care. 
 Other additional arrangements are to make the retention (deductible) depending upon 
the number of patients covered (the more patients, the higher the retention), or the type of 
care (a lower retention for high-risk care). 
 The above mentioned techniques as well as the risk-pooling techniques discussed in 
the following subsection can be applied to reduce a physician’s risk. An alternative ap-
proach might be to make the physician bearing the risk, and to compensate him by means 
of a risk load. This load can be used to create a buffer (a reserve) that will help the physi-
cian to meet cost fluctuations (Tolley et al. 1987). 
  
6.4.6.4 Risk-pooling techniques in risk-sharing arrangements 
Risk pooling resembles the aforementioned technique of coinsurance (see subsection 
6.4.6.1). The risk is not transferred to a single GP but spread over a group of physicians. 
All members of the pool take a share of the risk the third party wants to transfer to the 
physicians. A risk pool may thus be defined as a group of providers who share in the re-
wards and penalties from surpluses and deficits in the budgets for certain types of care 
(Hillman et al. 1992). These providers may be GPs but, as will be argued in the following 
text, other providers may be members as well. Within the pool, the physicians mutually 
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share the risks and thus the bonus or malus that may result from the surpluses or losses in 
the pooled budgets. It is a means to reduce the risk an individual physician runs. 
 In determining the size of a risk pool, spreading of risks needs to be balanced against 
financial incentives. Pool size is negatively related to risk but also to the incentives an 
individual pool member faces to behave cost-effectively. If the size of the pool increases, 
the effect of the physician’s behaviour decreases as the costs are borne by the group. 
Hillman et al. (1992) found that in 1988, of 216 three-tiered HMOs about 15 percent had 
‘risk pools’ that consisted of individual primary care physicians. About 30 percent had 
risk pools of physician subgroups, averaging 37 physicians. About 38 percent of the 
HMOs grouped all their primary care physicians in a single risk pool with on average 275 
physicians (data on the remaining HMOs were missing). The physicians in the individual 
‘pools’ were 100 percent responsible for the risk. Physicians in the subgroups as men-
tioned were responsible for, on average, 2.7 percent (1/37), whereas their colleagues in 
the single risk pool were responsible for only 0.4 percent (1/275) of surpluses or deficits. 
 It is not only the number of providers in a risk pool that is important for the size of the 
risk. Equally important are the number of patients per physician (this determines the in-
dividual physician’s share) and the total number of patients for whom money is put into 
the pool (the risk per physician decreases with increasing size). According to the law of 
large numbers, the standard deviation of the loss per patient will reduce if the number of 
patients increases. 
 Besides the size of the pool, the proximity of its members may also be of influence on 
the incentives an individual member faces. A risk pool consisting of a group of GPs prac-
tising in the same building will probably have a larger effect than a risk pool of which its 
members are practicing individually within a wide area (Hillman et al. 1992). Finnish 
experiences, on the other hand, showed that working within the same organisation is 
more important than working in the same building (Van de Ven and De Jong 1992). 
 Another point, mentioned by Hillman et al. (1992, p. 139) is the culture of the risk 
pool. This culture will result from the amount at risk, the size of the pool, and the location 
of its members, but also from the ‘philosophy of the risk pool’. Some risk pools seem to 
be more responsive to managed-care techniques employed by the third-party agent or the 
pool itself than other pools. 
 A GP may be member of one pool as well as member of several pools (a multi-pool 
system). In the first case, the members of the pool are (partly) responsible for the differ-
ence between the normative and the actual level of volume or costs of all the care in-
cluded in the risk package. In the second case, the physician is member of several risk 
pools. In a multi-pool system, the pools have, in principle, different members (see figure 
6.10). 
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Figure 6.10. Single-pool versus multi-pool system 
 
Single-pool: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TP: third party 
MT: middle tier 
A: general practitioner Multi-pool: 
B, C, D, E: other risk-pool members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creating several risk pools has the advantage that surpluses and deficits can be distrib-
uted among the members in various proportions. GPs may be held fully responsible for 
the differences between the normative and the actual level of volume or costs within the 
primary care fund, but may be held responsible for, for instance, only twenty percent of 
such differences within the hospital risk pool. Related is the advantage that the composi-
tion of a pool can be made contingent upon the type of care and upon the extent of the 
providers’ influence on the final results. The primary care risk pool may consist solely of 
GPs, whereas the responsibility for the hospital risk pool may be shared with medical 
specialists and the hospital itself. The risk pools may vary in size dependent on the risk 
associated with the type of care. Hospital care will demand a larger pool size, other things 
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being equal, than primary care. A disadvantage of creating several risk pools is that in-
centives for substitution of care may be decreased. Another disadvantage is the increased 
complexity of the arrangements. 
 Risk-pool arrangements may be two-tiered as well as three-tiered. In a two-tiered sys-
tem the third party settles the surpluses or the deficits between the members of the pool. 
In a three-tiered arrangement the middle tier receives payments from the third party and 
then settles the surpluses or the deficits. 
 
 
6.5 The third party’s options for dealing with risks 
 
As argued in subsection 6.2.4, the third party has three feasible options to deal with the 
financial risks: risk bearing (hundred percent responsibility for the third party), risk shift-
ing (zero percent responsibility), and risk sharing (responsibility larger than zero but 
smaller than hundred percent).22 Formation of risk pools creates additional options in 
case of the risk-shifting or risk-sharing strategy. Except shifting the risk to or sharing it 
with independent GPs or middle tiers, the third party may also shift it to or share it with a 
risk pool of GPs. The three strategies a third party may employ in combination with the 
strategies a middle tier may employ result in a set of options for the allocation of the risk. 
Gold et al. (2002) pointed at the fact that complex arrangements can even lead to four, 
five or even more tiers (multi-tiered arrangements). This can make it hard to identify the 
location of the risk. 
 The first strategy for a third party is to bear the risk itself (denoted by bold letters in 
figure 6.11). In this case, there are two main options. The first option (A) is to bear the 
risk and pay independent GPs according to, for instance, a fee-for-service system. Option 
B is to pay an intermediary organisation (the middle tier) likewise.23 The middle tier, 
then, has three options: paying independent physicians according to a fee-for-service sys-
tem (option B1); paying independent physicians according to a risk contract with, for 
instance, capitation payments (option B2); or paying a group of physicians (the risk pool) 
according to a risk contract (option B3). Options B2 and B3 – in these options the third 
party thus pays the middle tier according to a risk-free contract and allows the middle tier 
to pay the physicians according to risk contracts – are unlikely and, therefore, mainly of 
theoretical importance. 
 
 
                                                                 
22 The fourth option, risk splitting, is left out of consideration here. As argued, the middle coarse in 
which the third party bears the insurance risk and shifts the risk of imperfect agency to GPs is practically 
unfeasible. 
23 Note that the option of a third party paying a group of risk-pooling GPs directly (comparable with 
options D and G in figure 6.13 and 6.14 respectively) is omitted here. Since the third party bears all the 
risk, creating a risk pool makes no sense. 
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Figure 6.11. Risk bearing by the third party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second strategy for a third party is to shift the risk (see figure 6.12). Now there are 
three main options. The first option (C) is to shift the risk to independent physicians by 
paying them, for instance, full capitation. A third party may also choose to contract a risk 
pool of physicians according to a risk contract, which is a second option (D). A final op-
tion is to contract a middle tier (E). The middle tier, on its turn, may choose one out of 
five options. These also boil down to bearing, shifting and sharing. The middle tier itself 
can bear the risk (E1) or shift it to independent GPs (E2) or to a risk pool (E3). In options 
E4 and E5, finally, the risk is shared with independent physicians or with a pool of physi-
cians. 
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Figure 6.12. Risk shifting by the third party 
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Figure 6.13. Risk sharing by the third party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third strategy for a third party is to share the risk (see figure 6.13). A first possibility 
then is to share the risk with independent physicians (F). Another option is risk sharing 
with a risk pool of GPs (G). Option H contains of risk sharing with a middle tier which, 
on its turn, may bear its part of the risk (H1), or may share it with independent GPs (H2) 
or with a pool of physicians (H3). 
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 In the options B, E, and H, a middle tier subcontracts independent physicians or pools 
of physicians. It may conclude the same type of contracts with these physicians as with 
the third party, or it may alter the nature of the contracts by changing a risk contract in a 
risk-free contract. Whether a third party exerts influence on the contracting of physicians 
by middle tiers may differ. A third-party agent will probably prohibit a middle tier from 
shifting all the risk to physicians as this may create conflicting interests, but a third-party 
payer may not. Hillman et al. (1992, p. 138) noted that third parties – HMOs in their re-
search – are sometimes ignorant of the way a middle tier contracts physicians. 
 In option E the middle tier has the disposal of the largest set of contracting modalities, 
namely five. Not only has it the possibility to bear all the risk or to share it with physi-
cians, it also has the option to shift the whole of it to physicians. The other options with a 
middle tier, options B and H, have the advantage that the third party retains some influ-
ence by restricting the possibilities for the middle tier, and that the physicians are pre-
vented from bearing all the risk. 
 
Table 6.2. Risk-bearing party per option 
 
Risk bearer A B1 B2 B3 C D E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 F G H1 H2 H3 
TP X X               
IP     X   X         
RP      X   X        
MT       X          
TP + IP   X         X     
TP + RP    X         X    
TP + MT              X   
MT + IP          X       
MT + RP           X      
TP + MT + IP               X  
TP + MT + RP                X 
 
TP: third party 
IP: independent physician 
RP: risk-pool physicians 
MT: middle tier 
Bold: Physician risk-sharing options 
 
In table 6.2 the allocation of the risk is represented in a different way. It can easily be 
seen now that in the options C, D, E2, and E3, the physicians bear all the risk. In the op-
tions B2, B3, E4, E5, F, G, H2, and H3, the physicians are partly responsible (risk-
sharing). Actually, in the unlikely options B2 and B3 the risk is not really shared and, 
therefore, these are further left out of consideration. Of the sixteen options considered in 
this subsection, only six remain as options in which the risk is shared with physicians 
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(printed bold in the table). A third-party agent wanting to control GPs by means of risk 
sharing will thus have to: 
- share the risk directly with physicians (options F and G), 
- shift the risk to a middle tier and arrange that the middle tier shares it with the physi-
cians (options E4 and E5), or 
- will have to share it with the middle tier and then make such arrangements (options 
H2 and H3). 
 
 
6.6 Summary and conclusion 
 
One of the functions of a third-party agent is to provide insurance against the insurance 
risk. This risk results from the occurrence of illness, which has largely a stochastic na-
ture. In return for an insurance premium, the risk is transferred from the insured to the 
third party. The risk transfer involves a second risk, though, which we labelled the risk of 
imperfect agency. It consists of the risk of the provision of cost-ineffective care (mainly 
resulting from over-provision and inappropriate care) and of the risk of underprovision of 
care. The risk of imperfect agency can result from agency problems within the relation-
ship between patient and physician, and from the presence of insurance. Health insurance 
may lead to consumer-induced moral hazard and to supplier-induced moral hazard. 
 As the provision of health care is to a large extent at the GP’s discretion, the third-
party agent may focus on this physician in order to reduce the size of the risk of imperfect 
agency. Once taken over the insurance risk and the risk of imperfect agency, the third-
party agent may choose between four strategies in order to handle them. The first option 
is risk bearing, in which the third party accepts the risk of imperfect agency as well as the 
insurance risk. This option is not compatible with the agency function because the third 
party makes no attempt to influence the way health care is delivered. The second option 
is risk shifting, in which the third party shifts both risks to individual (primary care) phy-
sicians or to a group of (primary care) physicians. The physicians become responsible for 
the insurance risk, which however is typically a third-party function. Moreover, the re-
sponsibility for both risks may prompt the physicians to take, from the third-party agent’s 
viewpoint, undesirable measures to reduce their risk, like cream skimming. Hence this 
option is not compatible with the agency function either. In the third option, risk splitting, 
the third party attempts to separate both risks. Theoretically, this middle coarse between 
risk bearing and risk shifting is the most satisfactory solution. The third party can shift 
the risk of imperfect agency to the physicians whilst retaining the insurance risk itself. In 
practice, however, it will be very hard to separate both risks. The final option is risk shar-
ing, which also has the advantage of being a middle course between risk bearing and risk 
shifting but with the side-effect of shifting a part of the insurance risk to the (group of) 
physicians. The difficulty of separating both risks is evaded though. 
 The answer to the first research question of this chapter, 
 
What is the rationale for financial-risk sharing between third-party agents and general 
practitioners? 
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consists thus of two parts. Firstly, the cost-effectiveness and the quality of care are to a 
large extent at the discretion of GPs. Hence for a third-party agent these physicians are a 
perfect starting point for improvements in the provision of care. Secondly, of the four 
strategies to handle the risk, risk sharing is the best for a third-party agent. The other 
three strategies are inconsistent with the third party’s agency function (risk bearing and 
risk shifting) or not very feasible (risk splitting). 
 
In a financial-risk sharing arrangement the third-party agent stimulates the GP to reduce 
the amount of cost-ineffective care. Because the risk is shared, the incentives for over-
provision and for underprovision can be balanced. The effectiveness of such an arrange-
ment, however, depends on its financial and organisational structures. The more the ar-
rangement has the effect of the risk-shifting option, the stronger are both the incentives 
for cost-effective behaviour and for undesirable physician behaviour. There are at least 
three obvious forms of undesirable behaviour that a GP may show if he is at risk. In case 
of cream skimming, the physician selects patients for whom the (expected) costs are 
lower than the (expected) reimbursement. In case of cost shifting, the physician provides 
or arranges care for which he is not financially responsible. In case of quality skimping, 
the physician postpones or even withholds care, reduces his efforts, et cetera. 
 
The second research question of this chapter was: 
 
How can systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
Financial-risk sharing arrangements have five main aspects that the third-party agent has 
to take into consideration while drawing up the arrangement. These aspects are the risk 
package, the size of the practice population, the normative level of care, the bonus sys-
tem, and the limitation of the physician’s risk. 
 A first crucial aspect is the scope of the health-care goods and services for which the 
physician is financially responsible, the risk package. The type of care included will de-
termine the probability that the physician incurs costs as well as the variability of these 
costs. For some types of care it will be easier to diagnose and to estimate the costs of 
treatment, which is especially important if the GP has to arrange and pay for follow-up 
care. Other matters to take into consideration are whether the risk package provokes 
cream skimming or cost shifting, whether it is divided into separate cost categories and 
whether the behaviour of other providers of care is influenced. 
 The second aspect is the size of the practice population or the proportion of it for 
which the physician is financially responsible. The relative and absolute size of this 
population determine the magnitude of the incentives, the ability of the physician to shift 
costs to (patients from) other third parties and the extent to which the physician is vulner-
able to random fluctuations in the costs. 
 A third aspect is the normative level of care. The third party may define a norm, for 
instance in terms of a certain volume of care or a cost level, with which (the outcome of) 
the physician’s behaviour is compared. This is probably the most difficult part of the ar-
rangement. It is hard to determine an optimal level based on medically necessary, cost-
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effective and needs-based care. A way to determine a norm, then, is to use actual costs 
and to base the norm on historical costs or, better, on average costs. The norm can be 
adjusted for systematic differences in health status and for some of the other systematic 
factors, in so far as the physician can not influence them. 
 The fourth aspect is the bonus system. Eventually, the physician’s financial responsi-
bility may find expression in a bonus, which is an ancillary payment made if the physi-
cian has met certain requirements (like a financial norm). The negative variant of it is the 
malus, which the physician has to pay if he has not met the requirement. A bonus may be 
a fixed amount or may be proportional or inversely proportional to the difference be-
tween actual and normative costs. Further, the norm may function as a threshold or as a 
target. In the latter case, the bonus is at its maximum once the norm is met, which will 
probably be the third-party agent’s first choice. 
 The fifth aspect is the limitation of the physician’s risk by means of additional meas-
ures. These measures are considered additional because the amount of risk is in the first 
instance the result of the risk package, the practice population, et cetera. The difficulty of 
separating the insurance risk from the risk of imperfect agency makes that the physician 
is also responsible for (a part of) the insurance risk. Without limiting this risk, there is a 
chance that the physician shows undesirable behaviour, that the incentive system will 
malfunction or that the physician is ruined. The incentive system may not function prop-
erly due to a few expensive patients in the first part of the financial year. 
 One way of risk reduction is reinsurance. A GP who has taken over part of the third 
party’s risk may on his turn insure his liabilities. Although in the regular insurance indus-
try reinsurance usually results in a risk contract with a second insurer, in the present risk-
sharing arrangements the third-party agent may function as a kind of reinsurer. Reinsur-
ance is then a part of the financial arrangement between third party and physician. Not 
only may this result in lower costs, it also has the advantage that the third-party agent 
may balance the incentives from the reimbursement system with the incentives from the 
reinsurance system. Examples of reinsurance systems are an ‘excess of loss per risk’, ‘an 
excess of loss per occurrence’, a ‘stop loss’ or a ‘n largest claims’. 
 Another way to reduce the physician’s risk is by means of risk pooling, which is a 
form of coinsurance. In a risk-pooling arrangement a group of GPs share together, possi-
bly with other providers of care, in the rewards and penalties from surpluses and deficits 
in the budget(s) for a defined health-care package. Several variables determine the incen-
tives emanating from the risk-pool arrangement, like the number of physicians or other 
providers, the number of patients, the proximity of the members of the pool, et cetera. 
Other ways to vary the arrangements are by creating a multi-pool system and by adding 
intermediate organisations: the so-called middle tiers. This results in a myriad of options 
to allocate the financial risk, but only in a limited number of options the risk is really 
shared with physicians. A third party that wants to control physicians by means of risk 
sharing has to share the risk directly with the physicians, or has to arrange that the middle 
tier shares the risk with the physicians. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
As each GP receives payments, and as incentives emanate from all payment systems, 
each GP faces a financial incentive. Not each GP faces a financial risk (as defined in sub-
section 6.2.1), however. Whether a physician faces such a risk, depends on the basic 
payment system as well as on the presence and nature of an ancillary payment system. In 
some health care systems GPs are being put at risk for follow-up costs, like costs of drugs 
or hospital care. This is no new phenomenon. Already in the first half of the twentieth 
century there were third parties and physicians that agreed on risk contracts. Examples 
are the ‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ in the Netherlands and the first 
Prepaid Group Practices in the United States. 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed the rationale and the structure of arrangements 
in which the financial risk for follow-up costs is shared between third parties and GPs. 
By dividing the arrangements into five distinct aspects, an analytical framework has been 
created consisting of 1) the risk package, 2) the size of the practice population, 3) the 
norm, 4) the bonus, malus or withhold system and 5) the risk-limiting measures. We ar-
gued that these aspects can be chosen in various ways, with numerous arrangements as a 
result. 
 An analytical framework of risk sharing serves two purposes. Firstly, it can be used to 
structure new arrangements. Secondly, such a framework can be used to analyse and to 
evaluate risk-sharing arrangements in practice. The requirement then, is that it suffi-
ciently provides insight into the key differences of various (formerly) existing arrange-
ments. If so, one may use these insights to infer from evidence of specific arrangements 
the effectiveness of similar arrangements in stimulating the GP to act as agent for the 
patient. This second aim of the framework is pursued in the present chapter. Hence an 
answer is sought to the following two research questions: 
 
- What are actual effects of different systems of financial-risk sharing on the perform-
ance of general practitioners? 
 
- Does the analytical framework of financial-risk sharing sufficiently provide insight 
into the key differences of systems in which the risk is shared between third party and 
general practitioners so as to infer the effectiveness of such systems? 
 
In the following subsections, several older as well as more recent experiences with risk 
sharing will pass in review. Chosen is for examples from the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The rationale for this choice is that third parties and par-
ticularly GPs are clearly present within the health-care systems of these countries. More-
over, these countries have (some) experience with third parties that are attempting or 
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have attempted to exert influence on the provision of health care by GPs, or who have 
shifted part of the third-party functions to these physicians. Especially experience with 
the use of financial incentives in general and risk-sharing arrangements in particular was 
a decisive criterion for our selection of examples. 
 
 
7.2 Risk-sharing experiences in the Netherlands 
 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
GPs have an important position within the Dutch health care system. As opposed to 
medical specialists, they are generalists and directly accessible for their patients. Further, 
they act as gatekeepers; patients have to be referred by their GP otherwise the health in-
surer does not pay for health-care costs. There is usually a direct relationship between the 
GP and the health insurer (a contract model and a two-tiered system). Only some GPs are 
employed by a middle tier; either another GP or a primary health centre. The contract 
between health insurer and GP specifies administrative, quality and financial aspects of 
their relationship. 
 Of the three countries described, the Netherlands has the least experience with third 
parties and GPs sharing financial risks for follow-up costs. Until 2005, sickness funds 
paid GPs mainly by capitation. Private health insurers had no contractual relationships 
with GPs, but reimbursed the health care expenses of the insured (reimbursement model). 
Private patients paid their GP per consultation. In principle, Dutch GPs bore the risk of 
deficits in their capitated primary-care budgets for their public patients (about two third 
of their practice population). In practice, however, they were able to shift costs to sick-
ness funds or to private health insurers – by prescribing drugs or referring patients to 
other providers, or by increasing the revenues for private patients. Hence they only par-
tially bore (i.e. shared) this risk. 
 Since decades there has been a lively debate on the ‘ideal’ compensation system for 
GPs (see Vermaas 1994 for a short review). More recent proposals for payment reforms 
also included financial-risk sharing for follow-up costs. In 1993, the ‘Ziekenfondsraad’ 
(Council of Sickness funds) proposed a salary or a capitation system for public as well as 
private patients in combination with bonuses for efficient prescribing and referral behav-
iour (Ziekenfondsraad 1993). In 1994, the government appointed Commission on Mod-
ernising Curative Care proposed to replace the existing systems with a capitation system 
adjusted for age (eighty percent of the compensation) combined with locally differenti-
ated bonuses for the performance of specific functions and bonuses for efficient behav-
iour (Commissie modernisering curatieve zorg 1994). Also in 1994, researchers, a health 
insurer and GPs developed a model for a contract between health insurer and GP that 
contained an arrangement of financial-risk sharing (Breedveld et al. 1994). In 1995, the 
associations of private health insurers and GPs expressed their intention to replace the 
fee-per-consultation system with a capitation system. Even risk-sharing arrangements, 
like a fundholding experiment or a bonus system were suggested (Paritaire Werkgroep 
Huisartsenzorg 1995). In the same year the employers association proposed financial 
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incentives for GPs as one of the possible ways to influence their referral and prescribing 
behaviour (VNO-NCW 1995).  
 In 1999, four reports were published in which risk sharing in some form was pro-
posed. In three of them, a bonus system was proposed to stimulate GPs to prescribe drugs 
efficiently (Begeleidingscommissie Uitvoering Geneesmiddelenbeleid 1999, The Boston 
Consulting Group 1999, MDW-werkgroep Geneesmiddelen1999). In the fourth report, a 
budget system for GPs was proposed (Max Geldens Stichting 1999). 
 In 2001, the government appointed Commission on the Future Financing Structure of 
Primary Care, after its chairman called the ‘Tabaksblat Commission’, proposed a radical 
redesign of the payment system. The two existing payment systems should be replaced 
by a uniform system (i.e. no difference between public and private systems) with separate 
payments for practice costs and income. The basic payment system contained several 
incentives for efficient behaviour. In addition, the committee proposed the use of ancil-
lary payments for adequate referral behaviour and for adequate prescribing behaviour 
(Commissie Toekomstige Financieringsstructuur Huisartsenzorg 2001). In 2004 the Min-
ister of Health (Minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2004) and the College 
for Health Care Tariffs (College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg 2004) both proposed a revi-
sion of the payment system, partially in line with the proposals of the ‘Tabaksblat Com-
mission’. It was not until the middle of 2005, however, before a compromise agreement 
was reached between the National Association for General Practitioners (LHV), the Min-
istry of Health (VWS) and the Dutch Association for Health Insurers (ZN). From 2006 
GPs receive a partial capitation per patient per year plus fees per consultation. At least 
two remarkable arrangements are made. One arrangement concerns a direct relationship 
between the performances and the financing of the profession. Savings as a result of effi-
cient behaviour are invested in GP care. Another remarkable arrangement is that, at least 
in 2006, the financial risk associated with the volume of GP care is shifted to the profes-
sion: an increase in the number of consultations results in lower fees (Vogelaar 2005). 
 Some experience with risk sharing for follow-up costs is acquired through the early, 
so-called ‘Zaanland system’ and ‘Amsterdam system’ (‘Zaanlandse stelsel’ and ‘Amster-
damse stelsel’) in the 1930s and through a bonus/malus experiment in the 1980s. 
 
7.2.2 The ‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ 1 
 
7.2.2.1 ‘Zaanland’ 
In 1929, the sickness fund of Zaandam in the Netherlands introduced a new system in 
which GPs were made responsible for cost overruns in the pharmaceutical budget set by 
the sickness fund. The system was also supported by the NMG, the Dutch Medical Asso-
ciation (Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst). A reduction in 
the costs of pharmaceutical care would enable a rise in the payments for medical special-
ists as well as an increase of the benefit package without rising insurance premiums. 
Probably, GPs agreed with this system as they wanted to prevent that rising costs resulted 
in lower fees for their own services. Further, it was in their interests to keep insurance 
 
                                                                 
1 The information on both systems is based on Van Duuren (1993). 
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premiums low. Higher premiums could have meant less insured patients and, as a result, 
less income. 
 
Financial and organisational structures 
The risk package was composed of drugs. In fact, the physician was free to prescribe the 
drugs he considered necessary, i.e. no formulary was used by the sickness fund. Most of 
the available drugs were included in the risk package. Some drugs were excluded, how-
ever, like those prescribed by medical specialists and those related to high consumption 
levels per patient. Pharmacists had to keep track of the physicians’ prescribing patterns 
(volume as well as costs) and had to pass the information to the sickness fund. 
 The size of the practice population is unknown. Presumably, part of the population 
was insured by one of the other sickness funds or by a private insurer, or had no health 
insurance at all. It is plausible that the proportion of the practice population with a 
‘Zaanland’ policy differed per practice, but that it was less than 50 percent.  
 The normative level of care was considered to be a rather generous amount of money 
per patient. About the way it was computed is only known that drug prices were taken 
into account. Presumably it was based on mean costs and equal for each physician. Of the 
normative amount, some fifteen percent was paid into an account that was used to pay for 
the costs of the above mentioned high-use patients. The other 85 percent formed the phy-
sician’s budget for the risk package. In a later stadium a so-called ‘List of Sorts and 
Quantities’ was drawn up on which stipulated the drugs that were permitted and in which 
quantities they had to be prescribed. Aim was to teach the physicians to prescribe less 
expensively. It was also decided then to analyse the causes of the deficits more closely. 
 The system was an example of a cost-decreasing, proportional malus system with a 
norm functioning as a threshold. A deficit was settled by means of a deduction from next-
year payments. 
 The physician’s risk was limited by the above mentioned exclusion of drugs pre-
scribed by medical specialists and those related to high consumption levels per patient. 
 
Results 
Due to a lack of information, it is difficult to form a notion of the effects of the system. 
As far as it concerned drug costs, savings ranged from 11 to 20 percent per year. How-
ever, it was suspected that these savings were accompanied by an increase in the costs for 
specialist care. Possibly, cost shifting occurred by referral to medical specialists of those 
patients with expected high costs. Another way to keep within the budget was to supply 
patients with drug samples. 
 In about 10 percent of the cases, a physician faced a deduction from his payments.2 
Again the information is limited, but some physicians faced cost overruns ranging from 
11 to 24 percent. The system seemed to be disadvantageous for physicians with a small 
practice population as they faced more problems with risk spreading. 
 Unknown is which consequences the altered prescribing behaviour had for the pa-
tients. No information is available about the effects of the system on the patients’ health 
 
                                                                 
2 A ‘case’ is a budget year for one physician. 
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status. There is some anecdotal evidence, though, that the benefit package was enlarged 
or that the premiums remained relatively low. 
 
7.2.2.2 ‘Amsterdam’ 
Already in 1853 the board of a sickness fund in Amsterdam concluded that drug costs 
were too high. Pharmacists were asked to inform the sickness fund of each physician’s 
prescribing pattern. The findings were discussed with the physicians then. For a short 
period this feedback system was successful but soon drug costs started to increase again. 
Later, around the same time as the sickness fund ‘Zaandam’, the sickness fund ‘Amster-
dam’ introduced a new system. Again, the goal of the system was to reduce the costs of 
pharmaceutical care, but now the final aim was to improve dental care as well as to bal-
ance the sickness fund’s budget. To a large extent it was comparable to the ‘Zaanland 
system’: GPs were made responsible for cost overruns in the pharmaceutical budget. 
About half a decade after the introduction of the system, the regulation of the sickness 
fund was modified. At that moment the necessity of the system was restated, but then as 
way to be able to pay for expensive drugs. 
 The ‘Amsterdam system’ was used by 10 sickness funds operating in Amsterdam, but 
of only one of them the structure and the results are described here. 
 
Financial and organisational structures 
The GPs had to use a ‘List of Sorts and Quantities’ and were also given directions con-
cerning prescription of some special drugs, like insulin. The drugs on the list formed the 
risk package whereas the special drugs were excluded. 
 The size of the practice population presumably differed per practice. Although exact 
figures are not known, it is plausible that the practice population’s proportion with a rele-
vant insurance policy was less than 50 percent. 
 The normative level of care was based on mean costs and was the same for each phy-
sician. It was computed quarterly, probably per sickness fund. 
 Like the ‘Zaandam system’, the ‘Amsterdam system’ was an example of a cost-
decreasing malus system with a norm functioning as a threshold. The difference, how-
ever, was that a margin of 10 percent was used. If a physician exceeded the norm with 
more than 10 percent, the sickness fund could cut his payments. It is unclear whether the 
malus was proportional to the extent the physician in question exceeded the norm (or the 
10 percent margin). 
 The physician’s risk was limited as some drugs were excluded from the risk package. 
Further, a physician with less then 100 sickness-fund insured in his practice was ex-
empted from the malus system. For physicians with a small number of sickness fund pa-
tients (< 500) the margins were enlarged depending on their referral pattern. For physi-
cians who referred fewer patients to medical specialists than the mean number of refer-
rals, the 10 percent margin was enlarged as follows: 
- to 15 percent (in case of 400-500 sickness-fund insured in the practice), 
- to 20 percent (300-400 insured), 
- to 25 percent (200-300 insured), 
- or even to 30 percent (100-200 insured). 
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For physicians with a small number of sickness fund patients (< 500) who exceeded the 
mean number of referrals to medical specialists with less than 50 percent, the 10 percent 
margin was enlarged as follows: 
- to 12.5 percent (in case of 400-500 sickness-fund insured in the practice), 
- to 15 percent (300-400 insured), 
- to 17.5 percent (200-300 insured), 
- or to 20 percent (100-200 insured). 
For physicians who had less than 500 sickness-fund insured but who exceeded the mean 
number of referrals to medical specialists with more than 50 percent, the margin re-
mained 10 percent. Thus the smaller the number of sickness-fund patients in their prac-
tice and the more conservative their referral patterns, the more physicians were permitted 
to prescribe drugs. 
 The sickness fund ‘Amsterdam’ applied its system in a more flexible way than did the 
sickness fund ‘Zaanland’ by assessing and taking into account the causes for a physi-
cian’s deficit. Moreover, in the first years the educational function of the system was em-
phasised. As a result, the ‘Amsterdam system’ was more popular among physicians than 
was the ‘Zaanland system’. 
 
Results 
Apparently, the system had an effect on drug costs in an absolute as well as in a relative 
sense. For instance, the drug costs amounted to 193,800 Dutch guilders over the first 
three-quarters of 1931, to 162,400 guilders over the same period in 1932, and to 150,000 
guilders over that period in 1937. As a percentage of the premium contributions, the 
spending on drugs decreased too. In the same years these percentages were 18.32, 15.46, 
and 13.97 respectively. It is unclear, however, to what extent lower drug prices contrib-
uted to this decrease, and whether cost shifting occurred by increasing referrals to medi-
cal specialists. 
 In 1935, 151 physicians (about 56 percent) exceeded the norm, of which 66 physicians 
(about 23 percent) exceeded the margin of 10 percent. 
 It is not clear whether the system had a beneficial effect on the health status of the in-
sured. One of its aims, for instance, was to improve dentistry but the effect is unknown. 
Whether an effect was that necessary drugs were withheld, or that cheaper and perhaps 
less effective drugs were prescribed, is also unknown. Some patients may have experi-
enced a financial effect of the system. Anecdotal information suggests they had to pay for 
their drugs themselves if they wanted more expensive drugs than their physician was 
willing to prescribe. 
 
7.2.2.3 Discussion 
Both systems were implemented to reduce the costs of pharmaceutical care by making 
GPs financially responsible for the drugs budget. Although they functioned in the thirties 
of the previous century, their experience is still of interest here for several reasons. First 
of all it illustrates that risk sharing is not a new phenomenon. Secondly, it demonstrates 
that – although the evidence is limited here – financial responsibility of physicians for 
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drugs may have an effect on drug costs. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, it high-
lights some flaws of both systems. 
 As to the risk package, the systems showed the inherent dangers of restricting it to 
pharmaceutical care. As specialist care may substitute for drugs, physicians may be 
tempted to refer instead of to prescribe. Although one should take account of the effec-
tiveness of the drugs during that period of time, it is not inconceivable that pharmaco-
therapy was often a cost-effective alternative to specialist care. In the ‘Amsterdam sys-
tem’ undesirable substitution was counteracted by enlarging the margin (and thus limit-
ing the risk) if a physician had a conservative referral pattern (at least for those physi-
cians with a small number of sickness-fund patients). Another problem was that in the 
first few years GPs were responsible for the follow-up prescriptions involving drugs ini-
tially prescribed by a specialist. In a later stadium these prescriptions were excluded from 
the risk package, so it was restricted to drugs prescribed by the GP. 
 As to the size of the practice population, the ‘Amsterdam system’ recognised the prob-
lem of risk relating to practice size. Provisions were made to reduce the risk for those 
physicians that had a small number of sickness-fund patients. 
 A no-risk margin may be effective to meet fluctuations in need or demand. The figures 
mentioned in the foregoing show that it considerably reduced the number of physicians 
who faced a loss. Adjusting the margin to the number of sickness-fund insured in a phy-
sician’s practice population may be an effective way to reduce the physician’s risk. The 
inherent flaw, however, is that (risk-sharing) contracts with other sickness funds are not 
taken into account. 
 One of the main problems of both systems was the crude method of establishing a 
norm. As it was based on mean costs and not differentiated for patient characteristics, it 
was obvious that the prescribing figures of a physician were not solely a reflection of the 
cost-effectiveness of his prescribing behaviour. Furthermore, as the costs for drugs de-
creased, the normative level decreased too. The effect of such a system is that it becomes 
increasingly hard to keep within the prescribing budget and that the incentives to skim 
cream, to skimp on quality, or to shift costs increase. 
 Effective or not, the systems were abolished during and after the Second World War. 
At least three points underlay the abolition. First, during that period there was a consider-
able delay in the calculating of the physicians’ results. Secondly, physicians were dissat-
isfied with the way the system took account of other determinants of the costs of pharma-
ceutical care. They argued that their influence on the financial results was limited. A third 
and maybe crucial cause of the abolition was the enacting of the ‘Ziekenfondsenbesluit’ 
(the Sickness Funds Decree) by the German occupiers. As a result, sickness funds were 
no longer financially responsible but were reimbursed in full by a Central Fund. Hence 
the GPs as well as the funds had no longer an incentive to contain the costs of drugs. 
 
7.2.3 Bonus-malus experiment ‘Tilburg’ 
 
In 1984, a Dutch sickness fund started an experiment that aimed at investigating whether 
the use of financial incentives in the remuneration system of GPs could alter their prac-
tice style and result in a shift from secondary care to primary care. Later on, a second 
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Dutch sickness fund joined the experiment (Van Tits and Nuyens 1987; Van Tits 1989). 
The ultimate goal was not so much to save costs as it was to strengthen primary care. 
Further, a goal was to propagate practice patterns that were considered as adequate. To 
this end, eight primary care practices (13 GPs) formed an ‘experimental’ group (not ran-
domised but on a voluntary basis). 
 
Financial and organisational structures 
The experiment focused on a risk package containing five parts: referrals to ophthalmol-
ogy and ‘ENT’ (‘ear, nose, and throat’), referrals to remaining specialties, hospitalisation 
days (psychiatry excluded), physiotherapy (exercising therapy), and drugs (prescribed by 
GPs).3 
 The physicians' public patients (about two-thirds of his total practice population) 
formed the relevant practice population. 
 The five parts mentioned above were considered as separate cost categories with sepa-
rately settled normative levels. Initially, the norms were based on the figures of all GPs 
contracted by the sickness funds and defined as ranges with lower limits (i.e. the bonus 
levels) and upper limits (i.e. the malus levels). They were the same for each practice and 
not adjusted for differences in the age distribution of the practice populations, distance to 
the hospital, or any other factors that might have explained differences between prac-
tices.4 The bonus levels were set in a way that 25 percent of the primary care practices 
were below the levels (in terms of the number of referrals or the costs of drugs). The 
malus levels were set in such manner that 50 percent of the physicians were above the 
levels. Within the resulting range no bonuses or maluses were calculated. Later on, the 
bonus-malus levels were adjusted yearly. To this end, the levels for a practice were cor-
rected for developments in the figures of three comparable reference practices. 
 The bonus amounted to 30 percent of the saved direct costs, the malus 30 percent of 
the extra-generated direct costs. At the end of the budget year, all bonuses and maluses 
per practice were added up. In case of a positive result, the bonus was paid, but in case of 
a negative result the physicians did not have to pay anything. In this way the physicians’ 
risk was limited (profit side; see subsection 6.2.1). Nevertheless, physicians could still 
lose their bonus because of negative results (i.e. maluses) in some parts of the risk pack-
age. Besides the range instead of one fixed point, this system resembles the proportional 
bonus/malus system with threshold as displayed in figure 6.3. It is a cost-decreasing sys-
tem. 
 No additional risk-limiting measures were taken, as in the end the physicians’ risk was 
limited to the profit side. 
 
                                                                 
3 A distinction is made between referrals to ophthalmology and ‘ENT’ (‘ear, nose, and throat’) and refer-
rals to remaining specialties because the compensation of the GP per referral card differed for both 
groups of specialties. Psychiatry was excluded as the volume of such care depends on the availability of 
facilities, and as the length of stay within the facility is unpredictable.  
4 The reason for this was that adjustment was thought of as being administratively complex, and techni-
cally problematic. Furthermore, it was considered to be unnecessary as the usual payment system was 
not adjusted for such factors either (Van Tits 1989). 
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Table 7.1. Financial and organisational structures of ‘Tilburg’ 
 
1. Risk package: 
- Referrals ophthalmology and ‘ENT’; 
- Referrals remaining specialties; 
- Hospitalisation days (psychiatry excluded); 
- Physiotherapy (exercising therapy); 
- Drugs (prescribed by GPs). 
2. Size of the population: 
- Public patients (about two-thirds of the practice population).  
3. Norm: 
- First: based on average cost figures of all GPs having a contract with the two sickness funds; 
range with lower limit (bonus level with 25 percent of practices below it) and upper limit (malus 
level with 50 percent of practices above it); 
- Later: corrected for developments in the figures of three comparable reference practices. 
4. Bonus/malus system: 
- Cost-decreasing, proportional bonus/malus system with range as threshold; 
- Bonus: 30 percent of surpluses; 
- Malus: 30 percent of deficits (solely for calculation purposes). 
5. Risk reduction: 
- No additional measures. 
 
Results 
The results after four years of experimenting are displayed in table 7.2. It can be seen that 
the decrease in the number of referrals and the number of hospitalisation days was larger 
in the experimental group than in the reference group (a decrease of 21.6%, 15.4% and 
22.8% versus 13.8%, 3.5% and 13.7% respectively). These results are especially note-
worthy because the physicians in the experimental group already had lower figures for 
referrals, hospitalisation days, physiotherapy, and drug costs than their colleagues in the 
reference group had. The number of referrals to ophthalmology and ‘ENT’ decreased 
continuously across the four years and this decrease was considerably larger in the ex-
perimental group. In the experimental group, the decrease in other referrals and in the 
number of hospitalisation days stabilised at a lower level. In the reference group, the 
other referrals remained more or less constant, but the number of hospitalisation days 
kept decreasing. Further, the number of physiotherapy treatments and the costs of drugs 
in the experimental group increased at a slower pace than in the reference group (7.0% 
and 20.1% versus 18.1% and 29.3% respectively). 
 There were no figures on the influence of the financial incentives on the quality of 
care (for instance in terms of the way physicians practised), the health status of the prac-
tice populations and patient satisfaction. In fact, the only indication about the quality 
comes from the physicians themselves. The majority of them thought that the quality of 
their practising had improved. They were convinced that they: 
- performed more actions by themselves (instead of referring the patients); 
- adopted a more critical attitude towards referrals and prescriptions; 
- were stimulated to check on their own patients instead of letting medical specialists or 
the hospital check on these patients. 
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Table 7.2. Results of the ‘Tilburg’ experiment 
 
type of care experimental group reference group experimental vs. 
reference group 
referrals ophthal-
mology and ‘ENT’ 
-21.6% -13.8% -7.8% 
other referrals -15.4% -3.5% -11.9% 
hospitalisation days -22.8% -13.7% -9.1% 
physiotherapy +7.0% +18.1% -11.1% 
drug costs +20.1% +29.3% -9.2% 
 
‘ENT’: Ear, nose, and throat 
Source: Van Tits (1989). 
 
Discussion 
Due to the small numbers and the non-randomised groups, the research findings are not 
generalisable. Nevertheless, as the chosen bonus system appears to have had an effect on 
the behaviour of the participating physicians, the results are of interest here. Not only 
seems the effect to be reflected in the figures; the participating physicians implicitly con-
firmed it, given their remarks that the quality of their practising had improved. Although 
the changes in volumes and costs over the four years may well be the result of the finan-
cial incentives, such changes are not necessarily in the interests of the patients. Hence, 
the question remains whether the bonus-malus system encouraged the physicians to act 
as their patients’ agents. It is difficult to infer this from the experiment, as neither figures 
on the quality of care are available nor on the extent of cream skimming or cost shifting. 
The overall conclusion of the research was that, during the experiment, indeed a shift 
took place from secondary care to primary care and that, in general, the participating 
physicians altered their way of practising. The apparent shift may be favourable to the 
agency function, given that care provided in the GPs’ practices may be less intrusive and 
more comfortable for the patients. The altered way the physicians practised was an indi-
cation that the agency function had improved by the system. Not only provided the GPs 
more services by themselves, they also adopted a more critical approach to (repetitive) 
referrals and prescriptions. They referred more deliberately to specific medical special-
ists, tried not to lose sight of their patients once they were referred, demanded informa-
tion on their patients from specialists, et cetera (Van Tits 1989). 
 Additional judgements of the performance of the physicians’ agency function will 
have to be based on the financial and organisational structures of the bonus-malus sys-
tem. A first consideration is the composition of the risk package. As it was rather com-
prehensive, the incentive to alter behaviour was also rather strong. Only the utilisation of 
some health care goods and services – hospitalisation days for psychiatry, for instance – 
were not affecting the settlement of the bonus. Again, it is not clear whether the compre-
hensive composition improved the GPs’ functioning as agents for their patients. The re-
sulting incentive to reduce volume or costs of the several parts of the risk package may 
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have had a beneficial effect on the agency relationship, but only insofar as it resulted in a 
reduction of unnecessary care. It may have had a detrimental effect, however, if it has led 
to a reduction of necessary care, or if it has resulted in cream skimming. 
 Further, unjustified care shifting is against the patients’ interests. However, as cost 
shifting was made less attractive due to the comprehensiveness of the risk package, care 
shifting seemed no major issue. The importance of a careful composition of the risk 
package is also demonstrated by the problems with the bonus for drug costs. As only 
costs of drugs prescribed by the GPs were taken into account, physicians had a smaller 
chance of earning a bonus if they continued drug treatments initiated by the medical spe-
cialist. Interestingly, in the ‘Zaanland system’ and in the ‘Tilburg’ experiment the GPs’ 
risk was reduced by excluding drugs prescribed by specialists, but obviously at the cost 
of incentives for substitution. Hence the researchers that evaluated the ‘Tilburg’ experi-
ment suggested including all drugs into the risk package (Van Tits 1988). 
 The incentive contract covered about two-thirds of the physicians’ practice population. 
Not known is whether this had a (positive or negative) effect on the treatment of the phy-
sicians’ private patients. 
 In the initial calculations of the normative range, the age distribution of the practice 
populations, distances to hospitals, et cetera were not taken into account. The norms were 
solely based on the average cost figures of all primary care practices having a contract 
with the sickness funds. Obviously, this may have resulted in unfairness in the settlement 
of the bonuses, which on its turn could have prompted physicians to skimp on quality or 
to skim cream. In subsection 6.4.4, some disadvantages were mentioned of using norms 
based on actual figures. One disadvantage is the possible continuation of large differ-
ences in practice patterns. This was partly circumvented here by using aggregated figures 
for the norm instead of figures per physician or per practice, and by paying a bonus only 
if the actual figures were below the bonus level (instead of paying a bonus for each guil-
der saved). Physicians who had a costly style of practising in the previous years could not 
take advantage of that by earning a bonus easily. First, they had to reduce their volumes 
and costs beyond the bonus level in order to earn additional payments. 
 Another disadvantage mentioned in subsection 6.4.4 is the incentive to increase the 
costs in the year before the start of the risk-sharing contract. Data collection began 21 
months before the start of the experiment, but there was no evidence for such an increase. 
Besides, in case of calculations based on average costs, the incentive to increase costs in 
the preparatory year is less strong than in case of calculations of norms based on histori-
cal figures per physician or per practice. 
 Not very encouraging to the agency function seems the chosen bonus system. Al-
though the incentive to reduce volume or costs was limited to thirty percent of the sav-
ings, the bonus was not limited to a certain amount. The main constraints in such a bonus 
system are not provided by the system itself, but may result from the physicians’ ethics, 
the proximity of peers, and the leverage of these peers and of patients. During the ex-
periment a continuous decrease was indeed found for some of the parts of the risk pack-
age: for referrals concerning ophthalmology and ‘ENT’. For the other parts of the risk 
package an increase or a stabilisation was found. 
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 The overall conclusion here is that the findings indicate an improvement of the physi-
cians’ functioning as their patients’ agents. The absolute or relative reductions in the vol-
umes or costs of most of the parts of the risk package formed an important indication. 
But perhaps more important are the accompanying changes in the way the physicians 
practised. Nevertheless, the incentives emanating from the chosen financial and organisa-
tional structures of the system seem not fully compatible with the agency function. Espe-
cially modifications in the bonus system – for instance, an inversely proportional system 
with a normative target instead of a proportional cost-decreasing system – might have 
been more effective to support the physicians’ agency function as the first system as it 
makes the desired level of achievement explicit and adverse physician behaviour less 
likely. 
 
 
7.3 General Practice Fundholding in the United Kingdom 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Since the coming into force of the ‘National Health Service and Community Care Act’, 
in 1991, several far-reaching changes have been carried through within the United King-
dom’s National Health Service (UK NHS). Until 1991, the NHS was for the major part a 
monopolistic integrated system – in terms of Van de Ven et al (1994). It was mainly tax-
financed and a large part (hospital and community care) was provided by public organi-
sations. Family-health services were provided by independent suppliers, but without price 
competition (the bilateral monopolistic contract model of Van de Ven et al.) A minor part 
was privately paid for according to a reimbursement scheme. 
 After the 1991 reforms, the UK NHS mainly got the format of a monopsonistic con-
tract model. Within the still mainly tax-financed NHS, an internal market (a ‘quasi-
market’) was created with separated purchasers and suppliers of care.5 Different pur-
chasers started to represent the demand side. Health Authorities became the primary pur-
chasers and became responsible for hospital care and community care within their dis-
trict. A second group of purchasers consisted of GPs that opted for the so-called General 
Practice Fundholding scheme. The Regional Health Authorities may be referred to as the 
third group of purchasers, which were responsible for regional care. 
 Up to 1991, the situation in the UK was roughly comparable to that in the Nether-
lands. GPs received mainly capitation payments covering GP care. Main differences were 
that the British capitation payments pertained to the total practice populations (instead of 
 
                                                                 
5 The creation of a quasi-market is an example of how a regulator (a government, for instance) may re-
structure the health care system in order to provide a third party with the proper incentives. A quasi-
market differs from a conventional market in some of three ways (Le Grand 1991, p. 1260). Firstly, on 
the supply side there is competition for customers between a variety of not-for-profit organisations and, 
possibly, for-profit organisations. Secondly, instead of stated in terms of money, purchasing power of 
consumers is in the form of a voucher or an earmarked budget. Thirdly, the majority of the purchasing 
decisions are not made by consumers but by agents (third parties) representing them. 
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a certain percentage of it, like in the Dutch system), and that British GPs received some 
additional fee-for-service payments and allowances for some specific services. 
 From the start of the NHS to the 1991 reforms, GPs were in a relatively weak position 
with respect to hospitals and medical specialists. They could not act as agents on behalf 
of their patients very well. As far as they did act as their patients’ agents, this was mainly 
with regard to their own care. The absence of any instruments to manage other care hin-
dered them in the execution of their role as gatekeepers, but especially as co-ordinators of 
care. They had virtually no influence on the cost-effectiveness and quality of other pro-
viders’ care. A financial risk-sharing system specifically designed to enhance the GPs’ 
agency function, was the General Practice Fundholding system enacted in 1991. By 
means of fundholding GPs were provided with instruments to improve their agency role. 
Fundholding rigorously changed the allocation of the risk associated with follow-up care. 
Participating GPs were allocated a budget to purchase a health-care package on behalf of 
their practice population. GP fundholding was thus a perfect example of a scheme in 
which parts of the third-party functions were devolved to physicians. By giving the prac-
tices a budget and by providing them with the power and the instruments to purchase 
health care on behalf of their practice population, the insurance function and the agency 
function were partly transferred to the GPs. 
 Insofar as they met certain standards, all GPs could apply for the fundholding status 
voluntarily. Eventually, about fifty percent of the GPs were involved in the system. In 
1999, however, the fundholding system was replaced with a system of commissioning 
groups called Primary Care Groups (Royal College of General Practitioners, RCGP 
1998). Originally, the commissioning groups consisted of GPs that were involved in the 
planning, purchasing and monitoring of health services. Main difference with fundhold-
ers was that initially the commissioning groups were not financially responsible for sur-
pluses or deficits in health care budgets. The new Primary Care Groups, comprising 
about 50 GPs and serving about 100,000 people, had to start at some point of a spectrum 
ranging from an advisory role in the commissioning of care by health authorities to full 
budget responsibility (RCGP 1998, Majeed and Malcolm 1999). 
 
7.3.2 Financial and organisational structures 
 
Originally, the risk package of fundholders was composed of: 
- all practice team staff costs that were directly reimbursed under standard GP contracts; 
- all expenses incurred during management of the fund and other costs associated with 
participation in fundholding, up to a maximum amount; 
- all drugs prescribed and dispensed (within an agreed budget and excluding very ex-
pensive patients); 
- diagnostic investigations of patients or specimens ordered or performed by the GP; 
- initial and continuing outpatient services delivered by hospital-based staff; 
- costs related to a defined group of surgical inpatient and day-case treatments (covering 
most elective procedures); 
- costs related to direct access services (for instance, physiotherapy, speech therapy and 
occupational therapy, dietetics and chiropody); 
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- health visiting and community nursing; 
- elements of mental health and learning disabilities (RCGP 1998). 
This was the risk package of the ‘standard fundholding’ scheme. The package consisted 
of separated cost categories, but the fundholders were allowed to use the money accord-
ing to their own view. Excluded from this package were (RCGP 1998): 
- accident and emergency services; 
- hospital and consultant costs associated with medical cases and non-elective surgery; 
- hospital and consultant costs associated with medical inpatient cases; 
- maternity services; 
- certain preventive and screening tests (like screening programs for breast cancer). 
From budget year 1996-1997 on, so-called ‘community fundholders’ and ‘total purchas-
ers’ were accompanying the ‘standard fundholders’. Community fundholders were not 
responsible for hospital care. Total purchasers, however, were responsible for almost all 
hospital care (including emergency care, but with the exception of some rare and very 
expensive treatments), and for a more extensive part of community health services (NHS 
Executive 1994). For all the variants held that the local Health Authority purchased ser-
vices that were excluded from the risk package. 
 Because of the National Health Service, fundholders had a financial responsibility for 
the care to be provided to the total size of their practice population. 
 Definition of the normative level and thus calculating of the budget posed a problem. 
The initial idea of central government to uniform the way of financing of Regional 
Health Authorities, District Health Authorities and Fundholders by making use of differ-
entiated budgets (Department of Health 1989) appeared to be unfeasible, at least at short 
notice. Not clear was which formula had to be used. Moreover, the use of such a formula 
would have led to considerable redistribution of means among the practices. This, on its 
turn, would have implied a threat to the continuity of patient care. 
 In the first two years of budget setting (i.e. budget years 1991-1992 and 1992-1993), 
the norm for the hospital care included in the risk package was calculated by using his-
torical costs. This involved the aforementioned problems of data availability, and the in-
centive to manipulate data. Further, hospitals had problems with the calculation of cost-
based prices or were, for commercial reasons, not very eager to publish such figures. 
Moreover, hospitals faced the incentive to raise prices as this could led to an increase in 
the budgets that fundholders had available for hospital care (Glennerster et al. 1994). 
From budget year 1993-1994 on, some Health Authorities calculated the budgets by 
means of a weighted capitation formula using age and sex, mortality rates (as an index of 
relative need), availability of beds, self-reported illness, or local unemployment levels 
(RCGP 1998). These normative levels were not so much binding as they were indicative 
(‘capitation benchmarks’) and were to be used in budget negotiations (National Audit 
Office 1994). 
 The budgets for drugs were calculated in the same way as the ‘indicative prescribing 
amounts’ (later termed ‘target budgets’) according to the indicative prescribing scheme 
(IPS) for non-fundholding GPs. Although this IPS was not binding – overspends had no 
financial consequences – an increasing number of non-fundholders were also allowed to 
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share in the savings they achieved on drug costs. Regarding the budgets for fundholders, 
it happened that – because of Health Authorities’ policy – they were awarded higher pre-
scribing budgets than non-fundholders (Walley et al. 1995). Owing to the availability of 
prescribing analysis and cost (PACT) data, the calculation of the drugs budgets posed 
relatively minor problems. Figures from the previous year were adjusted for changes in 
age and sex distributions of the practice populations, the number of patients in need of 
exceptionally expensive drugs, prices and supply of drugs and some other factors (Glen-
nerster et al. 1994). 
 The budgets for community health services were based on historical figures (Audit 
Commission 1995). Also for staff costs, budgets were based on figures of previous years. 
Fundholders were free then to manage their human resources. 
 In principle, the budget system was an example of a proportional cost-decreasing bo-
nus system with a threshold (see subsection 6.4.5). The budget per fundholder formed the 
norm, and the surpluses (underspends) formed the bonus. Profits could be saved up for 
four years and had to be invested in patient care. Earning a bonus thus did not result in 
additional income.6 Allowed were: 
- investments in care included in the risk package; 
- the purchase of materials and equipment which: 
- could be used for the treatment of patients; 
- made patient care more comfortable; 
- enabled the physician to practise more efficiently and effectively; 
- the purchase of materials for patient information and education; 
- investments in premises and surgeries; 
- the attracting of new staff. 
In case of overspends, the excess of expenditures over income were paid for by the 
Health Authorities. Overspends could be met by the additional contingency funds that 
were set aside by the Health Authorities to ensure that fundholders’ commitments were 
met and services to patients could be provided uninterruptedly (Atkinson and Holbourn 
1994). As the budgets for fundholders and the overspends were subtracted from the 
budgets available for Health Authorities, such overspends could reduce the Health Au-
thorities’ abilities to arrange health care on behalf of the practice populations of non-
fundholders. Health Authorities could attempt to settle deficits in the following years, or 
they could deprive the fundholding practice in question of further fundholdership (Na-
tional Audit Office 1994). Withdrawing a practice from fundholding was an option in 
case the overspending was viewed as due to mismanagement of the fund (Atkinson and 
Holbourn 1994). Also, Health Authorities were increasingly devising risk-management 
plans with fundholders. As far as Health Authorities could succeed in making fundhold-
 
                                                                 
6 There were some methods to increase income through the fundholding system, though. Lerner and 
Claxton (1994) pointed at some indirect ways in which GPs could profit from their fundholdingship. 
Firstly, they could increase their income from the basic payment method (capitation) by attracting more 
patients to their practices through the use of the budget for services that were attractive for patients. Sec-
ondly, they could use the budget to hire extra auxiliary personnel to provide more fee-for-service proce-
dures like immunisations, and to start health promotion clinics. Thirdly, GPs were allowed to invest the 
surpluses in their practice facilities, thereby increasing their capital. 
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ers (partially) responsible for overspends, and deficits thus resulted in a malus, fundhold-
ers ran a speculative risk. Remarkably, the National Association of Fundholding Prac-
tices proposed the formation of some sort of bank from which ‘overspenders’ could bor-
row money that had to be paid back within a certain period.7 This would definitely have 
altered the fundholders’ risk from only profits into speculative. 
 Several risk-limiting measures were taken. First of all, the risk package was designed 
in such a way that very expensive care was excluded – to which extent differed for com-
munity fundholders, standard fundholders and total purchasers though. Secondly, as 
noted, it was policy of some of the Health Authorities to be rather generous in calculating 
the fundholders’ budgets. Obviously, this decreased the risk of overspends. Thirdly, 
overspends were not always settled in the following budget years, but were often met by 
Health Authorities. Fourthly, the fundholders’ risk was limited, originally to £5000, later 
on to a maximum of £6000 per patient per year. Exceeding costs were for account of the 
Health Authorities. In the terminology of subsection 6.4.6.1, this limitation is called an 
excess of loss per risk.8 Fifthly, risk pools were formed. The pools consisted of one or 
more group practices in such a way that the size of the (combined) patient lists of the 
practices met the list size requirements. Initially, participation was restricted to (groups 
of) practices with at least 11,000 patients. But in 1990, thus even before the launch of the 
scheme, this threshold was already lowered to 9,000 for the first-wave (i.e. standard) 
fundholders (Maynard 1994; Department of Health 1989). For the second-wave fund-
holders this was reduced to 7,000 patients, and it was further reduced to 5,000 patients 
from budget year 1996-1997 on. In the first instance, the restriction for community fund-
holders was 3,000 patients, but this threshold was abolished from budget year 1997-1998 
on (RCGP 1998). 
 
Table 7.3. Financial and organisational structures of GP fundholding 
 
1. Risk package:  
- List of elective hospital care, among which diagnostics; 
- Drugs (prescribed by GP fundholder); 
- Staff costs. 
2. Size of the practice population: 
- All patients. 
3. Norm: 
- Hospital care: historical figures, later adjusted for factors like patient characteristics; 
- Drugs: based on PACT-data, adjusted for changes in, for instance, patient characteristics and prices. 
4. Bonus/malus system: 
- Cost-decreasing, proportional bonus system with threshold; 
- Bonus: 100 percent of surpluses; 
 
                                                                 
7 The National Association of Fundholding Practices (1996), Risk Management by GP Fundholders – a 
NAFP Discussion Paper, as cited by the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP 1998). 
8 This differs from the terminology used in the United Kingdom, were the term ‘stop loss’ is used for it. 
In the reinsurance literature, however, the term ‘stop loss’ refers to a risk-limiting technique in which the 
sum of the claims is reinsured as far as it exceeds a set percentage of the premiums (see subsection 
6.4.6.1). 
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- Malus: depending on what was agreed upon. 
5. Risk reduction: 
- List size requirements; 
- Excess of loss per risk of £6,000 per year; 
- Health Authorities responsible for overspends, unless otherwise agreed upon; 
- Non-elective care excluded. 
 
7.3.3 Overall financial results 
 
At the start of the fundholding scheme, several authors pointed out that the size of the 
fundholding practices would be too small to meet large fluctuations in the nature and the 
amount of care (see, for instance, Weiner and Ferriss 1990, Drummond et al. 1990, 
Crump et al. 1991). Nevertheless, during the years the required list size was lowered 
from 11,000 to 5,000 patients for standard fundholders, and the initial restriction of 3,000 
patients for community fundholders was abolished. As a result, the average list size of the 
participating practices decreased year after year: 12,100 patients in 1991 and 8,400 pa-
tients in 1994 (Audit Commission 1995). The financial results, however, turned out less 
dramatic than some expected. Presumably, this was caused by: 
- the fact that fundholders were financially responsible for only a part of total patient 
care, as expensive and rare diseases as well as accident and emergency services were 
excluded from the risk package; 
- the excess of loss per risk that limited the fundholders’ responsibility to the first £6000 
per patient per budget year; 
- the ample budgets for fundholders, especially for the waves in the first years. 
In budget year 1991-1992 the budgets of fundholders in England amounted to a sum of 
£400 million. In budget year 1994-1995 this had increased to £2,800 million. In budget 
year 1993-1994 (with a sum of £1,800 million), English fundholders saved £64 million, 
which was about 3,5 percent. Three-quarters of the budgetholders saved some money, 
and twenty percent saved at least £100,000. About three percent had a deficit of at least 
£100,000 (Audit Commission 1995). These surpluses or deficits may, for instance, have 
resulted from: 
- the practice patterns of the fundholding physicians; 
- random fluctuations; 
- the use of false or incomplete data while calculating the budgets; 
- problems with the obtaining of hospital claims. 
Generally, Health Authorities attempted to reclaim the so-called ‘windfall profits’ gained 
unexpectedly (‘by luck’) from inaccurate budget calculations (National Audit Office 
1994). 
 Fundholders saved a total of £110 million in the first three budget years. At the end of 
budget year 1993-1994, 17 percent of these savings were reinvested (Audit Commission 
1995). Savings were mainly used for premises (35 percent of the spendings), furniture 
and equipment (25 percent), medical equipment (18 percent), and the reduction of wait-
ing lists (9 percent). 
 Glennerster et al. (1994) found substantial differences in the distribution of financial 
means among fundholders. For practices in three regions, for instance, the budgets for 
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hospital care ranged from £24 to £106 per patient in budget year 1993-1994. Total budg-
ets ranged from £65 to £203 per patient. It was unclear how far the variations could be 
explained by the differences in need between the practice populations. 
 Furthermore, differences were found in the distribution of budgets for hospital care 
among fundholders and District Health Authorities (i.e. the representatives of the non-
fundholders). In one region, for instance, the cost ratios of non-fundholders to fundhold-
ers ranged from 0.59 to 0.87 for inpatient care and day-case treatments and from 0.36 to 
1.06 for outpatient care (Dixon et al. 1994). Seemingly, these variations could not be ex-
plained by differences in need. There were, however, some authors who were critical of 
the way the costs were calculated in this research (Bowie and Spurgeon 1994, Spenceley 
et al. 1994). The figures for fundholders and districts were difficult to compare, as the 
amount of money for non-emergency care available per district depended upon the 
amount needed for accident and emergency services. This was not the case for fundhold-
ers. Further, it was argued that the prices that fundholders had to pay for hospital care 
were higher than the prices hospitals charged to districts. Such higher prices may reflect 
the higher transaction costs hospital faced in contracting several fundholders, but they 
may also be the result of the above mentioned incentive for hospitals to raise their prices 
in order to cause an increase in the fundholders’ hospital budgets. Another reason may be 
that, because of their size, districts had more market power and, as a result, were more 
able to negotiate lower prices. However, Propper et al. (1998), who considered District 
Health Authorities to be captive to their suppliers of care, found evidence contradicting 
this explanation. To this will be returned at the end of the next subsection. 
 In spite of the fact that the financial results turned out to be less dramatic than ex-
pected by some in the early years, also in the final years of fundholding concerns about 
the poor budget setting were expressed. Martin et al. (1997) argued that the random vari-
ability to which fundholders are subject may lead to inequity within practices (different 
financial pressures depending on the time of the budget year may lead to different patient 
care during the year) as well as between practices (different budgetary pressures between 
practices may lead to different patient care depending on the practice patients belong to). 
They suggested several strategies: 
- Increasing the size of patient groups for which the budgets are set (pooling). 
- Setting budgets for a period of more than one year. 
- Excluding certain expensive procedures from the budgeting scheme. 
- Excluding predictably expensive patients from the budgeting scheme. 
- Experimenting with contractual form (i.e. the contracts fundholders conclude with 
other providers of care). 
- Establishing contingency reserves by the Health Authorities to accommodate over-
spends. 
- Careful exploring of variations from budgets. 
 
7.3.4 Results for hospital care 
 
At the end of the eighties, main criticisms of the British health care system pertained to 
the long waiting lists for elective surgery, to the quality of pathological tests, and to out-
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patient care (Glennerster et al. 1994). An important goal of the fundholding system, 
therefore, was to improve the efficiency of the health care provided by GPs and medical 
specialists (i.e. the technical efficiency), and to further a more efficient distribution of 
means among the different parts of the health care system (i.e. the allocative efficiency). 
Because of the freedom budgetholders had in devising and concluding contracts with 
hospitals, they were able to make higher demands on the way care was provided in the 
hospital than they were previously. They also had the possibility to switch between hos-
pitals, or to switch to the private sector. As a result of their increased bargaining power, 
many budgetholders succeeded in reducing the waiting times for several types of special-
ist care (Bain 1992, Newton et al. 1993, Corney 1994, Glennerster et al. 1994, National 
Audit Office 1994). 
 
Referrals 
In several studies a decrease in the number of referrals to hospitals was found (Bain 
1992, Glennerster et al. 1994, Howie et al. 1994). In another study, no difference was 
found in the number of referrals for outpatient care made by fundholders and non-
fundholders (Coulter and Bradlow 1993). Gogarty and Halliday (1993), however, pointed 
at the slower increase in those referrals for fundholders. Also in a longer run the number 
of referrals made by fundholders turned out to have increased less than the increase in the 
number of referrals made by non-fundholders. In a good three years the increase was 8.1 
per 1,000 (7.5 percent) for fundholders and 25.3 per 1,000 (26.6 percent) for non-
fundholders (Surender et al. 1995). For two reasons these findings should be interpreted 
with caution, however. Firstly, only ten fundholders in one region participated in the re-
search. Secondly, out of the six non-fundholding practices, in the end four became fund-
holder. For three of these four practices, a strong increase in the number of referrals was 
found in their preparatory year, i.e. the year before they started as fundholder. 
 As not all of the hospital services were chargeable to the fundholders, it was suggested 
that fundholding GPs were tempted to have their patients receiving care that remained to 
be paid for by the Health Authority. It would especially be the case with emergency ad-
missions, for which fundholders were not financially responsible (Weiner and Ferriss 
1990). This phenomenon is called cost shifting (see section 6.3). To test the hypothesis 
that the introduction of fundholding was associated with changing emergency hospital 
admission proportions, Toth et al. (1997) compared hospital admissions of 21 first-wave 
fundholding practices (131 GPs) with those of 521 non-fundholders. To this end, they 
selected four groups of fund procedures for which an emergency admission might be 
substituted for an elective one, or for which outpatient referrals might be delayed until 
emergency care becomes necessary. No evidence was found that fundholders increased 
the proportion of emergency admissions as a means of cost shifting. 
 In a research among 101 GP fundholders, Whynes and Reed (1994) found that fund-
holders’ intentions with regard to referral behaviour were only to a limited extent deter-
mined by the costs of treatments. Fundholding GPs’ decisions on referrals for elective 
surgery in the first place seemed to be determined by their confidence in the ability of the 
medical specialists, by the length of the waiting times for a first appointment, and by the 
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level of information from specialist to GP. Relatively little weight was put on the costs of 
treatments and the style of management in the hospital. 
 
Day case surgery 
Fundholders faced an incentive to encourage elective surgical procedures to be carried 
out as day cases. Day case surgery is less intrusive for patients, may be equally beneficial 
in terms of outcomes and is, in general, less costly than inpatient care. In a report of the 
Audit Commission (1996) it was already noted that patients of fundholders were as likely 
to be treated on a day basis as were patients of non-fundholding practices. Raftery and 
Stevens (1998) carried out comparative cross-sectional analyses of Hospital Episode Sta-
tistics for NHS hospitals in England for budget years 1990-1991 to 1994-1995. Aim was 
to analyse the influence of target setting and the introduction of GP fundholding on the 
proportion of elective surgery carried out on a day basis. For a number of procedures, the 
Audit Commission set targets for the proportion of cases that should be treated as day 
cases. This reflected the policy objective within the NHS to substitute day case surgery 
for inpatient treatments. During the five budget years mentioned, the total number of 
elective surgical procedures increased from 2.7 million to 3.9 million (44 percent). The 
increase was largely caused by the increase of 117 percent in the numbers of day cases. 
Four percent increase was found for inpatient based surgery. The proportion of elective 
day cases increased from 35 percent to 53 percent. In case of fundholders, the total num-
ber of elective fundholding procedures increased from 1.9 million to 2.6 million (40 per-
cent). Here too, the increase was largely caused by the increase (109 percent) in the num-
bers of day cases. Only 0.1 percent increase was found for inpatient based surgery. The 
proportion of elective day case surgery increased from 36 percent to 54 percent. Al-
though there was a clear incentive for fundholders to increase the relative amount of day 
case surgery, just a minor – though in most of the years statistically significant – differ-
ence was found in the proportion of day cases purchased by district health authorities and 
those purchased by fundholders. Raftery and Stevens mentioned three possible reasons 
for the absence of a large difference. A first reason may be that both types of purchasers 
were equally affected by policies to stimulate day case surgery, like the target setting. A 
second reason could be that both parties influenced each other’s strategies. A third – ac-
cording to the authors, more plausible reason – may be the emphasis of central policy on 
day case surgery. This may have resulted in changing behaviour of providers, what on its 
turn affected both types of purchasers more or less equally. The authors argued that an 
increase in day case surgery often requires investments in new facilities, like operating 
theatres. After such large investments, the providers will probably change their behaviour 
anyhow, irrespective of whether the purchaser is fundholder or not. As the increase in 
day case surgery was not accompanied by a decrease in the number of surgical proce-
dures carried out on an inpatient basis, their final conclusion was that day case treatments 
are additional to, instead of a substitute for, inpatient treatments. An alternative to their 
conclusion may be that the increase in day case surgery was a substitute for an increase 
in inpatient treatments. Nevertheless, the conclusion is shared that it can be doubted that 
the increase in day case surgery was for a large part the result of fundholders’ efforts. 
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Outreach clinics 
Fundholders seemed to be more successful in achieving a rise in the number of ‘outreach 
clinics’. In an outreach clinic, medical specialists perform several diagnostic and thera-
peutic services outside the hospital that normally are performed within a hospital (Bailey 
et al. 1994). A part of these clinics were established within primary care practices. Many 
fundholders succeeded in arranging such clinics (Bain 1992, Bailey et al. 1994, Corney 
1994, Glennerster et al. 1994, National Audit Office 1994, Audit Commission 1996). 
However, the cost-effectiveness of outreach clinics is questionable. The results of a pilot 
study by Gosden et al. (1997) suggest that additional research into this topic is required. 
In a (simple) comparative study, they analysed the figures of three dermatology special-
ists and three orthopaedic specialists, each holding an outreach clinic as well as a hospital 
outpatient clinic. Only dermatology outreach patients experienced shorter waiting times 
for their first appointments. Differences were found in travel costs and total costs to pa-
tients between the two types of clinics in both specialties, but these were not significant. 
Due to differences in casemix – in general, outreach clinic patients have less severe con-
ditions – treatment costs were not comparable. Further, staff costs and staff travel costs 
were significantly higher for outreach clinics than for outpatient clinics, as were the asso-
ciated opportunity costs – more patients could have been treated if outreach patients were 
treated on an outpatient basis. The results of a patient satisfaction questionnaire used in 
the study indicated that patients found the interpersonal nature of the consultation itself 
more important than access or convenience. Several questions have yet to be answered to 
be able to assess whether the increase in the number of outreach clinics achieved by 
fundholders was a blessing or not. Examples of these questions are: 
- What is the effect of outreach clinics on GP-specialist communication? 
- Do outreach clinics prevent future care and costs through the reduction in waiting 
times? 
- Do such clinics reduce the number of inappropriate referrals? 
- Do patients treated within an outreach clinic often still need a referral for tests and 
treatments (see Gosden et al. 1997, p. 178)? 
 
Substitute services 
Difficulties were caused by the services that could be provided by medical specialists as 
well as by GPs. Fundholders were of the opinion that for those services they could pro-
vide at less cost than medical specialists, they had to be able to pay themselves out of the 
budget. Initially, however, none of such payments were allowed as that was considered to 
be unfair towards non-fundholders. Moreover, it would be an infringement on the pur-
chaser-provider split. To circumvent this prohibition, several fundholders started new 
institutions from which they could purchase particular services. From 1993 on, these ar-
rangements were prohibited too. Instead, a list was drafted which contained seventeen 
services for which fundholders were allowed to pay themselves. Each individual GP that 
participated in a fundholding practice was allowed to spend thirty hours per month on the 
listed services (Glennerster et al. 1992, Glennerster et al. 1994). 
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Price discounts 
Fundholders faced a strong incentive to contract providers on the basis of price. Price 
discounts could result in surpluses or could be used immediately to treat more patients or 
to treat them in a different way. On the other hand, the incentive was limited due to the 
way their budgets were calculated (on historic costs). Moreover, price competition was 
limited by regulations that imposed a ‘not-for-profit’ as well as a ‘no-reserves’ condition 
on NHS providers. Hospitals were required to break-even each year and were not al-
lowed to charge higher prices than in such a way that they covered all costs including 
depreciation plus a return on net assets of six percent (Propper et al. 1998). Nevertheless, 
Propper et al. (1998) found evidence that the regulatory rule that prices for procedures 
had to equal its average costs was broken – at least for some of the eight fundholding 
procedures for which they analysed price data. They investigated whether market forces 
had an influence on prices fundholders had to pay for care provided by NHS hospitals 
during the period 1991-1995. As costs of procedures are unclear, it is virtually impossible 
to calculate the exact average costs for a procedure, so it is virtually impossible for a 
regulator to detect price competition based on violations of the regulatory rule. NHS hos-
pitals had an incentive to reduce prices for fundholders in order to attract additional in-
come; this especially in view of the (expected) growth of the fundholding scheme. The 
largest purchasers (i.e. the Health Authorities) were considered by Propper et al. (1998, 
pp. 649-650) to be more or less captive to their suppliers (because of inertia, concern 
about the potential closure of hospitals as a result of moved services, or a lack of incen-
tives). This provided hospitals with the opportunity to increase prices to Health Authori-
ties and to make up for decreased prices to fundholders. A positive association was found 
for the market shares of Health Authorities with prices to Health Authorities, and a nega-
tive association for the market shares of Health Authorities with prices to fundholders, 
although the latter was significant for only three of the eight procedures. This was espe-
cially true for low-cost procedures.9 
 
7.3.5 Results for prescribing drugs 
 
In several studies the prescribing behaviour of fundholders was analysed (see, for in-
stance, Burr et al. 1992, Bradlow and Coulter 1993, Maxwell et al. 1993, Dowell et al. 
1995, Stewart-Brown et al. 1995, Whynes et al. 1995, Wilson et al. 1995, Harris and 
Scrivener 1996, Whynes et al. 1997). A rather general finding was that the costs per pa-
tient or per ‘prescribing unit’ were lower for fundholders, or increased relatively slower, 
than for non-fundholders (Burr et al. 1992, Bradlow and Coulter 1993, Maxwell et al. 
1993, Whynes et al. 1995, Wilson et al. 1995, Harris and Scrivener 1996, Whynes et al. 
1997).10 These figures were confirmed by aggregated figures. In budget year 1993-1994, 
the average drugs costs were £61 for fundholders’ patients and £67 for the patients of 
 
                                                                 
9 Obviously, these findings of Propper et al. (1998) conflict with the remarks some authors made with 
regard to the article of Dixon et al. (1994). See subsection 7.3.3. 
10 In case prescribing units are used, patients younger than 65 are counted once, whereas patients who 
are 65 or older are counted three times. 
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non-fundholders. From the start of the fundholding scheme in 1991, the growth in drugs 
costs for fundholders seemed constantly lower than for non-fundholders. In budget year 
1991-1992, the figures were 12 percent and 15 percent respectively. In year 1993-1994, 
these were 8 percent and 11 percent respectively (National Audit Office 1994). That 
fundholders had lower drugs costs had two reasons. Firstly, the lower costs resulted from 
a decrease or a relatively lower increase in the volume of drugs prescribed (Whynes et al. 
1995, Wilson et al. 1995). Secondly, fundholders increasingly prescribed generic drugs 
(Burr et al. 1992, Bradlow and Coulter 1993, Dowell et al. 1995, Wilson et al. 1995). 
These figures were confirmed by figures on an aggregated level. In budget year 1992-
1993, 52 percent of all prescriptions by fundholders pertained to generic drugs, whereas 
this was 46 percent for non-fundholders (National Audit Office 1994). 
 In another study only small differences were found over a period of six months within 
budget year 1993-1994. For non-dispensing fundholders, the costs per prescribing unit 
amounted to £21.04, for dispensing fundholders to £20.48, and for non-fundholders to 
£20.57. Since 1990-1991, the increase in costs was 38.1 percent, 32.0 percent, and 38.7 
percent respectively (Stewart-Brown et al. 1995). 
 A methodological problem for most of these studies is their short period of time. In a 
study of longer duration, significantly lower average costs per patient were found for 
fundholders. In 1991 fundholders had on average £2 lower costs per patient than non-
fundholders, but in 1994 fundholders spent about £63 and non-fundholders about £81. 
Remarkably, the lower costs for fundholders were solely the result of lower volumes and 
not of a profound use of generic drugs (Whynes et al. 1995). Other long-term studies of 
prescribing costs were performed by Harris and Scrivener (1996) and Whynes et al. 
(1997). Harris and Scrivener compared the performance of the first five waves of fund-
holders (totalling 2,649) in England with that of continuing non-fundholders during a six-
year period from April 1990. Research questions were whether the prescribing budgets 
for fundholders led to a reduction in prescribing costs, and whether such an association 
lasted in the following years. Except first-wave and fifth-wave fundholders, in the pre-
paratory year all groups had slightly higher costs per prescribing unit than non-
fundholders, but at the start of their own wave all fundholders had lower costs per pre-
scribing unit than non-fundholders. Over the six years, the prescribing costs of fundhold-
ers rose – depending on the wave – by 56-59 percent, while those of non-fundholders 
rose by 66 percent. The patterns appeared to be similar for all the waves: a small relative 
reduction in costs in the preparatory year, the largest relative reduction in the first year of 
fundholding, and a declining relative reduction in the second and third year. After their 
third year, fundholders faced the same increases in costs, as did non-fundholders. The 
savings remained, though. Further, as the number of items prescribed per prescribing unit 
remained stable for each of the waves relative to that of the non-fundholders, the relative 
cost reductions seemed to be the result of lower average costs per item. These lower av-
erages may have resulted from a more profound use of generic drugs but also, for in-
stance, from lower doses or reduced duration of the prescriptions (Harris and Scrivener 
1996). It is unclear what the effect was of the relative reductions in costs and of the lower 
average costs per item on the clinical outcomes. Whynes et al. (1997) analysed the pre-
scribing costs of – depending on the year – 668 to 696 practices in one region over a five-
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year period (budget years 1991-1992 to 1995-1996). Their findings were consistent with 
those of Harris and Scrivener in the sense that the prescribing figures suggested a cost-
reducing effect in the first period and the same increase in costs after that. The timing 
differed though, as here the effect occurred in the first year of the practices’ fundholder-
ship but did not persist beyond that first year. Whynes et al. found no evidence for artifi-
cially increased spending by the practices in their preparatory year in order to obtain lar-
ger budgets for drug costs. 
 The idea of the fundholding scheme was that it would stimulate fundholding GPs to 
prescribe more considerately, thereby putting an end to the rapidly increasing costs of 
drugs. The influence of fundholders on the overall drugs costs was limited, however. Al-
though they were financially responsible for drugs prescribed by themselves, they had a 
limited influence on the drugs their patients used. The reduced length-of-stay in hospitals 
in combination with the fact that medical specialists – forced by hospital budgeting – 
provided their patients with drugs for only a short period, resulted in a shift of drug costs 
to fundholders (Crump et al. 1995). 
 
7.3.6 Results for the quality of care 
 
Little is known about the impact of fundholding on the quality of patient care, especially 
in terms of clinical outcomes (Glennerster 1998). Some aspects of the quality of care, like 
waiting times, were already mentioned in the foregoing. In one study, the length of con-
sultations in budgetholding practices was analysed. This length was considered to be a 
measure for the quality of patient care. The average duration of the consultations for pa-
tients with pain in their joints remained constant over the period 1990-1992 (Howie et al. 
1994). In general, the same held for patients with one of the other of twelve health prob-
lems selected for this study (Howie et al. 1995). The patients’ satisfaction with the care 
provided receded a little, though. It is hard to say, however, whether this resulted from 
the fundholdership of their GPs as the study lacked a reference group. 
 Another aspect of the quality of care is the accessibility, especially for specific risk 
groups. Access to care can be endangered by cream skimming. However, this did not 
seem to be a problem within the fundholding system. The design of the scheme (the risk 
package restricted to non-emergency and elective care, the norm largely based on histori-
cal figures, the excess of loss per risk of £6000 per patient per budget year, and the list 
size requirements) as well as the fundholders’ medical ethics and their reputation may all 
have contributed to that. This may have been different for the ‘total purchasers’, but for 
those fundholders participating in the total-purchasing projects the risk (and thus the in-
centive to skim cream) was limited by the pooling of large numbers of patients. 
 
7.3.7 Discussion 
 
The lack of proper incentives for parties in the old-style National Health Service to pro-
vide health care in a technically and allocatively efficient way and to be responsive to 
patients, prompted the government to reform the system at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The question here is whether these reforms indeed improved the performance of the 
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agency function of those GPs that opted to become fundholder. Overseeing the research 
evidence, the following conclusions seem justified. As there is no decisive evidence it is 
difficult to judge the fundholders’ functioning as agents for their patients. Moreover, the 
introduction of the fundholding scheme was just one out of a set of system reforms. The 
organisation and functioning of Health Authorities and the functioning of other providers 
of care changed as well. Any evidence should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. 
 Fundholders appeared to be successful in reducing costs in some of the areas they 
were responsible for. This seems especially to be true for prescribing costs. Due to the 
absence of reliable information on the cost-effectiveness of changed (prescribing) behav-
iour in terms of clinical outcomes, it is hard to say whether cost reductions had a benefi-
cial effect on the patients. On the other hand, it seems plausible that, because of the re-
strictions on the use of savings, at least part of these savings were indeed used to improve 
the existing health services, to develop new services, to treat more patients, or to treat 
them quicker. 
 Although the fundholding system could have provoked undesirable behaviour, like 
cream skimming, cost shifting, or quality skimping, no evidence was found of that. There 
may be a relation between the absence of dramatic changes in the provision of health 
care, which might have been expected to be a result of fundholding, and the absence of 
adverse physician behaviour. Stronger incentives imposed on fundholders might have 
resulted in larger efficiency gains, but also in adverse physician behaviour. 
 Looking at the structure of the system, the risk package can be considered as compre-
hensive. This is especially true for standard fundholders and even more for total purchas-
ers. A main advantage of a comprehensive risk package is that segmentation of health 
care is prevented and substitution is furthered. The other side of the coin is that – al-
though depending on the type of care – the more comprehensive is the risk package, the 
larger is the physician’s risk. Adverse behaviour may be stimulated then. 
 The fundholding system covered each fundholder’s total practice population and 
hence the incentives emanating from the fundholding scheme related to the whole of this 
population. Hence the fundholder can not compensate a loss on the risk contract by in-
creasing the revenues from patients outside that contract. 
 Clearly, the calculation of a norm posed a problem. This may have resulted in an un-
fair distribution of money, not only among fundholders, but also among the group of 
fundholders and the group of non-fundholders (i.e. the District Health Authorities). Sec-
ondly, the question is whether the requirement of incentive compatibility (see subsection 
3.3.3) was met. No evidence was found of widespread cream skimming, cost shifting or 
quality skimping, but at the same time it is hard to ascertain the extent to which the way 
of budget setting resulted in an optimal quality and cost-effectiveness of patient care. As 
to latter, especially the calculation on the basis of historic costs raises doubt. 
 In general, a cost-decreasing proportional bonus system with a norm as threshold is not 
very conducive to the functioning of fundholding GP’s as agent for their patients. The 
criterion is ‘the costs of care’ instead of ‘the optimal level of care’. Obviously, it depends 
on the goals one wants to accomplish whether a cost-decreasing system is preferable. The 
goals of the 1991 reforms were not just limited to cost containment. It is clear that regard-
ing the drugs budgets, the goal was indeed to curb the rising costs. Then, a cost-
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 172 
decreasing system may, at least for some time, have a beneficial effect. Another impor-
tant goal was to enable GPs to exert more influence on the quality of non-emergency 
treatments and outpatient care (including the reduction of waiting lists and waiting 
times). It is questionable whether the incentive to reduce costs, which emanates from the 
cost-decreasing proportional bonus system, is the most adequate incentive to achieve this 
goal. An argument for using this particular incentive scheme is that it stimulates an effi-
cient use of the capacity of health care by which means more patients can be helped. An 
argument against such a scheme, given the goal just mentioned, is that it stimulates an 
efficient use of health care a patient receives, but that it does not stimulate to help more 
patients in the first place. A bonus system with a target might have been more appropriate 
then. 
 The set of measures to limit the physician’s risk seems to have been successful, in 
view of the financial results. But although the threshold of £6000 (i.e. the excess of loss 
per risk) may have prevented deficits in the fundholders’ budgets, it is unknown how 
often it occurred that a fundholder missed a bonus because of a few high-cost patients. 
 It was argued that fundholding resulted in a two-tier system (see, for instance, Bain 
1994). This may have found expression in the above-mentioned quicker treatment of 
fundholders’ patients. Perhaps this resulted in longer waiting times for patients of non-
fundholders. The findings of Propper et al. (1998), suggesting that Health Authorities had 
to pay higher prices in order to compensate for the price discounts for fundholders, may 
be another expression of a two-tier system. Thirdly, it was suggested that fundholders 
were awarded more generous budgets. The potential threat of a two-tier system would be 
less of a problem if patients could freely choose between a fundholding and a non-
fundholding GP. Given the number and the proportion of fundholding GPs, and given the 
personal relationship patients usually have with their GP – a characteristic of primary or 
general medical care – it is questionable whether all patients indeed had a free choice. 
 Another point of concern resulted from the high administration and transaction costs 
of the fundholding scheme. Fundholders needed managers and secretarial staff to admin-
ister the funds and they had to meet the requirements for computer hardware and soft-
ware. Health Authorities reimbursed 75 percent of hardware costs, and 100 percent of 
software costs. Between budget years 1990-1991 and 1994-1995, budgetholders received 
£165 million for management costs, equalling 2.5 percent of the total amount that was 
paid to fundholders (Audit Commission 1995). In 1993-1994, 3.5 percent of the total 
budgets was spent on management, computer systems, and preparing future fundholders 
(Petchey 1995). This money was withdrawn from direct patient care. These high costs 
formed one of the reasons for the Labour Government to end the fundholding system in 
the by then existing form (Glennerster 1998). 
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7.4 Managed-care experiences in the United States 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past three decades the American health care system has been facing major 
changes in the way it has been structured and financed. Noteworthy is the change of the 
health insurance market. From a system predominated by remote third-party payers, there 
has been a shift towards so-called ‘managed-care organisations’, ‘managed-care plans’, 
‘alternative delivery systems’, or ‘integrated delivery systems’. In terms of Hurst, there 
has been a shift from the reimbursement model towards contract and integrated models. 
 Managed-care organisations or integrated delivery systems are generic terms describ-
ing a myriad of organisation forms. These organisations have in common some degree of 
integration between the provision and the financing of health care, thereby abandoning 
the conventional indemnity-insurance way of working. 
 The first group of managed-care organisations (MCOs) is labelled ‘Health Mainten-
ance Organisations’ (HMOs). An HMO is an organisation that has a contractual respon-
sibility to arrange and provide a wide range of health care services for a defined popula-
tion of voluntary enrolled subscribers. These subscribers pay a flat-rated premium. Fur-
ther, the HMO assumes at least a part of the financial risk associated with health care use 
(see Luft 1981, p. 2). The prepaid group practice is the oldest and probably most well-
known type of HMO. Often, prepaid group practices are subdivided into staff-model, 
group-model and network-model HMOs. In a staff-model HMO physicians are employed 
by the organisation and only serve the HMO’s members. Staff-model HMOs have a 
closed panel: physicians are not allowed to join the HMO freely, not even if they have 
patients who are willing to become members of the HMO in question. 
 In a group-model HMO the physicians are employed by the physician-group practice, 
which on its turn has a contract with the HMO. The group often is a multi-specialty prac-
tice. The HMO may pay the group, for instance on a capitation basis or on a cost basis, 
and the group on its turn pays the physicians. A group model HMO is thus a three-tiered 
system. As with the staff model, group models are closed-panel HMOs. Physicians in the 
group may or may not see patients from outside the HMO in question. 
 A network-model HMO is an HMO having contracted several group practices. It is a 
three-tiered model and may have an open panel or a closed panel. 
 Besides prepaid-group practices, other types of HMOs can be discerned. In an individ-
ual practice association (IPA) model HMO the HMO contracts with an association of 
physicians, the IPA. Affiliated physicians are not working in a group practice and are 
members of the IPA. This is another example of a three-tiered system. Further, IPA-
model HMOs are open panels, so each physician willing to accept the contract terms and 
having patients wanting to become a member of the HMO is free to join. Usually only a 
small fraction of the practice population of an affiliated physician is member of the 
HMO. 
 A direct-contract model HMO resembles an IPA-model HMO in that it contracts in-
dependent physicians. The difference is the absence of a middle tier, i.e. the IPA. 
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 In addition to HMOs several other forms of managed-care organisations have been 
developed. One of these is the preferred-provider organisation (PPO), also described as 
preferred-provider arrangement (PPA), that accounts for about half of the enrolment in 
MCOs (Smith 1997). Definitions of PPOs differ, which may reflect the various mani-
festations in practice. According to Enthoven (1985) for instance, a PPO is not an organi-
sation but a type of contract between financiers and providers of care, whereas others 
distinguish between two-tiered and three-tiered arrangements. A PPA, then, is a two-
tiered system while the term PPO is used to denote an organisation between financier and 
providers (Wagner 1993). Maturi and Rachel (1985, p. 23) gave the following definition 
of a PPA: ‘a health care benefit program arrangement designed to control benefit costs by 
giving members incentives to use health care providers designated as preferred, but that 
also provides substantial coverage for services from other health care providers.’ This 
definition seems also applicable to PPOs. Remarkably, the definition emphasises cost 
containment and ignores quality arguments for stimulating members to use the selec-
tively contracted providers. 
 PPOs are subdivided into different generations. First-generation PPOs focused on se-
lecting well-known providers of care and using utilisation control techniques. Second-
generation PPOs have been focusing on enlarging the number of physicians and negotiat-
ing price discounts. The new third-generation PPOs are a combination of the first- and 
second-generation types in that they try to decrease the number of physicians and to im-
pose price discounts and utilisation management on them (Smith et al. 1997). 
 An exclusive-provider organisation resembles the PPO concept except that health care 
delivered by other providers is not covered. 
 In a point-of-service plan (POS) members have the choice of receiving care from the 
selected providers within the HMO or from providers outside the HMO. Coverage is lim-
ited in the latter case. When using out-of-plan services, members are confronted with cost 
sharing and more severe techniques used by the HMO in order to influence the provision 
of care. In this way, members are stimulated to use the HMO option. Some POS plans, 
so-called triple-option plans, also offer – next to an HMO and a PPO option – conven-
tional indemnity insurance. Characteristic of POS plans is that they offer their members a 
choice at the point of service instead of at the point of enrolment (Weiner and de Lisso-
voy 1993). 
 Although in the United States the relative number of primary care physicians (family 
practitioners, GPs, general paediatricians and non-subspecialising internists) is decreas-
ing (Starfield 1992), within MCOs primary care physicians are often employed to control 
the use of health-care services by their members. The vast majority of HMOs employ 
primary care physicians as gatekeepers (Gold et al. 1995a). 
 
Managed-care organisations differ from each other in the way they are organised. The 
arrangements between third parties and primary care physicians differ accordingly. De-
termining the nature of the relationships is, for instance, whether both parties are fully 
integrated in a corporate sense or only in a functional sense. In the first case (in a staff-
model HMO, for instance) the primary care physician is employed by the organisation. 
The relationship is thus one between employer and employee. In case of just integration 
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in a functional sense – this may, for instance, be the case in a direct contract model 
HMO – there is a contractual relationship between distinct organisations. The instruments 
the third party may employ to further the outcome he aims for, differ in case of a labour 
contract from those in case of an agreement between two legally separate entities. Fur-
thermore, there is often a correlation between employment and seeing patients from out-
side the MCO. In staff-model HMOs, physicians only serve patients who are member of 
the MCO concerned. If the proportion of his practice population that is member of this 
MCO increases, the primary care physician becomes increasingly dependent upon the 
third party. This increases the power of the latter and it might be hypothesised that this 
reduces the need for instruments to be used for influencing the primary care physician. 
Conversely, a small fraction reduces the primary care physician’s dependence and, there-
fore, makes it easier to switch between third parties. Hence the third party is limited in his 
choice of contract design and in the use of instruments, as contracts offered by other third 
parties may be more attractive to the primary care physician. 
 Also determining the nature of the relationships is whether the managed-care ar-
rangements are made within a two- or a three-tiered system. Within a two-tiered system 
there is a direct relationship between MCO and primary care physician. In case of a mid-
dle tier (in a three-tiered system), the relationship between both parties will only be indi-
rect. The contractual arrangements the MCO makes with the primary care physician in a 
two-tiered system are now being made with the middle tier. The middle tier on its turn 
contracts the primary care physician and may thereby change the nature of the arrange-
ments. 
 
Gold et al. (1995a) found that the majority of these organisations shared risks with pri-
mary care physicians. In this subsection we discuss two examples. Firstly, the United 
Healthcare experience in which an IPA-model HMO shared risks with individual primary 
care physicians. It is a classic example of how a risk-sharing system can fail if it lacks a 
proper financial and organisational design. Moreover, this experience has been well 
documented. 
 Less well documented is the experience of health insurer Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Minnesota, which developed a group-model HMO. Only some details are available of its 
financial arrangements and the organisational structures. Nevertheless, the system is de-
scribed in this chapter as Kralewski et al. (2000) provided relevant information on finan-
cial-risk sharing arrangements between a third party and medical group practices. They 
also provided information on the payment methods that the group practices used to com-
pensate the physicians operating within those practices. Moreover, the study is unique in 
the sense that the authors assessed the independent effects of these compensation meth-
ods (that is, separate from the effects other managed-care techniques, physician and pa-
tient characteristics et cetera may have) on the costs of services for members of Blue 
Plus. 
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7.4.2 A primary care network: the United Healthcare experience  
 
In 1974, the SAFECO Insurance Company started an individual practice association of 
the primary care network type: United Healthcare (Moore et al. 1983, Martin et al. 
1985).11 SAFECO, a large property, casualty and life insurance company, wanted to enter 
the health-insurance market for small groups. The company was convinced that the phy-
sician incentives offered in staff-model Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) were 
the major reason for the lower costs those types of HMOs had. However, SAFECO was 
mainly functioning outside the large metropolitan areas, which were considered to be the 
only suitable areas for these HMOs. Moreover, it did not want to provide large amounts 
of capital to start an HMO. Hence it decided to let United Healthcare share risks with 
large multi-specialty group practices on a prepaid basis. Having contracted one group 
practice, it became evident that this strategy had to be abandoned for not enough suitable 
practices were available. Therefore, the shift was made from a group model network plan 
to a primary care physician network plan. It started to contract individual primary care 
physicians then, who had to act as gatekeepers and who had to control the volume and 
costs of their patients’ health care. Every United Healthcare enrolee had to choose a pri-
mary care physician and had to visit that physician before going to a specialist or a hospi-
tal. To stimulate patients to indeed seek their primary care physician’s referral, services 
were only paid in full with the required approval. As an incentive for the primary care 
physicians, the risk of their patients’ health care costs was shared between them and 
United Healthcare. 
 
Financial and organisational structures 
The risk package consisted of all medical care except out-of-area emergencies. It covered 
services of the primary care physician (i.e. office and hospital visits, office lab and X-
rays, and procedures) as well as referred services and hospitalisation (i.e. hospitals, spe-
cialists, outside lab and X-rays, and prescriptions). Costs of these services were only de-
ducted from a primary care physician’s account if he had approved their provision. 
 In 1978 only 3.2 percent of the primary care physicians had more than 100 United 
Healthcare patients in their practice population, and about 50 percent had less than 20 of 
these patients. Although enrolment increased during 1979 and 1980, even then less than 8 
percent had more than 100 United Healthcare patients. Unclear is with which proportion 
of the physicians’ practice populations these figures correspond. 
 The normative level of care was based on the average expected costs, adjusted for the 
enrolee’s age and sex. In 1979, for example, the norm for the total risk package ranged 
from $12 to $40 per month per enrolee. 
 The United Healthcare plan had a bonus/malus system that functioned besides the ba-
sic payment system. Basic payments to primary care physicians were on a fee-for-service 
basis at 95 percent of the charges. Next to this basic system, the physicians shared in the 
speculative risk of surpluses or deficits in their own accounts at the end of the year. The 
 
                                                                 
11 For the description of the United Healthcare scheme is drawn on Moore et al. (1983) and Martin et al. 
(1985). 
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participating physicians were responsible for fifty percent of the differences between 
normative and actual costs. This resembles a cost-decreasing proportional bonus/malus 
system with a threshold, as described in subsection 6.4.5. 
 Two risk-limiting measures were taken. Initially, a physician’s maximum bonus or 
malus amounted to ten percent of his reimbursed charges. From the beginning of 1981, 
their risk was increased to twenty percent of their charges. Furthermore, a physician was 
only responsible up to $5,000 per patient per year (excess of loss per risk). Exceeding 
costs were entirely borne by United Healthcare’s reinsurance. 
 
Table 7.4. Financial and organisational structures of United Healthcare’ s network 
 
1. Risk package: 
- Primary care services: 
- office and hospital visits; 
- office lab and X-rays; 
- procedures; 
- Referral services and hospitalisation: 
- hospitals; 
- specialists; 
- outside lab and X-rays; 
- prescriptions. 
2. Size of the practice population: 
- The majority had less than 100 United Healthcare patients. 
3. Norm: 
- Based on the average expected costs, adjusted for age and sex of the enrolee. 
4. Bonus/malus system: 
- Cost-decreasing, proportional bonus/malus system with threshold; 
- Bonus: 50 percent of surpluses; 
- Malus: 50 percent of deficits; 
5. Risk reduction: 
- First: physician’s bonus or malus limited to ten percent of his reimbursed charges; 
- Later: physician’s bonus or malus limited to twenty percent of his reimbursed charges; 
- Excess of loss per risk of $5,000 per year. 
 
Results 
The United Healthcare plan was innovative in the sense that primary care physicians 
acted as gatekeepers and were stimulated to reduce the use and the costs of their patients’ 
health care. Despite this requirement, the plan was successful in attracting enrolees as 
well as physicians. The benefits were comparable to the comprehensive benefits offered 
by HMOs. However, as the majority of the primary care physicians were recruited, en-
rolees did not have to switch to another physician. Primary care physicians, on their turn, 
were eager to obtain a contract from United Healthcare because they feared losing pa-
tients. Another reason was that the minimum reimbursement of 85 percent of the charges 
(95 percent of the physicians’ charges minus a 10 percent loss in case of large deficits) 
was more than paid by other third parties (Martin et al. 1985, p. 57). Because of this 
popularity, the United Healthcare plan became the largest of its kind in the United States. 
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 Although successful in attracting enrolees, the large proportion of primary care physi-
cians participating in the network resulted in small proportions of United Healthcare pa-
tients in each physician’s panel. Hence the impact of the financial incentives was limited. 
At the end of 1978, seventy percent of the primary care physicians had a surplus in their 
personal account. The surpluses ranged from $1 to $4,987 with a mean of $430. Only 
eight percent had a surplus of more than $1,000. Thirty percent of the physicians faced a 
deficit. These ranged from $1 to $2,877 with a mean of $288. Only three percent had a 
deficit of more than $500. Moreover, the physicians were only responsible for half of 
these amounts with a maximum bonus or malus of ten percent of their reimbursed 
charges. 
 In the first instance, the overall results appeared to be very satisfactory, but at the end 
of the seventies use and costs escalated. Over a four-year period (1978 to 1981) total 
costs per insured increased from $299 to $469 (an increase of about 56 percent). The 
costs for referral care, drugs, and hospital care increased by 64 percent, 47 percent, and 
72 percent respectively. Primary care costs increased relatively slow: by 32 percent (see 
table 7.5). 
 
Table 7.5. Increase in annual costs per insured 
 
 1978 
$ 
1981 
$ 
Increase 
% 
Primary care 85 113 32 
Referral care 89 146 64 
Drugs 23 34 47 
Hospital 102 176 72 
Total 299 469 56 
 
Source: Martin et al. 1985 
 
United Healthcare operated in a competitive market, hence premiums had to be competi-
tive. Compared to national averages, the use and costs at United Healthcare were low. 
Compared to some of their competitors, however, United Healthcare had a relatively 
large proportion of patients using outpatient services as well as relatively high costs per 
user. The use of hospital care did not differ from that faced by competitors, but United 
Healthcare had relatively high costs per hospital day. In an attempt to control costs, the 
design of the plan was altered during 1980. The following changes were carried through: 
- specialists were contracted selectively; 
- primary care physicians were contracted selectively and had to refer to the selected 
specialists; 
- the primary care physicians’ financial risk increased from ten percent to twenty per-
cent of their reimbursed charges; 
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- other managed-care techniques were introduced, like prior authorisation (preadmission 
review), length-of-stay protocols, outpatient-surgery requirements, and maximum fee 
schedules for specialists; 
- risk-sharing contracts were concluded with pharmacies; 
- per diem contracts were concluded with hospitals. 
Further, insured faced some coverage changes too, like the introduction of a low-option 
plan with cost sharing. 
 In 1981 the costs per enrolee continued to increase, but in 1982 these costs decreased 
spectacularly. The direct cause of this decrease is unclear. The changes made in the fi-
nancial and organisational structures may have resulted in a more appropriate use of 
goods and services. On the other hand, the decrease in costs coincided with a significant 
decrease in the number of enrolees (and, finally, with the termination of the plan in 
1982). Unclear is whether this decrease in the number of enrolees resulted from knowl-
edge of United Healthcare’s financial position or SAFECO’s decision to sell the plan, 
from disenchantment with the plan or from a selective disenrollment of high-cost insured 
as a result of the plan revision. Although there is no evidence to support this, the 1980 
reforms may have led to adverse physician behaviour. For instance, the stronger incen-
tives may have prompted the primary care physicians to withhold or to postpone neces-
sary care. 
 
Discussion 
The primary reason for SAFECO to enter into health-insurance arrangements was to ex-
tend its insurance function by expanding and by diversifying its products and markets. 
Adding health insurance was seen as a way to increase sales of the primary products (like 
property insurance) and to meet the demand of clients, and not as a way to develop into 
an agent on behalf of its insured (in the sense as described in subsection 2.2.3). Conse-
quently, the incentive system was not designed to stimulate the primary care physicians’ 
agency function specifically. It may have had a beneficial effect on this function, though, 
for instance insofar as physicians reduced intrusive inpatient care by substituting outpa-
tient care or primary care with at least equal outcomes for it. 
 At most, the goal of the incentive system for physicians was to control costs. 
SAFECO and United Healthcare intentionally kept these incentives weak, however, as 
they did not want to deter primary care physicians from joining the plan. They wanted to 
attract as many physicians as possible for this was viewed as the key to large market 
penetration. Moreover, SAFECO and United Healthcare were of the opinion that third 
parties should not interfere in the patient-physician relationship. 
 As a principal, United Healthcare had three primary strategies to further the achieve-
ment of its goals. The first strategy, selecting physicians, was only introduced in 1981, 
some seven years after the start. From 1981, primary care physicians were selected on the 
basis of the number of (United Healthcare) patients in their practice, their financial results 
in the previous years, and their willingness to refer solely to the newly selected panel of 
medical specialists. In 1981 United Healthcare even terminated its relationship with phy-
sicians with high costs of care (i.e. ‘deselecting’ the physicians; see also the description 
of the managed-care cycle in chapter 5). 
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 For the second strategy, controlling physicians, more or less held the same; it was not 
until 1980 that several techniques were formalised. Besides the already applied tech-
niques of financial incentives and gatekeeping, the most prominent techniques were from 
then on physician profiling with feedback, prior authorisation, and concurrent and retro-
spective utilisation review. As noted, the financial incentive for primary care physicians 
was increased to twenty percent of their reimbursed charges. 
 Except some analysis of claims, little was invested in the third strategy, monitoring 
physicians. From 1980, the individual accounts of the primary care physicians were 
monitored. The results were used for selection and feedback purposes. Further, hospitals 
had to signal the admission of United Healthcare patients. 
 
The design of the major formal technique that was applied right from the start of the 
scheme, the risk-sharing arrangement, is especially of interest here. The risk package was 
comprehensive and included hospital care and even emergency care within the area. On 
the one hand, such a design stimulates an integral approach to a patient’s health care. It 
stimulates substitution and it reduces possibilities for cost shifting. On the other hand, it 
increases incentives for cream skimming and quality skimping. No evidence was found 
for these forms of physician behaviour, though. In fact, evidence suggested that physi-
cians did not change their practice style once they had entered into a relationship with 
United Healthcare. 
 The proportion of United Healthcare patients in a physician’s total practice population 
is not known, but the small absolute numbers of these patients – the majority of the phy-
sicians had less than 100 United Healthcare patients – in combination with small risks 
suggest that the incentives to change behaviour were little. 
 The normative amount of money per patient was only adjusted for the insured’s age 
and sex. Such crude norms proved to be insufficient to account equitably for the differ-
ences in health status. The combination of practically unadjusted norms, the small pro-
portion of United Healthcare patients, and the comprehensive risk package resulted in 
account outcomes being mainly determined by bad luck rather than by the physician’s 
behaviour. 
 It has been noted before that a cost-decreasing, proportional bonus or bonus/malus 
system with a norm as threshold is not very conducive to the physician’s functioning as 
agent for his patients; the criterion is not ‘the optimal level of care’ but ‘the costs of care’. 
The fact that in the United Healthcare plan the bonus or malus was limited to fifty per-
cent of surplus or deficit hardly improves matters. 
 The weakness of the incentive system is reinforced by the risk-limiting measures. 
More than the excess of loss per risk of $5,000 per year, it is the limitation of the maxi-
mum bonus or malus to ten percent of the reimbursed charges that is responsible. As the 
total amount of charges was already low due to the small numbers of United Healthcare 
patients per practice, the resulting risk was not so much an incentive to alter behaviour as 
it was an acceptable risk of doing business. 
 
Summarizing, the United Healthcare plan was appealing to physicians and enrolees and, 
as a result, grew rapidly. The major drawback, however, was its inability to constrain the 
 
7  FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN PRACTICE 
 
 181 
health-care costs of the insured. The initial strategy of generous benefits, unrestrictive 
recruiting of physicians and weak incentives turned out to be unsuccessful. The 1980 
changes in the plan’s structure seemed to sort some effect, but SAFECO did no longer 
want to carry the huge losses. With hindsight, the plan should have been keener on using 
several managed-care techniques right from the beginning. Next to stronger consumer 
incentives, the plan could have benefited from a more selective contracting policy. Fur-
ther, a combination of several controlling techniques and monitoring could have been 
used in order to stimulate a more cost-effective provision of care. Moreover, the use of 
such techniques might have had the effect of self-selection of physicians. 
 The main conclusions are that: 
1. Cost control without intervention by United Healthcare was unsuccessful; 
2. Stronger financial incentives were necessary in order to influence the behaviour of the 
participating primary care physicians; 
3. The use of other managed-care techniques besides financial incentives would have 
made it more likely that the behaviour of physicians was influenced, while at the same 
time it would have provided a guarantee against adverse physician behaviour as a re-
sult of stronger financial incentives. 
Noteworthy is the set of strategies that Martin et al. (1985) mentioned as crucial in order 
to encourage a rational use of health care services by providers (besides another set of 
strategies to affect the behaviour of enrolees): 
- A rigorous cost containment plan that is communicated to providers explicitly. 
- Careful selection of primary care physicians and specialists based on quality and costs. 
- Provisionary participation in the plan. 
- One provider as case manager. 
- Individual provider accountability and financial risk sharing. 
- Financial incentives that encourage providers to deliver appropriate and cost-effective 
care. 
- Capitation or prospective reimbursement for primary care physicians. 
- Utilisation review, especially for hospitalisations and referral care. 
- Provider education based on feedback of utilisation review. 
In this list the three main categories from the managed-care cycle (i.e. selection, control 
and monitoring) are clearly recognisable. 
 
7.4.3 Primary care clinics in a Blue Cross managed-care program 
 
Once the SAFECO Insurance Company (see previous subsection) had given up the idea 
of starting a staff-model Health Maintenance Organisation, it decided to let United 
Healthcare share risks with large multi-specialty group practices. Due to a lack of suit-
able practices, however, it ended up with a network plan of primary care physicians. The 
health insurer Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota, on the other hand, did manage to 
develop a managed-care program (‘Blue Plus’) under which they contracted medical 
group practices. Blue Plus contracted the group practices and paid them in a way that the 
financial risks were shared between the insurer and the groups. Contrary to the United 
Healthcare system, the Blue Plus system is an example of a three-tiered system with the 
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 182 
group practice being the middle tier. The enrolees of the managed-care program were 
required to select a primary care clinic that had to manage their health care. The physi-
cians in the clinics could provide the care themselves, or they could refer the patients to 
medical specialists. 
 In studying this program, Kralewski et al. (2000) focused on primary care clinics with 
at least three full-time physicians. They selected 86 clinic sites with a total of 57,123 
Blue Plus members for whom the care was provided and managed by these clinics during 
1995. Their selection included primary care clinics that were members of larger group 
practice systems as well as of independent clinics, and also multi-specialty clinics with a 
primary care component. 
 
Financial and organisational structures 
 
Risk package 
In the study by Kralewski et al. (2000) all the patients’ health care costs were attributed 
to the primary care clinics, even though for a part of the care the patients may have been 
referred to other clinics. Professional and facility services were included in the study, but 
mental health care, chemical dependency and pharmacy costs were not. 
 The contracts medical groups had with Blue Plus during 1995 differed. Kralewski et 
al. distinguished between contracts with: 
1. full-risk capitation for all doctor and hospital services; 
2. capitation for doctors’ services with some risk sharing for hospital costs; 
3. full capitation for all physician services only; 
4. full capitation for primary care physician services only; 
5. fee-for-service with withhold provision or target rates with settlement at the end of the 
year or adjustment during the next year; 
6. discounted fee-for-service negotiated specifically with the clinic; 
7. fee-for-service based on a general fee schedule not specific to the clinic; 
8. billed charges (fee-for-service). 
Only the first five are risk contracts. Clearly, the risk package differed per contract and 
ranged from primary care physician services only to all doctor and hospital services. In-
formation on the sources of revenue was obtained from a mailed survey. Apparently, 
Kralewski et al. were not able to discriminate between the sources of revenue. As a re-
sult, the group practice payment data reflected the total practice revenue. Some of the 
contract forms, therefore, may have been used by other third parties only. Cost data, 
however, were only obtained from Blue Plus. Kralewski et al. assumed that group prac-
tice physicians treat all patients alike regardless of the patients’ health plan (and thus re-
gardless of the financial incentives emanating form the several contracts between health 
plan and group practice). In the subsection ‘discussion’ is gone into this assumption. 
 Unclear is whether the physicians’ risk packages differed from those of the clinics. 
This is not likely, however, in view of the small size of the clinics. 
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Size of the practice population 
Firstly, medical groups, including multi-site group practices, were selected if they had a 
minimum of 200 Blue Plus members who were continuously enrolled during 1995. Sec-
ondly, clinic sites with fewer than 50 Blue Plus patients during 1995 were excluded. The 
rationale for this exclusion was to secure a more accurate assessment of clinic-level costs. 
As mentioned, the result was that 86 clinic sites with a total of 57,123 Blue Plus members 
were included in the analyses. 
 Detailed information on the distribution of the Blue Plus members over the practices is 
lacking, just like the effect of this distribution on the working and outcome of the incen-
tive system. The lower limit (50 Blue Plus members per clinic site) is known, the number 
of members per physician, however, is not. Known are the minimum, the average and the 
maximum number of full-time physicians per clinic: 3, 11 and 79 respectively. 
 Finally, the proportions of Blue Plus members within the respective total practice 
populations are not known either. This is unfortunate, for it is not only the absolute num-
ber of Blue Plus members that has relevance to the incentive system, but also the ratio of 
Blue Plus members to the physician’s other patients. The incentives emanating from the 
payment system(s) in use for the other patients or from the contract(s) concluded on be-
half of those patients may interfere with the incentives emanating from the Blue Plus 
contracts (again, see the subsection ‘discussion’ for the remark about the aforementioned 
assumption). 
 
Normative level of care 
Kralewski et al. did not describe the way the cost levels per clinic were calculated (for 
instance, based on historical costs). In view of the above mentioned contract forms (see 
‘risk package’) and the fact that the medical group practices had a contract with Blue Plus 
that placed them at some financial risk, it appears that the norm per clinic was expressed 
as a cost level. 
 Within the clinics, norms had to be calculated per (primary care) physician or per 
group of physicians. Also of these norms, Kralewski et al. gave no description of the way 
they were calculated. The methods by which the primary care physicians were paid are 
known, though. From these methods can be deducted that not all norms were calculated 
as a cost level. Compensation of physicians was based on one or more of the following 
methods: 
1. guaranteed or base salary; 
2. individual physician productivity (e.g., cash collection, billings, visits, relative value 
units, et cetera); 
3. individual physician quality of care (e.g., patient satisfaction, chart review, evaluations 
by supervisor, et cetera); 
4. assessment of individual physician management of utilisation (e.g., rate of referrals, 
laboratory, x-ray utilisation, et cetera); 
5. the financial performance of the group of which the individual physician is a member 
(e.g., share of group net revenue). 
Probably, the financial performance of the group was compared with a normative cost 
level. The normative level is not necessarily a predetermined level, then. It may be a 
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flexible norm as well and may, for instance, be influenced by the financial performance 
of other groups. The quality of an individual physician’s care, for instance measured by 
the satisfaction of his patients, will not have been compared with a cost level but with a 
different kind of norm. 
 
Bonus, malus and withhold 
Five out of the eight contract types that Kralewski et al. distinguished at the clinic level, 
were risk contracts. The practices’ financial responsibility can only partially be derived 
from these contract forms. In case of full capitation, which was the case in contract types 
1, 2 (as far as it concerns doctors’ services), 3 and 4, the risk is not shared with but 
shifted to the medical group practices. Obviously, the practices’ risk was not limited, 
given the term ‘full capitation’. In that case, the groups can reduce their risks by increas-
ing the cost-effectiveness of the care, or by cream skimming, cost shifting and quality 
skimping. In case of contract type 2 (as far as it concerns hospital costs) the risk was ac-
tually shared. 
 In case of the fee-for-service type contract with withhold provision or target rates with 
settlement at the end of the year or adjustment during the next year (contract type 5), it 
depends on the exact contract terms whether the risk was shared or just shifted. If, for 
instance, a practice’s risk is the size of the withhold provision, then the risk was shared; 
costs beyond the withhold are for Blue Plus. 
 As mentioned, Kralewski et al. were not able to discriminate between the sources of 
revenue and, therefore, it is not known which contract form(s) Blue Plus used. 
At the physicians’ level, only the compensation methods are known (see the above). 
Clearly, ancillary payment methods were used to stimulate the physicians’ productivity 
(compensation method 2), the provision of high-quality care (compensation method 3), or 
the provision of cost-effective care (compensation methods 4 and 5). Unfortunately, more 
detailed information on the compensation methods is not available. Not known is, for 
instance, for which proportion of deficits or surpluses in the risk pool for referral care, 
laboratory et cetera physicians were responsible, or which proportion of the group net 
revenue (see compensation method 5) they received. It is assumed here that such vari-
ables had an effect on the (costs of) care provided by the physicians in question. 
 
Limitation of the physicians’ risk 
As mentioned in the above, the risk contracts at the clinic level were mainly full-risk 
capitation contracts. Only in contract type 2, there was risk sharing for hospital costs. 
Whether a clinic’s risk was limited in another way than by means of a financial responsi-
bility less than a hundred percent is unclear. 
At the physicians’ level it is known that the risk was spread among a group of physicians 
(i.e. a risk pool) in compensation method 5, but not how the payments were related to the 
financial performance of the group. 
 
Results 
An overall finding was a substantial variance in the mean per member per year (PMPY) 
costs of care across medical group practices. Even when controlled for patient age, gen-
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der, and morbidity (the latter by means of Ambulatory Care Groups), the costs ranged 
from less than $1,000 to over $3,000 PMPY. The mean is not given but is about $1,550 
PMPY (derived from a figure in the article). Ninety percent of the revenue of the more 
tightly clustered midrange clinics is derived from managed-care programs. Although 
these programs use financial-risk sharing systems and other managed-care techniques, 
like profiling or guidelines, there is a $400 difference in PMPY costs within these mid-
range clinics. 
 
At the group practice clinic level, the capitation payment methods were collapsed into 
one variable. Moreover, Kralewski et al. used a corrected capitation payment variable in 
order to deal with the problem that health plans may favour the use of capitation systems 
in case of high-cost clinics (a test confirmed this problem). For the correction they used 
five clinic organisational characteristics that might influence the clinic’s ability to deal 
with the financial risk. These characteristics were: 
- group practice or hospital membership (in that case, clinics are expected to be more 
able to manage risks due to their internal capacity to spread their risk among more pa-
tients and because of their ability to control a broader range of providers); 
- years of experience with risk-sharing payment contracts (more experienced clinics are 
expected to be more able to manage risks); 
- years of experience of the physicians (more experienced, and presumably more estab-
lished physicians are expected to favour and to be able to negotiate risk-minimising 
contracts); 
- the number of specialties within the clinic (with more specialists, clinics are expected 
to be more able to manage risks due to their internal capacity to spread their risk 
among more patients and because of their ability to control a broader range of provid-
ers); 
- urban versus rural location (clinics in rural areas, where there is often little competi-
tion, are expected to favour and to be able to negotiate risk-minimising contracts). 
Using the corrected variable, it was found that capitation had a significant negative effect 
on costs compared to other payment methods. Interestingly, adding fee-for-service with a 
withhold provision to the corrected capitation payment variable resulted in a smaller 
negative effect. Obviously, a fee-for-service system with withhold provision had a differ-
ent (i.e. smaller) effect on the physicians’ behaviour than a capitation system. 
 
At the physician level, compensation based on resource management factors (rate of re-
ferrals et cetera) reduced costs significantly compared to compensation linked to some 
share of the clinic’s net revenue. Compared to the latter, both a salary system and com-
pensation based on the individual physician’s productivity increased costs. The propor-
tion of a physician’s compensation based on his quality of care had a decreasing, but not 
statistically significant effect on the costs of care. 
 
The effect of the financial incentives both at the clinic level and the physician level 
should not be judged apart from the context in which they are used. Other managed-care 
techniques (i.e. selection, controlling and monitoring techniques, see chapter 5) may as 
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well be used by the third party (in this case the insurer, i.e. Blue Plus, or the group prac-
tice). Kralewski et al. found that at the physician level the use of clinical guidelines and 
physician profiles reduced costs significantly. The use of a computer-based clinical in-
formation system or of a more restrictive gatekeeper system had no or no statistically 
significant effect (see also the discussion section). 
 Further, some group practice organisational variables were found to have an effect on 
PMPY costs and may, therefore, be useful as selection criteria. The more experienced the 
clinic’s physicians were, the lower the costs. A higher proportion of women physicians 
resulted in significantly higher costs, as did, surprisingly, the proportion of primary care 
physicians. 
 In the managed-care cycle presented in chapter 5, ‘size of the clinic’ or ‘size of a 
group practice’ is not included explicitly. It is included implicitly, though, as a part of a 
financial-incentive system in which a clinic or a group practice may function as a risk 
pool. Kralewski et al. found no significant effect of clinic size on the costs of care. 
 
Discussion 
The article by Kralewski et al. is of importance for this chapter; not so much because of a 
detailed description of a risk-sharing arrangement, but because of the description of the 
effects of that arrangement. As mentioned, only some details about the Blue Plus ar-
rangement are available. The drawback of the lacking information about the arrangement 
is that comparison of the Blue Plus system and the other systems described in this chapter 
is hampered. Moreover, it is difficult to analyse the influence of some specific structures 
(as defined in section 6.4) of the Blue Plus arrangement on the PMPY costs. 
 
The information in the article suggests that Blue Plus only shifted or shared risks without 
using other controlling techniques. This points to the fact that although Blue Plus was a 
managed care program, it primarily functioned as a third-party payer instead of a third-
party agent. The capitation payments used by Blue Plus clearly had a cost-decreasing 
effect, which may be in the interest of insured. This is a crude technique, however, and 
potentially negative effects of it are not monitored or compensated by other techniques. 
Not known is whether Blue Plus exerted influence on the contracts that the group prac-
tices concluded with their physicians, in order to keep some control over the individual 
physicians. 
 On the other hand, the medical group practices displayed features of a third-party 
agent. They used several techniques like financial incentives, primary care gatekeepers, 
guidelines and physician profiles. Not all of the financial and organisational techniques 
had a cost-decreasing effect. Kralewski et al. concluded that the most cost-effective clin-
ics were the smaller multi-specialty clinics that used guidelines, profiles and compensa-
tion systems based on resource management factors and in which the physicians shared 
the group net revenue. As, moreover, these clinics are often owned by the physicians, 
they have the attributes of small family-owned businesses.12 
 
                                                                 
12 In a family owned business the goals of the organisation and the employees may converge. Further, 
the assumption of opportunistic behaviour, which is at the heart of the agency theory, may have to be 
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 Whether the arrangements between clinic and physicians were beneficial to the Blue 
Plus members in another than a cost-effective way is unclear. Assuming that the risk 
package of a clinic and the individual physicians were the same, this package ranged 
from only primary care physician services to all doctor and hospital services. The larger 
risk package with all doctor and hospital services will make it more difficult to shift 
costs. 
 The size of the practice population may pose a problem if it is as small as it was in at 
least some of the clinics. Unless the other insurers with whom a physician or his clinic 
had contracts used the same incentives, a small proportion of Blue Plus members may 
have diluted the incentives emanating from a physician’s risk contract. This was also the 
case with the United Healthcare plan (see the previous subsection). For instance, the fact 
that Kralewski et al. found no effect from gatekeeper systems might have been the result 
of the other physician’s patients being free to make appointments to see (some) special-
ists without a referral.  
 On the way the normative levels of care were calculated no information is available, 
except that other things than costs were also taken into account. 
 Of the bonus, malus and withhold systems is only known that at the clinic level at 
least in some contracts full capitation was used as payment system. Although a clinic 
may be able to bear such risks, the fact that the clinics were small implies that even at the 
clinic level such a system may provoke undesired behaviour. This is especially true if the 
capitation system is used for expensive care. Moreover, as in some clinics the physicians’ 
compensation was based on the net revenue, such a payment system may even provoke 
undesirable physician behaviour. Risk sharing reduces such incentives. 
 Especially in case of full capitation for high-cost care, some measures to limit the phy-
sicians’ risk are desirable. An effective mechanism is the use of risk pools, which is used 
in some of the contracts between clinic and physicians. 
 
A final remark is about the assumption Kralewski et al. made. They assumed that group 
practice physicians treat all patients alike regardless of their patients’ health plan. The 
assumption was made to overcome the problem that they were not able to discriminate 
between the sources of revenue, whereas the cost data only related to patients enrolled in 
the Blue Plus program. The authors did not go further into the subject, but this assump-
tion seems doubtful. If it is correct though, than this equal treatment may result from the 
fact that physicians: 
- are insensitive to the different incentives emanating from different contracts; 
- are only sensitive to the incentives emanating from the contract they concluded with 
the group practice, but are insensitive to the different incentives emanating from the 
different contracts the group practice concluded with the several health plans; 
- choose an ‘average’ treatment pattern in a way the effect from the several incentive 
systems is optimised; 
- choose a way of treatment in response to the most attractive contract and then choose 
this way for all their patients; 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
relaxed in such businesses. See also subsection 3.2.3. 
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- or may have different contracts of which the incentives have the same effect on their 
behaviour. 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
7.5.1 The five aspects of financial-risk sharing 
 
In this chapter we analysed several arrangements in which the financial risks of follow-
up costs are or were shared between third parties and (groups of) GPs. We use the analy-
sis to provide an answer to the first research question in this chapter: 
What are actual effects of different systems of financial-risk sharing on the performance 
of general practitioners? 
 
Risk package 
In the examples described here, the risk package differed considerably and ranged from 
drugs only (‘Zaanland’ and ‘Amsterdam’) to an extensive package consisting of primary 
care services, several referral services and hospitalisation (like GP Fundholding or United 
Healthcare). An extensive package has the advantage that it stimulates an integral ap-
proach to health care, stimulates substitution and reduces the possibility to shift costs. 
The Dutch systems with the limited risk packages illustrated the difficulties of composing 
the risk package. On the one hand the Dutch systems showed that the care included in the 
package should be restricted to care on which the GPs can exert some influence. On the 
other hand, these systems showed that since only costs of drugs prescribed by the GPs 
were taken into account, physicians had a smaller chance of earning a bonus if they con-
tinued drug treatments initiated by the medical specialist. By excluding the drugs pre-
scribed by specialists, the GPs’ risk was reduced. Obviously, this was at the cost of in-
centives for substitution. Hence the researchers that evaluated the ‘Tilburg’ experiment 
suggested including all drugs into the risk package (Van Tits 1988). 
 GP Fundholders (standard fundholders and especially total purchasers), United 
Healthcare physicians and Blue Plus physicians were responsible for extensive risk pack-
ages. Evidently, in most schemes drug costs were included. Apparently, especially this 
part of the risk package is considered to provide room for improvements in the cost-
effectiveness or quality of care. 
 
Size of the practice population 
Regarding the size of the physician’s practice population and the proportion for which he 
is at risk, large differences were found. Primary care physicians participating in the 
United Healthcare plan, for instance, had only small proportions of relevant members 
within their practice populations, while GP Fundholders were responsible for all their 
patients. 
 The United Healthcare experience showed that due to such small proportions the in-
centives were limited, as were the effects. Obviously, the proportion of a primary care 
physician's practice population for which the third party concludes a risk contract has to 
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be substantial. But it does not have to be a hundred percent, like in the fundholding sys-
tem, to have an effect though. In case of the ‘Tilburg’ experiment, for instance, about 
two-thirds of the physicians’ practice populations concerned publicly insured patients for 
which they had a risk contract. This proved to be enough to have a significant effect on 
the physician’s behaviour. 
 
Normative level of care 
Undoubtedly the most problematic aspect of the risk-sharing arrangements proved to be 
the calculation of a norm. In the absence of a more sophisticated way to establish a nor-
mative level of care, historical figures were used or crude adjustments (for example, for 
age only) were made to average figures. In all systems the norms resulted in uncertainty 
about the cause of a difference between norm and actual figures (i.e. volumes or costs). 
For instance, patient characteristics may have played a larger role than the physicians’ 
behaviour (see, for instance the Dutch systems). In case of a norm based on historical 
figures, physicians were rewarded for inefficient behaviour in the previous years (see, for 
instance, ‘Tilburg’ or the GP Fundholding system). 
 
Bonus, malus and withhold 
The logical consequence of the problems with the calculation of a norm is that problems 
arise once bonuses and maluses have to be calculated. In all the schemes cost-decreasing 
bonus or malus systems were used, mostly in a proportional form. The exact form dif-
fered, though. In some schemes a margin had to be exceeded before the bonus or the 
malus was applied (‘Zaanland’ and ‘Amsterdam’). 
 Further, the percentages that were used to calculate a bonus or a malus based on the 
difference between norm and actual figures differed too. United Healthcare shared the 
risks with the participating physicians on a fifty-fifty basis. GP Fundholders, however, 
were responsible for hundred percent of the difference as were some of the clinics par-
ticipating in the Blue Plus scheme. 
 
Limitation of the physician’s risk 
Besides by a bonus/malus system in which the risk for United Healthcare physicians was 
reduced to fifty percent of the surpluses or deficits, the total financial risk was limited to 
ten percent, and later to twenty percent of the reimbursed charges. Furthermore, the an-
nual financial risk was also limited to $5,000 per patient (an excess of loss per risk). GP 
Fundholders faced a different system and had a full responsibility for the first £6,000 per 
patient per year (excess of loss per risk). The Dutch ‘Amsterdam system’ had the most 
refined risk-limiting measures; the no-risk margin used within the malus system was in-
versely related to the number of insured. In general, however, the risk-limiting measures 
were rather simple as compared with the systems described in subsection 6.4.6. 
 
7.5.2 The effects of different systems of financial-risk sharing 
 
The majority of the experiences described in this chapter at least indicate an effect of 
risk-sharing arrangements on the behaviour of GPs or primary care physicians: 
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- The ‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ both showed savings in the drug 
budgets of the sickness funds. 
- In the ‘Tilburg’ experiment, the experimental group demonstrated a larger decrease in 
the number of referrals and hospitalisation days than the reference group did. Further, 
drug cost and the number of physiotherapy treatments increased less. 
- GP Fundholding appeared to be successful in cost reduction, especially with regard of 
drugs, reduction of waiting times for specialist care, decreasing the number of hospital 
referrals, increasing the number of day case treatments et cetera. 
- Blue Plus resulted in cost reduction, both at the plan level and the physician level, al-
though the effect differed per payment method. 
United Healthcare was not successful in altering the physicians’ behaviour initially, but 
after structural changes were carried through costs per enrolee decreased spectacularly. It 
is not clear though whether the modified arrangements induced the physicians to alter 
their behaviour or whether it, for instance, resulted in a selective disenrollment of high-
cost insured. 
 But despite the evidence, there is no clear answer to the question whether there is a 
differential effect of the distinct systems of financial-risk sharing on the performance of 
GPs (as agents for their patients). Firstly, the behaviour of a GP will probably not result 
from a risk-sharing arrangement only. Financial-risk sharing for follow-up costs is just 
one financial incentive a physician may face, whereas the use of (financial) incentives is 
just one possibility out of a set of control techniques that the third party has at its dis-
posal. Furthermore, the physician may respond to the other steps of the managed-care 
cycle, (re)selection and monitoring, or to stimuli from outside the third party-physician 
relationship. 
 Secondly, in the analyses of risk-sharing systems the dependent variable is often ‘the 
costs of care’ or ‘the volume of care’. The costs or the volume of care, however, give 
only a partial picture of the effect of a risk-sharing system on the GPs’ functioning as 
their patients’ agents. To judge this more closely, other effects are equally important, like 
the quality of patient care. Hence it is important to evaluate whether undesired physician 
behaviour, like cream skimming, cost shifting or quality skimping, is provoked by the 
risk-sharing arrangement. 
 About managed care Steiner and Robinson (1998, p. 178) concluded that ‘despite lit-
erally thousands of publications since 1990 whose subject is some component of the 
managed care approach, it is still not possible to answer fundamental questions about the 
independent contribution of each component to organisational performance. There are 
almost no randomised-controlled trials of these techniques in managed care settings. 
Most publications either describe or advocate the use of techniques, without any eviden-
tial basis; many others evaluate interventions only in qualitative terms, lack comparison 
groups, and make no tests of statistical significance’. The number of publications on fi-
nancial-risk sharing may be smaller, but the conclusion is comparable. Experimental re-
search may provide some answers, but because of the interaction with other incentives 
the physician faces and with context variables, a decisive answer to this chapter’s first 
research question is unlikely. 
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7.5.3 The framework 
 
By describing and analysing the examples using the analytical framework of risk sharing 
developed in chapter 6, the framework is put to the test here. Thereby, an answer is 
sought to the second research question in this chapter: 
 
Does the analytical framework of financial-risk sharing sufficiently provides insight into 
the key differences of systems in which the risk is shared between third party and general 
practitioner so as to infer the effectiveness of such systems? 
 
The framework proved to be useful in analysing the risk-sharing systems systematically. 
It helped to gain insight into the key aspects of several systems and provided a basis to 
compare them. Ideally though, researchers in this field should apply the same framework 
while analysing a system and while reporting on it. Now the framework had to be used to 
review sources providing information that was not acquired and reproduced according to 
the framework in question. In general there was enough information available to derive 
the characteristics of the systems sought after, though. For the Blue Plus system, how-
ever, this proved to be difficult. That it did not work out in the latter case seems not so 
much the result of the framework as it is of a lack of information.  
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8  TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL-RISK 
 SHARING 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 6 we argued that there are good reasons for sharing the financial risk between 
third-party agents and GPs. Hence the question arises whether some lessons can be de-
rived from the analysis of the theoretical and the practical models of financial-risk shar-
ing. These lessons can not be definitive enough to form a normative model of financial-
risk sharing. First of all, only a rather limited number of practical examples are described 
here. They are primarily meant to be an illustration and do not provide a representative 
description of the arrangements in the real world. Moreover, the examples are purposely 
picked from several health care systems. This provides a broad picture of the use of fi-
nancial-risk sharing, but makes it difficult to derive conclusions that are applicable to 
other health care systems. Further, a crucial factor in the design of a model of financial-
risk sharing is the resulting amount of risk that is transferred from third-party agent to 
GP. The five main aspects of financial-risk sharing all determine this risk and have to be 
balanced accurately. Quantitative analysis is crucial then. A final argument is that there 
will not be one definitive form of financial-risk sharing. What is optimal will differ per 
country and per health care system, will depend on the position and the role of the GP, 
will depend on the (political) goals one wants to achieve, will depend on the preferences 
of the GP, et cetera. 
 In spite of these limitations, some lessons can be learned indeed by which we will at-
tempt to answer the following research question: 
 
How should systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
 
8.2 The five aspects of financial-risk sharing once more 
 
Risk package 
The size and the nature of the risk package determine the physician’s risk and by that the 
incentives and possibilities to provide cost-effective and high-quality care. It also deter-
mines the incentives and possibilities to skim cream, shift costs or skimp on quality (i.e. 
to show adverse behaviour). 
 In chapter 7 we showed that the risk package differed considerably within the several 
examples, and that it ranged from drugs only to a very broad package consisting of pri-
mary care services, referral services and hospital care. Clearly, an extensive package 
promotes integrated health care and enhances substitution. It also reduces the possibility 
to shift costs, although the incentives to do so may increase. The larger the risk package, 
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the larger the physician’s risk may become. The larger the physician’s risk, the more he 
may want to reduce his risk, for instance by means of cost shifting. However, a larger risk 
package makes it more difficult to shift costs. 
 For some care it will be easier to diagnose, to estimate the costs of treatment and to 
exert some influence on the way the care is provided than it will be for other care. This is 
especially important if the GP has to arrange and pay for follow-up care, i.e. is a pur-
chaser of care. Although there may be good reasons to start with a very limited risk pack-
age (only drug costs, for instance in order to gain experience), in the end the physician 
should be responsible for a broad risk package (like in the GP Fundholding system) in 
order to prevent cost shifting and to facilitate substitution. Very expensive and ‘open-
ended treatments’ should be excluded though. The larger risk because of a more exten-
sive risk package can be reduced by means of one of the other aspects of risk sharing. 
 Finally, the risk package can be divided into separate cost categories, but that is 
merely a refinement of a system after some years of experience. Advantages of such a 
categorisation are an increased insight into the costs and the option to vary the bonus sys-
tem per type of care. The latter is administratively more complex though. Moreover, if 
the categorisation and the bonus system are not carefully balanced, the result may be re-
duced substitution or unwanted substitution of expensive care for inexpensive care (if the 
physician runs a larger risk for the inexpensive care). 
 
Size of the practice population 
It may be hypothesised that the incentives are likely to be too limited if the GP is not at 
risk for a substantial part of the practice population. What is substantial, however, will 
also depend on the rest of the incentive contract. If, for instance, the risk for a minor pro-
portion of the practice population is large enough, the physician may still be inclined to 
behave in the desired direction. The less than 100 United Healthcare patients that those 
physicians had within their practice population turned out not to be enough – especially 
in combination with the small risks. The about two-thirds of the practice population 
within the ‘Tilburg’ experiment, however, proved to be substantial enough to influence 
the participating physicians’ behaviour. Hence there will be a trade-off for the third party 
between the proportion of its members within the physician’s practice population and the 
strength of the incentives emanating from the other aspects of the risk-sharing arrange-
ment. 
 Another aspect that the third party should take into account (if known) is what kind of 
arrangements other third parties made with the GP. Other contracts can dilute the effect 
the third party may want to have. 
 Besides that the proportion has to be substantial in order to draw a reaction from the 
physician, a larger group of patients makes the physician less vulnerable to random fluc-
tuations in health-care costs. Although depending on the risk package, the number of pa-
tients will have to be larger than the size of an individual physician’s practice population 
though. Hence pooling or other forms of risk-reduction will be necessary then. 
 Finally, a larger proportion of the population for which the physician is at risk makes 
it more difficult to shift costs to other third parties. 
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Normative level of care 
At the heart of a risk-sharing arrangement is a norm. Historical data may be used or crude 
adjustments (for example, for age and sex only) can be made to average figures in case a 
more sophisticated way to establish a normative level is absent. Advantage of the use of 
historical figures, though, is the relatively smooth transition from a system in which the 
third party bears all the risk to a risk-sharing system. Disadvantage is that physicians are 
rewarded for inefficient behaviour in the previous years. Furthermore, a difference be-
tween norm and actual figures (i.e. volumes or costs) may very well result from factors 
exogenous to the physician. Patient characteristics, for instance, may have played a larger 
role then than the physicians’ behaviour. 
 The norm should at least meet two requirements. The first one is the requirement of 
fairness. The norm should account for those systematic factors of which the resulting 
costs can not be influenced by the physician. Secondly, the norm should meet the re-
quirement of incentive compatibility: the arrangement should provide the proper incen-
tives instead of provoking cream skimming, cost shifting or quality skimping. This asks 
for a more sophisticated norm within risk-sharing systems. Hence econometric modelling 
is vital. However, as in health care systems with a risk-adjusted capitation formula for 
calculating the health insurers’ budgets, the calculation of a risk-adjusted norm for physi-
cians proved to be difficult. The Fundholding experience has been a good demonstration 
of the permanent struggle to calculate a risk-adjusted capitation payment for practices 
participating in the scheme. If the bonus or malus is related to the difference between 
actual and normative costs, then the difficulties of calculating a norm will have conse-
quences for the calculation of bonuses and maluses. 
 Of course, there are alternatives to econometric modelling. Norms can be specified as 
a set quality level, like x percent compliance with guidelines or protocols. Norms may 
also be specified as a certain volume, like the number of referrals or prescriptions per 
patient per year. The scope of guidelines or protocols is, however, often limited to a set of 
specific diseases. Setting a norm in terms of a certain volume is an option. National or 
regional figures may be used, but again corrections have to be made for factors over 
which the physician has no control. Further, the GP can only influence the volume of 
care as a way to reduce his financial risk. In case of a norm expressed as a cost level, he 
may try to influence the volume as well as the price of care, or attempt to substitute rela-
tively inexpensive care for relatively expensive care. There is increased scope for the 
kind of behaviour of the GP the third party may aim for. 
 
Bonus, malus and withhold 
A bonus system may provide a cost-increasing or a cost-decreasing incentive, depending 
on whether actual costs should be higher or lower than the norm in order to receive a bo-
nus. In addition, a bonus may be proportional to this difference (the larger the difference, 
the larger the bonus) or inversely proportional (the more equal actual and normative costs 
are, the larger the bonus). From a third-party agent’s point of view an inversely propor-
tional system with a target may be preferable to a cost-decreasing proportional system 
with a threshold, for in the first system the norm makes the desired level of achievement 
explicit. The bonus is at its maximum if the norm is reached and the danger of adverse 
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physician behaviour is reduced to a minimum. A cost-decreasing system makes the de-
sired level of achievement less explicit and stimulates the physician to withhold care 
completely. Determining the optimal norm, however, is difficult. 
 For proportional bonus systems holds that, since in risk-sharing systems the risk is 
shared between third party and physician, the bonus has to be less than hundred percent. 
Only if risk-limiting measures are taken, then the bonus can equal the difference between 
norm and actual level. Hence the choice for a certain percentage should at least be related 
to the choice of the risk-limiting measures. 
 Another consideration for a third party in designing a bonus system is whether the 
bonus is varied per type of care. It is a way to refine the system and to adjust the amount 
of risk, for instance to the extent the GP can influence specific care or to the risk associ-
ated with the type of care. Hence the design of the bonus system should particularly be 
related to the design of the risk package. Disadvantages of a variable bonus system are 
the inherent danger of reduced or even undesirable substitution, and its complexity with 
connected administration costs. But if the risk package consists of different types of care 
and if the risk differs considerably per type of care, a variable bonus can be a useful re-
finement. Otherwise, a few episodes of an expensive disease may ruin the incentive sys-
tem.  
 
Limitation of the physician’s risk 
In general, the risk-limiting measures found in practice are rather simple as compared 
with the possible coinsurance or reinsurance systems described here. The use of one or 
more measures is necessary though, especially in view of the fact that the risk package 
and the bonus have to be substantial in order to reduce the possibility that cost shifting 
occurs and to stimulate the physician to behave in the desired way. 
 Coinsurance by means of a risk pool is a good way to increase the size of the popula-
tion for which the physicians are financially responsible, to spread the risk over a group 
of physicians and to make the physicians less vulnerable to random fluctuations in 
health-care costs. In determining the size of the risk pool, risk reduction has to be bal-
anced against financial incentives to behave cost-effectively. To retain these incentives, a 
physician group with a maximum of about ten physicians may well do. Each physician is 
responsible for ten percent of the surpluses or deficits then. 
 The maximum risk can and has to be bounded by upper limits, for a few expensive 
patients at the beginning of a financial period may ruin the incentive system or may even 
ruin the participating physicians. To this end, one of the reinsurance techniques has to be 
incorporated in the risk-sharing arrangement. Given the physicians’ limited capacity to 
bear financial risks, an ‘excess of loss per risk’ and a ‘stop-loss contract’ provide the best 
assurance. Alternatively, a ‘quota-share arrangement’ or a ‘n largest claims’ provision 
can be used. 
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8.3 Discussion 
 
In answer to the tenth research question: 
 
How should systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? 
 
we recommend to start carefully. Then an initial risk-sharing arrangement can have the 
following characteristics: 
- A limited risk package, for instance, consisting of drug costs only. 
- A risk contract for at least fifty percent of the practice population. 
- A norm at least partly based on historical figures in order to enable a relatively smooth 
transition from a risk-free to a risk-sharing system. 
- A simple bonus system. Whether it is a cost-decreasing proportional system or an in-
versely proportional system with a target depends on the third party’s goals. In case of 
a proportional system, the bonus (and malus) should be substantial, but should also be 
substantially less than hundred percent of the difference between norm and actual 
costs. If profit or loss is limited to a fixed amount, then a bonus (and malus) of around 
fifty percent results in an incentive that maintains longer than a bonus (and malus) of 
hundred percent. 
- An ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combination with a ‘stop-loss contract’. A group prac-
tice or a locum group, for instance, are an obvious choice to form a risk pool. 
 
If a ‘smooth’ transition has been made to a risk-sharing system, if third parties as well as 
physicians have gained experience with risk sharing and if the effects on behaviour and 
outcomes are known, then a less conservative arrangement can be considered. The ar-
rangement may then have the following characteristics: 
- A broad risk package from which expensive and ‘open-ended treatments’ are ex-
cluded. 
- A risk contract preferably for the whole practice population. 
- A norm that functions as a target and is risk-adjusted or based on an optimal level of 
care (or a combination of both). 
- A more sophisticated bonus system with a variable bonus. A third-party agent will 
probably prefer an inversely proportional system with a target as it makes the desired 
level of achievement explicit and adverse physician behaviour is less likely. Again, in 
a proportional system the bonus should be substantial but substantially less than hun-
dred percent, for instance fifty percent. 
- An ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combination with a ‘stop-loss contract’. A group prac-
tice or a locum group, for instance, are an obvious choice to form a risk pool. 
 
The five main aspects of a financial-risk sharing arrangement have to be balanced care-
fully. Each aspect partly determines the risk that is transferred from third-party agent to 
GP, but it is the ensemble of these aspects that is decisive. Altering the risk package or 
the population at risk will have consequences for the design of the bonus system and the 
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risk-limiting measures. Quantitative analysis is a crucial step then in the design of such 
arrangements. 
 Besides the five main aspects of financial-risk sharing arrangements, third parties may 
take some additional aspects into consideration while designing an arrangement. The 
bonus and the malus may be maximised. Further, the physician may be restricted in the 
use of the bonus. It may be arranged that the physician has to invest the bonus in patient 
care, instead of using it as additional income. 
 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are devoted to financial-risk sharing arrangements. Financial-risk 
sharing, however, is not used as an isolated technique. It is one form of control by incen-
tives (i.e. financial incentives), whereas controlling a physician is just one of the three 
phases of the managed-care cycle. Hence the third-party agent will and has to use finan-
cial-risk sharing in combination with other managed-care techniques. Initial selection 
strategies can be used to select cost-conscious and high-quality providers. Other control-
ling techniques can be used complementary to financial-risk sharing. Further, the third 
party has to monitor the physician’s behaviour and the outcome to know the effect of the 
arrangement. The acquired information can then be used as feedback and in re- or dese-
lecting decisions. 
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9  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Is there a rationale for financial-risk sharing between third-party agents and general prac-
titioners? And if so, how should systems of financial-risk sharing be structured? These 
are the two central questions of this research. These questions are relevant since incentive 
systems are viewed as an effective way to increase the efficiency of the health-care sec-
tor. As part of ongoing health-care reforms, third parties, like public or private health 
insurers, are stimulated to organise a more efficient health-care system of higher quality. 
Often, third parties are made financially responsible for a specified package of health-
care goods and services for a defined group of members (i.e. insured) and for a certain 
period of time. Third parties on their turn can use techniques to achieve the goals of effi-
ciency and high-quality care. Because general practitioners (GPs) have a large influence 
on the nature, the quantity, the quality and the costs of care, third parties may consider 
making arrangements with these physicians. Part of the arrangements may be the use of 
financial incentives, like the application of financial-risk sharing. 
 
The behaviour of physicians partially determines the efficiency of the health care sector. 
Given the worldwide interest in the efficiency of this sector, it is remarkable how little 
reliable empirical research has been done into the effect of financial incentives on the 
behaviour of physicians and the outcome of their actions. Also, little theoretical, concep-
tual research has been done. This holds especially for payment systems for GPs and for 
systems of financial-risk sharing. The main purpose of our study is to construct a concep-
tual framework for systems of financial-risk sharing between third parties and GPs. We 
will use this to analyse several examples of financial-risk sharing. Then we will see 
which lessons can be learned for the structuring of systems of financial-risk sharing. By 
this, we aim at contributing to the literature on payment systems for GPs. 
 Financial incentives are just one possible technique out of the set of potential tech-
niques the third party may use to try to influence the behaviour of GPs. In health care (the 
use of) such a set of techniques is often designated as ‘managed care’. Managed care is a 
rather diffuse concept that lacks a sound theoretical framework. Hence before creating a 
conceptual framework for systems of financial-risk sharing, we consider it necessary to 
provide managed care as a whole with a theoretical basis and a clear classification. By 
this, we aim at contributing to the literature on managed care. 
 In this research we used agency theory to analyse the relationship between third par-
ties and GPs. There are several reasons why we chose an agency perspective. A first 
reason is that agency theory seems to correspond well with the situation central in this 
thesis: the contractual relationships between two parties (that is, third-party agents and 
GPs) in which the one party (the principal) enters into a relationship with a second party 
(the agent) in the expectation that the agent’s actions are beneficial to the principal. Also, 
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a main focus of the theory on the use of (financial) incentives corresponds well with the 
subject of this thesis, namely financial-risk sharing. A decision rights approach could 
have shed an interesting light on the different kind of organisational arrangements be-
tween third parties and GPs, but questions of integration and ownership of assets are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Other considerations are that the use and the ownership 
of assets are less important issues in general practice than they are for instance in medical 
specialist care. Furthermore, there are hardly relation-specific assets. Regarding the ques-
tion of authority, we assumed that the professional and the physicians’ individual auton-
omy make it difficult for third parties to interfere in the patient-physician relationship in a 
way that differs from the ways in a market relationship. Hence we assumed that the pro-
fessional relationship with GPs makes that the agency problems within an employment 
situation do not significantly differ from the agency problems within a market relation-
ship. A final consideration was that GPs are often self-employed. 
 By applying agency theory to the several relationships between the patient, the GP, the 
third party and the so-called regulator, we constructed a theoretical framework that 
served as the theoretical background for the further analysis of the relationship between 
third parties and GPs. Firstly, we analysed what the agency function of third parties in 
health care involves. In order to provide the in health care familiar phenomenon ‘man-
aged care’ with a proper theoretical framework and a clear classification, we then ana-
lysed whether managed care can be placed within the framework of agency theory. Next, 
we analysed in depth one specific managed-care technique third-party agents may em-
ploy within their relationships with GPs: financial-risk sharing. We analysed and dis-
cussed the rationale for such risk-sharing arrangements and the way they can be struc-
tured, and evaluated several examples of such arrangements in practice. Finally, we dis-
cussed how systems of financial-risk sharing should be structured. 
 
 
9.2 Third-party agents and general practitioners 
 
The health-care sector is characterised by uncertainty at the demand side, by an asymme-
try of information between demanders and providers of care, and by the presence of ex-
ternal effects. These characteristics form a justification for the presence of a third party in 
health care, besides the patient (first party) and the provider of care (second party). The 
three main functions of a third party are: 
- the insurance function, which consists mainly of pooling risks and paying claims; 
- the agency function, which consists of buying care for a certain population, limiting 
moral hazard, and collecting and providing information about care; 
- the access function, which is about guaranteeing the accessibility of, at least, some 
basic health-care goods and services. 
In this study we focussed on one type of third party, namely a risk-bearing party that 
receives contributions for a defined group of members and for a certain period of time, 
and has the contractual or legal obligation to reimburse or to provide a specified package 
of health-care goods and services. More specific, we focussed on third parties that also 
act as agent on behalf of the insured. These third-party agents have to enter into relation-
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ships with providers of care in order to fulfil their role properly. From their viewpoint, 
the relationship with GPs may be of interest then, as these physicians often act as gate-
keepers and co-ordinators of medical services and have a considerable influence on the 
nature, the quantity, the quality and the costs of health care. 
 There are several ways the relationships between third parties and GPs can be struc-
tured. There are also several ways these relationships may be analysed and classified. We 
reviewed four classification schemes. Two major conclusions can be drawn then. Firstly, 
there are different approaches to the relationships, like a juridical, an organisational or a 
financial. Moreover, within a certain approach classification schemes focus on different 
aspects of the relationships. For instance, the option of an intermediary organisation (a 
middle tier) is sometimes overlooked. Secondly, the financial and the organisational sides 
of the relationships can differ considerably. These may vary from no direct relationship at 
all to full integration of both parties. Third parties may contract directly or indirectly (via 
a middle tier), pay physicians directly for the care provided or reimburse the insured, use 
several payment systems, et cetera. Further, a middle tier may translate a contract con-
cluded with a third party into an altered contract with the physicians and change, for 
instance, the payment system. 
 
 
9.3 Agency theory 
 
Relationships between third parties and GPs are characterised by the presence of un-
equally distributed information and conflicting interests. Agency theory focuses on the 
relationship between two parties, specifically addresses the problems of asymmetric in-
formation and conflicting interests, and proposes strategies to deal with such problems 
(for instance, by suggesting optimal contract designs). In this theory, a principal commis-
sions an agent to perform actions for, or on behalf of him. Their relationship is character-
ised by asymmetric information and conflicting interests. The agent has more information 
about his intentions, his actions or the circumstances upon which he bases his actions and 
may have other goals than the principal. As a result, problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard may arise. Moreover, the principal may have problems drawing conclusions 
about the agent’s efforts from the outcome, because in many agency relationships the 
outcome is uncertain due to external factors over which the agent has no control. 
 Some modifications of the traditional assumptions of the theory of agency have been 
proposed. These relate to the assumptions of goal conflict and opportunistic behaviour, 
the rationality of principal and agent, the programmability of the agent’s tasks, the meas-
urability of the outcome, the number of agents, and the duration of the relationship. 
 There are different strategies to handle the problems of agency relationships. In this 
thesis, we classified these strategies into three groups. Firstly, the principal may select an 
agent who is expected to behave in the principal’s best interests. Then, the principal may 
try to control the agent. Different controlling strategies are control by incentives, control 
by persuasion or information, and control by directive or authority. By monitoring the 
agent, the principal may reduce the information gap and stimulate the agent to act in the 
principal’s interests. 
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 To accomplish desired behaviour, the principal has to incur monitoring and controlling 
costs. The agent may have to incur so-called bonding costs (expenses the agent has to 
incur when avoiding harming the principal or ensuring that the principal is compensated 
in case he acts contrary to the principal’s best interests). Despite all the efforts, there still 
may be a residual loss due to the divergence between the realised outcome and the out-
come the principal had in mind. Total agency costs are minimised by searching for a 
level of equilibrium between the monitoring and controlling plus bonding costs on the 
one hand and the residual loss on the other hand. 
 
 
9.4 Agency and health care 
 
Agency theory is not specifically aimed at relationships in health care, but in view of the 
characteristics of these relationships its use here seems justified. Regarding the relation-
ship between patient and physician, some authors have even pointed at it as an obvious 
example of an agency relationship. Although less prominent, also the relationship be-
tween a third party and a physician has been described in agency terms. 
 Health-care relationships are not straightforward agency relationships, and in several 
respects they differ from the standard agency ones. Firstly, in the relationship with a GP 
the conflict of interests may be relatively small because of professional norms and values, 
social control by peers, et cetera that may guide him. Moreover, as a professional the 
physician may include at least part of the patient’s interests in his own objectives. Sec-
ondly, the relationship between patient and GP usually is a lengthy or repeated one. This 
may stimulate the physician not to pursue solely his own interests. Poor performance may 
prompt the patient to terminate or not to renew the relationship and may also ruin the 
physician’s reputation. Thirdly, due to his superior knowledge and experience, it will 
often be the agent (i.e. the physician) instead of the principal (i.e. the patient) who defines 
the goals that are attainable. Paradoxically, where in agency theory the information 
asymmetry is viewed as problematic, here the relatively ill-informed patient thus enters 
an agency relationship hoping for and trusting in the physician’s superior knowledge and 
experience. Fourthly, the physician’s informational advantage gives him the opportunity 
to induce the patient’s demand for his goods or services. Although inducing demand is 
what a physician-as-agent should do, the physician may be able to persuade the patient to 
demand more goods or services than the patient probably would have demanded if he 
were as informed as his physician is. If the patient has health insurance then a special 
form of supplier-induced demand, namely supplier-induced moral hazard, may occur. 
Finally, the presence of a third party results in a triangular relationship. The third party 
may influence the information the patient and the physician possess as well as their inter-
ests (for instance, because of the altered financial incentives they face as a result of the 
presence of health insurance offered by the third party). Also, the presence and role of a 
third party has external effects since he has to take into account the preferences of other 
insured. Another effect of the presence of a third party is that it will be the third party, 
instead of the patient himself, who will make the contractual arrangements with the phy-
sician and try to promote that the physician acts in the patients best interests. This leaves 
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the patient as a principal with only a very limited set of techniques to influence the be-
haviour of the GP. 
 In spite of the fact that health-care relationships differ from standard agency relation-
ships, the agency characteristics and the resulting agency problems are obviously present 
within the relationships described here. Hence agency theory is well applicable to rela-
tionships in the health care sector in general, and to the relationship between the third-
party agent and the GP in particular. 
 
We constructed a theoretical framework then that consists of four agency relationships 
and that provides the rationale for the use by a third party of strategies in order to influ-
ence the GPs. 
 The first agency relationship is between the patient (the principal) and the GP (the 
agent). Because of asymmetric information and diverging interests, the patient may en-
counter problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In order to reduce the agency 
problems he may face within his relationship with the physician and to reduce his finan-
cial risk, the patient may want to enter into a relationship with a third-party agent; the 
second agency relationship. He may face difficulties then in selecting the third-party 
agent who will serve his interests best. 
 Once selected, the third-party agent is supposed to take measures to reduce the prob-
lems the patient may encounter within his relationship with the GP. To be an effective 
agent, the third party will have to enter into a relationship with the physician; the third 
agency relationship. Whether the third party is indeed an agent that serves the patient’s 
best interests, is part of the problems within the second agency relationship. 
 The fourth agency relationship of the framework is the relationship between the third-
party agent and the so-called regulator. In spite of the several techniques available to the 
insured, like (de)selection, control and monitoring, the insured’s weak position creates a 
need for a regulator. The regulator should reduce the problems the insured may have 
within his relationship with the third-party agent and stimulate the latter to serve the insu-
red’s interests. A regulator may, for instance, further (managed) competition between 
third parties, provide information and institute supervision. 
 
Within this framework, it is supposed that the insured as well as the regulator stimulate 
the third-party agent to gain information about the insured’s preferences and to take 
measures in order to improve the agency relationship between patient and physician. 
Hence starting from standard agency theory, one might expect to find a third-party agent 
controlling and monitoring a selected group of physicians. For several reasons, like the 
presence of positive transaction costs and professional norms, the factual arrangements 
may differ from the theoretical arrangements, though. Moreover, it has been argued that 
relationships in health care may deviate from standard agency relationships. The question 
is therefore to what extent third-party agents actually use the three main strategies (select-
ing, controlling and monitoring) within their relationships with GPs. 
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9.5 Agency and managed care 
 
The three main strategies derived from agency theory may result in the use of several 
techniques by the principal to further the outcome he aims for. Interestingly, we find such 
techniques within relationships between third-party agents and GPs as well. In health 
care (the use of) such a set of techniques is usually designated as ‘managed care’. Al-
though the term managed care is frequently used, a proper theoretical framework and a 
clear classification are lacking. We argued that the managed-care techniques fit in the 
triptych of agency theory remarkably well. We then pictured this triptych (selecting, 
controlling and monitoring) as three successive phases, together forming an iterative 
process: the agency cycle. Hence from the perspective of agency theory, managed care 
can be viewed as (the cyclical use of) a set of techniques by which the third-party agent 
attempts to influence the GP’s behaviour in a way beneficial to the patient. We called this 
cyclical use the managed-care cycle. 
 Despite the difficulties associated with it, the selection and contracting of (primary 
care) physicians is regarded to be a crucial aspect of managed care. Some consider care-
ful selection of physicians with a conservative practice style even to be the best guarantee 
of cost-effective and high-quality care. Research indicates that third parties prefer the 
selection of physicians before concluding contracts instead of ‘pruning later’. The latter 
may be easier as more information about (the behaviour of) the physicians may be ac-
quired, but it will be more difficult to change the physicians’ behaviour by then or to get 
rid of them afterwards. However, selecting and then contracting the selected physicians is 
not simple. Selection requires sufficient and reliable qualitative information and quantita-
tive data about the physicians’ behaviour controlled for, for instance, practice size and 
case mix. Enhancing self-selection of physicians may reduce the selection problem, 
though. Once a subset of physicians is selected, they have to be contracted. Selective 
contracting requires an oversupply of physicians (in order to have a real choice), legal 
possibilities to contract selectively, the co-operation of individual physicians (the ‘partici-
pation constraint’) or of the profession as a whole and, last but not least, the consent of 
the insured. 
 The second phase of the managed-care cycle is controlling the physician. One promi-
nent means to control the physician, the use of (financial) incentives, may help to stimu-
late the physician to choose from a set of possible actions the alternative that is most 
beneficial to the third party (and the patient as well). Financial incentives may emanate 
from the basic payment system and from ancillary payment systems. Predominant basic 
systems to pay GPs are fee for service, capitation and salary. Ancillary payments may be 
function-related, behaviour-related or outcome-related. Contrary to a function-related fee, 
behaviour- and outcome-related fees are made contingent upon an ex-post check on the 
way the specified services are provided and on the effects of the physician’s behaviour 
respectively. A bonus system is one form of an ancillary payment. The third party may 
use mixed (blended) payment systems in order to balance the incentives from the several 
basic and ancillary payment systems. A mixed system may, for instance, balance the 
incentives for undesirable behaviour, like cream skimming and quality skimping, and 
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efficient behaviour as well as the incentives for quality efforts across contractible and 
noncontractible dimensions of quality. 
 Another way to control GPs by means of an incentive system is by their assignment to 
the gatekeeper function. The physician is stimulated to refer patients to other providers of 
care only if necessary. As it is a weak incentive, gatekeeping is often combined with 
other techniques. 
 Practice guidelines, physician or practice profiling and utilisation-management tech-
niques are other prominent means to control physicians. Some of these techniques, like 
guidelines and profiling, aim at informing the physician and persuading him to perform 
the desired actions. Other techniques, like (pre-)admission review, mandatory second 
opinion and continued-stay review, aim at restricting the physician’s choice. These tech-
niques are sometimes viewed as an infringement on the professional autonomy or the 
individual physician’s autonomy. However, an infringement on the individual physician’s 
autonomy is exactly what is aimed at here and what is considered as a way to ensure that 
the patients’ interests are served best. Whether such techniques are an infringement on 
the professional autonomy, depends on the role of the profession in designing and con-
ducting the managed-care techniques. An association or a college of physicians, for in-
stance, may issue practice guidelines. An example of practice guidelines are the eighty 
NHG-Practice Guidelines, developed by the Dutch College of General Practitioners 
(NHG). The same holds for monitoring physicians. Peer review is a widely accepted way 
of monitoring physicians by physicians themselves. In both examples the individual 
autonomy is in question but the professional autonomy is maintained. Because of this 
professional autonomy, physicians will prefer managed-care techniques designed or is-
sued by the profession itself to techniques of a relative outsider, like a health insurer. 
Because of their individual autonomy, they will probably prefer control by incentives and 
control by persuasion or information to control by directives or authority. By means of 
directives or authority the physicians’ actions are restricted in an almost coercive way. 
Choosing an alternative action is still an option, but at the risk of sanctions. 
 The final phase of the managed-care cycle is monitoring the physician. One goal is 
revealing information about the behaviour of the physician or the outcome of the process 
to which the physician contributed. In this way, the third party may try to reduce the in-
formational advantage of the physician. A second goal is to reduce the information gap 
between physician and third party by informing the physician about his (relative) per-
formance. 
 Managed care requires a relationship between third-party agent and physician. Within 
this relationship the several techniques may be used in combination with each other. The 
use of managed care gains in effectiveness if the three successive phases of the managed-
care cycle, i.e. selection, control and monitoring, are designed and used coherently. 
 
A problem for the third-party agent is that the outcome in terms of the patient’s health 
status is uncertain and will only partially result from the GP’s actions. It will result from 
the natural course of the disease, the medical treatment, the behaviour of the patient, and 
other health influencing factors. As a result, the third-party agent will have problems 
assessing the appropriateness of the physician’s actions. Hence contracts that will specify 
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(all) possible outcomes and that, for instance, relate payments to factual outcomes are not 
common in health care. The majority of managed-care techniques focus on the behaviour 
of the physicians. Monitoring of physicians and analysing claim data may reveal impor-
tant information then. Indeed, some third parties adjust their payments to physicians on 
the basis of utilisation, cost or quality measures, consumer surveys, physician productiv-
ity or other measures. 
 As the outcome in terms of health status will be the result of many factors, it is diffi-
cult to make the physician responsible for a negative outcome. The volume and the costs 
of the care provided, however, are closely related to physician’s actions. Hence the third 
party may design a payment system with incentives that are directed at the volume or the 
costs of care. An example of such a system is financial-risk sharing, by which means the 
third party shares the responsibility for the costs of care with the physician. To safeguard 
the quality of care, the risk-sharing system has to be designed carefully and will addi-
tional controlling and monitoring techniques be necessary. 
 
 
9.6 Financial-risk sharing in theory 
 
The rationale for financial-risk sharing 
A function of a third-party agent is to provide insurance against the insurance risk. This 
risk results from the incidence of illness, which has largely a stochastic nature. In return 
for an insurance premium, the risk is transferred from the insured to the third-party agent. 
This transfer involves a second risk, though, which is labelled here the risk of imperfect 
agency. It consists of the risk of the provision of cost-ineffective care, which mainly 
results from over-provision and inappropriate care, and of the risk of underprovision of 
care. The risk of imperfect agency may result from agency problems within the relation-
ship between patient and physician, and from the presence of health insurance. Health 
insurance may lead to consumer-induced moral hazard as well as to supplier-induced 
moral hazard. 
 As the provision of health care is to large extent at the GP’s discretion, the third-party 
agent may focus on this physician in order to reduce the size of the risk of imperfect 
agency. Once the third-party agent has taken over the insurance risk and the risk of im-
perfect agency from the insured, it may choose between four strategies to handle them. 
The first option is risk bearing in which the third party accepts the risk of imperfect 
agency as well as the insurance risk. This option is not very well compatible with the 
agency function, because the third party makes no attempt to influence the way health 
care is delivered. The second option is risk shifting in which the third party shifts both 
risks to individual physicians or to a group of physicians. The physicians become respon-
sible for the insurance risk then, which however is typically a third-party function. The 
responsibility for both risks may prompt the physicians to take, from the third-party 
agent’s viewpoint, undesirable measures to reduce their risk. An example of such unde-
sirable behaviour is cream skimming. In the third option, risk splitting, the third party 
attempts to separate both risks after which it shifts the risk of imperfect agency to the 
physicians. Theoretically, this middle coarse between risk bearing and risk shifting may 
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be the most satisfactory solution. In practice, however, it will be very hard to separate 
both risks. The final option is risk sharing. Just like the third option, this option has the 
advantage of being a middle course between risk bearing and risk shifting. The difficulty 
of separating both risks is evaded though. A side-effect is that a part of the insurance risk 
is shifted to the (group of) physicians. 
 In a financial-risk sharing arrangement, the third-party agent stimulates the GP to 
reduce the amount of cost-ineffective care. Because the risk is shared, the incentives for 
over-provision and for underprovision can be balanced. Shifting a part of the risk (i.e. 
risk sharing) and the accompanying responsibilities has also the advantage that the deci-
sion-making is placed at a lower level (closer to the patient). The effectiveness of such an 
arrangement, however, depends on its specific financial and organisational design. The 
more the arrangement has the effect of the risk-shifting option, the stronger are both the 
incentives for cost-effective behaviour and for undesirable physician behaviour. There 
are at least three obvious forms of undesirable behaviour that a GP may show if he is at 
risk. In case of cream skimming the physician selects patients for whom the expected 
costs are lower than the reimbursement. In case of cost shifting the physician substitutes 
care for which he is not financially responsible for care for which he is. In case of quality 
skimping care is postponed or even withheld, efforts are reduced, et cetera. 
 
The structure of risk-sharing arrangements 
Financial-risk sharing arrangements have five main aspects that the third-party agent has 
to take into consideration while drawing up the arrangement. These aspects are the risk 
package, the size of the practice population, the normative level of care, the bonus sys-
tem, and the limitation of the physician’s risk. 
 A first crucial aspect is the scope of package of goods and services for which the phy-
sician is financially responsible, i.e. the design of the risk package. The type of care in-
cluded will determine the probability that the physician incurs costs as well as the vari-
ability of the costs, given costs are made. For some types of care it will be easier to diag-
nose and to estimate the costs of treatment, which is especially important if the GP has to 
arrange and pay for follow-up care. Other matters to take into consideration are whether 
the risk package is divided into separate cost categories and whether the risk package 
influences the behaviour of other providers of care. 
 The second aspect is the size of the practice population or the proportion of it for 
which the physician is financially responsible. The relative and the absolute size of this 
population determine the magnitude of the incentives, the ability of the physician to shift 
costs to other parties and the extent that the physician is vulnerable to random fluctua-
tions in the costs. 
 A third aspect is the normative level of care. The third party may define a norm, for 
instance a certain volume of care or a cost level, with which (the outcome of) the physi-
cian’s behaviour is compared. This is probably the most difficult part of the arrangement. 
It is hard to determine an optimal level of care that is medically necessary and needs-
based as well as cost-effective. An obvious way to determine a norm, then, is to use ac-
tual costs. In that case, a norm may be based on historical costs or on average costs. More 
sophisticated is econometric modelling to determine a norm that is adjusted for system-
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atic differences in health status and for some of the other systematic factors, in so far as 
the physician can not influence them. 
 A fourth aspect is the bonus system. Eventually, the physician’s financial responsibil-
ity may find expression in a bonus. A bonus is an ancillary payment paid if the physician 
has met certain requirements (like a financial norm). The negative variant of it is the 
malus, which the physician has to pay if he has not met the requirement. A bonus may be 
a fixed amount, may be proportional to the difference between actual and normative costs 
(the larger the difference, the larger the bonus) or may be inversely proportional to the 
difference between actual and normative costs (the smaller the difference, the larger the 
bonus). Other variants are systems in which the norm functions as a threshold (a bonus or 
a malus if the threshold is exceeded) or those in which the norm functions as a target (a 
bonus if the target is achieved). 
 The fifth aspect is the limitation of the physician’s risk by means of additional meas-
ures. These measures are considered additional because the amount of risk is in the first 
instance the result of the risk package, the practice population, et cetera. The difficulty of 
separating the insurance risk from the risk of imperfect agency makes that the physician 
is also responsible for (a part of) the insurance risk. Without limiting this risk, there is a 
chance that the physician shows undesirable behaviour, that the incentive system will 
malfunction or that the physician is ruined. The incentive system may not function prop-
erly due to a few expensive patients in the first part of the financial year. 
 One way of risk reduction is reinsurance. A GP who has taken over part of the third 
party’s risk may on his turn insure his liabilities. Although in the regular insurance indus-
try reinsurance usually results in a risk contract with a second insurer (the reinsurer), in 
the present risk-sharing arrangements the third-party agent may function as a kind of 
reinsurer as well. Reinsurance is then a part of the financial arrangement between third 
party and physician. Not only may this result in lower costs, it also has the advantage that 
the third-party agent may balance the incentives from the reimbursement system with the 
incentives from the reinsurance system. Examples of reinsurance systems are a ‘quota-
share arrangement’, an ‘excess of loss per risk’, ‘an excess of loss per occurrence’, or a 
‘stop loss’. 
 Another way to reduce the physician’s risk is by means of risk pooling. In a risk-
pooling arrangement a group of (primary care) physicians share together, possibly with 
other providers of care, in the rewards and penalties from surpluses and deficits in the 
budget(s) for a defined health-care package. Several variables determine the incentives 
emanating from the risk-pool arrangement, like the number of physicians or other pro-
viders, the number of patients, the proximity of the members of the pool (within the same 
building or scattered over a large region), et cetera. Other ways to vary the arrangements 
are by creating a multi-pool system and by adding one ore more intermediate organisa-
tions: the so-called middle tiers. This results in a myriad of options to allocate the finan-
cial risk. 
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9.7 Financial-risk sharing in practice 
 
In some health care systems GPs are being put at risk for follow-up costs, like drug or 
hospital costs. This is no new phenomenon, since already in the first half of the twentieth 
century several third parties concluded risk contracts with physicians. Examples are the 
‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ in the Netherlands. Also the first Prepaid 
Group Practices in the United States are an example of early risk-sharing systems. Goal 
of the ‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ was to reduce the costs of drugs in 
order to keep insurance premiums affordable and to enable a rise in the payments for 
medical specialists. The systems were indeed successful in curbing drug costs, but the 
restricted risk package stimulated the physicians to refer their patients. For several other 
reasons though, the systems were abolished during and after the Second World War. 
Another Dutch experience, the bonus-malus experiment in Tilburg during the 1980s, was 
also rather successful but was not followed by a permanent risk-sharing system. 
 Besides several Dutch systems, also British and North-American experiences with risk 
sharing were examined. In the United Kingdom, GPs could apply for fundholding status 
and receive a budget for follow-up care. They acted as purchasers of a health-care pack-
age on behalf of their practice population. Whether General Practice Fundholding was 
successful may always be up for discussion. The evidence suggests that fundholders 
managed to reduce the costs of some parts of their risk package, especially the costs of 
prescribing drugs. As the savings had to be used to improve patient care, it is likely that 
patients benefited from new services, quicker access to hospital care et cetera. As fund-
holders were smaller purchasers than Health Authorities, they were more flexible and 
were more able to shop around. The criticism that fundholding created a two-tier system 
indeed suggests that the system had positive effects and that fundholders’ patients reaped 
the benefits of it. Whether this was at the expense of the patients of non-fundholders, 
remains a question to be answered. There is no evidence that the system provoked unde-
sirable physician behaviour, like cream skimming or cost shifting. 
 Managed-care organisations in the US have a wide, but not always successful experi-
ence with risk sharing. Two cases were examined more in depth. Perhaps the most fa-
mous failure in the history of managed care is the United-Healthcare experience. United 
Healthcare contracted individual primary care physicians and shared the risks with them. 
The physicians had to act as gatekeepers and who had to control the volume and costs of 
their patients’ health care. A very limited use of the large set of managed-care techniques 
and wrong choices in the design of the system finally resulted in the termination of the 
plan. The Blue Cross managed-care program Blue Plus seems to have been a more suc-
cessful initiative. The financial incentives applied by Blue Plus, especially capitation but 
also fee for service with a withhold provision, seemed to reduce costs. Main difference 
with United Healthcare was that Blue Plus contracted medical group practices. These 
practices on their turn applied several managed-care techniques, including financial in-
centives linked to, for instance, individual physician productivity or the financial per-
formance of the group. 
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The effects of different systems of financial-risk sharing 
We described different risk-sharing arrangements here. The majority of these experiences 
at least indicate an effect of them on the behaviour of the GPs or primary care physicians. 
The ‘Zaanland system’ and the ‘Amsterdam system’ showed savings in the sickness 
funds’ drug budgets. The ‘Tilburg’ experiment demonstrated a decrease in the number of 
referrals and hospitalisation days, as well as a slower increase in the number of physio-
therapy treatments and in the costs of drugs. GP Fundholding appeared to be successful, 
for instance, in reducing (drug) costs and waiting times for specialist care, decreasing the 
number of hospital referrals and increasing the number of day case treatments. Blue Plus 
demonstrated reduced cost, both at the plan level and the physician level, although the 
effect differed per payment method. Less successful was United Healthcare, although 
costs per enrolee decreased spectacularly after structural financial and organisational 
changes were implemented. Whether this decrease resulted from altered physician behav-
iour or whether it, for instance, resulted from a selective disenrollment of high-cost in-
sured is unclear. 
 Although the evidence indicates a differential effect of financial-risk sharing systems 
on the performance of GPs as agents for their patients, definite findings are especially 
hampered by methodological problems. A proper research design is often lacking. This 
makes it difficult to judge to what extent the physician’s behaviour is affected by other 
(financial) incentives, by other managed-care techniques or by external factors. Further, 
studies of risk-sharing arrangements often provide little information on the quality of 
care, whereas this is an important outcome measure for judging the physicians’ function-
ing as their patients’ agents. 
 
 
9.8 Towards a system of financial-risk sharing 
 
Important lessons can be derived from the analysis of the theoretical and the practical 
models of financial-risk sharing. For several reasons these lessons are not definitive 
enough to devise a normative model of financial-risk sharing, though. Firstly, the practi-
cal examples that we analysed are limited in number. Hence the conclusions derived 
from these examples can not straightforwardly be applied to other health care systems. 
Further, econometric research is crucial in the design of a financial-risk sharing model. 
The several aspects of financial-risk sharing together determine the amount of risk that is 
transferred from third-party agent to GP and have to be balanced accurately. Finally, the 
ultimate form of financial-risk sharing will, for instance, differ per country and per health 
care system, will depend on the GPs’ role and position, will depend on the preferences of 
the GP, and will be determined by the goals the third-party agent wants to achieve. Nev-
ertheless, we have made a distinction between the design of an initial risk-sharing ar-
rangement and the ultimate arrangement. The initial arrangement is characterised by: 
- a limited risk package (for instance, drug costs only); 
- a risk contract for at least fifty percent of the practice population; 
 
9  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 211 
- a norm (partly) based on historical figures to enable a relatively smooth transition to a 
risk-sharing system; 
- a simple bonus system; 
- an ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combination with a ‘stop-loss contract’, and a group 
practice or a locum group as risk pool. 
A less conservative arrangement can be considered if a ‘smooth’ transition has been 
made to a risk-sharing system, third parties as well as physicians have gained experience 
with risk sharing and the effects on behaviour and outcomes are known. The arrangement 
may then be characterised by: 
- a broad risk package from which expensive and ‘open-ended treatments’ are excluded; 
- a risk contract preferably for the whole practice population; 
- a norm that is adjusted for the patients’ needs for care, that to some extent can predict 
future health-care costs, that is based on an optimal level of care and that functions as 
a target; 
- a more sophisticated bonus system with a variable bonus, preferably an inversely pro-
portional bonus system in combination with a norm as target; 
- an ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combination with a ‘stop-loss contract’, and a group 
practice or a locum group as risk pool. 
Regarding the bonus system, a third-party agent probably prefers an inversely propor-
tional bonus with a norm as target as this makes explicit which goals should be achieved 
and as it makes adverse physician behaviour less likely. In case of a (inversely) propor-
tional system, the bonus or malus should be substantial but less than hundred percent. 
Approximately fifty percent seems a good starting point then, but eventually a decision 
on the percentage will have to be taken in conjunction with the other aspects of financial-
risk sharing. 
 It is crucial to balance all the aspects of a financial-risk sharing arrangement, the five 
main aspects and the additional aspects as well, very carefully. Furthermore, financial 
risk-sharing has to be accompanied by other techniques out of the managed-care cycle. 
Ideally, all the three phases of the managed-care cycle are represented in the design of the 
arrangement. Only then a risk-sharing arrangement may be acquired that helps to achieve 
the third-party agent’s goals of efficient and high-quality care. 
 
 
9.9 Epilogue 
 
Although the behaviour of GPs partially determines the efficiency of the health-care 
sector, only little empirical and theoretical conceptual research has been done into the 
(effects of) financial incentives that may influence this behaviour. This holds especially 
for financial-risk sharing between third parties and GPs, but also for the broader set of 
managed-care techniques that the third party may use in an attempt to influence the be-
haviour of GPs. By constructing a conceptual framework for financial-risk sharing, by 
using this for the analysis of examples of risk-sharing systems, and by learning lessons 
for the structuring of such systems, we aimed at contributing to the literature on payment 
systems for GPs. By linking agency theory and managed care and by classifying the dif-
 
AGENCY, MANAGED CARE AND FINANCIAL-RISK SHARING IN GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
 212 
ferent techniques and bringing them in connection with each other by means of the man-
aged-care cycle, we also aimed at contributing to the literature on managed care. These 
contributions are relevant because payment systems, financial-risk sharing and the other 
managed-care techniques are important issues in the worldwide discussion about improv-
ing the efficiency of health care. Based on the here described theoretical and empirical 
findings, we think there are good reasons to implement financial-risk sharing between 
third parties en GPs in those health-care systems in which the third party bears all the 
risks. For those systems though further econometric research may be necessary, and ex-
perimenting will have to prove whether the introduction of financial-risk sharing is at-
tainable and desirable. 
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SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIE 
 
 
1 Inleiding 
 
‘De vernieuwing van het verzekeringsstelsel zal er aan bijdragen dat de verzekeraars 
hogere eisen zullen gaan stellen aan hun contracten met zorgaanbieders, zowel kwalitatief 
als financieel. Verruiming van de contracteermogelijkheden voor verzekeraars en aanbie-
ders, prestatiegerichte bekostigingssystemen (…) en het beschikbaar komen van vergelij-
kende informatie over prestaties van zorgaanbieders ondersteunen deze ontwikkeling’ 
(Tweede Kamer 2003-2004, blz. 5). Deze passage uit de Memorie van toelichting bij het 
wetsvoorstel Zorgverzekeringswet schetst hoe de toenmalige Nederlandse regering de 
relatie tussen zorgverzekeraars en zorgaanbieders in het nieuwe verzekeringsstelsel voor 
zich zag. De Zorgverzekeringswet (ingevoerd per 1 januari 2006) geeft zorgverzekeraars 
meer invloed dan voorheen en draagt ertoe bij dat zij kunnen optreden als onderhande-
lingspartners van de zorgaanbieders. Door de in de Memorie van toelichting genoemde 
contracteermogelijkheden, zoals het (selectief) contracteren, het honoreren op basis van 
prestaties en het vergelijken van prestaties, kunnen zorgverzekeraars bijdragen aan het 
bereiken van de doelstellingen van het nieuwe zorgverzekeringsstelsel: meer doelmatig-
heid, minder centrale sturing en een goede toegankelijkheid. 
 Het onderscheid tussen ziekenfondsverzekering en particuliere verzekering is met de 
invoering van de Zorgverzekeringswet opgeheven. Aangezien in de financieringsstruc-
tuur voor de huisartsenzorg dit onderscheid nog steeds bestond, was een ingrijpende 
wijziging van deze financieringsstructuur noodzakelijk. Al meerdere keren, waaronder in 
2001 door de Commissie toekomstige financieringsstructuur huisartsenzorg (de ‘Com-
missie Tabaksblat’), was een uniforme financieringsstructuur geadviseerd. Het zou echter 
tot medio 2005 duren voordat de Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging, het ministerie van 
VWS en Zorgverzekeraars Nederland het (met behulp van een bemiddelaar) eens werden 
over de wijze van uniformeren. Het belangrijkste punt van discussie vormde juist de 
bovengenoemde invloed die zorgverzekeraars over de beroepsgroep zouden krijgen. Zo 
was het oorspronkelijk de bedoeling dat zorgverzekeraars de zeggenschap kregen over 
een bedrag van € 138 miljoen, wat neerkwam op 20 procent van de praktijkkostenver-
goeding die huisartsen tot dan toe kregen uitbetaald (ofwel circa 10 procent van de ma-
crokosten van huisartsenzorg). Na protesten van de beroepsgroep werd dit bedrag ver-
volgens teruggebracht tot € 25 miljoen voor 2006, waarmee de invloed van de zorgver-
zekeraars weer werd beperkt. 
 Toch zijn er tussen de Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging, het ministerie van VWS en 
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland enkele opmerkelijke afspraken gemaakt. De verplichting 
voor zorgverzekeraars om vrije beroepsbeoefenaren, waaronder huisartsen, te contracte-
ren is al in 1992 afgeschaft. Doordat echter is afgesproken dat huisartsen voor het ver-
krijgen van een belangrijk deel van hun omzet een contract nodig hebben, lijkt er nu 
vanaf 2006 een omgekeerde contracteerplicht te zijn ingevoerd. Ten tweede zijn er af-
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spraken gemaakt over het versterken van de poortwachters- en spilfunctie van de huis-
arts, over substitutie van tweede- naar eerstelijnszorg en over het voorschrijfbeleid van 
geneesmiddelen. De besparingen die deze afspraken moeten gaan opleveren zullen wor-
den gebruikt voor de financiering van de huisartsenzorg. Er is daardoor sprake van een 
directe relatie tussen de prestaties van de beroepsgroep en de honorering ervan. Ten der-
de is afgesproken dat een stijging van het aantal contacten per patiënt per jaar met de 
huisartspraktijk zal leiden tot een verlaging van de consulttarieven. Omgekeerd zal een 
daling leiden tot een verhoging van de consulttarieven. Onduidelijk is voor hoeveel jaar 
deze afspraak zal gelden, maar voor de desbetreffende periode betekent deze in ieder 
geval dat het financiële risico voor zorgverzekeraars betreffende het volume van huisart-
senzorg is afgewenteld op de beroepsgroep. 
 Het verschuiven van (een deel van) het financiële risico van zorgverzekeraars naar 
(een groep van) huisartsen is het onderwerp van dit onderzoek. Daarbij staan de volgende 
twee vragen centraal: 
 
1. Zijn er argumenten voor financiële-risicodeling tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen? 
2. Zo ja, hoe zouden systemen waarin het financiële risico wordt gedeeld moeten worden 
vormgegeven? 
 
Deze vragen zijn relevant omdat (financiële) prikkels in toenemende mate worden gezien 
als een effectieve manier om de doelmatigheid in de gezondheidszorg te vergroten. Een 
belangrijk onderdeel van hervormingen van de gezondheidszorg in het algemeen en van 
het zorgverzekeringsstelsel in het bijzonder is dat zogenaamde derde partijen, zoals pu-
bliek- of privaatrechtelijke zorgverzekeraars, worden geprikkeld om de efficiency en de 
kwaliteit van de gezondheidszorg te verbeteren. De bovenbeschreven invoering van de 
Zorgverzekeringswet is een voorbeeld van dergelijke hervormingen. Veelal worden 
zorgverzekeraars daarbij gedurende een bepaalde periode ten behoeve van een omschre-
ven populatie verzekerden financieel verantwoordelijk gesteld voor een omschreven 
(basis-)verzekeringspakket. Op deze wijze worden zorgverzekeraars geprikkeld om door 
toepassing van diverse technieken de gestelde doelen van efficiency en kwaliteit te beha-
len. Contracteren van zorgaanbieders is dan een manier om invloed uit te oefenen op 
onder meer de wijze waarop en de prijs waartegen zorg wordt geleverd. Huisartsen zijn 
daarbij een interessante partij voor zorgverzekeraars, omdat zij door hun rol en positie 
een grote invloed hebben op de aard, het volume, de kwaliteit en de kosten van de zorg. 
Zorgverzekeraars kunnen in hun contracten met huisartsen afspraken maken over het 
gebruik van financiële prikkels, bijvoorbeeld door toepassing van financiële-risicodeling. 
 
Het gedrag van artsen is mede bepalend voor de doelmatigheid van de gezondheidszorg. 
Gezien de wereldwijde belangstelling voor de doelmatigheid van de zorg, is het dan ook 
opmerkelijk hoe weinig betrouwbaar empirisch onderzoek er is naar het effect van finan-
ciële prikkels op het gedrag van artsen en op de uitkomsten van hun handelen. Er is ook 
betrekkelijk weinig theoretisch, conceptueel onderzoek voorhanden. Dit geldt vooral 
voor de honorering van huisartsen en voor financiële-risicodeling. Belangrijkste doelstel-
ling van ons onderzoek is het creëren van een conceptueel raamwerk voor systemen van 
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financiële-risicodeling tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen. Dit gebruiken we om ver-
schillende praktijkvoorbeelden van financiële-risicodeling te analyseren. Hieruit zullen 
we vervolgens lessen trekken voor op te zetten systemen van risicodeling. We willen 
hiermee een bijdrage leveren aan de literatuur over honoreringssystemen voor huisartsen. 
 Financiële prikkels vormen echter slechts één mogelijkheid uit de set potentiële tech-
nieken die de zorgverzekeraar kan gebruiken om te trachten het gedrag van huisartsen te 
beïnvloeden. Deze set, of het gebruik ervan, wordt wel aangeduid met de term ‘managed 
care’. Managed care is een diffuus begrip en mist een heldere theoretische inbedding. 
Voordat we een conceptueel raamwerk voor systemen van financiële-risicodeling tussen 
zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen creëren, achten we het dan ook noodzakelijk om eerst het 
ruimere fenomeen managed care van een theoretische inbedding en een heldere classifi-
catie te voorzien. We willen hiermee een bijdrage leveren aan de literatuur over managed 
care. 
 In dit onderzoek hebben we gebruik gemaakt van agency-theorie om de relatie tussen 
zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen te analyseren. Om verschillende redenen hebben we voor 
een agency-perspectief gekozen. Een eerste reden is dat agency-theorie goed lijkt aan te 
sluiten bij de in dit proefschrift centraal staande situatie: de contractuele relatie tussen 
twee partijen (zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen) waarin de ene partij (de principaal) een 
relatie aangaat met een andere partij (de agent) in de verwachting dat de handelingen van 
de agent de principaal nut opleveren. Dat de theorie zich in belangrijke mate richt op het 
gebruik van (financiële) prikkels sluit goed aan bij het onderwerp van dit proefschrift, 
namelijk financiële-risicodeling. Een benadering waarin beslissingsrechten centraal staan 
zou een interessant licht hebben kunnen laten schijnen op de verschillende organisatori-
sche wijzen waarop de relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen in de praktijk zijn 
vormgegeven. Vraagstukken van integratie en eigendom van activa, zoals (onroerende) 
goederen of apparatuur, vallen echter buiten het bereik van dit proefschrift. Andere 
overwegingen zijn dat het gebruik en het eigendom van dergelijke activa in de huisart-
senzorg minder van belang zijn dan bijvoorbeeld in de medisch specialistische zorg. 
Bovendien is er in de huisartsenzorg nauwelijks sprake van relatie-specifieke activa. Wat 
betreft het vraagstuk van autoriteit, hebben we verondersteld dat de professionele auto-
nomie en de autonomie van de individuele arts het voor een zorgverzekeraar moeilijk 
maken om zich te mengen in de relatie tussen arts en patiënt op een manier die afwijkt 
van de manier waarop de zorgverzekeraar dat in een marktrelatie kan. We hebben daar-
om verondersteld dat de professionele relatie met huisartsen ertoe leidt dat er voor wat 
betreft de agentschapproblemen geen wezenlijke verschillen zijn tussen situaties waarin 
huisartsen in dienstverband werkzaam zijn en situaties waarin huisartsen zelfstandig zijn 
gevestigd. Een laatste overweging betrof het feit dat huisartsen meestal zelfstandig zijn 
gevestigd. 
 Door agency-theorie eerst toe te passen op de relaties tussen de patiënt, de huisarts, de 
zorgverzekeraar en de overheid, hebben we een theoretisch raamwerk opgesteld. Dit 
heeft vervolgens gefungeerd als achtergrond voor de verdere analyse van de relatie tussen 
zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen. We hebben eerst geanalyseerd wat de agentschapsfunctie 
van een zorgverzekeraar inhoudt. Om het in de zorgsector bekende fenomeen ‘managed 
care’ van een goede theoretische inbedding en een heldere classificatie te voorzien, heb-
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ben we vervolgens onderzocht of managed care kan worden geplaatst in het kader van de 
agency-theorie. Daarna zijn we nader ingegaan op één specifieke managed-caretechniek 
die zorgverzekeraars in hun relatie met huisartsen zouden kunnen toepassen: financiële-
risicodeling. Na het analyseren en bediscussiëren van de argumenten voor financiële-
risicodeling en de wijze waarop dergelijke systemen kunnen worden vormgegeven, heb-
ben we enkele praktijkvoorbeelden van financiële-risicodeling geëvalueerd. Vervolgens 
zijn we ingegaan op de vraag hoe systemen met financiële-risicodeling zouden moeten 
worden vormgegeven. Ten slotte hebben we specifiek voor de Nederlandse situatie een 
eerste opzet gegeven voor experimenten waarin zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen de risi-
co’s delen. 
 
2 De derde partij als agent en de huisarts 
 
De gezondheidszorg wordt gekenmerkt door onzekerheid aan de vraagzijde van de markt, 
door een asymmetrische verdeling van informatie tussen vragers en aanbieders van zorg 
en door de aanwezigheid van externe effecten. Deze kenmerken vormen een rechtvaardi-
ging voor de aanwezigheid, naast de patiënt (eerste partij) en de zorgaanbieder (tweede 
partij), van een derde partij in de gezondheidszorg. De drie hoofdfuncties van een derde 
partij zijn: 
- de verzekeringsfunctie, voornamelijk bestaande uit het poolen van risico’s en het beta-
len van claims; 
- de agentschapsfunctie, bestaande uit de inkoop van zorg voor een bepaalde populatie, 
het terugdringen van ‘moral hazard’ en het verzamelen en leveren van informatie over 
de zorg; 
- de toegangsfunctie, bestaande uit het garanderen van de toegankelijkheid van op zijn 
minst een basispakket gezondheidszorg. 
In dit onderzoek hebben we ons gericht op één type derde partij, namelijk een risicodra-
gende partij die gedurende een bepaalde periode premies ontvangt voor een omschreven 
groep verzekerden en die de contractuele of wettelijke plicht heeft om een omschreven 
pakket gezondheidszorggoederen en –diensten te leveren of te vergoeden. Meer specifiek 
hebben we ons gericht op derde partijen die ook als agent voor hun verzekerden optre-
den. Deze derde-partijen-als-agent, die we vanaf hier zorgverzekeraars zullen noemen, 
dienen relaties met zorgaanbieders aan te gaan om hun rol goed te kunnen vervullen. 
Vanuit hun standpunt bezien kunnen relaties met huisartsen zeer interessant zijn, omdat 
deze artsen vaak fungeren als poortwachters en regisseurs van medische zorg en daarmee 
een aanzienlijke invloed hebben op de aard, het volume, de kwaliteit en de kosten van de 
zorg. 
 De relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen kunnen op verschillende manieren 
worden vormgegeven. Er zijn ook verschillende manieren waarop deze relaties vervol-
gens kunnen worden geanalyseerd en geclassificeerd. Na bespreking van vier classifica-
tiemodellen hebben we vervolgens twee conclusies getrokken. Ten eerste zijn er verschil-
lende manieren om tegen de relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen aan te kijken, 
zoals een juridische, een organisatorische of een financiële benadering. Bovendien rich-
ten binnen een bepaalde benadering de modellen zich op verschillende aspecten van de 
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relaties. Zo wordt de mogelijke aanwezigheid van een tussenliggende organisatie (tussen 
zorgverzekeraar en huisarts) in het ene model als relevante factor beschouwd, maar in 
andere modellen buiten beschouwing gelaten. Ten tweede verschillen de relaties aanzien-
lijk wat betreft de financiële en organisatorische kanten ervan. Ze kunnen variëren van 
geen directe relatie tot volledige integratie van beide partijen. Verder kunnen zorgverze-
keraars huisartsen direct of indirect (via een tussenliggende organisatie) contracteren, 
huisartsen direct betalen voor geleverde zorg of verzekerden de kosten ervan vergoeden, 
verschillende betalingssystemen hanteren enzovoorts. Vervolgens kan een tussenliggende 
organisatie een met de zorgverzekeraar gesloten contract vertalen in een afwijkend con-
tract met huisartsen, bijvoorbeeld door de met de zorgverzekeraar overeengekomen beta-
lingssystematiek te veranderen. 
 
3 Agency-theorie 
 
Relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen worden gekenmerkt door de aanwezigheid 
van ongelijk verdeelde informatie en conflicterende belangen. Agency-theorie richt zich 
op de relatie tussen twee partijen, houdt zich specifiek bezig met problemen als asymme-
trische informatie en conflicterende belangen en stelt strategieën voor om die problemen 
te hanteren. In deze theorie schakelt een principaal een agent in om voor of namens hem 
bepaalde handelingen uit te voeren. Hun relatie wordt gekenmerkt door asymmetrische 
informatie en conflicterende belangen. De agent heeft meer informatie over zijn intenties, 
zijn handelen of de omstandigheden waarop hij zijn handelen baseert en heeft mogelijk 
andere doelen dan de principaal. Hierdoor kunnen problemen ontstaan als antiselectie en 
‘moral hazard’. Bovendien kan het voor de principaal moeilijk zijn om op basis van de 
uitkomst conclusies te trekken over de inspanningen van de agent, omdat de uitkomst 
veelal onzeker is als gevolg van externe omstandigheden waarop de agent geen invloed 
kan uitoefenen. 
 In de loop der tijd zijn verschillende aanpassingen van de traditionele aannames in de 
theorie voorgesteld. Deze hebben betrekking op de veronderstelde uiteenlopende doelen 
en opportunistische gedragingen, het rationele handelen van principaal en agent, de pro-
grammeerbaarheid van het handelen van de agent, de meetbaarheid van de uitkomst, het 
aantal agenten en de duur van de relatie. 
 Er zijn verschillende strategieën om de problemen van een agency-relatie te hanteren. 
We hebben deze strategieën in dit proefschrift ondergebracht in drie groepen. Ten eerste 
kan de principaal een agent selecteren waarvan hij veronderstelt dat deze zich in het be-
lang van de principaal zal gedragen. Vervolgens kan de principaal trachten de agent te 
sturen, hetzij door prikkels, hetzij door overreding of informatie, hetzij door regels of 
macht. Ten derde kan de principaal door het monitoren van de agent trachten de informa-
tieachterstand te verkleinen. Dit monitoren kan tevens dienen als motivatie voor de agent 
om in het belang van de principaal te handelen. 
 Om gewenst gedrag tot stand te brengen moet de principaal bepaalde kosten maken, 
bijvoorbeeld voor het sturen van de agent. Daarnaast zal de agent mogelijk ook bepaalde 
kosten maken, bijvoorbeeld om te voorkomen dat de principaal schade lijdt of om de 
principaal te kunnen compenseren als hij in strijd met het belang van de principaal han-
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delt. Ondanks alle inspanningen kan de principaal nog steeds verlies lijden doordat de 
gerealiseerde uitkomst afwijkt van de uitkomst die de principaal in gedachten had. De 
totale agency-kosten worden geminimaliseerd door een evenwicht te zoeken tussen het 
beperken van dat verlies enerzijds en de kosten die daarvoor moeten worden gemaakt 
anderzijds. 
 
4 Agency en gezondheidszorg 
 
De agency-theorie is niet specifiek gericht op relaties in de gezondheidszorg, maar gelet 
op de kenmerken van deze relaties is het gebruik ervan in dit onderzoek alleszins ge-
rechtvaardigd. De relatie tussen patiënt en arts wordt zelfs wel aangeduid als een typisch 
voorbeeld van een agency-relatie. Hoewel in mindere mate, is ook de relatie tussen een 
zorgverzekeraar en een (huis)arts wel in agency-termen beschreven. 
 Relaties in de gezondheidszorg zijn geen standaard agency-relaties en wijken daarvan 
in meerdere opzichten af. Ten eerste kunnen in de relaties met een huisarts de belangen-
conflicten relatief klein zijn, bijvoorbeeld doordat professionele normen en waarden en 
sociale controle door collega’s richting geven aan zijn handelen. Bovendien maken voor 
de arts als professional de belangen van de patiënt mogelijk onderdeel uit van zijn eigen 
doelstellingen. Ten tweede is er tussen patiënt en huisarts vaak sprake van een langdurige 
of zich herhalende relatie, hetgeen de huisarts kan stimuleren niet slechts zijn eigen be-
langen na te streven. Ondermaatse prestaties van de huisarts kunnen voor de patiënt aan-
leiding zijn om de relatie te beëindigen of om de relatie te herzien en kunnen bovendien 
de reputatie van de huisarts schaden. Ten derde zal het door zijn kennis en ervaring vaak 
de agent (de huisarts) in plaats van de principaal (de patiënt) zijn die bepaalt welke doe-
len in hun relatie haalbaar zijn. Paradoxaal is dat waar in de agency-theorie de informa-
tieasymmetrie als een probleem wordt gezien, de slecht geïnformeerde patiënt hier juist 
een agency-relatie start hopende en vertrouwende op de superieure kennis en ervaring 
van de arts. Ten vierde geeft de voorsprong in informatie van de arts hem de mogelijk-
heid om de vraag van de patiënt naar zijn goederen of diensten te beïnvloeden. Hoewel 
het beïnvloeden van deze vraag precies is wat de huisarts-als-agent moet doen, kan de 
huisarts de patiënt ervan overtuigen meer goederen of diensten te vragen dan de patiënt 
zou doen indien hij over dezelfde informatie zou beschikken als de arts. Als de patiënt 
een ziektekostenverzekering heeft kan bovendien een speciale vorm van aanbodgeïndu-
ceerde vraag optreden, namelijk aanbodgeïnduceerde ‘moral hazard’. Ten slotte resulteert 
de aanwezigheid van een zorgverzekeraar in een driehoeksrelatie. De zorgverzekeraar 
kan zowel de informatie waarover de patiënt en de arts beschikken als hun belangen 
beïnvloeden (bijvoorbeeld vanwege de veranderde financiële prikkels die zij ondervinden 
doordat de zorgverzekeraar ziektekostenverzekeringen levert). Ook ontstaan externe 
effecten doordat de zorgverzekeraar de voorkeuren van andere verzekerden in ogen-
schouw zal moeten nemen. Een ander effect van de aanwezigheid van een zorgverzeke-
raar is dat deze, in plaats van de patiënt zelf, de contractuele afspraken met de arts zal 
maken en zal trachten te bevorderen dat de arts handelt in het belang van de patiënt. 
Hierdoor beschikt de patiënt als principaal slechts over een beperkt aantal mogelijkheden 
om het gedrag van de huisarts te beïnvloeden. 
 
SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIE 
 
 229 
 Hoewel relaties in de gezondheidszorg veelal afwijken van de standaard agency-
relaties, zijn de kenmerken van een agency-relatie en de resulterende problemen overdui-
delijk aanwezig. De agency-theorie is dan ook goed toepasbaar op relaties in de gezond-
heidszorg in het algemeen en op de relatie tussen de zorgverzekeraar en de huisarts in het 
bijzonder. 
 
Vervolgens hebben we een theoretisch raamwerk opgesteld dat uit vier agency-relaties 
bestaat en waarmee wordt beargumenteerd waarom een zorgverzekeraar strategieën zou 
toepassen om het gedrag van huisartsen te beïnvloeden. 
 De eerste agency-relatie is de relatie tussen de patiënt (de principaal) en de huisarts 
(de agent). Door de asymmetrische informatie en de uiteenlopende belangen, kan de 
patiënt worden geconfronteerd met problemen als antiselectie en ‘moral hazard’. Om 
zowel de agency-problemen die hij in de relatie met de arts ondervindt als zijn financiële 
risico te verminderen, kan de patiënt een relatie aangaan met de zorgverzekeraar; de 
tweede agency-relatie. Hij kan vervolgens problemen ondervinden bij het selecteren van 
een zorgverzekeraar die zijn belangen het best dient. 
 Zodra een zorgverzekeraar is geselecteerd wordt deze verondersteld maatregelen te 
treffen om de problemen die de patiënt ondervindt in zijn relatie met de huisarts terug te 
dringen. Om een effectieve agent te kunnen zijn, zal de zorgverzekeraar een relatie met 
de huisarts aan moeten gaan; de derde agency-relatie. Of de zorgverzekeraar ook daad-
werkelijk als een agent in het belang van de patiënt handelt, is onderdeel van de proble-
men in de tweede agency-relatie. 
 De vierde agency-relatie in het raamwerk, is de relatie tussen de zorgverzekeraar en 
de zogenaamde ‘spelregelbepaler’. Ondanks de mogelijkheden die een verzekerde tot zijn 
beschikking heeft (selecteren, sturen en monitoren), is de positie van de verzekerde dus-
danig zwak dat er behoefte is aan bijvoorbeeld een overheidsinstantie die de ‘spelregels’ 
bepaalt. Deze overheidsinstantie moet de zorgverzekeraar stimuleren om in het belang 
van de verzekerde te handelen en zo de problemen beperken die deze verzekerde in zijn 
relatie met die zorgverzekeraar kan ondervinden. De overheid kan bijvoorbeeld (geregu-
leerde) concurrentie tussen zorgverzekeraars stimuleren, informatie verschaffen en toe-
zicht instellen. 
 
In het raamwerk wordt ervan uitgegaan dat zowel de verzekerde als de overheid de zorg-
verzekeraar stimuleert om informatie over de preferenties van de verzekerde in te winnen 
en om maatregelen te treffen teneinde de agency-relatie tussen patiënt en arts te verbete-
ren. Met de standaard agency-theorie in gedachten zou men dan verwachten een zorgver-
zekeraar aan te treffen die tracht het gedrag van een geselecteerde groep artsen te sturen 
en hun prestaties te monitoren. De feitelijke afspraken kunnen echter om verschillende 
redenen afwijken van de theoretische afspraken, zoals door de aanwezigheid van positie-
ve transactiekosten en professionele normen. Bovendien wijken, zoals beargumenteerd, 
relaties in de gezondheidszorg af van de standaard agency-relaties. De vraag is dan ook in 
welke mate zorgverzekeraars als agent de drie strategieën (selecteren, sturen en monito-
ren) daadwerkelijk toepassen in hun relaties met huisartsen. 
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5 Agency en managed care 
 
De drie strategieën die uit de agency-theorie naar voren zijn gekomen kunnen een princi-
paal ertoe aanzetten om door toepassing van verschillende technieken de door hem ge-
wenste uitkomst te bevorderen. Interessant is dat we dergelijke technieken ook aantreffen 
in de relaties tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen. In de gezondheidszorg wordt (het 
gebruik van) een dergelijke set technieken doorgaans aangeduid met de term ‘managed 
care’. Hoewel managed care een veel voorkomend begrip is, ontbreken een goede theore-
tische inbedding en een heldere classificatie ervan. We hebben hier beargumenteerd dat 
de managed-caretechnieken opmerkelijk goed passen in het drieluik van de agency-
theorie. Vervolgens hebben we dit drieluik (selecteren, sturen en monitoren) voorgesteld 
als drie opeenvolgende fases die gezamenlijk een iteratief proces vormen: de agency-
cyclus. Vanuit het perspectief van de agency-theorie kan managed care dan worden ge-
zien als (het cyclische gebruik van) een set technieken waarmee de zorgverzekeraar 
tracht het gedrag van de huisarts zodanig te beïnvloeden dat deze in het belang van de 
patiënt handelt. Dit cyclische gebruik hebben we de managed-carecyclus genoemd. 
 Ondanks de moeilijkheden die ermee gepaard gaan, wordt het selecteren en contracte-
ren van (huis)artsen gezien als een cruciaal onderdeel van managed care. Het zorgvuldig 
selecteren van artsen met een terughoudende manier van werken wordt zelfs wel be-
schouwd als de beste garantie voor kosteneffectieve zorg van hoge kwaliteit. Onderzoek 
geeft aan dat zorgverzekeraars er veelal de voorkeur aan geven om artsen te selecteren 
voordat contracten worden gesloten in plaats van achteraf maatregelen te moeten treffen. 
Voordeel van de laatste methode is weliswaar dat eenvoudiger informatie over (het ge-
drag van) de artsen kan worden verzameld, maar het zal dan moeilijker zijn om het ge-
drag van de artsen alsnog te veranderen of om nog van ze af te komen. Het selecteren en 
vervolgens contracteren van de geselecteerde artsen is echter niet eenvoudig. Selectie 
vergt voldoende en betrouwbare kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve informatie over het gedrag 
van de artsen die moet worden gecorrigeerd voor bijvoorbeeld praktijkomvang en samen-
stelling van de praktijkpopulatie. Het bevorderen van zelfselectie door artsen kan het 
selectieprobleem echter verkleinen. Zodra een groep artsen is geselecteerd, dienen ze te 
worden gecontracteerd. Selectief contracteren vergt een overschot aan artsen (wil er 
sprake kunnen zijn van een echte keuze). Verder dient selectief contracteren wettelijk te 
zijn toegestaan, dienen individuele artsen of dient de beroepsgroep als geheel bereid te 
zijn om mee te werken en, niet in de laatste plaats, dienen de verzekerden ermee in te 
stemmen. 
 De tweede fase van de managed-carecyclus is het sturen van de arts. Het gebruik van 
(financiële) prikkels is een belangrijke manier om te bevorderen dat de arts uit de verza-
meling mogelijke handelingen de handeling kiest die het meest nuttig is voor de zorgver-
zekeraar (en ook voor de patiënt). Financiële prikkels kunnen afkomstig zijn van zowel 
het basissysteem van honoreren als van allerlei aanvullende honoreringssystemen. De 
meest voorkomende basissystemen om huisartsen te betalen zijn betaling per verrichting, 
een abonnement of een salaris. Aanvullende betalingen kunnen gerelateerd zijn aan een 
functie, aan gedrag of aan een uitkomst. In tegenstelling tot een functiegerelateerde beta-
ling, zijn gedrags- en uitkomstgerelateerde betalingen afhankelijk van respectievelijk een 
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controle achteraf op de wijze waarop bepaalde diensten zijn geleverd en op de effecten 
van het gedrag van de arts. Een bonussysteem is een vorm van aanvullende betalingen. 
De zorgverzekeraar kan gemengde honoreringssystemen toepassen om zo een evenwicht 
te vinden tussen de prikkels van de verscheidene basis- en aanvullende systemen. Een 
gemengd systeem kan bijvoorbeeld een evenwicht brengen in de prikkels voor onge-
wenst gedrag, zoals het selecteren van risico’s en het bezuinigen op de kwaliteit van zorg, 
en doelmatig handelen. Ook kan een gemengd systeem een evenwicht brengen in de 
prikkels voor het leveren van inspanningen voor zowel contracteerbare als niet-
contracteerbare dimensies van kwaliteit. 
 Een andere manier om huisartsen door prikkels te sturen is door toewijzing van de 
poortwachtersfunctie. De huisarts wordt op deze wijze gestimuleerd om patiënten alleen 
naar andere zorgaanbieders door te verwijzen indien dit noodzakelijk is. Aangezien hier-
van slechts een zwakke prikkel uitgaat, wordt de poortwachtersfunctie vaak gecombi-
neerd met andere technieken. 
 Praktijkstandaarden, het maken van profielen van huisartsen of van praktijken en zo-
genaamde ‘utilisation-managementtechnieken’ zijn andere in het oog springende manie-
ren om artsen te sturen. Sommige technieken, zoals standaarden en profielen, hebben tot 
doel de arts te informeren en hem te overreden de gewenste handelingen uit te voeren. 
Andere technieken, zoals de verplichte second opinion en de zogenaamde 
‘(pre)admission review’ en ‘continued-stay review’, hebben tot doel de keuze van de arts 
te beperken. Dergelijke technieken worden wel beschouwd als een inbreuk op de profes-
sionele autonomie of de individuele autonomie van de arts. Een inbreuk op de individuele 
autonomie van de arts is juist precies wat hier wordt beoogd en wat wordt beschouwd als 
een manier om ervoor te zorgen dat de belangen van de patiënten het best wordt gediend. 
Of dergelijke technieken een inbreuk vormen op de professionele autonomie, hangt af 
van de rol van de beroepsgroep bij het ontwerpen en uitvoeren van de managed-
caretechnieken. Zo kan een vereniging of een college van artsen standaarden uitgeven. 
Een voorbeeld van praktijkstandaarden zijn de inmiddels tachtig NHG-Standaarden die 
door het Nederlands Huisartsen Genootschap (NHG) zijn ontwikkeld. Hetzelfde geldt 
voor het monitoren van artsen. Intercollegiale toetsing is een algemeen geaccepteerde 
vorm van het monitoren van artsen door artsen zelf. In beide voorbeelden is de individue-
le autonomie in het geding, maar blijft de professionele autonomie gehandhaafd. Vanwe-
ge deze professionele autonomie zullen artsen de voorkeur geven aan managed-
caretechnieken die zijn ontwikkeld of uitgegeven door de beroepsgroep zelf boven tech-
nieken van een relatieve buitenstaander, zoals een zorgverzekeraar. Vanwege hun indivi-
duele autonomie zullen ze waarschijnlijk de voorkeur geven aan sturing door prikkels en 
sturing door overreding of informatie boven sturing door regels of macht. Door regels of 
macht worden de handelingen van artsen immers op een nagenoeg dwingende manier 
beperkt. Het kiezen van een alternatieve handeling is weliswaar nog steeds mogelijk, 
maar met als risico dat sancties worden opgelegd. 
 De laatste fase van de managed-carecyclus is het monitoren van de arts. Eén doel 
ervan is het openbaren van informatie over het gedrag van de arts of de uitkomst van het 
proces waaraan de arts heeft bijgedragen. De zorgverzekeraar kan zo trachten zijn infor-
matieachterstand ten opzichte van de arts te verkleinen. Een tweede doel is om de infor-
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matiekloof tussen arts en zorgverzekeraar te overbruggen door juist de arts te informeren 
over zijn (relatieve) prestaties. 
 Managed care vereist een relatie tussen de zorgverzekeraar en de arts. In deze relatie 
kunnen vervolgens verschillende technieken in combinatie met elkaar worden gebruikt. 
De toepassing van managed care wint aan effectiviteit als de drie opeenvolgende fases uit 
de managed-carecyclus, te weten selecteren, sturen en monitoren, in samenhang worden 
vormgegeven en worden toegepast. 
 
Een probleem voor de zorgverzekeraar is, dat wat betreft de gezondheidstoestand van de 
patiënt de uitkomst onzeker is en dat deze slechts gedeeltelijk het gevolg zal zijn van het 
handelen van de huisarts. De gezondheidstoestand zal de resultante zijn van het natuurlij-
ke beloop van de ziekte, de medische behandeling, het gedrag van de patiënt en andere 
gezondheidsbeïnvloedende factoren. Hierdoor zal het voor de zorgverzekeraar lastig zijn 
om te beoordelen of de handelingen van de arts voldoen. Contracten waarin alle mogelij-
ke uitkomsten zijn gespecificeerd en waarin bijvoorbeeld de vergoedingen zijn gerela-
teerd aan de feitelijke uitkomsten, zijn in de gezondheidszorg dan ook niet gebruikelijk. 
Van de managed-caretechnieken richt het merendeel zich op het gedrag van de artsen. 
Het observeren van artsen en het analyseren van claimdata kunnen daarbij belangrijke 
informatie opleveren. Zorgverzekeraars stemmen hun vergoedingen aan artsen dan af op 
basis van gebruik, kosten- of kwaliteitsmaatstaven, klantenonderzoeken, productiviteit 
van de arts of andere maatstaven. 
 Aangezien de uitkomst in termen van gezondheidstoestand door vele factoren zal 
worden bepaald, kan de arts moeilijk verantwoordelijk worden gesteld voor een negatie-
ve uitkomst. Het volume en de kosten van de geleverde zorg zijn echter nauw aan het 
gedrag van de arts gerelateerd. De zorgverzekeraar kan daarom een systeem ontwerpen 
met prikkels die op het volume of de kosten van de zorg zijn gericht. Een voorbeeld van 
een dergelijk systeem is financiële-risicodeling, waardoor de zorgverzekeraar de verant-
woordelijkheid voor de kosten van de zorg deelt met de arts. Om de kwaliteit van zorg te 
waarborgen, dient een systeem van risicodeling zorgvuldig te worden vormgegeven en 
zullen aanvullende sturings- en monitoringstechnieken nodig zijn. 
 
6 Financiële-risicodeling in theorie 
 
Argumenten voor financiële-risicodeling 
 
Een zorgverzekeraar heeft onder meer als rol om verzekeringen aan te bieden tegen het 
verzekeringsrisico. Dit risico ontstaat doordat het vóórkomen van ziekten een grotendeels 
stochastisch karakter heeft. In ruil voor een verzekeringspremie wordt het risico van de 
verzekerde overgedragen aan de zorgverzekeraar. Deze overdracht betreft echter ook een 
tweede risico, dat wij het risico van imperfect agentschap hebben genoemd. Het bestaat 
uit het risico van ondoelmatige zorg, dat vooral ontstaat door overconsumptie en niet-
gepaste zorg, en uit het risico van onderconsumptie. Het risico van imperfect agentschap 
kan het gevolg zijn van agency-problemen in de relatie tussen patiënt en arts en van de 
aanwezigheid van ziektekostenverzekeringen. Ziektekostenverzekeringen kunnen leiden 
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tot zowel consument-geïnduceerde moral hazard als aanbieder-geïnduceerde moral ha-
zard. 
 Aangezien huisartsen bij de levering van gezondheidszorg voor een belangrijk deel 
naar eigen goeddunken kunnen handelen, kan de zorgverzekeraar zich op deze arts rich-
ten teneinde het risico van imperfect agentschap te beperken. Nadat de zorgverzekeraar 
het verzekeringsrisico en het risico van imperfect agentschap heeft overgenomen van de 
verzekerde, kan hij uit vier strategieën kiezen om deze te hanteren. De eerste optie is het 
dragen van beide risico’s, waarbij de zorgverzekeraar zowel het verzekeringsrisico als 
het risico van imperfect agentschap accepteert. Deze optie is niet goed verenigbaar met 
de agentschapsfunctie, omdat de zorgverzekeraar geen pogingen onderneemt om de ma-
nier waarop gezondheidszorg wordt geleverd te beïnvloeden. De tweede optie is het 
doorschuiven van beide risico’s, waarbij de zorgverzekeraar beide risico’s naar individu-
ele artsen of naar een groep van artsen doorschuift. De artsen worden dan verantwoorde-
lijk voor het verzekeringsrisico, wat echter een typische functie voor een zorgverzekeraar 
is. De verantwoordelijkheid voor beide risico’s kan de artsen ertoe aanzetten om, bezien 
vanuit het gezichtspunt van de zorgverzekeraar, ongewenste maatregelen te nemen om zo 
hun risico te beperken. Een voorbeeld van dergelijk ongewenst gedrag is selectie van 
gunstige risico’s. In de derde optie, het opsplitsen van beide risico’s, tracht de zorgverze-
keraar beide risico’s te scheiden, waarna hij het risico van imperfect agentschap door-
schuift naar de artsen. Theoretisch gezien lijkt deze middenweg tussen het dragen van 
beide risico’s en het doorschuiven van beide risico’s de meest bevredigende oplossing. In 
de praktijk zal het echter moeilijk zijn om beide risico’s van elkaar te scheiden. De laatste 
optie is het delen van beide risico’s. Net als de derde optie heeft deze optie als voordeel 
dat er een middenweg is gevonden tussen het dragen van beide risico’s en het doorschui-
ven van beide risico’s. Het problematische scheiden van beide risico’s wordt hierdoor 
echter vermeden. Bijkomend effect is wel dat een deel van het verzekeringsrisico naar 
(een groep van) artsen wordt doorgeschoven. 
 Door een regeling met financiële-risicodeling stimuleert de zorgverzekeraar de huis-
arts om de hoeveelheid ondoelmatige zorg te verminderen. Doordat het risico wordt ge-
deeld, kunnen de prikkels voor het leveren van te veel of voor het leveren van te weinig 
zorg in evenwicht worden gehouden. Het verschuiven van een deel van het risico (risico-
deling) en de bijbehorende verantwoordelijkheden heeft bovendien als voordeel dat be-
sluitvorming op een lager niveau (dichter bij de patiënt) komt te liggen. De effectiviteit 
van een dergelijke regeling wordt echter bepaald door de specifieke financiële en organi-
satorische vormgeving ervan. Naarmate de regeling meer de vorm aanneemt van de optie 
waarin beide risico’s worden doorgeschoven, nemen de prikkels voor zowel doelmatig 
gedrag als voor ongewenst gedrag voor de arts toe. Een huisarts die risico loopt kan min-
stens drie voor de hand liggende vormen van ongewenst gedrag vertonen. Bij selectie van 
gunstige risico’s selecteert de arts patiënten waarvan hij verwacht dat de kosten lager 
zullen uitvallen dan de vergoedingen. Bij het doorschuiven van de kosten substitueert de 
arts zorg waarvoor hij niet financieel verantwoordelijk is voor zorg waarvoor hij dat wel 
is. Bij het bezuinigen op de kwaliteit van zorg wordt zorg uitgesteld of zelfs onthouden, 
worden inspanningen verminderd enzovoorts. 
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De structuur van regelingen met financiële-risicodeling 
 
Als een zorgverzekeraar een regeling met financiële-risicodeling opstelt, dan dient hij vijf 
hoofdaspecten in beschouwing te nemen. Deze aspecten zijn het risicopakket, de omvang 
van de praktijkpopulatie, het normatieve niveau van zorg, het bonussysteem en de beper-
king van het risico van de arts. 
 Een eerste cruciaal aspect is de omvang van het pakket goederen en diensten waarvoor 
de arts financieel verantwoordelijk is, oftewel de vormgeving van het risicopakket. Het 
type zorg dat wordt opgenomen bepaalt de kans dat de arts kosten moet maken alsook, 
gegeven dat kosten worden gemaakt, de variabiliteit van de kosten. Bij bepaalde types 
zorg zal het makkelijker zijn om een diagnose te stellen en om de kosten van behandeling 
in te schatten, wat vooral belangrijk is als de huisarts verantwoordelijk is voor het regelen 
en vergoeden van vervolgzorg. Andere punten die hierbij in ogenschouw moeten worden 
genomen zijn of het risicopakket wordt opgedeeld in verschillende kostencategorieën en 
of het risicopakket het gedrag van andere zorgaanbieders beïnvloedt. 
 Het tweede aspect is de omvang van de praktijkpopulatie of het deel daarvan waarvoor 
de arts financieel verantwoordelijk is. De relatieve en absolute omvang van deze popula-
tie bepalen de grootte van de prikkels, de mogelijkheid voor de arts om kosten door te 
schuiven naar andere partijen en de mate waarin de arts kwetsbaar is voor toevallige 
schommelingen in de kosten. 
 Een derde aspect is het normatieve niveau van zorg. De zorgverzekeraar kan een norm 
definiëren, bijvoorbeeld een bepaald volume van zorg of een kostenniveau, waarmee (de 
uitkomst van) het gedrag van de arts wordt vergeleken. Dit is vermoedelijk het meest 
lastige onderdeel van de regeling. Het is moeilijk om een optimaal niveau te bepalen van 
zorg die zowel medisch noodzakelijk en op basis van behoefte is als doelmatig. Een norm 
kan in dat geval gebaseerd zijn op historische of gemiddelde kosten. Econometrisch mo-
delleren is een geavanceerdere manier om een norm vast te stellen die is gebaseerd op 
systematische verschillen in gezondheidstoestand en enkele andere systematische facto-
ren, voor zover de arts ze niet kan beïnvloeden. 
 Een vierde aspect is het bonussysteem. Uiteindelijk kan de financiële verantwoorde-
lijkheid van de arts tot uitdrukking komen in een bonus. Een bonus is een aanvullende 
betaling die wordt betaald als de arts aan bepaalde vereisten heeft voldaan (zoals een 
financiële norm). De negatieve variant ervan is een malus, die de arts moet betalen als hij 
niet aan de vereisten heeft voldaan. Een bonus kan bestaan uit een vast bedrag, kan even-
redig zijn aan het verschil tussen de werkelijke en de normatieve kosten (hoe groter het 
verschil, hoe groter de bonus) of kan omgekeerd evenredig zijn aan het verschil tussen de 
werkelijke en de normatieve kosten (hoe kleiner het verschil, hoe groter de bonus). Ande-
re varianten zijn systemen waarin de norm fungeert als een drempel (een bonus of een 
malus als de drempel is overschreden) of die waarin de norm fungeert als een doel (een 
bonus als het doel is behaald). 
 Het vijfde aspect is het door middel van aanvullende maatregelen beperken van het 
risico van de arts. Deze maatregelen kunnen als additioneel worden beschouwd omdat de 
hoeveelheid risico in eerste instantie wordt bepaald door het risicopakket, de praktijkpo-
pulatie enzovoorts. De moeilijkheid om het verzekeringsrisico en het risico van imperfect 
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agentschap van elkaar te scheiden leidt ertoe dat de arts ook verantwoordelijk wordt voor 
(een deel van) het verzekeringsrisico. Als dit risico niet wordt beperkt, bestaat de kans 
dat de arts ongewenst gedrag gaat vertonen, dat het systeem van prikkels niet meer goed 
functioneert of dat de arts wordt geruïneerd. Dat het systeem van prikkels niet meer goed 
functioneert, kan worden veroorzaakt door het hebben van een paar kostbare patiënten 
aan het begin van het financiële jaar. 
 Eén manier om het risico te beperken is door middel van herverzekering. Een huisarts 
die een deel van het risico van de zorgverzekeraar heeft overgenomen kan zich op zijn 
beurt verzekeren voor zijn aansprakelijkheden. Hoewel in de reguliere verzekeringswe-
reld herverzekering doorgaans resulteert in een contract met een tweede verzekeraar (de 
herverzekeraar), kan in de onderhavige risicodelingsregelingen de zorgverzekeraar even-
eens als een soort herverzekeraar optreden. Herverzekering vormt dan een onderdeel van 
de regeling tussen zorgverzekeraar en arts. Niet alleen kan dit tot lagere kosten leiden, het 
heeft ook als voordeel dat de zorgverzekeraar de prikkels die van het systeem van ver-
goedingen uitgaan en de prikkels die van het herverzekeringssysteem uitgaan met elkaar 
in evenwicht kan brengen. Voorbeelden van herverzekeringssystemen zijn een ‘quota-
share’ regeling, een ‘excess of loss per risk’, een ‘excess of loss per occurrence’ of een 
‘stop loss’. 
 Een andere manier om het risico van de arts te beperken is door middel van risico-
pooling. In een regeling met risicopooling deelt een groep (huis)artsen gezamenlijk, 
eventueel met andere aanbieders van zorg, in de beloningen en boetes die volgen uit 
overschotten of tekorten in het budget of in de budgetten voor een omschreven gezond-
heidszorgpakket. Verschillende variabelen bepalen de prikkels die uitgaan van een rege-
ling met risicopooling, zoals het aantal artsen of andere zorgaanbieders, het aantal patiën-
ten, de nabijheid van de leden van de pool (in hetzelfde gebouw of verspreid over een 
grote regio) enzovoorts. Andere manieren om de regelingen te variëren zijn het vormen 
van een meervoudige pool en het toevoegen van één of meerdere tussenliggende organi-
saties. Dit resulteert in een grote hoeveelheid opties voor de verdeling van het financiële 
risico. 
 
7 Financiële-risicodeling in praktijk 
 
In enkele gezondheidszorgsystemen dragen huisartsen risico voor vervolgkosten, zoals 
geneesmiddelen of ziekenhuiskosten. Dit is geen nieuw fenomeen, aangezien verschil-
lende zorgverzekeraars al in de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw risicocontracten met 
artsen afsloten. Voorbeelden zijn het Zaanlandse stelsel en het Amsterdamse stelsel in 
Nederland. Ook de eerste ‘Prepaid Group Practices’ in de Verenigde Staten zijn een 
voorbeeld van vroege systemen met risicodeling. Doel van het Zaanlandse stelsel en het 
Amsterdamse stelsel was de kosten van geneesmiddelen te beperken om zo de verzeke-
ringspremies betaalbaar te houden en een stijging van de betalingen voor medisch specia-
listen mogelijk te maken. De stelsels waren inderdaad succesvol in het beteugelen van de 
kosten van geneesmiddelen, maar het beperkte risicopakket stimuleerde de artsen om hun 
patiënten te verwijzen. Om verscheidene andere redenen echter, werden de stelsels tij-
dens en na de Tweede Wereldoorlog opgeheven. In Nederland is verder gedurende de 
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jaren tachtig ervaring opgedaan met het bonus-malusexperiment in Tilburg. Ook dit was 
succesvol, maar heeft niet geleid tot een permanent systeem met risicodeling. 
 Behalve de Nederlandse systemen zijn ook Britse en Noord-Amerikaanse ervaringen 
met risicodeling bekeken. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk konden huisartsen zich opgeven 
voor budgethouderschap en een budget ontvangen voor vervolgzorg. Ze traden namens 
hun praktijkpopulatie op als zorginkopers. Of ‘GP Fundholding’ succesvol was zal wel 
altijd onderwerp van discussie blijven. De onderzoeksresultaten lijken uit te wijzen dat 
budgethouders in staat waren om de kosten voor bepaalde onderdelen van hun risicopak-
ket te beperken, vooral de kosten van geneesmiddelen. Omdat de besparingen moesten 
worden gebruikt om de patiëntenzorg te verbeteren, is het waarschijnlijk dat patiënten 
baat hebben gehad bij nieuwe diensten, snellere toegang tot ziekenhuiszorg enzovoorts. 
Doordat budgethouders kleinere zorginkopers waren dan de ‘Health Authorities’ waren 
ze flexibeler en beter in staat om zorg elders in te kopen. De kritiek dat budgethouder-
schap tweedeling creëerde geeft aan dat het systeem inderdaad positieve effecten had en 
dat de patiënten van budgethouders er de vruchten van plukten. Of dit ten koste ging van 
de patiënten van niet-budgethouders blijft onduidelijk. Er is geen bewijs dat het systeem 
ongewenst gedrag van artsen, zoals het selecteren van gunstige risico’s of het doorschui-
ven van de kosten, uitlokte. 
 Managed-careorganisaties in de Verenigde Staten hebben een ruime, doch niet altijd 
succesvolle ervaring met risicodeling. Twee voorbeelden zijn nader bestudeerd. Wellicht 
het meest beroemde fiasco uit de geschiedenis van managed care is dat van United Heal-
thcare. United Healthcare contracteerde individuele huisartsen en deelde de risico’s met 
hen. De artsen fungeerden als poortwachters en dienden het volume en de kosten van de 
zorg voor hun patiënten te beheersen. Een zeer beperkt gebruik van managed-
caretechnieken en verkeerde keuzes in het ontwerp van het systeem leidden uiteindelijk 
tot de beëindiging van het verzekeringsmodel. Het managed-careprogramma Blue Plus 
van Blue Cross lijkt een succesvoller initiatief te zijn geweest. De financiële prikkels die 
door Blue Plus werden toegepast, met name het abonnementssysteem maar ook betaling 
per verrichting met een voorziening waarin vooraf geld werd ingehouden (een zoge-
naamde ‘withhold’), leken de kosten te beperken. Het belangrijkste verschil met United 
Healthcare was dat Blue Plus groepspraktijken contracteerde. Deze praktijken pasten op 
hun beurt verscheidene managed-caretechnieken toe, waaronder financiële prikkels die 
bijvoorbeeld waren gekoppeld aan de productiviteit van de individuele arts of aan de 
financiële prestaties van de groep. 
 
De effecten van verschillende systemen met financiële-risicodeling 
 
We hebben hier verschillende systemen met financiële-risicodeling beschreven. De 
meerderheid van de ervaringen die hiermee zijn opgedaan wijzen minimaal op een effect 
ervan op het gedrag van de huisartsen. Het Zaanlandse stelsel en het Amsterdamse stelsel 
lieten besparingen zien in de ziekenfondsenbudgetten voor geneesmiddelen. Het Tilburg-
se experiment vertoonde zowel een daling in het aantal verwijzingen en ziekenhuisdagen 
als een lagere stijging van het aantal fysiotherapeutische behandelingen en van de kosten 
van geneesmiddelen. Het Britse systeem van budgethoudende huisartsen (GP Fundhol-
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ding) bleek succesvol, bijvoorbeeld bij het beperken van de kosten voor onder meer ge-
neesmiddelen, het terugbrengen van de wachttijden voor specialistische hulp, het verla-
gen van het aantal ziekenhuisverwijzingen en het verhogen van het aantal dagbehande-
lingen. Blue Plus vertoonde een kostendaling, zowel op het niveau van de verzekeraar als 
op het niveau van de arts, hoewel het effect verschilde per manier van betalen. Minder 
succesvol was United Healthcare, hoewel de kosten per verzekerde spectaculair afnamen 
nadat structurele organisatorische en financiële wijzigingen waren doorgevoerd. Of deze 
daling het gevolg was van veranderd gedrag van de artsen of dat deze het gevolg was van 
bijvoorbeeld een selectieve uitstroom van verzekerden met hoge kosten, is onduidelijk. 
 Hoewel de bevindingen wijzen op een onderscheidend effect van systemen met finan-
ciële-risicodeling op het gedrag van huisartsen als agenten voor hun patiënten, worden 
definitieve conclusies vooral bemoeilijkt door methodologische problemen. Het ont-
breekt vaak aan een gedegen onderzoeksopzet. Dit maakt het moeilijk om te beoordelen 
in hoeverre het gedrag van de arts wordt beïnvloed door andere (financiële) prikkels, 
door andere managed-caretechnieken of door externe factoren. Verder leveren studies 
naar systemen met financiële-risicodeling vaak weinig informatie over de kwaliteit van 
zorg, terwijl dit een belangrijke uitkomstmaat is voor het beoordelen van het functioneren 
van de artsen als agenten voor hun patiënten. 
 
8 Naar een systeem met financiële-risicodeling 
 
Er kunnen belangrijke lessen worden getrokken uit de analyse van de theoretische en 
praktijkmodellen van systemen met financiële-risicodeling. Om verschillende redenen 
zijn deze lessen echter niet beslissend genoeg om een normatief model voor een systeem 
met financiële-risicodeling op te stellen. Ten eerste is het aantal geanalyseerde praktijk-
voorbeelden beperkt. De uit deze voorbeelden getrokken conclusies kunnen daarom niet 
eenvoudigweg worden toegepast op andere gezondheidszorgsystemen. Verder is econo-
metrisch onderzoek cruciaal voor het ontwerpen van een model van financiële-
risicodeling. De verscheidene aspecten van financiële-risicodeling bepalen gezamenlijk 
de hoeveelheid risico die van de zorgverzekeraar wordt overgeheveld naar de huisarts en 
dienen nauwkeurig in evenwicht te worden gebracht. Ten slotte zal de uiteindelijke vorm 
van financiële-risicodeling bijvoorbeeld per land en per gezondheidszorgsysteem ver-
schillen, afhangen van de rol en positie van de huisartsen, afhangen van de preferenties 
van de huisartsen en worden bepaald door de doelen die de zorgverzekeraar nastreeft. 
Toch hebben we een onderscheid gemaakt tussen het ontwerp voor een eerste regeling 
met financiële-risicodeling en de uiteindelijke regeling. Een eerste regeling wordt ge-
kenmerkt door: 
- een beperkt risicopakket (bijvoorbeeld alleen de kosten van geneesmiddelen); 
- een risicocontract voor minimaal vijftig procent van de praktijkpopulatie; 
- een norm die (gedeeltelijk) is gebaseerd op historische gegevens, om een relatief 
vloeiende overgang naar een systeem van financiële-risicodeling mogelijk te maken; 
- een eenvoudig bonussysteem; 
- een ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combinatie met een ‘stop loss’ contract en een groeps-
praktijk of waarneemgroep als risicopool. 
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Een minder behoudende regeling kan worden overwogen indien een vloeiende overgang 
naar een systeem van risicodeling is gemaakt, zowel zorgverzekeraars als artsen ervaring 
hebben opgedaan met risicodeling en de effecten op gedrag en uitkomsten bekend zijn. 
De regeling voor risicodeling kan dan worden gekenmerkt door: 
- een breed risicopakket waarvan dure behandelingen en behandelingen met een open 
einde zijn uitgezonderd; 
- een risicocontract voor bij voorkeur de gehele praktijkpopulatie; 
- een norm die is gebaseerd op de behoefte van patiënten aan zorg, die een zekere voor-
spellende waarde heeft voor toekomstige kosten van gezondheidszorg, die is geba-
seerd op een optimaal niveau van zorg en die fungeert als doel; 
- een meer geavanceerd bonussysteem met een variabele bonus, bij voorkeur een omge-
keerd evenredig bonussysteem in combinatie met een doelstellende norm; 
- een ‘excess of loss per risk’ in combinatie met een ‘stop loss’ contract en een groeps-
praktijk of waarneemgroep als risicopool. 
Wat betreft het bonussysteem zal een zorgverzekeraar waarschijnlijk een voorkeur heb-
ben voor een omgekeerd evenredige bonus met een norm als doel, omdat deze de te be-
reiken doelen expliciet maakt en ongewenst gedrag van de arts minder waarschijnlijk 
maakt. Bij een (omgekeerd) evenredig systeem moet de bonus of de malus substantieel 
zijn, maar minder dan honderd procent. Circa vijftig procent lijkt dan een goed uitgangs-
punt, maar uiteindelijk zal een besluit over het percentage in samenhang met de overige 
aspecten van financiële-risicodeling moeten worden genomen. 
 Het is van groot belang om alle aspecten van een regeling met financiële-risicodeling, 
zowel de vijf hoofdaspecten als de overige aspecten, zeer zorgvuldig op elkaar af te 
stemmen. Bovendien zal financiële-risicodeling vergezeld moeten gaan van andere tech-
nieken uit de managed-carecyclus. Idealiter komen alle drie de fases uit de managed-
carecyclus voor in het ontwerp van de regeling. Slechts dan kan een regeling voor risico-
deling worden verkregen die de zorgverzekeraar helpt om een doelmatige en kwalitatief 
hoogwaardige zorg te bereiken. 
 
9 Epiloog 
 
Hoewel het gedrag van huisartsen mede bepalend is voor de doelmatigheid van de ge-
zondheidszorg, is er betrekkelijk weinig empirisch en theoretisch conceptueel onderzoek 
voorhanden naar de (effecten van) financiële prikkels die dit gedrag kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Dit geldt zeker voor financiële-risicodeling tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen, maar 
ook voor de bredere set managed-caretechnieken die door een zorgverzekeraar kan wor-
den gebruikt om te trachten het gedrag van huisartsen te beïnvloeden. Door een concep-
tueel raamwerk voor financiële-risicodeling op te stellen en door dit vervolgens te ge-
bruiken voor de analyse van praktijkvoorbeelden en het trekken van lessen hieruit, heb-
ben we een bijdrage willen leveren aan de literatuur over honoreringssystemen voor huis-
artsen. Door een verbinding te leggen tussen agency-theorie en managed care en door de 
verschillende technieken te classificeren en met elkaar in relatie te brengen in de mana-
ged-care cyclus, hebben we tevens een bijdrage willen leveren aan de literatuur over 
managed care. Deze bijdragen zijn relevant omdat honoreringssystemen, financiële-
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risicodeling en de overige managed-caretechnieken belangrijke vraagstukken zijn in de 
wereldwijde discussie over verbetering van de doelmatigheid van de zorg. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 hebben we enkele voorbeelden van systemen met financiële-
risicodeling in Nederland beschreven. Hoewel er in het verleden wel meerdere projecten 
zijn opgestart en invoering van dergelijke systemen in Nederland al vaak is voorgesteld 
(zie paragraaf 7.2.1), is er in Nederland niet veel ervaring opgedaan met financiële-
risicodeling tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen. In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we beargu-
menteerd dat er goede redenen zijn om het verzekeringsrisico en het risico van imperfect 
agentschap tussen beide partijen te delen. De per 1 januari 2006 ingevoerde Zorgverzeke-
ringswet en de nieuwe Wet Marktordening Gezondheidszorg geven zorgverzekeraars en 
huisartsen daartoe ook meer ruimte en mogelijkheden. Daarnaast spelen er andere ont-
wikkelingen die ertoe bijdragen dat voor beide partijen de tijd rijp lijkt te zijn om in over-
leg te treden over een systeem waarin de risico’s worden gedeeld. Voorbeelden hiervan 
zijn de professionalisering van de onderhandelingen tussen beide partijen, de overgang 
naar grotere samenwerkingsverbanden van huisartsen en de belangstelling onder in ieder 
geval een deel van de huisartsen voor het ondernemerschap. 
  De tijd lijkt echter niet rijp te zijn om tot grootschalige invoering van financiële-
risicodeling voor vervolgkosten over te gaan. Het verdient aanbeveling om op bescheiden 
schaal te starten in de vorm van experimenten. Hiervoor zijn in ieder geval twee belang-
rijke redenen te noemen. Een eerste reden is dat systemen van financiële-risicodeling veel 
aspecten kennen waarop kan worden gevarieerd. Daarbij kunnen de vele variaties ver-
schillend uitpakken voor de mate waarin het risico wordt overgedragen aan de huisarts en 
voor de wijze waarop de huisarts op de prikkels reageert. In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we vier 
mogelijke effecten onderscheiden. Enerzijds kan een positief effect op de doelmatigheid 
van de zorg optreden. Anderzijds kan de huisarts ook ongewenst gedrag vertonen door 
gunstige risico’s te selecteren, de kosten door te schuiven en op de kwaliteit van zorg te 
bezuinigen. Belangrijk doel van de experimenten is dan ook het verkrijgen van meer 
inzicht in de mate waarin de verschillende organisatorische en financiële structuren tot 
dergelijke effecten leiden. 
 Een tweede reden om niet tot grootschalige invoering over te gaan maar om te starten 
met experimenten is dat, hoewel van ieder systeem van honoreren financiële prikkels 
uitgaan, een discussie over financiële prikkels gevoelig ligt in de beroepsgroep. Ondanks 
deze gevoeligheid zijn er verschillende redenen om te veronderstellen dat invoering van 
financiële-risicodeling in Nederland haalbaar is: 
- Het volledige abonnementssysteem in de voormalige Ziekenfondssector is een voor-
beeld van een systeem waarin decennia lang financiële-risicodeling heeft plaatsgevon-
den, al had het abonnement geen betrekking op de kosten van vervolgzorg. 
- Nederlandse artsen hebben in het verleden actief met dergelijke systemen gewerkt, al 
dan niet in een experiment (bijvoorbeeld ‘Zaanland’, ‘Amsterdam’ en ‘Tilburg’; zie 
hoofdstuk 7). 
- Vanuit de beroepsgroep zelf zijn voorstellen voor financiële-risicodeling ontwikkeld 
(bijvoorbeeld door de Paritaire Werkgroep Huisartsenzorg; zie paragraaf 7.2.1). 
- Huisartsen in andere landen werken vaak op vrijwillige basis met dergelijke systemen 
dan wel hebben ermee gewerkt. 
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- De huidige belangstelling onder huisartsen om met zorgverzekeraars afspraken te 
maken over eerstelijns DBC’s voor ketenzorg. 
Ongeacht deze positieve voortekenen is het voor goed functionerende systemen belang-
rijk om ze in nauwe samenspraak met de beroepsgroep vorm te geven en aan te sluiten 
bij de professionele normen en waarden van de beroepsgroep. Door op kleine schaal en 
met een groep enthousiaste huisartsen te starten met experimenteren, kan eerst worden 
onderzocht wat de effecten in de praktijk zijn. Bij positieve effecten is bredere invoering 
dan wellicht acceptabel voor een grotere groep huisartsen. Andere belangrijke doelen van 
de experimenten zijn dus het in een vroeg stadium van het ontwerp betrekken van de 
beroepsgroep en het vergroten van het draagvlak voor invoering. 
 Centraal in de experimenten staan de verschillende mogelijkheden voor financiële-
risicodeling voor bepaalde kosten van vervolgzorg. In het voorgaande hebben we echter 
gesteld dat risicodeling één van de mogelijkheden is om het gedrag van huisartsen te 
sturen en dat deze mogelijkheid vergezeld zal moeten gaan van andere technieken uit de 
managed-carecyclus. Idealiter worden dan ook bij de opzet van het experiment de drie 
opeenvolgende fases uit de cyclus, te weten selecteren, sturen en monitoren, in samen-
hang vormgegeven. Op deze onderdelen wordt in het onderstaande ingegaan. Daarnaast 
gelden voor de opzet van experimenten andere aandachtspunten, waaronder de samen-
werking tussen verschillende beroepsgroepen, doelmatigheid versus bureaucratisering en 
administratieve lasten, de gegevensverzameling, automatisering en privacy (zie ook 
Breedveld et al. 1994). Deze blijven hier buiten beschouwing. 
 Op basis van de in eerdere hoofdstukken beschreven theoretische en empirische be-
vindingen en gelet op de huisartsenzorg in Nederland, komen meerdere modellen in 
aanmerking voor een experiment. Hier worden twee modellen voorgesteld: 
- Een bonussysteem voor solopraktijken. 
- Een bonussysteem voor groepspraktijken. 
De bonussystemen in de experimenten hebben betrekking op bepaalde kosten van ver-
volgzorg en worden naast de basishonorering van de huisarts toegepast. Het zou interes-
sant zijn om in een apart experiment te onderzoeken welke varianten van basishonorering 
(zoals een abonnement, betaling per consult of gemengd systeem) gecombineerd met een 
bepaalde vorm van risicodeling voor vervolgkosten tot welke resultaten leiden. Ervan 
uitgaande dat een huisarts zich door een abonnementssysteem eerder geprikkeld voelt tot 
doorverwijzen dan door een consultsysteem, zou bij een volledig abonnement de bonus 
vooral moeten zijn gericht op het terugdringen van het aantal verwijzingen. Een andere 
hypothese zou kunnen zijn dat een vergelijkbaar bonussysteem in combinatie met een 
volledig consultsysteem, leidt tot een te hoog aantal onterecht niet verwezen patiënten. 
Bij de opzet van de experimenten is er echter van uitgegaan dat ze worden toegepast in 
aanvulling op de huidige gemengde honoreringsystematiek van huisartsen, bestaande uit 
inschrijf-, consult- en moduletarieven. 
 
Experimenteren met een bonussysteem voor solopraktijken 
 
Hoewel het aantal solopraktijken al jaren terugloopt, is het in Nederland de meest voor-
komende praktijkvorm. Dat maakt de solopraktijk nog steeds tot een relevante praktijk-
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vorm voor een experiment. Het bonus-malus experiment in Tilburg heeft bovendien laten 
zien dat een experiment met vooral solopraktijken succesvol kan zijn. Ook de ervaringen 
van United Healthcare zijn, hoewel minder succesvol, in dit verband relevant. 
 
Selecteren 
Het eerste onderdeel betreft de selectie van individuele artsen (en dus van praktijken) die 
aan het experiment willen deelnemen. Drie selectiemethoden liggen daarbij voor de hand. 
Een eerste methode is zelfselectie. Door vooraf goed te specificeren wat het doel is van 
het experiment en hoe het wordt opgezet, zullen naar verwachting artsen geïnteresseerd 
zijn die doel en opzet onderschrijven. Een tweede methode betreft het analyseren van 
declaratiegegevens. De overgang naar een gedeeltelijk consultsysteem in de huisartsen-
zorg in combinatie met de toename van het elektronische declaratieverkeer maakt een 
eerste analyse van het gedrag van zorgaanbieders betrekkelijk eenvoudig. Voor een die-
pere analyse zijn meer gegevens nodig. Daarbij gaat het vooral om patiëntkenmerken, 
morbiditeit, artsspecifieke kenmerken, omgevingsfactoren en (de methode van verzame-
ling van) de gebruikte data (NIVEL/RIVM 2004). Een derde methode is selectie op basis 
van de kennis en ervaringen van accountmanagers huisartsenzorg werkzaam bij de be-
treffende zorgverzekeraar. Deze hebben veelal enig zicht op de praktijkvoering door 
huisartsen in hun regionale werkgebied. 
 
Sturen 
Poortwachterschap is een voor de hand liggende combinatie met een financiële prikkel 
voor de kosten van vervolgzorg. Voor de Nederlandse huisarts is dit al bij wet geregeld. 
Andere sturingstechnieken die hier voor eerste experimenten worden voorgesteld hebben 
vooral een informerende en overtuigende werking, zoals het opstellen van praktijkprofie-
len en het stimuleren van het volgen van NHG-standaarden. Het gebruiken van de derde 
groep sturingstechnieken, namelijk sturing door regels en autoriteit wordt hier vooralsnog 
afgeraden. Deze lijken in de Nederlandse verhoudingen niet opportuun en passen niet bij 
de professionele, onafhankelijke status van de Nederlandse huisarts. 
 
Monitoren 
Het monitoren is om twee redenen een onmisbaar onderdeel van de experimenten. Ten 
eerste verkrijgt de zorgverzekeraar hiermee de noodzakelijke informatie over het gedrag 
van de deelnemende huisartsen of de uitkomst van de processen waaraan ze hebben bij-
gedragen. Ten tweede levert het monitoren feedbackinformatie op voor deelnemende 
huisartsen waardoor ze kunnen worden geïnformeerd over hun (relatieve) prestaties. Om 
goed te kunnen monitoren is een nauwkeurige, uniforme registratie van verrichtingen en 
declaraties essentieel. Dit vergt een uniform (gebruik van een) registratiesysteem en 
voorlichting aan deelnemende huisartsen. Het probleem van onderregistratie zal sinds de 
invoering van het gemengde honoreringssysteem (per 1 januari 2006) zijn verminderd 
voor declarabele verrichtingen, maar blijft een gevaar voor niet-declarabele verrichtin-
gen. 
 Betrouwbare monitoring vergt verschillende betrouwbare metingen. Dit verkleint de 
kans op gewenst gedrag op de punten waarop wordt gemeten. Daarnaast is uit onderzoek 
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gebleken dat de prestaties van een arts bij de behandeling van een bepaalde ziekte geen 
goede indicatie vormen voor de prestaties op andere delen van het vakgebied. 
 Belangrijk onderdeel van het monitoren betreft het meten van de effecten van het 
systeem van risicodeling op de kwaliteit van zorg. Er zullen tussen zorgverzekeraar en 
huisartsen(groep) nadere afspraken moeten worden gemaakt over de te hanteren indicato-
ren, zoals bij- en nascholing, openingstijden en bereikbaarheid, praktijkvoorzieningen, 
het volgen van standaarden en de gezondheidstoestand en tevredenheid van patiënten. 
 
Belangrijk aandachtspunt betreft de optimale combinatie van de verschillende managed-
caretechnieken. Met andere woorden, welke technieken zijn complementair en welke 
technieken zijn substitueerbaar? Het betreft dan vooral de vraag welke sturingstechnieken 
dienen te worden gekozen. We hebben immers beargumenteerd dat de drie fases uit de 
managed-carecyclus allemaal aan bod zouden moeten komen. Bij de selectie- en de mo-
nitoringsfase zijn er, in tegenstelling tot bij de sturingsfase, echter niet veel opties. Wel 
zou de keuze voor zelfselectie of voor selectie door de zorgverzekeraar een verschil kun-
nen maken. Bij zelfselectie betreft het naar verwachting vooral gemotiveerde huisartsen 
die zich kunnen vinden in de gestelde doelen van een systeem van risicodeling. De hypo-
these zou dan kunnen zijn dat bij zelfselectie sturende technieken (zoals allerlei vormen 
van protocollen, machtigingen of verplichte second opinions) minder nodig zijn dan bij 
selectie door de zorgverzekeraar. Dit hangt echter weer af van de opzet van het systeem 
van risicodeling. Een systeem zou ook tot antiselectie kunnen leiden: juist ondoelmatig 
werkende huisartsen worden aangetrokken, omdat er voor hen meer winst valt te behalen 
dan voor doelmatig werkende collega’s. Eerder is al gewezen op de logische combinatie 
van financiële prikkels voor vervolgzorg en het poortwachterschap. De combinatie van 
financiële prikkels en sterk sturende technieken ligt minder voor de hand. Bij financiële 
prikkels worden bepaalde keuzes voor de arts relatief aantrekkelijker gemaakt, terwijl bij 
bijvoorbeeld protocollen of machtigingen de keuzevrijheid juist sterk wordt ingeperkt of 
zelfs afwezig is. Daarnaast is er al op gewezen dat sterk sturende technieken in de Neder-
landse verhoudingen niet opportuun lijken en niet lijken te passen bij de professionele, 
onafhankelijke status van de Nederlandse huisarts. 
 
Financiële-risicodeling 
 
Bij het bonus-malus experiment in Tilburg en bij United Healthcare was sprake van een 
breed risicopakket. Belangrijk verschil was de mate waarin de huisartsen risico liepen. 
Dit verschil was vooral het gevolg van het feit dat in ‘Tilburg’ huisartsen voor tweederde 
van de praktijkpopulatie risico liepen, terwijl het bij United Healthcare slechts om zeer 
kleine aantallen patiënten ging. Bij de huidige Nederlandse marktverhoudingen zal al 
snel 50 procent van de praktijkpopulatie zijn verzekerd bij de regionale zorgverzekeraar. 
De omvang van de relevante praktijkpopulatie zou verder kunnen worden vergroot door 
een andere zorgverzekeraar bij het experiment te betrekken. Ook zou een deel van de 
overige patiënten in het experiment kunnen worden betrokken door de contracten met en 
de betalingen van de desbetreffende zorgverzekeraars via een tussenliggende organisatie 
te laten verlopen. 
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 In de praktijk zal het niet wenselijk zijn om solopraktijken te belasten met de financië-
le, organisatorische en personele lasten van een meer gecompliceerd systeem van finan-
ciële-risicodeling. Daarom is er juist bij deze variant voor gekozen het risicopakket in het 
experiment te beperken tot slecht één enkel onderdeel, namelijk geneesmiddelen. De 
keuze juist voor geneesmiddelen sluit ook aan bij de vele rapporten die er over het ge-
neesmiddelenbeleid zijn geschreven en waarin voorstellen zijn gedaan om financiële 
prikkels in te voeren gericht op een doelmatig voorschrijfbeleid door huisartsen (zie hier-
voor paragraaf 7.2.1). Voordeel is bovendien dat in het experiment kan worden gevolgd 
of het beperken tot geneesmiddelen bijvoorbeeld leidt tot een stijging van het aantal ver-
wijzingen naar het ziekenhuis. Verder maakt een keuze voor alleen geneesmiddelen het 
systeem eenvoudig en overzichtelijk. 
 Dat het meest complexe onderdeel van het experiment het vaststellen van een norm is 
op basis waarvan achteraf de bonus (en eventueel de malus) wordt vastgesteld, is wel 
gebleken uit de in hoofdstuk 7 beschreven ervaringen. In hoofdstuk 6 zijn verschillende 
manieren beschreven waarop middels kostengegevens tot een norm zou kunnen worden 
gekomen. Een norm op basis van historische kosten of op basis van gemiddelde kosten is 
de meest simpele methode om tot een norm te komen. Historische kosten hebben boven-
dien als voordeel dat invoering van risicodeling niet tot grote schommelingen leidt. Van-
wege de nadelen van deze methoden, zoals een oneerlijke verdeling van middelen over 
de huisartsen en het gevaar van risicoselectie, verdient het sterk de voorkeur om de norm 
te verfijnen op basis van verdeelkenmerken. Onderzocht zou moeten worden in hoeverre 
de verdeelkenmerken zoals die nu worden gebruikt voor de bepaling van normuitkerin-
gen voor zorgverzekeraars, ook kunnen worden gebruikt voor het vaststellen van de norm 
voor huisartsen. Het gaat hierbij om verdeelkenmerken als leeftijd, geslacht, woonplaats, 
aard van het inkomen, gebruik van bepaalde geneesmiddelen (via Farmaceutische Kosten 
Groepen of FKG’s) en specifieke aandoeningen (via Diagnose Kosten Groepen of 
DKG’s). Verdeelkenmerken die dan mogelijk in aanmerking komen voor de norm voor 
huisartsen zullen dan kenmerken dienen te zijn waarop huisartsen geen of moeilijk in-
vloed kunnen uitoefenen. Deze eis kan ertoe leiden dat een verdeelkenmerk dat wel 
wordt gebruikt in het normuitkeringensysteem niet of op een andere manier wordt ge-
bruikt voor het vaststellen van de norm voor huisartsen. Ook het omgekeerde is mogelijk. 
 Uit de in hoofdstuk 7 beschreven ervaringen is gebleken dat bepaalde geneesmiddelen 
van het risicopakket worden uitgesloten. Het gaat dan om zeer kostbare geneesmiddelen 
of geneesmiddelen voor patiënten met hoge zorgkosten. Interessante vraag voor een ex-
periment is of alleen de kosten van geneesmiddelen die door de huisarts zijn voorge-
schreven bepalend zijn, of dat ook de kosten van door specialisten geïnitieerde behande-
lingen dienen te worden meegenomen. Zie voor de overwegingen verder de discussie in 
paragraaf 7.2.3. 
 Het grote voordeel van een systeem van financiële-risicodeling voor huisartsen is dat 
zij delen in de besparingen door doelmatig voorschrijfgedrag; besparingen die anders 
volledig bij de zorgverzekeraar terechtkomen. Hoewel arbitrair, lijkt een bonus van 
maximaal 50% van de bespaarde kosten in beginsel een goed uitgangspunt. Huisartsen 
worden geprikkeld doordat ze hiermee substantieel delen in de eventuele besparingen. De 
prikkels zijn echter niet gemaximeerd teneinde ongewenst gedrag tegen te gaan. In de 
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experimenten is dit echter een percentage waarin zou kunnen worden gevarieerd. 
 Een andere vraag die in de experimenten aan de orde moet komen is of er een malus 
wordt gehanteerd. Verschillende overwegingen spelen hierbij een rol. Enerzijds vermin-
dert een malus de aantrekkelijkheid van deelname aan een systeem van risicodeling. 
Anderzijds is er door de combinatie van bonus en malus daadwerkelijk sprake van deling 
van de risico’s. Hier wordt voorgesteld om in de experimenten met een fictieve malus te 
werken. De eventuele malus wordt wel berekend en aan de desbetreffende artsen be-
kendgemaakt, maar leidt vooralsnog niet tot een daadwerkelijke korting of terugvorde-
ring. Uit de totale bevindingen van de experimenten moet vervolgens blijken waardoor 
de eventuele malussen zijn ontstaan, zoals door ondoelmatig gedrag van de desbetreffen-
de artsen, door foutief vastgestelde normen of door toeval. 
 Het risico kan verder worden beperkt door een ‘excess of loss per risk’. Hierdoor 
wordt voorkomen dat enkele patiënten met hoge kosten voor geneesmiddelen de hoogte 
van de bonus sterk negatief beïnvloeden. Aangezien is voorgesteld om de malus niet 
daadwerkelijk te verrekenen, zijn andere maatregelen, zoals een ‘stop loss’, niet nodig. 
De huisartsen maken ook geen deel uit van een risicopool. 
 De bonus wordt in dit model beschouwd als een vorm van extra inkomsten, waarbij 
het aan de huisarts is om te bepalen of deze als inkomen worden beschouwd of (gedeelte-
lijk) worden geïnvesteerd in de zorgverlening. 
 
Tabel 1. Bonussysteem solopraktijk 
 
Huisartsen Zelfstandig gevestigde huisartsen werkzaam in een solopraktijk. 
Risicopakket Door huisarts voorgeschreven geneesmiddelen. Nader vast te stellen 
geneesmiddelen of patiënten met te verwachten hoge kosten uitslui-
ten. Aandachtspunt: kosten van door specialisten geïnitieerde farma-
ceutische behandelingen. 
Omvang praktijkpopulatie Circa 50 procent van praktijkomvang (uitgaande van een normprak-
tijk circa 1.200 patiënten), eventueel te verhogen door (al dan niet 
via tussenliggende organisatie) verzekerden van andere zorgverzeke-
raars te betrekken. 
Norm Idealiter een norm vastgesteld op basis van verdeelkenmerken zoals 
leeftijd, geslacht, woonplaats, aard van het inkomen, FKG’s en/of 
DKG’s. Indien dit leidt tot grote verschuivingen, eventueel in de 
overgangsperiode gecombineerd met historische kosten. 
Bonussysteem Bonus van maximaal 50 procent van bespaarde kosten. Fictieve 
malus. 
Risico beperken ‘Excess of loss per risk’. Geen risicopool. 
Besteding bonus Beslissing huisarts: beschouwen als inkomen en/of investeren in de 
zorgverlening. 
 
Experimenteren met een bonussysteem voor groepspraktijken 
 
Een toenemend aantal huisartsen is werkzaam in een mono- of multidisciplinaire groeps-
praktijk. Dit biedt de mogelijkheid om een experiment op te zetten waarbij de zorgverze-
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keraar het risico niet deelt met de individuele huisartsen maar met de groepspraktijk. We 
laten hierbij in het midden of sprake is van een mono- of een multidisciplinaire groeps-
praktijk en zetten het experiment alleen op voor de in de groepspraktijk werkzame huis-
artsen. In het eerste experiment is de individuele huisarts contractspartij en is er geen 
sprake van een tussenliggende organisatie. In het tweede experiment contracteert de 
zorgverzekeraar de groepspraktijk. De groepspraktijk vormt daarmee een tussenliggende 
organisatie tussen de zorgverzekeraar en de individuele huisarts. Hoewel afhankelijk van 
eventuele afspraken daarover tussen zorgverzekeraar en tussenliggende organisatie, is het 
bij dergelijke modellen in principe de laatste die bepaalt hoe de relatie tussen de tussen-
liggende organisatie en individuele zorgaanbieder wordt vormgegeven. 
 Voor het experiment is het essentieel om vast te stellen wie de relatie tussen de tussen-
liggende organisatie en de individuele huisarts vormgeeft. Er zijn dan twee opties. De 
eerste optie is dat in het experiment alleen de relatie tussen zorgverzekeraar en groeps-
praktijk wordt vastgelegd. Het is dan aan de groepspraktijk om te bepalen hoe de afspra-
ken met de zorgverzekeraar worden vertaald in afspraken met de individuele huisartsen. 
In het experiment kan dan worden onderzocht hoe een groepspraktijk reageert op de met 
de zorgverzekeraar gemaakte afspraken en vervolgens wat het effect is van de afspraken 
tussen groepspraktijk en huisartsen op de zorg. Deze optie is vooral geschikt als de zorg-
verzekeraar slechts is geïnteresseerd in het overdragen van een deel van het risico. In het 
in hoofdstuk 4 opgestelde raamwerk gaan we er echter vanuit dat de zorgverzekeraar als 
agent van de verzekerde/patiënt optreedt en daarom invloed wil kunnen uitoefenen op de 
arts-patiëntrelatie. We hebben tevens gesteld dat deze invloed vooral via de arts zal 
plaatsvinden. Daarom wordt hier een andere optie voorgesteld, namelijk dat in het expe-
riment tevens wordt vastgelegd hoe de relatie tussen huisartsengroep en individuele huis-
artsen wordt vormgegeven. 
 
Selecteren 
Aangezien de groepspraktijk contractspartij is, gaat het bij dit experiment in de eerste 
plaats om de selectie van praktijken (en dus niet van individuele artsen) die aan het expe-
riment willen deelnemen. Ook hier geldt dat zelfselectie, het analyseren van declaratiege-
gevens en selectie op basis van de kennis en ervaringen van accountmanagers huisartsen-
zorg voor de hand liggen. Aangezien ook in groepspraktijken huisartsen vaak individueel 
declareren, zal de analyse van declaratiegegevens toch informatie over de individuele 
artsen opleveren. De selectie op groepsniveau kan dan toch worden beïnvloed door in-
formatie op individueel niveau. 
 Bij selectie door de zorgverzekeraar op groepsniveau zou de selectie van huisartsen op 
individueel niveau (de toetreding tot de groepspraktijk) aan de groep kunnen worden 
overgelaten. Gezien de agentschapsfunctie van de zorgverzekeraar ligt het echter wel 
voor de hand dat deze in het contract met de groepspraktijk nadere (kwaliteits)eisen aan 
de in de praktijk werkzame huisartsen stelt. De daadwerkelijke selectie vindt dan wel 
door de groep plaats. 
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Sturen 
De sturingstechnieken komen deels overeen met de technieken in het eerste experiment: 
poortwachterschap in combinatie met financiële prikkels gericht op de kosten van ver-
volgzorg, het opstellen van praktijkprofielen en het stimuleren van het volgen van NHG-
standaarden. Het gebruik door de zorgverzekeraar van de derde groep sturingstechnieken, 
namelijk sturing door regels en autoriteit, ligt ook hier om de eerder genoemde redenen 
niet voor de hand. 
 In de relatie tussen groep en individuele huisartsen kunnen afwijkende technieken 
worden gehanteerd. Zo is een punt van aandacht welk systeem voor de basishonorering 
wordt gebruikt. Zoals gesteld gaan we uit van de huidige gemengde honoreringsystema-
tiek van huisartsen, bestaande uit inschrijf-, consult- en moduletarieven. In sommige 
groepspraktijken werken echter ook huisartsen in loondienst. Mogelijk leidt een salaris in 
combinatie met een bepaalde vorm van risicodeling tot een ander effect dan de gemengde 
honorering in combinatie met dezelfde vorm van risicodeling. Daarnaast kunnen de na-
bijheid van collega’s en druk om bepaalde groepsnormen, nadere afspraken, protocollen 
of standaarden te respecteren van invloed zijn op het gedrag van de artsen. Bij dienstver-
band kan bovendien een gezagsrelatie aan de orde zijn. 
 
Monitoren 
Het monitoren kan zowel op groepsniveau als op individueel niveau plaatsvinden. Als 
huisartsen bijvoorbeeld individueel declareren, levert de analyse van declaratiegegevens 
informatie op individueel niveau. De zorgverzekeraar kan ook de contractpartij (zijnde de 
groepspraktijk) om nadere gegevens op individueel niveau vragen. Het aanleveren van 
deze gegevens kan wel degelijk in het belang van de artsen zijn, bijvoorbeeld indien deze 
gegevens nodig zijn om de bonussen te berekenen of indien ze informatie kunnen opleve-
ren over de relatieve prestaties van de artsen. 
 Verder geldt ook hier dat er tussen zorgverzekeraar en huisartsen(groep) nadere af-
spraken moeten worden gemaakt over de te hanteren indicatoren voor de kwaliteit van 
zorg. 
 
Financiële-risicodeling 
Omdat de opzet van het onderdeel financiële-risicodeling voor een deel overeenkomt met 
de opzet in het experiment voor solopraktijken, beperken we ons hier tot de verschillen. 
Een eerste verschil is dat in dit experiment de deelnemende huisartsen voor een breed 
risicopakket verantwoordelijk zijn, bestaande uit verwijzingen naar de fysiotherapeut, 
verwijzingen naar de polikliniek en de door de huisarts voorgeschreven geneesmiddelen. 
Nader vast te stellen zeer kostbare geneesmiddelen of geneesmiddelen voor patiënten met 
hoge zorgkosten worden uitgesloten, evenals spoedeisende hulp. Ook hier geldt als aan-
dachtspunt het al dan niet verantwoordelijk maken van de huisartsen voor de kosten van 
door specialisten geïnitieerde behandelingen. Belangrijke voordelen van een breed pakket 
zijn dat het risico over een breder deel van de zorg kan worden gedeeld, dat het integrale 
zorg en substitutie bevordert en dat het moeilijker wordt om zorg waarvoor de arts (deels) 
financiële verantwoordelijkheid draagt te vervangen door zorg waarvoor hij geen verant-
woordelijkheid draagt. Doordat het om groepspraktijken met verantwoordelijkheid voor 
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een breed risicopakket gaat, zou dit experiment op termijn kunnen uitgroeien tot een 
model van budgethouderschap (vergelijkbaar met GP Fundholding). Het experiment sluit 
bovendien aan bij het groeiende aantal groepspraktijken en bij de toekomstvisie van de 
beroepsgroep op huisartsenzorg. Ook sluit het aan bij ontwikkelingen in de eerstelijns-
zorg waarbij partijen integrale afspraken over een deel van de zorg willen maken (bij-
voorbeeld afspraken over ketenzorg). 
 
Tabel 2. Bonussysteem groepspraktijk 
 
Huisartsen Zelfstandig gevestigde huisartsen werkzaam in een groepspraktijk. 
Risicopakket Breed samengesteld, bestaande uit verwijzingen fysiotherapie, verwij-
zingen polikliniek, door huisarts voorgeschreven geneesmiddelen. 
Nader vast te stellen geneesmiddelen of patiënten met te verwachten 
hoge kosten uitsluiten, evenals spoedeisende hulp. Aandachtspunt: 
kosten van door specialisten geïnitieerde farmaceutische behandelin-
gen. 
Omvang praktijkpopulatie Circa 50 procent van de gezamenlijke praktijkomvang (uitgaande van 
een groepspraktijk met 10.000 patiënten circa 5.000 patiënten), even-
tueel te verhogen door (al dan niet via tussenliggende organisatie) 
verzekerden van andere zorgverzekeraars te betrekken. 
Norm Idealiter een norm vastgesteld op basis van verdeelkenmerken zoals 
leeftijd, geslacht, woonplaats, aard van het inkomen, FKG’s en/of 
DKG’s. Indien dit leidt tot grote verschuivingen, eventueel in de 
overgangsperiode gecombineerd met historische kosten. 
Bonussysteem Bonus van maximaal 50 procent van bespaarde kosten. In eerste 
instantie fictieve malus. In tweede instantie een malus van maximaal 
50 procent. 
Risico beperken ‘Excess of loss per risk’, later in combinatie met een ‘stop loss’. Een 
risicopool bestaande uit de drie tot vijf huisartsen in de groepspraktijk. 
Besteding bonus Investeren in de (kwaliteit van de) zorgverlening.  
 
Ook hier wordt in eerste instantie gewerkt met een fictieve malus. Nadat de aanlooppro-
blemen met het vaststellen van een norm zijn opgelost, wordt echter zo snel mogelijk 
overgestapt op een gecombineerde bonus/malus van maximaal 50 procent. De gecombi-
neerde bonus/malus is tevens de opstap naar een toekomstig systeem van budgethouder-
schap. Daarbij bedragen bonus en malus 100 procent tot een nader vast te stellen maxi-
mum (maximale winst en ‘stop loss’). 
 Vanwege de grotere financiële risico’s maken de huisartsen uit de groepspraktijk deel 
uit van een risicopool. De risico’s worden hiermee gespreid over de groep deelnemende 
huisartsen. Daarbij zou ervoor kunnen worden gekozen om de bonus of de (fictieve) 
malus op individueel niveau te berekenen, maar om de risico’s zoveel mogelijk te sprei-
den verdient berekening op groepsniveau de voorkeur. Een andere reden om bonus en 
malus op groepsniveau vast te stellen is dat in dit experiment ervoor is gekozen de beste-
ding van de bonus te beperken tot investeringen in de (kwaliteit van de) zorgverlening. 
Deze opzet is vergelijkbaar met die van GP Fundholding. De inkomensprikkel die uitgaat 
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van verantwoordelijkheid voor een breed risicopakket wordt hierdoor gedempt, hoewel 
ook investeringen in de zorgverlening indirect tot inkomensverbeteringen kunnen leiden 
(bijvoorbeeld doordat de praktijk aantrekkelijker wordt voor patiënten of via een produc-
tiestijging door investeringen in extra personeel). In een groepspraktijk kunnen investe-
ringen in de zorgverlening makkelijker gezamenlijk plaatsvinden dan in een samenwer-
kingsverband van solopraktijken (bijvoorbeeld door personeel, ruimte, inventaris en in-
strumentarium te delen). Daarnaast zullen discussies in de groep huisartsen over bijvoor-
beeld werkbelasting, praktijkstijl en inkomensverschillen worden beperkt. Enerzijds is 
het wenselijk dat financiële-risicodeling leidt tot dergelijke discussies, tot meer uniforme-
ring en reductie van praktijkvariatie. Anderzijds dienen ingewikkelde discussies over 
bijvoorbeeld de relatieve bijdragen van de huisartsen aan de besparingen niet verstorend 
te werken op de onderlinge verhoudingen. 
 
Op grond van de hier beschreven theoretische en empirische bevindingen menen we dat 
er goede redenen zijn om financiële-risicodeling tussen zorgverzekeraars en huisartsen 
ook in Nederland in te voeren. Nader econometrisch onderzoek en de bevindingen uit 
experimenten zullen moeten uitwijzen of invoering van financiële-risicodeling ook 
daadwerkelijk haalbaar en wenselijk is. 
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lijke omstandigheden een paar keer flink tegen gezeten, waardoor het bij het schrijven 
niet echt mee zat. Ook kwam het voor dat het persoonlijk erg mee zat (zoals bij het 
krijgen van mijn twee lieve kindjes), waardoor het bij het schrijven van het proefschrift 
juist weer tegen zat. Er was voor anderen waarschijnlijk geen peil op te trekken. 
 
Wynand van de Ven en Erik Schut bedank ik voor de geweldige begeleiding. Zoals dat 
hoort op het multidisciplinaire instituut Beleid en Management Gezondheidszorg, was 
de aanpak multidisciplinair. Economie, Engels, methodologie en psychologie zijn 
voorbeelden van disciplines die bij de begeleiding aan de orde kwamen. Beiden wisten 
altijd de tijd te vinden om in alle rust mee te denken, om mij te stimuleren en om mijn 
stukken tekst snel van waardevol commentaar te voorzien. Daarbij waren onze over-
leggen ook nog eens gezellig. Dat alles lijkt misschien vanzelfsprekend, maar ik heb 
genoeg andere verhalen gehoord om te weten dat een goede begeleiding helemaal niet 
vanzelfsprekend is. Ik heb het erg goed getroffen. 
 
Mijn ouders, Bert en Lottie van der Togt en Pien van der Togt bedank ik voor het feit 
dat ze mij indertijd hebben gestimuleerd om aio te worden, ook al dachten ze misschien 
dat het na een paar studies toch eigenlijk wel eens tijd werd voor een echte baan. Ik 
dank mijn familie en de familie Kloos voor de steun gedurende de afgelopen jaren en 
voor het feit dat ze nooit hebben gemopperd wanneer ik het weer eens liet afweten 
tijdens familiefestiviteiten. Van Eelkjen Kloos mocht ik bovendien een fragment van 
één van haar vele schilderijen gebruiken voor de voorkant van mijn boekje. Dank! 
 
Aan Frank Bakker en Werner Brouwer heb ik indertijd bij BMG twee erg leuke kamer-
genoten gehad. Ik ben blij dat Frank en Bert Vrijhoef als ervaringsdeskundige vrienden 
bereid waren om tijdens de promotie bij mij te staan en mij bij te staan. Eindelijk kun-
nen Bert en ik onze afspraak nakomen om na het afronden van onze beider proefschrif-
ten in de Alpen te gaan fietsen. Bert heeft daarvoor lang op mij moeten wachten. In de 
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afronden van mijn boekje viel deels samen met het maken van het Switch-boekje. 
Twee dingen tegelijk doen is niet mijn sterkste kant, maar kiezen ook niet. Ze bleef 
vrolijk en geduldig, ook wanneer ik niet meer wist hoe het verder moest. Marjolijn 
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